DocketNumber: Civil Action No. 17–0372 (ESH)
Citation Numbers: 292 F. Supp. 3d 496
Filed Date: 2/12/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/17/2022
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge *498Plaintiff Antoinette Hudson sued defendant Harris Teeter, LLC, based on an incident in May 2015, when Hudson alleges that she slipped, fell, and sustained injuries as a result of applesauce left on the supermarket floor. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 12, ECF No. 1-1.) Harris Teeter has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts are legally insufficient to support Hudson's negligence claim. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 24 ("Mot.").) Upon consideration of the pleadings and the record before it, the Court concludes that Hudson has failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists and thus grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTS
On May 26, 2015, plaintiff Antoinette Hudson and her work supervisor, Boyle Stuckey, went together to a Harris Teeter supermarket in northeast Washington, D.C., to buy lunch. (Pl.'s Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 2, ECF No. 25 ("Opp."); see Mot. ¶ 1.) Hudson and Stuckey were talking and walking from the dairy section to the front of the store when Hudson "slipped on applesauce that was on the floor, and attempting to brace herself struck her left shoulder and head on a display of mayonnaise jars before finally falling on her right hip." (Opp. at 2 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 41-46, ECF No. 25-1); see Mot. ¶ 2.) No Harris Teeter representative was nearby, so Stuckey "left to get the manager, Charles Magaraci." (Opp. at 2 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 2, at 18, ECF No. 25-2).) Hudson told Magaraci that "she had hurt her hip and felt dizzy." (Id. at 3 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 49-50).) She then left the Harris Teeter with Stuckey and returned to work, but she soon left and "drove herself to an urgent care center for treatment." (Id. (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 54-56).)
Neither Hudson nor Stuckey saw the applesauce before Hudson fell, nor do they know when or how the applesauce came to be on the floor. (Mot. ¶¶ 3-5; Opp. ¶¶ 3-6.) Hudson and Stuckey also do not know whether anyone from Harris Teeter knew the applesauce was on the floor. (Mot. ¶¶ 7-8; Opp. ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 50; Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 19).) Hudson adds that she and Stuckey testified in their depositions that they saw someone stocking wine near where she fell, that Hudson "remembers the unknown wine stocker as the person who cleaned up the mess," and that Stuckey "believed the Harris Teeter Manager [Magaraci] actually instructed the wine stocker to do so." (Opp. ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 50-51; Pl.'s Ex. 2, at 19).)
It is also undisputed that Harris Teeter uses a " 'Gleason System' for tracking store inspections," and that the Gleason Report for the day in question indicates that "checks were made every hour and that the area of the fall was marked 'clear.' " (Opp. ¶ 10 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 5, ECF No. 25-5); Def.'s Reply Mot. Summ. J. at 2, ECF No. 26 ("Reply").)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on January 23, 2017. (Compl. at 3.) Harris Teeter filed a notice of removal and an answer to the complaint on March 2, 2017. (ECF No. 1; Answer, ECF No. 2.) After discovery, on December 6, 2017, Harris Teeter moved for summary judgment. (Mot., ECF No. 24.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[T]he plain language of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, *499against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ,
ANALYSIS
In its motion for summary judgment, Harris Teeter argues that Hudson has failed to present the evidence necessary to make out an essential element of her legal claim for negligence. (Mot. at 6-9.) Hudson argues in response that she has either presented the necessary evidence, or that defendant's evidence is unreliable. (Opp. at 5-7.) The Court finds that Hudson has not met her burden.
"To succeed in a negligence action under District of Columbia law, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury." Martin v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp. ,
Notice is a question ordinarily left for the jury, but where there is no testimony about how a "substance came to be on the floor or how long it had been there, or that any employee of [defendant] knew of its existence," the court may properly decide the case as a matter of law "because of [the] failure to present prima facie proof of liability." Anderson ,
Harris Teeter argues that Hudson has failed to present evidence that Harris Teeter had notice of the applesauce on the floor. (Mot. at 7-8.) As to actual notice, Hudson responds that "Stuckey testified that he seemed to remember the wine stocker stating that he had 'told them [Harris Teeter] about it [the dangerous condition]' prior to [ ] Hudson's fall." (Opp. at 5 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 2, at 38).)
First, Hudson's actual notice argument is flawed since Hudson admits that she does not know whether any "official Harris Teeter employee knew of the alleged applesauce." (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Even without this concession, however, her argument is doomed because Stuckey's testimony is equivocal, based on a vague memory, and thus cannot be credited. See Martin ,
*501Second, Hudson's constructive notice argument is equally flawed. After admitting that she has no evidence to show how long the applesauce was on the floor and admitting that neither she nor Stuckey could "say with certainty whether an official Harris Teeter employee knew of the alleged applesauce," (Opp. ¶¶ 7-8), Hudson argues that it is enough to show that defendant's system for recording spills and maintaining safe conditions is inadequate. (Opp. at 6.) There is no evidentiary support for the claim that Harris Teeter's system is inadequate, but perhaps more importantly, Hudson also fails to demonstrate how this alleged inadequacy would be relevant to the Court's analysis because it is unrelated to whether Harris Teeter had notice of the applesauce. "[F]rom this record no reasonable jury could conclude that the [applesauce was on the floor] '... for such a duration of time that had reasonable care been exercised the hazard would have been discovered.' " See Martin ,
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the case is dismissed because the plaintiff failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. A separate Order, ECF No. 28, accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Plaintiff cites Stuckey's deposition to support this statement, but the quoted portion of the deposition actually appears on page 37, which is not included in plaintiff's excerpted version. Defendant includes the deposition in full, and so the discussion that follows refers to defendant's exhibit. (Def.'s Ex. 3, at 37, ECF No. 24-3.)