Overnite Trans Co v. NLRB

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 17, 1998 Decided April 7, 1998
No. 97-1387
Overnite Transportation Company,
Petitioner
v.
National Labor Relations Board,
Respondent
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 728
Intervenor
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
for Enforcement of an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
John N. Raudabaugh argued the cause for petitioner, with
whom Christopher A. Johlie and Kenneth F. Sparks were on
the briefs.
Jill A. Griffin, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,
argued the cause for respondent, with whom Linda Sher,
Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy
Associate General Counsel, and Frederick L. Cornnell, Jr.,
Supervisory Attorney, were on the brief.
James D. Fagan, Jr., and Robert S. Giolito were on the
brief for intervenor International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 728.
Before: Wald, Silberman and Rogers, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.
Wald, Circuit Judge: This dispute arose out of a union
election conducted at the Atlanta Service Center of Overnite
Transportation Company ("Overnite") on April 17, 1995, by
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board").
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 728 ("un-
ion") won the election by a wide margin. Nonetheless, Over-
nite refused to bargain with the union on the grounds that the
union had engaged in unlawful pre-election and election day
video and photographic surveillance of employees and unlaw-
ful electioneering, thereby destroying the conditions required
for a free and fair election. In Overnite's final appeal before
the Board, the Board granted the NLRB's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that the union was the properly
elected bargaining agent for employees at Overnite's Atlanta
facility and that Overnite violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") when it refused to
bargain with the union. Overnite filed a petition for review
with this court, arguing for a remand to the Board with
instructions to decide the case in light of its forthcoming
decision in two consolidated cases, Flamingo Hilton-Reno,
Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Randell Warehouse of Arizona,
Inc., Case No. 28-RC-5274, which Overnite claims address
issues substantially similar to the case at hand. Alternative-
ly, Overnite asks this court to deny enforcement of the
Board's order, thus permitting a new election. We hold that
the pre-election and election day videotaping and photograph-
ing of Overnite employees did not constitute unlawful surveil-
lance sufficient to invalidate the union election, that there was
no unlawful electioneering by the union, and that the Board
reasonably refused to delay certification of the union. Ac-
cordingly, we deny Overnite's petition for review and grant
the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Overnite points to four separate instances in which it
argues agents of the union engaged in impermissible conduct.
The first incident occurred approximately two weeks before
the election. John Blow, an Overnite employee, attended a
meeting at Local 728's union hall. Blow, who was pro-
company, testified that he saw Local 728's Secretary video-
taping employees as they left the union hall. See Transcript
at 377-79, 405-06 (May 9, 1996) (testimony of John Blow).
He also testified that no one explained why the Secretary was
videotaping the attendees. See id. at 378.
A second incident occurred on Tuesday, April 11. Employ-
ee Parker Roberts testified that Overnite President Jim
Douglas and Overnite Vice President Paul Heaton visited the
Atlanta Service Center. See Transcript at 466-67 (May 9,
1996) (testimony of Parker Roberts). During the visit, union
supporters took photographs of Douglas, Heaton, and em-
ployees with whom they spoke, including Roberts. See id. at
467. Roberts testified that he believed that the photographs
would be used to intimidate employees who supported the
company. See id. at 467-68.
A third incident occurred in the late afternoon and early
evening of Friday, April 14, 1995. Three employees testified
that when they arrived for work at the Atlanta facility, they
saw a crowd of union supporters gathered in the driveway
area, a few of whom were taking pictures and one of whom
was using a videocamera. That same day, several employees
gathered in the break room of Overnite's Atlanta facility to
discuss an upcoming union election. After a "heated argu-
ment," employee Dennis McConley, a member of the Union
Organizing Committee who had actively campaigned for the
union and who was later elected a union steward, left the
break room and returned with a video camera. McConley did
not explain the purpose of the videotaping, and there is no
evidence that anyone asked why he was videotaping. Two
pro-company employees, John Sibley and Tim Carter, left the
room soon after McConley entered with the videocamera
because they were concerned that the videotape would be
used to retaliate against them for taking an anti-Teamster
position. See Transcript at 273-79 (May 9, 1996) (testimony
of John Sibley); Transcript at 518-23 (May 9, 1996) (testimo-
ny of Tim Carter).
