Jean-Pierre Ronet v. Stephen Morrison

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEAN-PIERRE RONET, No. 22-15942
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01677-DLR-MHB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STEPHEN MORRISON, Administrative
Service Manager, Arizona Department of
Public Safety, in his official and individual
capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Jean-Pierre Ronet appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims related to his
registration as a sex offender and his attempt to register to vote. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,
1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ronet’s claims against defendants
Morrison and Rubio because Ronet failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he
was not required to register as a sex offender or that he was denied any process that
was due. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (rejecting a
procedural due process argument where sex offender registration requirements
“turn[ed] on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has
already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest”); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process
is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
(citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Ronet’s claim against defendant Richer
because Ronet failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Richer had any personal
involvement in Ronet’s failure to receive a voter registration card or that Ronet
was denied a voter registration card as the result of a Maricopa County policy,
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practice, or custom. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(explaining that “in an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must
have played a part in the violation of federal law” (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (“A plaintiff must
allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally
involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”).
Because Ronet failed to make any argument in his opening brief regarding
the district court’s dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims, Ronet has waived
any challenge to the dismissal of these claims. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v.
Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “we cannot
manufacture arguments for appellant and . . . will not consider any claims that were
not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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