Alexander Stross v. Zillow, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEXANDER BAYONNE STROSS, No. 22-36000
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:21-cv-01489-RAJ-BAT
v.
ZILLOW, INC.; TRULIA, LLC, MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Alexander Stross appeals the dismissal of his claims against Zillow, Inc. and
Trulia, LLC1 for direct copyright infringement, vicarious infringement, and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Because Trulia is a subsidiary of Zillow and the differences between the two
entities are not at issue in this appeal, Defendants/Appellees are collectively
referred to as “Zillow.”
contributory infringement. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a
claim. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We
affirm.
Stross, an Austin-based real estate photographer, alleges that Zillow allowed
his photographs of homes in the Austin area to remain on display after the homes
were sold, violating the rules of the Austin/Central Texas Realty Information
Service (“ACTRIS”), the Austin Board of Realtors (“ABOR”), Texas Realtors, and
the National Association of Realtors. Stross alleges that Zillow either “accessed
the [photographs] through . . . a third party license with ACTRIS MLS (prior to
becoming a Texas broker), or as a participant/subscriber to ACTRIS MLS” after
becoming a broker. Then Zillow, “on [its] own initiative, instigated the long-term
reproduction and display of the Photographs on the Websites for purposes other
than marketing the properties depicted in the Photograph, and solely for [its] own
benefit.”
To prevail on a claim of direct copyright infringement, Stross must
demonstrate that Zillow “violate[d] at least one exclusive right granted to [Stross]
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013
(9th Cir. 2001). Stross must also establish causation, known as the “volitional-
conduct requirement.” VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 731 (9th Cir.
2019); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir.
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2017) (“Direct liability must be premised on conduct that can reasonably be
described as the direct cause of the infringement.” (cleaned up)).
Stross fails to plausibly plead volitional conduct here. He does not plausibly
allege that Zillow acquired and displayed the photographs at issue after Zillow
registered as a broker in Texas. According to his own allegations, Zillow did not
register as a broker in Texas until July 2021, but Stross took the photographs in
question and registered them between 2008 and 2014, and sent the takedown
notices to Zillow in April 2021 (and thus, presumably, found that the photos were
still displayed on Zillow prior to that date). To the extent Stross instead pleads that
Zillow acquired and displayed the photos through a third-party license before
registering as a broker, and is therefore liable, in Stross’s words, for “fail[ing] to
control the photographs on its system in conformance with the licensing
restrictions on those photographs imposed by the ABOR/ACTRIS rules,” that
argument is squarely foreclosed by VHT, Inc. v. Zillow. VHT, 918 F.3d at 733–34
(holding that Zillow did not “exercise[] control” over the photos at issue “beyond
the ‘general operation of [its website]’” (quoting Perfect 10, 847 F.3d at 670)).
Stross also brings claims for both vicarious infringement and contributory
infringement, which were dismissed by the district court for failure to plead an
underlying direct infringement by a third party, a requirement of any claim of
secondary infringement. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d
3
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). But Stross failed to argue in his briefing before us that
underlying direct infringement was plausibly pleaded here, thus waiving that issue.
See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The Court
of Appeals will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically
and distinctly argued in appellant’s opening brief.”).2
AFFIRMED.
2
Though Stross briefly argues that the district court erred in dismissing without
granting leave to amend, Stross has failed to proffer, either before this court or the
district court, any additional facts he would plead if given the opportunity to
amend. Accordingly, amendment would be futile. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008).
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