Finally, Overnite claims that on the day of the union
election, there was a crowd of about 100 union supporters,
including International Organizer Keith Maddox, Teamster
President Ron Carey, and the President of Local 728, gath-
ered in the facility's driveway area. See Brief of the Petition-
er at 13-14. Overnite charges that employees were subjected
to intimidation, coercion, surveillance, and electioneering by a
group of supporters who held a "raucous" rally within earshot
of the polling station and within sight of employees waiting to
vote. See id. at 14-15. Members of the pro-union crowd
were seen taking videos and photographs, while Maddox was
present. See id. at 16-17. At least one employee was
concerned that the union would use the video and photo-
graphs to retaliate against pro-company employees. See id.
at 17. At no time, Overnite argues, did the union provide an
explanation to employees for the videotaping and photogra-
phy. See id. at 18.
In the April 17, 1995 election, 136 employees voted for
union representation, and 100 voted against; there were only
four challenged ballots. See Tally of Ballots at Joint Appen-
dix ("J.A.") 6-7. Overnite filed 12 objections to the election.
See Employer's Objections to Conduct Affecting the Results
of the Election (April 22, 1995). The objections included
allegations that the union had engaged in unlawful surveil-
lance, coercion, intimidation, and harassment by videotaping
employees known to be company supporters in the break
room on April 14, 1995 (Objection 1), had engaged in similar
conduct on election day by photographing employees as they
entered and exited the company's premises (Objection 4), and
had engaged in unlawful electioneering within the no-
electioneering zone (Objection 5). See id. The Regional Director conducted an administrative investigation of the
objections pursuant to which he issued a Supplemental Deci-
sion and Certification of Representative overruling all of the
objections and certifying the union as the employees' collec-
tive-bargaining representative. Soon thereafter, Overnite
filed a request for review of the decision with the Board. By
order dated March 20, 1996, the Board remanded Objections
1, 4, and 5 for a hearing, but denied the request for review in
all other respects.
On May 31, 1996, the Hearing Officer issued his Report and
Recommendations on Objections, in which he found that the
objections were without merit and recommended that the
Board dismiss them and certify the election results. Overnite
filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Report. Nonethe-
less, on February 7, 1997, the Board adopted the Hearing
Officer's findings and recommendations and certified the un-
ion as the exclusive bargaining representative for Overnite's
Atlanta employees. Overnite filed a Motion for Reconsidera-
tion in light of the Board's pending consideration of two cases,
Flamingo Hilton-Reno, Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Randell
Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., Case No. 28-RC-5274 (June 12,
1996), in which it claimed the Board was expected to clarify
the standards for videotaping and photography during union
elections. The Board denied the motion on March 20, 1997.
By letter dated February 12, 1997, Overnite notified the
union that it would not recognize or bargain with it. See J.A.
122A. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging that the company's refusal to bargain violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ss 158(a)(1) and
(5). See J.A. 123. One month later, the Board issued a
complaint alleging that Overnite violated sections 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act. Overnite answered and the General Counsel
moved for summary judgment. On May 30, 1997, a three-
member panel of the Board issued its Decision and Order
concluding that Overnite's refusal to bargain with the union
violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Accordingly, it
ordered Overnite to bargain with the union upon request,
embody an understanding in a signed agreement, and post an
appropriate notice. See Overnite Transp. Co., 323 N.L.R.B.
No. 145 (May 30, 1997). Overnite filed its Petition for Review
of the Board's Decision and Order on June 10, 1997. The
Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order.
