Rolando Jimenez v. Alejandro Mayorkas

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 21-5193 September Term, 2022
FILED ON: MARCH 23, 2023
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
APPELLANT
v.
ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,
APPELLEE
Consolidated with 22-5112
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:19-cv-02055)
(No. 1:17-cv-02731)
Before: KATSAS and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge
JUDGMENT
The Court considered this appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia on the record and the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 34(j). The Court
has afforded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published
opinion. See D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). For the following reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the orders of the district court, filed on September
24, 2020, September 29, 2020, and March 1, 2022, be affirmed.
Rolando Jimenez is a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
employee who sued the Secretary of Homeland Security, in his official capacity, in 2017 (Jimenez
I) and 2019 (Jimenez II). 1 His lawsuits raised a multitude of employment discrimination and
1
The district court entered orders in Jimenez I on September 24, 2020, and March 1, 2022. Though
the district court entered orders in Jimenez I roughly eighteen months apart, the claims at issue all
1
retaliation claims. The district court initially dismissed many of the claims for failure to state a
claim or failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court later granted summary
judgment in favor of the Government, including on four claims from Jimenez I, and one claim
from Jimenez II. Importantly, the district court: (1) granted summary judgment prior to discovery
on several of the claims; and (2) accepted the Government’s statement of undisputed facts as
admitted for those claims, because Jimenez’s counsel failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d) and Local Rule 7(h)(1).
On appeal, Jimenez challenges the district court’s decisions to: (a) grant summary
judgment before discovery; (b) grant summary judgment despite alleged evidence of pretext; and
(c) deny subsequent motions to alter or amend those judgments. We review—and reject—each of
these challenges.
I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) governs when a district court may rule on motions
for summary judgment prior to discovery, and we review such rulings for an abuse of discretion.
Jeffries v. Barr, 965 F.3d 843, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (d).
The district court acted within its discretion when it granted the Government’s motions for
summary judgment prior to discovery in this case. Rule 56(d) required Jimenez’s trial counsel to
submit affidavits or declarations explaining why counsel could not present necessary facts to
oppose the Government’s motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). At a status conference, the district court
unequivocally instructed trial counsel to file this supporting documentation, and the district court
waited almost one year before ruling on the motions. Trial counsel was also alerted about the
obligation to file declarations or affidavits via the Government’s reply brief in Jimenez I, which
was filed almost eight months before the district court’s rulings in Jimenez I and Jimenez II.
The excuse that trial counsel misunderstood the obligation did not undermine the district
court’s authority to consider the Government’s undisputed statement of facts as admitted and to
rule on the summary judgment motions, as contemplated in federal and local rules of procedure. 2
arose from an action Jimenez filed in 2017. The district court entered its order in Jimenez II on
September 29, 2020. The Jimenez II ruling relates to an action Jimenez filed in 2019.
2
Rule 56(e) permits district courts to “consider [a] fact undisputed for purposes of the [summary
judgment] motion” or “grant summary judgment” when a party fails to support its own assertions
with facts or address another party’s factual assertions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also SEC
v. Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[i]f the party opposing
the motion fails to comply with [Local Rule 7(h)(1)], then ‘the district court is under no obligation
to sift through the record’ and should ‘[i]nstead . . . deem as admitted the moving party’s facts that
are uncontroverted by the nonmoving party’s Rule [7(h)(1)] statement’”) (third through fifth
alterations in original) (quoting Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner,
101 F.3d 145, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
2
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment
prior to discovery.
II.
In addition to the procedural issue, Jimenez also contests the district court’s determinations
on the merits. Specifically, Jimenez raises his non-selection for three permanent positions, a non-
appointment to an acting position, and the denial of access to an internal data network. We review
de novo the grant of summary judgment and conclude that the district court reached the right
outcome. Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
A.
The Government concedes that Jimenez established a prima facie case for Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination or retaliation regarding the selection of other
candidates to fill permanent positions in Frankfurt, Germany; Monterrey, Mexico; and Miami,
Florida (United States of America). But to establish pretext for non-selection, the non-selected
person must be “substantially more qualified” than the selected applicant. Calhoun v. Johnson,
632 F.3d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2003)). Based on this standard, we agree with the Government that its proffered reasons for
selecting other candidates to fill these positions were not pretextual.
i.
Frankfurt, Germany – Jimenez was not “substantially more qualified” than the selected
applicant for the position in Frankfurt, Germany. Id. Jimenez received two negative references in
relation to the Frankfurt application, whereas the selected applicant had not only an “outstanding
interview” but also “received glowing endorsements.” J.A. 191. Further, though the selected
applicant had not been a fraud detection and national security immigration officer, he had recent
experience with adjudications as a “primary national security supervisor,” and he held a master’s
degree and spoke German. J.A. 186–87. By contrast, Jimenez had experience as a fraud detection
and national security immigration officer, but lacked recent or relevant adjudications experience,
held only an associate’s degree, and did not speak German.
Also, without “positive evidence beyond mere [temporal] proximity[,]” one of Jimenez’s
interviewers becoming aware of Jimenez’s EEO complaint does not, alone, establish pretext.
Iyoha v. Architect of the Capitol, 927 F.3d 561, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Woodruff v. Peters,
482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
Accordingly, the Government was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
3
ii.
Monterrey, Mexico – Jimenez was likewise not substantially more qualified than the
selected candidate for the Monterrey, Mexico position. The selecting official was looking for
specific field experience. For instance, the selecting official sought to install a person with
documentation verification and past supervisory experience; Jimenez did not possess these
experiences, but the candidate selected to fill the position did. Further, despite Jimenez appearing
on a list of eligible candidates, he was ultimately less qualified than the selected applicant.
