Yvette Castaneda v. Margaret Burton-Cahill

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 4 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
YVETTE CASTANEDA, No. 13-15159
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01856-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MARGARET BURTON-CAHILL, in her
official capacity as Justice of the Peace,
AKA Meg Burton-Hall; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Yvette Castaneda appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims
arising from a state court proceeding related to her dog. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076,
1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Castaneda’s federal and state law
claims against defendants Burton-Cahill and Ore because they are entitled to
judicial immunity under federal and Arizona law. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges and those performing judge-like
functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their
official capacities.”); Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t., 690 P.2d 38, 40
(Ariz. 1984) (setting forth the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in Arizona);
Hernandez v. Maricopa County, 673 P.2d 341, 343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (justices
of the peace are entitled to judicial immunity). Moreover, Castaneda failed to
allege facts sufficient to show that Burton-Cahill and Ore acted in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction. See O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369-70 (9th
Cir. 1981) (discussing the distinction between acts taken “in clear absence of all
jurisdiction” and those taken merely “in excess of jurisdiction”); In re Alexander,
300 P.3d 536, 546 (Ariz. 2013) (“A judge loses [] immunity only when acting in a
non-judicial capacity or in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” ).
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The district court properly dismissed Castaneda’s federal claims against
defendant Hunter because Castaneda failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
Hunter acted under color of state law. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior
Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (private parties do not generally act
under color of state law for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes, and conclusory allegations
that a private party conspired with a state actor to deprive plaintiff of constitutional
rights are insufficient to state a claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Castaneda’s remaining state law claims against
Hunter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction once it has “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction”).
We reject as without merit Castaneda’s contention that the district court
prematurely dismissed Castaneda’s claims against Burton-Cahill and Hunter before
they were served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (court shall dismiss at any time if
it determines that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or
that the action seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune).
AFFIRMED.
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