II. Discussion
A.The Board Reasonably Determined that Videotaping
and Photographing of Employees Did Not Constitute
Surveillance Sufficient to Invalidate the Election
Overnite claims that the bargaining order issued by the
Board should not be enforced because pre-election and elec-
tion day video and photographic surveillance destroyed the
conditions required for a free and fair election. Overnite
argues that the Board was incorrect to conclude that the
videotaping and photography by McConley and others was
not fairly attributable to the union. Accordingly, because
McConley and the others were union representatives, Over-
nite contends, the election must be set aside if their conduct
" 'reasonably tends to interfere with employees' free and
uncoerced choice in the election.' " See Brief of the Petition-
er at 29 (quoting Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 736,
736 (1988) (emphasis added by Petitioner)). Even if the
Board were correct to conclude that all but one of the videos
and photographs were taken by third parties, Overnite con-
tinues, the election should still be set aside because the
surveillance created " 'an atmosphere of fear and reprisal
such as to render a free expression of choice impossible.' "
Id. at 29-30 (quoting Millard Processing Serv., Inc., v.
NLRB, 2 F.3d 258, 261 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1092 (1994) (emphasis added by Petitioner)). The NLRB, in
turn, argues that the Board's finding that the videotaping and
photography was not attributable to the union (except for the
union meeting incident) was reasonable and supported by the
evidence and thus it was reasonable for the Board to apply
the less stringent third-party standard to evaluate the legality
of the election. The NLRB further says that the Board's
conclusion that the videotaping and photography by the third
parties (and in one instance by a union representative) did not
constitute surveillance sufficient to invalidate the election was
also reasonable and supported by the evidence. We affirm
the Board's decision.
1.Pro-union employees were third parties, not union
agents
We begin by resolving a threshold issue: whether those
who engaged in videotaping and photographing did so as
agents of the union or whether they were simply third
parties, albeit enthusiastic pro-union supporters. In consid-
ering claims of election misconduct, the Board and the courts
have long recognized a distinction between actions of a party
to the election and those of employees or other third parties.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Herbert Halperin Distributing Corp., 826
F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1987). This distinction is based on a
recognition that "[n]ot every employee who supports the
union or speaks in its favor is a union agent" and "neither the
union nor the employer can control everything these employ-
ees say or do." Id. at 291 (citations omitted). Where election
misconduct is attributable to one of the parties, the Board will
overturn the election if the misconduct "created such an
environment of tension and coercion ' "as to have had a
probable effect upon the employees' actions at the polls" ' and
to have ' "materially affected the results of the election." ' "
Swing Staging Inc. v. NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 861-62 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 424
F.2d 818, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)). Where
misconduct is attributable to third parties, however, the
Board will overturn an election only if the misconduct is "so
aggravated as to create a general atmosphere of fear and
reprisal rendering a free election impossible." Westwood
Horizons Hotel, 270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984).
In considering questions of agency under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), we turn to section 2(13) of the
Act, which provides as follows: "In determining whether any
person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of
whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized
or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C.
s 152(13) (1994). The Board applies ordinary common law
principles of agency in deciding issues of agency under sec-
tion 2(13). See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
NLRB, 56 F.3d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1158 (1996) ("the legislative history of that statute makes
clear that it was designed to render 'both employers and
labor organizations ... responsible for the acts of their
agents in accordance with the ordinary common law rules of
agency' ") (citations omitted); Local 1814, Int'l Longshore-
men's Ass'n v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 1384, 1394, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1072 (1984) ("Beyond doubt, the legislative intent of this
provision was to make the ordinary law of agency applicable
to the attribution of individual acts to both employers and
unions."); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 80-510 at 36 (1947),
reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1142 ("[B]oth employers
and labor organizations will be responsible for the acts of
their agents in accordance with the ordinary common law
rules of agency."). Thus, the Board must apply the common
law meaning of the terms "agency" and "apparent authority"
in determining whether the union will be held responsible for
the acts of one of its members.
