DocketNumber: Civil Action No. 17–1257 (JEB)
Citation Numbers: 284 F. Supp. 3d 14
Judges: Boasberg
Filed Date: 1/4/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
Pro se Plaintiff Christine M. Mills, a long-time employee of the Library of Congress's Collection Access, Loan Management (CALM) Division, brings this suit alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. She principally claims that the Library passed her up for a promotion on the basis of her race, national origin, color, and sex, and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Librarian Carla Hayden now moves to dismiss on two grounds. First, she argues that Plaintiff's entire suit is time-barred; second, she alternatively asserts that Mills failed to properly exhaust her national-origin claim. Disagreeing on both scores, the Court must deny the Motion.
I. Background
According to her Complaint, which the Court must presume true at this stage, Mills is a 34-year veteran of the (somewhat inaptly named) CALM Division. See Compl. at 5. Starting in 2007, she repeatedly applied for-and was denied-promotions, watching the Library fill each position with employees from outside the Division. Id. at 4-5. Finally, in 2016, she sought one of two open positions as a Reference Library Technician within CALM, but the Library once again tapped out-of-house employees for the slots. Id. at 5.
Apparently reaching a tipping point after having been denied at least eight positions in ten years, Mills filed an informal complaint with the Library on June 16, 2017, attributing her non-selection to her race, sex, and age, and to retaliation. See Compl., Exh. A (Informal Complaint). Shortly thereafter, she followed up with a formal complaint along the same lines, tacking on color and national origin as additional bases for the alleged discrimination. See MTD, Exh. 3 (EEO Complaint).
*17After an investigation, the Designee of the Chief of the Library's Equal Employment Office/Diversity Program (EEO/DP) issued a Decision Letter, dated February 3, 2017, finding insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff's claims. See MTD, Exh. 1 (Decision Letter) at 1, 8. Consistent with the Library of Congress's internal regulations, the letter advised Mills that she would have five workdays after receipt to request reconsideration or fifteen workdays to request a hearing or a Final Agency Decision without a hearing. Id. at 8 (citing LCR 2010-3.1 § 10). Finally, it alerted her: "If you do not timely seek a hearing or Final Decision from the Librarian without a hearing, this decision shall constitute the Library's Final Agency Decision." Id. at 8.
Plaintiff failed to meet either deadline. Her request for reconsideration came due on February 10, but she waited until February 24 to ask for an extension. See Compl., Exh. B at 1. The agency declined to excuse the delay, informing her as much on two separate occasions. Id. at 2, 4. Likewise, Mills needed to request a hearing (or a Final Decision without a hearing) by February 27 but took no such action until March 21. Id. at 5. Once again, the agency denied her request as untimely. Id. at 7. She ultimately brought this suit on June 27. See ECF No. 1.
II. Legal Standard
The Librarian first argues that Plaintiff's suit is untimely and the Court should thus dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That Rule provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court "may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School,
Even at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, a Court can review "documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint," or "documents upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss." Ward v. D.C. Dep't of Youth Rehab. Servs.,
Defendant alternatively moves to dismiss at least one of Plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). To survive such a motion, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her claims. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
III. Analysis
The Librarian maintains that because Plaintiff failed to timely file suit, this case must be dismissed. At a minimum, she contends that the Court should toss Mills's national-origin claim for failure to exhaust. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Statute of Limitations
Under Title VII, employees must commence their action in district court "[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final action" taken by the relevant agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). That deadline is "strictly enforced," Horsey v. Harris,
So when did the clock start ticking in this case? At first blush, the answer might seem to be February 27. Plaintiff received a written decision on February 3, along with notice that the decision would become final absent timely action on her part. See Decision Letter at 1, 8; Compl., Exh. B at 7 ("The EEO/DP notified you of the Chief's decision on February 3, 2017."). Plaintiff let the due dates for action slide by, missing both the February 10 deadline to request reconsideration and the February 27 deadline to seek a hearing. See Compl., Exh. B at 1, 5. As such, the Decision Letter became the agency's final decision by the latter date-the last day Plaintiff might have challenged the letter. See Continental Resources v. Jewell,
But, as an old aphorism teaches, appearances can be deceiving. While Mills does not seriously dispute this timeline, she pleads that she did not "receive[ ] a notice of her right to sue" until May 10. See Compl. at 2 (emphasis added). As recent *19D.C. Circuit precedent makes clear, an agency action cannot "trip the ninety-day filing limit" without providing a litigant "notice of [her] rights to further review." Al-Saffy v. Vilsack,
Although Title VII conditions the start of the ninety-day time limit for filing suit on the employee's "receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit[,]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), the Court of Appeals has held "that notice of final agency action alone does not start that ninety-day clock running." Al-Saffy,
The Decision Letter is thus not up to the mark. True, it warned Mills: "If you do not timely seek a hearing or a Final Agency Decision from the Library without a hearing, this decision shall constitute the Library's Final Agency Decision." Decision Letter at 8. But the letter references her right to file a civil action only once: if the Library had "not issued a Final Agency Decision on [her] complaint of discrimination within one hundred and eighty (180) days."
Al-Saffy leaves no doubt that this deficiency "alone bars application of the ninety-day limitation period."
"Because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation," the Decision Letter "did not trigger the ninety-day deadline." Al-Saffy,
*20B. Failure to Exhaust
Although Mills's Complaint contains other fairly notable deficiencies-e.g. , insufficient allegations for hostile work environment and no mention of exhaustion of other, pre-2016 adverse actions-the government attacks only Plaintiff's national-origin claim by asserting failure to exhaust. To bring a civil action under Title VII, an employee must first timely file an administrative claim with the employing agency (here, the Library of Congress) and exhaust all internal remedies. See Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin.,
Defendant nevertheless takes issue with this latter charge because the EEO Complaint repeats the same basis-"African American"-for her national-origin claim as for her race claim. See MTD at 9. She believes, as a result, that Plaintiff never "state[d] a national origin claim separate from her race claim prior to the Final Agency Decision," and has thus failed to exhaust that charge. Id. at 11.
This argument finds no traction. It is true that courts in this district have sometimes treated race and national-origin discrimination as "two separate claims," both of which must be exhausted at the EEO stage. See Nyunt v. Tomlinson,
That this charge might overlap with her race one is of no moment. National origin relates to "the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc.,
*21But because [she] is African-American, she not only can support her race claim, but also can support her national origin claim." Brown,
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies and that her suit is timely. It will therefore deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and issue a contemporaneous Order so stating this day.