1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ETUATE SEKONA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00399-AWI-BAM (PC) 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND FOR TONGAN 12 v. INTERPRETER 13 TRUJILLO, et al., (ECF No. 14) 14 Defendants. ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE FIRST 15 AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 13) 16 17 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 18 19 Plaintiff Etuate Sekona (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 20 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 9, 2019, the 21 Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint 22 within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 10.) On October 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff a thirty- 23 day extension of time to file his first amended complaint. (ECF No. 12.) 24 Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and a Tongan 25 interpreter, (ECF No. 14), and Plaintiff’s motion for a second extension of time to file his first 26 amended complaint, (ECF No. 13). In both motions, Plaintiff argues that he requires counsel, an 27 interpreter, and additional time because he received a TABE score of 2.3 in English, he has a 28 limited knowledge of the English language, and he is suffering from brain damage that causes 1 confusion and dizziness. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) Plaintiff also argues that counsel should be 2 appointed due to the complexity of the case, and because Plaintiff cannot write artfully to the 3 Court. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff is first informed that he does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel 5 in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other 6 grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and the court cannot require an attorney to 7 represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. 8 of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may 9 request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 10 1525. 11 Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek 12 volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 13 “exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on 14 the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 15 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 16 The Court has considered Plaintiff’s request, but does not find the required exceptional 17 circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has 18 made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. 19 This Court is faced with similar cases filed by prisoners with limited literacy, limited knowledge 20 of English, and facing serious medical issues who are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 21 almost daily. These prisoners also must conduct legal research and prosecute claims without the 22 assistance of counsel. 23 Furthermore, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination that 24 Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record in this case, the 25 Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. 26 As to Plaintiff’s request for an interpreter, “the expenditure of public funds [on behalf of 27 an indigent litigant] is proper only when authorized by Congress . . . .” Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 28 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The in forma pauperis 1 statute does not authorize the expenditure of public funds for court-appointed interpreters. 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915; Loyola v. Potter, Case No. C 09-0575 PJH, 2009 WL 1033398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 3 Apr. 16, 2009) (“The court is not authorized to appoint interpreters for litigants in civil cases, and, 4 moreover, has no funds to pay for such a program.”). Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege any 5 facts demonstrating that he is entitled to a court-appointed Tongan interpreter as an 6 accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. Therefore, the Court finds that 7 Plaintiff has not established that this Court has the authority to appoint a Tongan interpreter to 8 assist him with this litigation. 9 However, based on Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his limited English proficiency and 10 his ongoing health issues the Court finds good cause to grant a second thirty-day extension of 11 time for Plaintiff to file his first amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). 12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 13 1. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and a Tongan interpreter, (ECF No. 14), is 14 DENIED, without prejudice; 15 2. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to file a first amended complaint, (ECF No. 16 13), is GRANTED; 17 3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 18 4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 19 amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in the September 9, 20 2019 screening order or file a notice of voluntary dismissal; and 21 5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 22 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey 23 a court order and for failure to state a claim. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 Dated: November 13, 2019 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28