Since Congress did not delegate to the Board the power to
interpret section 2(13) of the NLRA, the Board's determina-
tion of whether a particular actor is properly considered an
agent or was acting with apparent authority is granted only
limited deference. In other words, the court "need not defer
to the agency's judgment as we normally might under the
doctrine of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (1984)." 56 F.3d at 212. However, the standard
of review is not de novo. We have previously held that "the
existence of an agency relationship is a factual matter ...
which cannot be disturbed if supported by 'substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole.' " Local 1814,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 735 F.2d at 1394. Elsewhere, we
have explained that common law agency questions are " 'per-
meated at the fringes by conclusions drawn from the factual
setting of the particular industrial dispute,' " and therefore
"we must give due weight to the Board's judgment to the
extent that 'it made a choice between two fairly conflicting
views.' " International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 56 F.3d at
212 (citation omitted); see C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60
F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that in resolving issues
requiring reference to the common law of agency, the court
does not review the Board's determination de novo, but
instead will "uphold the Board if it can be said to have 'made
a choice between two fairly conflicting views' ") (citation
omitted). Read together, these cases stand for the proposi-
tion that we review the Board's agency law decisions to
determine whether its decision is reasonable, consistent with
its prior decisions, supported by substantial evidence, and
consistent with common law determinations on similar facts.
In doing so, we must bear in mind that "[t]ransplantation of
ordinary agency law, which arises out of ordinary contract
and tort disputes, into the NLRA context necessarily requires
sensitivity to the particular circumstances of industrial labor
relations." Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 735 F.2d
at 1394.
Both parties acknowledge that Dennis McConley and the
other union supporters' conduct was not expressly authorized
by the union. However, Overnite argues that they had
apparent authority to act on behalf of the union because
McConley was a member of the Union Organizing Committee
and campaigned aggressively for the union, McConley stood
on the podium with union officers during a union meeting,
McConley was in a photograph with the Union International
President placed on a union flyer, and at least some of the
"surveillance" took place in the presence of union officials.
"Apparent authority" exists where the principal engages in
conduct that "reasonably interpreted, causes the third person
to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on
his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency s 27 (1992). For there to be
apparent authority, however, the third party must not only
believe that the individual acts on behalf of the principal but,
in addition, "either the principal must intend to cause the
third person to believe that the agent is authorized to act for
him, or he should realize that his conduct is likely to create
such belief." Id. at cmt. a.
The fact that McConley and Reeves were members of the
Union Organizing Committee, alone, is not sufficient to confer
apparent authority on them. The Hearing Officer found that
the Union Organizing Committee was not a formally struc-
tured organization formed by the union; the Committee was
entirely voluntary and members were not paid. Although the
Hearing Officer found that International Organizer Keith
Maddox visited the Atlanta facility, there was no evidence
that he gave any specific directives to employees on the
Committee. In Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we said mere
membership in an in-plant organizing committee is not suffi-
cient, by itself, to make the actions of an individual attribut-
able to the union. See id. at 1565 (holding that members of
in-plant organizing committee, which supported the organiz-
ing campaign, drafted, endorsed and distributed leaflets, so-
licited employees to join the union, wore pro-union insignia,
and made visits to the homes of fellow employees to urge
them to support the union, were not agents of the union, in
part because "none of the IPOC members held official posi-
tions with the union, received formal training or instruction
from the union, or were paid by the union for their work on
the campaign"); see also Kux Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d
804 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding conduct of members of in-plant
organizing committee not attributable to union); Uniroyal
Technology Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding Board's determination that member of in-plant
organizing committee was not an agent of the union where he
did not have substantial union responsibilities); NLRB v.
Herbert Halperin Distributing Corp., 826 F.2d 287, 290-91
(4th Cir. 1987) (upholding Board's determination that employ-
ees were not agents of the union where the union's profes-
sional staff was heavily involved in the campaign and where
union did not rely primarily on employees to organize the
other workers). Overnite presented no evidence that the
union encouraged any belief among employees that McConley
had union allowance to engage in videotaping in the break
room. Nor was there evidence that the union ratified
McConley's videotaping activity by viewing or distributing it,
or by showing it to employees. Thus, while it may be the
case that several employees did in fact believe that McConley
acted on behalf of the union, the union cannot be held
responsible for McConley's conduct because it did nothing to
confer apparent authority upon him.
The same is true of the other union supporters who photo-
graphed and took videotapes of various Overnite employees.
