Ian Scott-Anderman v. Robert Martinez

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 9, 2022 Decided February 17, 2023
No. 22-7092
IAN SCOTT-ANDERMAN AND DAVID SUPPLEE,
APPELLANTS
v.
ROBERT MARTINEZ, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-02625)
Thomas H. Geoghegan, argued the cause for appellants Ian
Scott-Anderman and David Supplee. With him on brief were
Beatriz L. Annexy and Stephen C. Leckar.
Evan Hudson-Plush, argued the cause for appellees. With
him on brief were Jacob R. Karabell and Bruce R. Lerner.
Before: WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and RANDOLPH and
ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: Ian Scott-Anderman and
2
David Supplee – the former secretary-treasurer and president,
respectively, of a District Lodge of the International Association
of Machinists – appeal the district court’s denial of their motion
for a preliminary injunction. They sued the international union,
its president Robert Martinez, Jr., and its general secretary-
treasurer Dora Cervantes. The controversy concerns the
suspensions of Scott-Anderman and Supplee and the
international union’s imposition of a trusteeship on their District
Lodge.
Scott-Anderman ran for a position with the international
union. In her election campaign she alleged that Cervantes, her
opponent, had engaged in financial misconduct. She lost the
election and, a few days later, the international union notified
her and Supplee that it would soon audit their District Lodge.
The audit itself – a routine Fee Reduction Audit – disclosed
no issues. However, the auditor recommended (and Scott-
Anderman and Supplee agreed) that the District Lodge convert
to a different accounting program. During the conversion, the
auditor discovered financial improprieties.1 In light of these
findings, the international union approved the auditor’s request
to conduct a five-year comprehensive audit.
The auditor found more improprieties, including: improper
payments of thousands of dollars a month for unused phone
equipment and lines; $270,000 of union funds in a secret
account; missing unemployment withholding payments, which
jeopardized certain employee’s unemployment rights; violations
of federal reporting requirements; and more than $3,000 worth
of Starbucks gift cards in an unsecured cardboard box.
On January 25, 2022, the auditor temporarily suspended
Scott-Anderman and Supplee from their offices, pursuant to the
1
These included (1) failing to obtain requisite approval for
expenditures; (2) failing to provide the auditor with all phone bills; (3)
failing to keep “activity sheets”; (4) and failing to use original
signatures for checks.
3
international’s shortage policy and Article VII, Section 5 of the
international’s constitution. On January 26, 2022, the
international union canceled District Lodge officer elections
(which were ongoing at the time) and imposed a trusteeship2 on
the District Lodge for financial mismanagement, pursuant to
Article VI, section 8 of the international’s constitution.
Scott-Anderman and Supplee’s first amended complaint
alleged one count under Title I and five counts under Title III of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the
“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 412, 464. They sought equitable
relief along with compensatory and punitive damages. A month
after they filed their first amended complaint, they filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied
the motion. It held that Scott-Anderman and Supplee had not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits. It also held that the
other factors did not favor them.
Title I of the LMRDA provides a “Bill of Rights” to union
members that they may enforce in federal court. See Loc. No.
82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 536
(1984); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415. Union members are
granted equal rights, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1); freedom of speech
and assembly, id. § 411(a)(2); and other rights. If the union
member shows a violation of these rights, a court may award
“appropriate” relief. See id. § 412.
Title III of the LMRDA governs a union’s imposition of
trusteeships on subordinate bodies, such as district lodges. See
id. § 462. It provides an enforcement procedure for the
Secretary of Labor, a subordinate body of a labor organization,
or individual union members to bring a civil action to remove an
2
A “trusteeship” is defined in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act as “any receivership, trusteeship, or other method
of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the
autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its
constitution or bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 402(h).
4
unlawfully imposed trusteeship. See id. § 464(a); Hodgson v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
Title IV governs “the conduct of elections for union
officers.” See Crowley, 467 U.S. at 539; 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83.
