DocketNumber: No. 7661
Citation Numbers: 119 F.2d 6
Judges: Groner
Filed Date: 2/17/1941
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/23/2022
Suit was begun in the court below by First National Steamship Company and others against United States Shipping Board, United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation (formerly Emergency Fleet Corporation), Daniel C. Roper, as Secretary of Commerce, and United States Maritime Commission, for damages in excess of $300,000 and interest, representing the balance of deposits made in 1920 by the plaintiffs under a contract between them and “the United States Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation”, providing for repayment under conditions which had subsequently occurred. All defendants moved to dismiss, on the ground the court lacked jurisdiction of the defendants and of the subject matter. Thereafter the court granted the motion as to the United States Shipping Board, Secretary Roper, and the United States Maritime Commission, but denied it as to the Fleet Corporation. Subsequently Fleet Corporation filed a motion to dismiss and to strike and for a bill of particulars, which was overruled, and we allowed a special appeal.
The single question for our decision is this — whether Sec. 203 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 29, 1936,
Section 907, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1246, made the act effective thirty days after a majority of the Maritime Commissioners had taken office.
This proceeding was begun some two years after the passage of the act. Plaintiffs contend that Fleet Corporation has never been dissolved and that the purpose
The history and status of the Shipping Board and Fleet Corporation have been described again and again over the last quarter of a century in 'Such a variety of cases that no more than a brief outline is necessary here. By the Shipping Act of 1916,
Here the complaint shows that at some time in 1920 it was agreed between the Board and the Fleet Corporation that plaintiffs would operate, as manager-agents, three vessels owned by the United States; that the vessels were delivered and operated and an accounting duly made of earnings and expenses; and as a part of the contract that plaintiffs deposited sums in excess of $500,000 in money, which under the agreement was to be applied to the purchase price of the vessels if they should be sold and bought by plaintiffs and, if not, should be returned to plaintiffs; that the Board or the corporation subsequently insisted upon a written contract, which plaintiffs were unwilling to sign, and the Board thereupon withdrew the vessels and refused either to return the deposit or to pay certain additional sums due to plaintiffs as managing agents. To recover, these sums, suit was brought against the corporation. Assuming the verity of the statements of the complaint, enough appears perhaps to make a case if the corporation is now suable. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation v. Harwood, 281 U.S. 519, 50 S.Ct. 372, 74 L.Ed. 1011, and cases cited there.
It is not contended or argued that Congress is lacking in the power to abolish the corporation, notwithstanding it used the statutes of the District of Columbia in its creation. The case in this respect is much like that of the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Sioux City, Iowa, in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784. The question there was whether Congress had endowed that corporation with the government’s immunity. It was conceded Congress had the right to do so, and the only question was — had it done so ? The sudden dissolution of the corporation is similar to giving it such immunity. The same question in the present case need not, we think, be traced to a general policy, for the conditions under which the Fleet Corporation was created arose out of an emergency, and the congressional intention is apparent that its life should not be prolonged beyond the probable continuation of the emergency. It was, therefore, declared in the beginning that its functions should cease five years after the termination of the war. In line with this purpose, Congress in 1920 authorized the Board to take over all of its property and left the corporation as a shell for convenience as an agency of the Board in winding up its war projects and activities. The Board thereafter was required to assume and carry out all contracts or agreements previously made, and the statute permitted dissatisfied persons to stie the United States.
It is hard to think of language more definite in meaning. The provisions of the whole act show an unmistakable intent to adopt a new instrumentality to accomplish the new purposes, and in our opinion it is impossible to construe the words in any other manner than as revoking and annulling the charter of Fleet Corporation and ending its existence without regard to the ordinary machinery for dissolution under the District of Columbia laws. In fact, the original Merchant Marine Act of 1916 indicates that its dissolution was to be independent of these laws. The'D.C.Code of 1901, then and now in effect, provided in Sections 768-797, D.C.Code 1929, T. 5, §§ 391-419, for dissolution of all corporations by judicial proceedings accompanied by a receivership. By Section 772, the District Court was authorized to enter a decree of dissolution, and Section 785 expressly prolonged the capacity of “such dissolved corporation” to be sued on accrued causes of action. Section 11 of the Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C.A. § 810, authorizing the incorporation of Fleet Corporation, however, expressly stated that the corporation “shall * * * stand dissolved” five years after the war, and provided for liquidation of its affairs by the Shipping Board. The corporate life was later extended, but nothing in subsequent legislation indicates an intent that dissolution would be conducted under the laws of the District of Columbia, as ap-pellees contend. As noted below, the Act of 1936 also provides a complete method for liquidation of the corporation’s debts aside from the ordinary machinery.
Nor is there anything in this action of Congress which violates any of plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment. The statute provides that “all existing contractual obligations of the dissolved corporation shall be assumed by the United States”. The effect of this, of course, is to substitute the United States in the place
We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act of 1936 not only dissolved the Fleet Corporation and was an express withdrawal of consent by the United States that suit might be thereafter brought against that dissolved corporation, but also furnished an exclusive forum, the Court of Claims,
Reversed and remanded, with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
D.C.Code, Tit. 18, § 26.
49 Stat. 1985, 1987, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1113.
D.C.Code, Tit. 5, Ch. 13, §§ 391-408.
39 Stat. 728, 46 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258 U.S. 549, 42 S.Ct. 386, 66 L.Ed. 762; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 6, 48 S.Ct. 12, 72 L.Ed. 131.
United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 41 S.Ct. 165, 65 L.Ed. 368.
Panama Railroad Co. v. Curran, 5 Cir., 256 F. 768.
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, supra.
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, supra.
Urgent Deficiencies Act, June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. at 183.
Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 41 Stat. 988, 46 U.S.C.A. § 861 et seq.
Ibid., 46 U.S.C.A. § 871.
44 Stat. 1083, 46 U.S.C.A. § 810a.
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125, 58 S.Ct. 125, 127, 82 L.Ed. 147.
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, supra, Sec. 2 (c), 46 U.S.C.A. § 862 (c).
Sec. 204 (a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1114(a).
Sec. 203, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1113.
41 Stat. 525, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq.
Johnson v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320, 50 S.Ct. 118, 74 L.Ed. 451.
Tucker Act (Claims), Mch. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 (20), 250, 251, etc.