The only evidence that Overnite offers in support of its case
for apparent authority is the fact that union officials were
present when these unidentified employees took photographs
and videotapes 1; in essence, Overnite argues that the union
__________
1 Overnite argues that it was entitled to inferences that the
unidentified employees were authorized or encouraged to engage in
surveillance by union officials and that the "surveillance" was
intended to be used for purposes of intimidation and retaliation
because the union failed to present testimony denying those propo-
sitions. We explained the adverse inference rule in International
Union (UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (1972) as follows:
The theory behind the rule is that, all other things being equal,
a party will of his own volition introduce the strongest evidence
available to prove his case. If evidence within the party's
control would in fact strengthen his case, he can be expected to
introduce it even if it is not subpoenaed. Conversely, if such
evidence is not introduced, it may be inferred that the evidence
is unfavorable to the party suppressing it.
Id. at 1338. Although the courts can reverse the Board for an
unexplained failure to draw the inference, see, e.g., NLRB v. Selwyn
Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 225 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Ford
Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1958), the decision
of whether to draw an adverse inference has generally been held to
be within the discretion of the fact finder. See, e.g., International
Union, 459 F.2d at 1339. Here, there was good reason for the
union to believe that Overnite had failed to meet its burden of proof,
therefore the decision of the Board not to draw an adverse infer-
ence against the union was rational and consistent with this court's
and the Board's previous decisions. See, e.g, id. at 1338 ("Of
course, if a party has good reason to believe his opponent has failed
officials should have realized that their failure to take action
to prevent pro-union employees from photographing and vid-
eotaping other employees would foster the belief the picture-
takers were authorized to act on behalf of the union. The
Hearing Officer said "no" to this proposition. Indeed, he
labeled the evidence "grossly insufficient" to support that
notion, noting that Overnite had "presented no evidence that
any of the union officials engaged in, condoned, or ratified any
of the conduct presented by testimonial evidence." J.A. 53
n.18. Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that the
Hearing Officer was right. The simple fact that a union
official stood nearby while a pro-union employee took pictures
is not enough to confer apparent authority on the employee,
particularly where there was no evidence that union officials
made or attempted to make use of the photographs or
videotapes or even viewed the tapes and photographs.
Evidence that the union supporters who participated in the
pro-union gathering outside the Atlanta facility on election
day had apparent authority to act on behalf of the union is
also lacking. Overnite claims that the union supporters
yelled loudly, leafleted individuals entering the voting place,
operated a large cookout, and engaged in excessive horn
blowing easily heard inside the polling place, as well as
photographed and videotaped employees around the election
facility. In support of its claim that these union supporters
were agents of the union Overnite offers the fact that several
union officials were present and observed these activities.
Overnite also claims that the election day gathering was a
"picket line," and that the union was therefore responsible for
keeping the gathering under control and can be held respon-
sible for the actions of those in attendance.2
__________
to meet his burden of proof, he may find no need to introduce his
strong evidence.") (citation omitted).
2 It is well-settled that when a union pickets an employer, it
empowers picketers to act on behalf of the union, see, e.g., Dairy
Employees, Local 695, 221 N.L.R.B. 647, 653 (1975), and that if the
union fails to control the line, it can be held responsible for those in
Again, however, this evidence is insufficient to show appar-
ent authority to act on behalf of the union. The mere
presence of union officials at a gathering is insufficient to
grant all participants apparent authority to act on behalf of
the union. Moreover, the gathering clearly was not a picket
line. Not every gathering arranged by the union can be
called a picket line; in order for there to be a picket line
there must be some evidence that the union organized a
picket line and exercised control over it. See, e.g., Dairy
Employees Local 695, 221 N.L.R.B. 647, 653 (1975) (holding
that picket line existed where pickers were paid by union and
received instructions from picket captains who attended daily
union meetings); Boilermakers Local 696, 196 N.L.R.B. 645,
646 (1972) (holding that picket line existed where union
assigned picket captains and individual pickets to shifts).
Here, there was no evidence that a union official directed the
activities of or assigned responsibilities to those who attended
the gathering and engaged in the complained of activity.
