Mary Wickenkamp v. Andrew Strotman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 3 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MARY WICKENKAMP, No. 12-35724
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00624-MO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW STROTMAN; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Mary Wickenkamp appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her
action alleging illegal wiretapping, slander, and other federal and state law claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction, Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Wickenkamp’s action for lack of
personal jurisdiction because Wickenkamp failed to establish that Strotman, a
Nebraska resident, and Cline Williams, a Nebraska partnership, had the required
minimum contacts with Oregon such that the maintenance of her suit there would
not offend due process. See Or. R. Civ. P. 4 L; Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg
Machinery Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (Oregon’s
long-arm statute allows for jurisdiction over non-residents coextensive with due
process requirements); see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121-24 (2014)
(discussing “minimum contacts” necessary to create personal jurisdiction).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wickenkamp’s
motion for jurisdictional discovery where the facts pertinent to the question of
jurisdiction were not controverted. See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020 (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that district court’s refusal to permit
jurisdictional discovery “will not be reversed except upon the clearest showing that
denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining
litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
2 12-35724