Separately, Jimenez also fails to adequately explain how an email from Joanna Ruppel (a
supervisor) is relevant to his non-selection for the position. Jimenez originally asserted this
argument—that Ruppel’s email instructed interviewers not to interview him—in relation to a
position in Bangkok, Thailand, not Monterrey, Mexico, and he has not appealed the decision
regarding the Bangkok position. All the same, a jury could not infer animus or retaliation from
the responses in a different supervisor’s affidavit that Jimenez raises in relation to the Monterrey
position. 3 So, the Government was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
iii.
Miami, Florida – For the Miami, Florida position, the vacancies were field positions and
called for persons with knowledge of current processes. That being so, it was reasonable for hiring
personnel to prioritize recent field experience, which Jimenez lacked. Contrary to Jimenez’s
assertions, the hiring official’s purportedly “strict” reliance on posted hiring criteria was certainly
not “unreasonable.” Cf. Jeffries, 965 F.3d at 858 (explaining, by contrast, that deviation from
standard procedures “can justify an inference of discriminatory motive”) (quoting Lathram, 336
F.3d at 1093). Accordingly, the Government was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
B.
Jimenez next asserts that USCIS unlawfully denied him access to an internal data network.
This claim went through discovery, and we agree with the district court that the Government was
entitled to summary judgment.
USCIS had valid reasons to deny Jimenez access to a data network with confidential
information. Jimenez was under investigation for violating policies concerning the dissemination
of sensitive information while he was on temporary duty at the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL). Jimenez’s superiors also believed that he did not need access to the
3
A reasonable jury could not infer animus or retaliation from a statement in a supervisor’s affidavit
that the supervisor “was required to prepare a response similar to this one” for one of Jimenez’s
prior EEO complaints. J.A. 644; see also Appellant’s Br., 42 (quoting J.A. 644). A jury likewise
could not infer animus or retaliation from that same supervisor explaining the positive attributes
of the selected applicant. J.A. 646–47; see also Appellant’s Br., 42.
4
network to complete his job duties; thus, he still earned the highest performance rating available
during the years he was denied access. Moreover, Jimenez admitted that he stopped requiring
access to the system over six years ago.
Accordingly, the Government was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
C.
In the last summary judgment claim, Jimenez asserts that he should have been placed in an
acting chief position. As with other parts of his brief, Jimenez “fails to develop arguments for his
claim[], often choosing instead to simply state facts (inviting the Court, perhaps, to make of them
what it will).” Jefferies, 965 F.3d at 861. In such cases, we have “decline[d] to take up that task,”
and our resulting opinions have been produced from “the wheat of arguments made” rather than
“the chaff of those potential arguments that might have been constructed from the raw materials
[the appellant] includes or alludes to in his briefing.” Id. This judgment follows suit.
Jimenez alleges that a second-line supervisor was aware of his prior EEO activity, which
influenced the decision not to appoint him to the acting chief position. Specifically, Jimenez takes
issue with: (1) a needed security clearance, and (2) receiving no response to his written request for
an explanation regarding selection for the position. The Government argues that Jimenez lacked
the required security clearance and that an adequate reason exists as to why the supervisor did not
respond to Jimenez’s request for an explanation. We conclude that a reasonable jury could not
find the Government’s proffered reasons were pretextual. 4
First, Jimenez’s supervisor explained that a “Top Secret/Secure Compartmental
Information” clearance was necessary for the acting chief position. J.A. 1054. Jimenez did not
have this clearance and, as explained above, was under investigation for violating security policies.
Consequently, because Jimenez lacked an adequate security clearance, a reasonable jury could not
conclude that this reason for denying him the appointment was pretextual.
Second, the written request Jimenez claimed that his supervisor never responded to was
only carbon copied to her; Jimenez, in fact, directed the email to the person selected for the acting
chief position. Jimenez provides no additional reason to support his notion that the lack of a
response was pretextual other than that “a jury could consider [it],” and that the reasons recounted
above could have been raised in response to the email rather than in an affidavit. Appellant’s Br.,
49–50 (explaining that the reasons offered in the affidavit made a “late appearance” that could
“raise[] an inference of pretext”). This type of speculation does not “create a genuine issue of
4
The district court determined that the denial of the acting chief position was not a materially
adverse action. “We need not address this issue, however, because, as the government urges, we
can affirm on an alternative ground[.]” Evans v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
5
fact.” Jeffries, 965 F.3d at 861 (quoting Porter v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2010). So,
we agree that the Government was entitled to summary judgment. 5
III.
In the final challenge on appeal, Jimenez argues that the district court should have granted
his motions to alter or amend the judgments in favor of the Government. We review the district
court’s actions for an abuse of discretion and conclude that there was none. Morrissey v.
Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Attorney error for failing to comply with a rule of procedure is generally insufficient to
warrant altering or amending a final judgment. See e.g., Morrissey, 17 F.4th at 1162–63. Trial
counsel was directed to submit affidavits and had almost one year to do so before the district court
granted summary judgment. In light of counsel’s inaction, the district court’s rulings could have
been anticipated and did not contravene governing law. See Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881
F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied motions to alter or amend its earlier judgments.
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(d), this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely
petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R.
41(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /s/
Daniel J. Reidy
Deputy Clerk
5
Jimenez also takes issue with the same supervisor’s statement that Jimenez “consistently and
inappropriately tries to disparage [her],” J.A. 1055, and whether a customary thirty-day rotation
for the acting chief position existed. Jimenez fails to develop these claims, and, in any regard, they
do not undermine the Government’s legitimate justification that persons in the acting chief position
required a security clearance, which Jimenez did not possess.
6