Faced with a somewhat parallel situation and similar argu-
ments, the Seventh Circuit recently held: "In our view, the
union's efforts to pump up the electorate and inspire enthusi-
asm for the union cause did not transform the assorted
supporters and revelers who spent all or part of the day in
front of Overnite's terminal into union agents. The union's
actions were notable not for their express direction of those
persons' actions, but for their passivity." Overnite Transp.
Co. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 109, 114 (7th Cir. 1997). Similarly,
here, the existence of the pro-union gathering outside the
polling place did not transform participants into agents of the
union.
2.The Board reasonably determined that third-party
misconduct did not create an atmosphere of fear and
reprisal
Concluding, then, that all but one of the union supporters
who engaged in the activity complained about were not union
agents but instead third parties, we turn to the second step of
the analysis: Was the misconduct nonetheless "so aggravated
__________
attendance, see, e.g., United Tel. Answering and Communications
Serv. Union, Local 780, 276 N.L.R.B. 507, 510 (1985).
as to create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal render-
ing a free election impossible?" Westwood Horizons Hotel,
270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984). We affirm the Board's negative
answer to that question.
The videotaping in the break room by McConley was
insufficient to create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal.
Although a few employees may have feared that the videotape
could be used to retaliate against them, there is no evidence
that McConley suggested any such use. Moreover, the Hear-
ing Officer found no evidence that information about the
break room incident was widely disseminated among employ-
ees at the Atlanta Service Center. Thus Overnite has not
demonstrated that the videotaping, without more, interfered
with employee free choice, and the Board's conclusion that it
was not sufficient grounds for overturning the union election
was entirely reasonable.
The other incidents of videotaping and photography of
Overnite employees by unidentified union supporters--con-
sidered both individually and cumulatively (as well as in
conjunction with the other misconduct alleged)--did not cre-
ate an atmosphere of fear and reprisal either. Only one
employee, Parker Roberts, asserted any concern that the
election day videotaping would be used to intimidate him, see
Transcript at 465-66 (May 9, 1996) (testimony of Parker
Roberts), and he admitted that he did not personally receive
any threats, see id. at 469. Here again there was no evidence
that any incidents of photography and videotaping were wide-
ly discussed by the employees at the facility or that other
employees felt intimidated. The election day gathering at
which the photography and videotaping took place was de-
scribed by Roberts himself as having a "sort of a party
attitude," id. at 489, and by another pro-company employee
as "friendly." Transcript at 428-29 (May 9, 1996) (testimony
of Albert Williams). Thus, the Board could reasonably con-
clude that the photography and videotaping by unidentified
pro-union employees on election day did not create an atmo-
sphere of fear and reprisal so as to render a free election
impossible. See, e.g., Nu Skin Int'l, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 223,
224-35 (1992) (finding no coercion when union agents photo-
graphed employees at union-sponsored picnic); Friendly Ice
Cream Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033, enforced, 503 F.2d
1396 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding photography by pro-union em-
ployees at a company dinner did not create an atmosphere of
fear and coercion rendering a free election impossible). The
Board could also reasonably conclude that the impact of the
election day conduct in conjunction with prior videotaping and
photography incidents was insufficient to warrant overturning
the election. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work-
ers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting
that the cumulative impact of allegedly objectionable conduct
" 'may not be used to turn a number of insubstantial objec-
tions to an election into serious challenge' ") (citation omit-
ted).
3.The Board reasonably determined that the union hall
videotaping by Local 728's Secretary did not material-
ly affect the results of the election
Both parties agree that Local 728's Secretary was a union
agent. In this one instance, therefore, the court must deter-
mine whether it was reasonable for the Board to conclude
that her actions did not "create[ ] such an environment of
tension and coercion ' "as to have had a probable effect upon
the employees' actions at the polls" ' and to have ' "materially
affected the results of the election." ' " Swing Staging Inc. v.
NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)). We hold that it was.
