Albert Yendes, Jr. v. Troy Ribail

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 05 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBERT E. YENDES, Jr.; FRANKLIN No. 11-56152
GARRETT, Jr.,
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01143-L-CAB
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM *
TROY RIBAIL, Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in his
individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 24, 2013 **
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Albert E. Yendes, Jr., and Franklin Garrett, Jr., appeal pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing their action brought under Bivens v. Six
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
alleging that FBI agents violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights while
investigating their operation of “assistance clinics” offering notarized residency
documents to Spanish-speaking immigrants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.
2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim alleging unlawful
seizure because plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that defendants lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (investigatory stops are permitted under the Fourth
Amendment “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot”).
Plaintiffs’ contentions that the district court erred in addressing qualified
immunity at this stage in the proceedings, applied incorrect standards in deciding
the motion to dismiss, and improperly considered matters outside the pleadings are
unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
2 11-56152
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 11-56152