Damian Raffele v. Vca, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAMIAN RAFFELE, No. 22-55502
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:18-cv-01727-MAA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
VCA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
The Honorable Maria A. Audero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 18, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Damian Raffele (“Raffele”) appeals from a jury verdict
finding that his former employer, Veterinary Centers of America, Inc. (“VCA”),
(1) did not fail to accommodate his disability and (2) did not discriminate against
him. Raffele also appeals from the district court’s order striking his Rule 59
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Motion for a New Trial because of his failure to comply with Central District of
California Local Rule 7-3, which requires a conference with opposing counsel at
least seven days before the filing of such a motion. We review the jury verdict for
substantial evidence, Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 797 (9th
Cir. 2017), and we review the district court’s application of its local rules for abuse
of discretion.1 Miranda v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983).
For the reasons described below, we affirm both the jury verdict and the district
court’s order.
1. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to
accommodate Raffele when it refused to allow Raffele to work from home full
time. Substantial evidence review is deferential: We must affirm a verdict if there
is “evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings, even if contrary
findings are also possible.” Dunlap, 878 F.3d at 797.
Raffele argues that the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to accommodate
his disability is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Raffele could perform his
essential job functions with a reasonable accommodation. We disagree for two
reasons. First, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Raffele is
not entitled to any specific accommodation; VCA’s only obligation is to offer a
1
We review de novo whether a district court’s local rule conflicts with a federal
rule. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013).
2
reasonable accommodation. See Raine v. City of Burbank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1215,
1222 (2006). An accommodation is reasonable if it allows an employee to
“perform the essential functions of the job the employee holds.” Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 2, § 11065(p)(1)(B). The jury heard evidence that Raffele would not be able to
perform his essential job functions while working from home full time. Therefore,
the jury could have concluded that Raffele’s requested accommodation—working
from home—was not reasonable, but that other accommodations, such as those
offered by VCA, would enable Raffele to perform his essential job functions.
Second, an employer is not required to grant an accommodation if an
employee provides insufficient documentation to show the need for it.
Documentation can be insufficient if “the health care provider does not have the
expertise to confirm the applicant’s or employee’s disability or need for reasonable
accommodation, or other objective factors indicate that the information provided is
not credible or is fraudulent.” Id. § 11069(d)(5)(C). In such cases, “the employer
may require an employee to go to an appropriate health care provider of the
employer’s or other covered entity’s choice.” Id. The jury heard evidence that
VCA did not find Raffele’s medical certification credible, that VCA requested
Raffele undergo a medical evaluation by a VCA-selected physician, and that
Raffele never underwent that evaluation. Accordingly, the jury could have found
that VCA did not fail to accommodate Raffele because there was no valid medical
3
certification establishing that Raffele required accommodation.
2. Substantial evidence supports the jury verdict that VCA did not
discriminate against Raffele when the employment relationship ended because
VCA did not discharge him. Although Raffele argues that the fact of his discharge
is “undisputed,” the jury instructions did not define “discharge” and left to the jury
the question of whether Raffele’s separation was a discharge. The jury heard
evidence that VCA terminated Raffele’s position because it concluded he had
abandoned his job. The jury was empowered to conclude that a separation due to
abandonment does not constitute a discharge.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Raffele’s Rule 59
motion. The district court applied the local rules as written and explained its
reasons for doing so. See United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.
1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection
with the application of local rules.”). Further, Local Rule 7-3 does not conflict with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 because it conditions, but does not eliminate, a
party’s right to file a motion for a new trial. See Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722,
725 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, the district court’s decision did not violate Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)(2). The district court did not strike Raffele’s motion
because of a requirement of form; instead, the court referenced Raffele’s failure to
include a statement of compliance under Local Rule 7-4 to conclude that Raffele
4
did not comply with the substantive conference requirement of Local Rule 7-3.
AFFIRMED.
5