Although the videotaping may have made some employees
uncomfortable, the record does not support a finding that the
incident created such an environment of tension and coercion
as to have had a probable effect upon the employees' actions
at the polls or to have materially affected the results of the
election. The Board has previously found, in Nu-Skin Int'l,
Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 223 (1992), that it is permissible for the
union to take pictures of employees who voluntarily attend a
union-sponsored picnic. See id. at 224-25. Here, as in Nu-
Skin, the employees voluntarily attended the union meeting,
which was held off-premises. And, again as in Nu-Skin, no
evidence was presented that any threats of retaliation were
made in conjunction with the videotaping by any union official
at any time. Indeed, no individual or group of individuals
were ever singled out to be videotaped. Thus, we affirm the
Board's holding that the offsite incident of union videotaping
of employees who attended a union hall meeting did not rise
to the level of unlawful surveillance or misconduct sufficient
to set the election aside.
B.The Board Reasonably Found That There Was No Un-
lawful Electioneering
Overnite claims finally that there was unlawful electioneer-
ing by the union and its supporters in front of the voting
place on election day. Union supporters not only engaged in
surveillance of employees entering the polling center, but
they also held a "raucous" rally near the polling center, which
was attended by International Organizer Maddox, Teamsters
International President Carey, and the President of Local
728. According to the company, union supporters who ran
the gathering held a cookout, which Overnite estimates in-
cluded 100 employees at various points, and dispensed free
food and drink. The crowd engaged in constant "hooting and
hollering" and chanted slogans, and Teamster drivers from
other trucking companies honked their horns as they drove
by the gathering. The effect of this activity, Overnite argues,
was to destroy the "laboratory conditions," General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), that must be present on
election day to ensure a free and fair election. Therefore this
court should refuse to enforce the bargaining order issued by
the Board.
The Hearing Officer, however, found that Overnite "pre-
sented no evidence that any union supporter approached any
employee while that person was waiting in line to vote," or
that there was even "an established 'no-electioneering zone' at
the polling place." Hearing Officer's Report and Recommen-
dations on Objections (May 31, 1996) at 22. The Hearing
Officer also found that Overnite had presented no evidence of
any campaign rhetoric or appeals for votes from union sup-
porters as employees waited in line to vote. Finally, the
Hearing Officer found that the company had presented no
evidence that union officials encouraged the horn blowing by
Teamster truckers or that employees complained about it.
See id. at 22-23. Thus, the Hearing Officer concluded that
there was no unlawful electioneering, and the Board adopted
his findings. We affirm the Board's holding.
The Board does not prohibit all electioneering in the vicini-
ty of the polling place on election day. Indeed, the Board has
recognized that "it is unrealistic to expect parties or employ-
ees to refrain totally from any and all types of electioneering
in the vicinity of the polls." Boston Insulated Wire & Cable
Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 (1982), enforced, 703 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1983); see also NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy
Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the
Board permits legitimate 'electioneering' subject to specific
regulations"). Instead, the Board considers a range of fac-
tors and circumstances in determining whether electioneering
activity is sufficient to justify overturning an election. First,
it determines whether the activity violates the Milchem rule
prohibiting "prolonged conversations between representatives
of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast
ballots." Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968).
Here, that rule is not implicated at all because Overnite
presented no evidence that any union supporter approached
any employee while she was waiting in line to vote. More-
over, Milchem applies only to conduct by agents of the
parties to the election, see NLRB v. Hood Furniture Mfg.
Co., 941 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1991), and there was no
evidence indicating that the truckers who blew their horns
while passing the facility or the union supporters who chanted
slogans at the gathering were union agents clothed with
actual or apparent authority to act on behalf of the union.3
__________
3 This finding is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 109 (7th Cir. 1997), which
involved a fact situation almost identical to the case at hand.
There, the court affirmed the Board's conclusion that "the group
were [sic] nothing more than boisterous union supporters and
sympathizers." Id. at 114.
Where an employer objects to electioneering not encom-
passed within the Milchem rule, the Board will overturn the
election only if the electioneering " 'substantially impaired the
exercise of free choice.' " NLRB v. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc.,
823 F.2d 1135, 1140 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The
Board generally considers the nature and extent of the elec-
tioneering, whether it happened within a designated "no
electioneering" area, whether it was contrary to the instruc-
tions of the Board's election agent, whether a party to the
election objected to it, and whether a party to the election
engaged in it. See id. In the case at hand, Overnite has
failed to demonstrate that there was any designated "no
electioneering" area, that there were any instructions issued
by a Board agent, that any party objected to the activities of
the union supporters prior to or during the election, or that
the union was responsible for directing or participating in the
objectionable activity. Under these circumstances, it was
entirely reasonable for the Board to refuse to overturn the
results of the election.