For example, it fixes the terms of office, 29 U.S.C. § 481(a);
requires elections by secret ballot, id. § 481(a), (b); regulates
campaign literature, id. § 481(c); governs nominations and
eligibility of candidates, id. § 481(e); and so forth. Crowley,
467 U.S. at 539. At bottom, Title IV protects free and
democratic union elections. Id.Title IV requires a union member to exhaust his rights
within the union before he may file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor to enforce Title IV rights. See 29 U.S.C. §
482(a); Crowley, 467 U.S. at 539-40. The Secretary will then
investigate and bring a civil action if there is “probable cause”
to believe a violation has occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b); Crowley,
467 U.S. at 539-40. If the Secretary meets his requisite burden
of showing a violation, the court may void an election and order
a new one. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). Title IV states that this method
“for challenging an election already conducted shall be
exclusive.” 29 U.S.C. § 483.
Scott-Anderman and Supplee’s preliminary injunction
motion sought an order ending the trusteeship; reinstating them
“during the pendency of th[e] case”; and rescheduling canceled
officer elections “as appropriate.”
Their request under Title III to end the trusteeship is moot.
A case becomes moot when a party obtains the relief they
sought. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, the disputed
trusteeship has been lifted. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am.,
AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Post Off., 880 F.2d 1388, 1393 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Johnson v. Holway, 2005 WL 3307296, at *11 (D.D.C.
Dec. 6, 2005).
Furthermore, their request to reschedule canceled officer
5
elections is moot for the same reason. Elections were scheduled
for and occurred on November 29, 2022.3
The only remaining relief sought in Scott-Anderman and
Supplee’s preliminary injunction motion is their request for
reinstatement under Title I.4 Supplee’s request for reinstatement
is moot because his term in office has expired. E.g., UWM
Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2018).
Scott-Anderman’s request for reinstatement is not moot because
her term has not expired.
But we reject Scott-Anderman’s claim for another reason:
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a Title I claim
insofar as it seeks to void a completed union officer election.
This is so because of the interaction between Title I and Title
IV.5 As already discussed, a plaintiff proving a Title I claim is
entitled to “appropriate” relief. 29 U.S.C. § 412. The Supreme
Court has held that Title I relief invalidating an election of union
officers is not “appropriate” relief because it infringes on Title
IV’s exclusive remedial scheme for invalidating an officer
election. As the Court put it, if “the remedy sought is
invalidation of the election already being conducted with court
3
If the request for relief is characterized as a request to reschedule
a particular election, i.e., the one that had been canceled in January
2022, then the district court would be required to set aside the just-
completed officer election. For the reasons discussed below regarding
Title IV, the district court would not have jurisdiction to do so.
4
The reinstatement of a union officer is not available relief under
Title III. See Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 884 F.3d 48, 57 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted).
5
The defendants brought Title IV to the court’s attention at oral
argument in light of the November 29, 2022, election, held after
briefing had been completed. We gave both parties an opportunity to
address the Title IV issue in supplemental briefs.
6
supervision of a new election, then union members must utilize
the remedies provided by Title IV.” Crowley, 467 U.S. at 550;
see also Murray v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 719 F. App’x
5, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Simply put, if the plaintiff
disregards the procedures in Title IV and mounts only a Title I
claim seeking to overturn an officer election, the court has no
authority to grant relief. See Murray v. Amalgamated Transit
Union, 206 F. Supp. 3d 202, 210 (D.D.C.), amended in part, 220
F. Supp. 3d 72 (D.D.C. 2016), and aff’d, 719 F. App’x 5 (D.C.
Cir. 2018); see also Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 138-39,
141 (1964).
Granting Scott-Anderman’s request for reinstatement would
require the court to invalidate the results of the just-completed
November officer election. Scott-Anderman and Supplee
themselves state that they seek to “challeng[e] the legitimacy of
the election itself”; “reinstate Plaintiff Scott-Anderman to serve
the remainder of her term in office”; and “allow the District
Lodge itself . . . to conduct its own officer elections for the other
open positions.” Appellants Supplemental Br. at 2 (emphasis in
original). In other words, Scott-Anderman and Supplee seek to
invalidate an officer election. It is impossible to reinstate Scott-
Anderman as secretary-treasurer or allow the District Lodge to
elect new members to other positions unless the court
invalidates the officer election that just occurred. We therefore
reject Scott-Anderman’s Title I claim. E.g., Davis v. United
Auto. Workers of Am., 390 F.3d 908, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).6
Affirmed.
6
Scott-Anderman and Supplee, in their first amended complaint,
also sought money damages. That portion of their case is not
necessarily moot.