Fred Peters v. Equifax Commerical Solutions

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 04 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRED J. PETERS; EAST WEST TRUCK No. 14-56637
AND REPAIR, a business entity,
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-05595-TJH-OP
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
EQUIFAX COMMERICAL
SOLUTIONS, a corporation,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and SINGLETON, Senior
District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
The facts and procedural posture of this case are known to the parties, and
we do not repeat them here. Appellant Equifax Commercial Solutions (“ECS”)
appeals the district court’s order remanding appellee Fred Peters’ case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). We affirm.
ECS argues that it was error for the district court to remand the case to state
court based on the insufficiency of ECS’s allegations regarding the amount in
controversy without first giving ECS an opportunity to respond with additional
evidence. In the alternative, ECS argues that the district court should not have
remanded the case because it possessed federal-question jurisdiction.
When removing a case based on diversity jurisdiction or the Class Action
Fairness Act, a defendant has the burden of proving, “by a preponderance of
evidence, that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
minimum” of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) or § 1332(d)(2), respectively. Rodriguez v.
AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013). ECS did not satisfy
this burden. Its notice of removal contained little more than conclusory assertions
regarding the amount in controversy. “[A] defendant seeking to remove an action
may not offer mere legal conclusions; it must allege the underlying facts
supporting each of the requirements for removal jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co.,
749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the district court could have asked
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for and considered additional jurisdictional evidence, no authority required it to do
so before remanding the case to state court.
Assuming that our jurisdiction under § 1453(c)(1) extends to ECS’s second
claim, we also conclude that the district court did not have federal-question
jurisdiction over this case. Peters’ complaint, as amended, pleaded only state-law
causes of action: a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and
common-law claims for defamation, false light, and trade libel. ER 79. State-law
causes of action “invoke[] federal-question jurisdiction only if [they] necessarily
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial.” Nevada v. Bank of
America Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 674 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). Although Peters’ complaint mentions the Fair Credit Reporting
Act several times, his UCL claim does not necessarily raise a federal issue or
depend upon federal law. “[M]ere references by way of example” to federal
statutes or regulations in a state-law cause of action “are not enough to confer
federal-question jurisdiction.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340
F.3d 1033, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not err in remanding this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Its remand order is therefore
AFFIRMED.
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