C.The Board Reasonably Refused to Delay Certification of
the Union Pending Its Decisions in Flamingo Hilton-
Reno and Randell Warehouse
Overnite sought rehearing of the Board's decision in this
case based upon the pendency of the full Board's decision in
two forthcoming cases. A panel of the Board denied the
motion "as raising nothing not previously considered." Order
Denying Motion for Reconsideration (March 20, 1997). Over-
nite asks for a remand of this case to the Board for further
proceedings because the Hearing Officer and the Board relied
on case law that the Board has indicated may no longer be
valid. In particular, Overnite argues that this case should be
decided in light of the Board's forthcoming decisions in
the consolidated cases, Flamingo Hilton-Reno, Case No.
92-CA-14378, which involved videotaping employees for a
pro-company video to be shown to all the employees prior to a
union election, and Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., Case
No. 28-RC-5274, which involved photography of employees
by union officials for use in campaign propaganda. Overnite
points to Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354,
1363 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as support that this court should
remand cases to the Board when the Board has failed to
provide "some clear guidelines" regarding the critical issues
in the case.
The NLRB contends that the Board's denial of the motion
for reconsideration was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.
The issues in this case, it claims, are substantially different
from the issues presented in Flamingo Hilton-Reno and
Randell Warehouse. In those two cases, the NLRB explains,
the parties to the election were responsible for the videotap-
ing and photographing of employees. Here, however, all but
one of the incidents of videotaping and photography were not
attributable to the union but instead to third-party union
supporters. Contrary to Overnite's assertion that the legal
standards in this area are unclear, the NLRB claims that the
standard for assessing the legality of third-party conduct has
been both clear and consistent. Moreover, the NLRB claims
that Overnite's reliance on Allegheny Ludlum is misplaced
because that case involved videotaping and photography by
an employer, not a third party.
We affirm the Board's decision because the pending cases
involve issues that are substantially different from those
posed by the case at hand. On June 12, 1996, the Board
issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling oral argument in
Flamingo Hilton-Reno and Randell Warehouse for August 7,
1996, and directing the parties to prepare to argue five
questions, including: "What standard should the Board apply
to determine whether photographing or videotaping of em-
ployees is an unfair labor practice or objectionable conduct?";
"What weight, if any, should the Board give to evidence that
the purpose of the photographing or videotaping was ex-
plained to employees?"; and "Are there other factors that the
Board should consider in determining whether photographing
or videotaping is coercive and/or objectionable conduct?"
Notice of Hearing, Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Case No.
28-RC-5274 (June 12, 1996) (quoted in Brief of the Petitioner
at 23). Although the questions, read broadly, could overlap
with the issues presented in this case, it appears to us that
the context in which the issues will be examined is quite
different. The pending cases involve incidents of surveillance
attributable to a party to the election, not to third parties.
With one limited exception, the case at hand involves conduct
by third parties. Moreover, the pending cases center on
whether use of videotape and photography in campaign litera-
ture is an unfair labor practice or constitutes objectionable
conduct and on the tension between protecting the free
speech interests of the parties and providing a free and fair
election. These issues are not directly implicated in this case,
and therefore their resolution is unlikely to have much if any
effect on the outcome. In addition, the single incidence of
videotaping by the union of workers who voluntarily attended
a union meeting was so clearly insufficient to warrant over-
turning the election that it is unnecessary to await the
Board's decision in the pending case. Thus, the Board was
well within its province in concluding that Overnite's motion
for reconsideration raises "nothing not previously considered"
and therefore lacked merit. Order Denying Motion for Re-
consideration.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Overnite engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of sections 8(a)(1)
and (5) when it refused to bargain with the union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Overnite's
employees. We therefore deny Overnite's petition for review
and grant the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.
So ordered.