Anderson v. United States

Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 1 Filed: 01/20/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
GEORGE ANDERSON, AUDREY BABLES,
CHRISTOPHER DONAL, ESTES ET UX, ADELE
MARY GADLIN, MICHAEL HOLLEMAN, REGINA
HOLLEMAN, SHERRY DIANE BRANDON
HOLLOMAN, RALPH DAVID HOLLOMAN,
ROBERT MOORE KING, DORIS J. KING, TERESA
MAYS, LESTER MCDOWELL, MARIA ROSA
MENDOZA, JUNIOR MORGAN, GINA GAIL
MOSLEY, DINNA ANNETTA PATTON, MICHAEL
PATTON, ERIC J. POWERS, TANYA RENEE
RIGSBY, NKA TANYA GRAVES, W S SPEARMAN,
DAVID SMITH, LYDIA C. WEAVER, CHARLES E.
WILSON, APALA D. WILSON, KATIE G. WRIGHT,
ESTATE OF JUSTO & CLAR BELTRAN, EUNICE
JACKSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
JAVIER SANCHEZ, VALENTINA SANCHEZ, LOVIE
LEE STANLEY, DOE NO. 3,
Plaintiffs
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2021-1445
______________________
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 2 Filed: 01/20/2022
2 ANDERSON v. US
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:17-cv-00668-MMS, Senior Judge Margaret M.
Sweeney.
______________________
Decided: January 20, 2022
______________________
JOHN ROBERT SEARS, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice
LLC, St. Louis, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.
JEFFREY AARON HALL, Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division, United States Department of Justice
Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also rep-
resented by ERIKA KRANZ, JEAN E. WILLIAMS.
______________________
Before PROST, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
In this rails-to-trails case, the United States Court of
Federal Claims interpreted multiple real property deeds
and determined that the property owners conveyed fee sim-
ple interests, not easements, to a railroad. The Court of
Federal Claims granted summary judgment for Appellee,
the United States, upon determining that no takings from
the landowners occurred when the government later au-
thorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail.
We hold that the granting clauses of the subject deeds un-
ambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and
not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in
the deeds. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal
Claims.
BACKGROUND
The Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate the discontinuance or abandon-
ment of nearly every railroad in the United States. See
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ANDERSON v. US 3
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). The STB is tasked with, among other
things, enforcing the National Trails System Act (the
“Trails Act”). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241, et seq.
In 1983, Congress amended the Trails Act by adding a
process known as “railbanking.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
In general, railbanking involves the transition of unused
railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking
trails—a process commonly referred to as “rails to trails.”
Like a discontinuance or abandonment, railbanking is sub-
ject to authorization by the STB, and the STB retains ju-
risdiction over the railroad line. See Preseault v. Interstate
Com. Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1990).
Generally, railbanking involves a transfer of interest in
the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. See
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). This transfer of interest can consti-
tute a taking depending on the nature of the property in-
terest held by the railroads. See Preseault v. United States,
100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996). If a railroad initially
was granted only a limited-use easement over the corridor,
then a taking may occur when the STB authorizes the
third-party entity to make use of the corridor for recrea-
tional purposes. Id. If the railroad initially was granted a
fee simple interest, the railbanking may result in no taking
because “there is no owner of a separate underlying prop-
erty interest to claim the rights of the servient estate
holder.” Id.PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs-Appellants (the “Landowners”) 1 own parcels
of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a railroad line (the
1 The Landowners in this action are George Ander-
son, Audrey Bables, Christopher Donal Estes Et Ux, Adele
Mary Gadlin, Michael Holleman, Regina Holleman, Sherry
Diane Brandon Holloman, Ralph David Holloman, Robert
Moore King, Doris J. King, Teresa Mays, Lester McDowell,
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 4 Filed: 01/20/2022
4 ANDERSON v. US
“Line”) in McLennan County, Texas, which is owned by Un-
ion Pacific Railroad Company. See J.A. 41. Union Pacific’s
predecessor in interest, Texas Central Railroad Company
(“Texas Central”), originally acquired the Line in 1902
through a series of transactions, including multiple deeds
executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest.
Three of those deeds are at issue in this appeal: (1) the
Falkner Deed, (2) the Brown Deed, and (3) the George
Deed. J.A. 82–93.
In February 2019, the Landowners filed an amended
complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims
(“Court of Federal Claims”), alleging takings of real prop-
erty interests caused by the STB’s authorization of rail-
banking of the Line. J.A. 4. The Landowners sought
compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in
interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central in
the century-old deeds. Id.The parties agree that all three deeds at issue on ap-
peal contain the same operative language. By way of ex-
ample, the Falkner Deed was executed in March 1902 and
provides in relevant part:
That we C. Falkner and wife Emma J. Falkner . . .
do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said
Texas Central Railroad Company all that piece or
parcel of land, situate, lying and being in the
County of McLennan, State of Texas, and described
as follows:
Maria Rosa Mendoza, Junior Morgan, Gina Gail Mosley,
Dinna Annetta Patton, Michael Patton, Eric J. Powers,
Tanya Renee Rigsby n/k/a Tanya Graves, W S Spearman,
David Smith, Lydia C. Weaver, Charles E. Wilson, Apala
D. Wilson, Katie G. Wright, the Estate of Justo & Clar Bel-
tran, and Eunice Jackson.
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 5 Filed: 01/20/2022
ANDERSON v. US 5
Being a strip of land 75 feet in width . . . [detailed
description of land]. This conveyance is made to
the Texas Central Railroad Company for a right of
way over and upon which the said railroad com-
pany is to construct and operate and maintain its
said railroad as the same is now located and estab-
lished over and upon the above described tracts of
land. And the right to take and use all stone earth
and other material existing or that may be found
within the right of way is hereby granted.
J.A. 82–85 (emphases added).
The Court of Federal Claims interpreted the deeds as
having granting clauses (the first paragraph reproduced
above) that conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.
Anderson v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 661, 676–79, 681
(2020). The Court of Federal Claims explained that under
Texas law, the granting clause controls if it is not ambigu-
ous, despite other language in the deed(s) referring to the
conveyance as a right of way. Id. at 677 (citing Tex. Elec.
Ry. Co. v. Neale, 252 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. 1952)). The
Court of Federal Claims concluded that because the grant-
ing clauses at issue unambiguously conveyed fee simple in-
terests, summary judgment in favor of the government was
proper as to all claims based on the Falkner, Brown, and
George deeds.
The Landowners appeal. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Court of Federal Claims’s legal conclu-
sions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Ca-
sitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Estate of Hage v. United
States, 687 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Accordingly,
we review a grant of summary judgment by the Court of
Federal Claims de novo. FastShip, LLC v. United States,
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 6 Filed: 01/20/2022
6 ANDERSON v. US
892 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Summary judgment
is appropriate where the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the mo-
vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.;
RCFC 56(a). We view the facts supported by evidence, as
well as all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Whether a taking occurred is a legal question based on
factual underpinnings. Chi. Coating Co., LLC v. United
States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Stearns Co. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2005)). In a takings case, determining the scope of a com-
pensable property interest is a question of law. Casitas,
708 F.3d at 1351 (citing Tex. State Bank v. United States,
423 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Relevant here,
whether a specific deed conveys a fee simple interest or an
easement is a question of law that we review de novo under
the law of the state in which the property interest arises,
here the State of Texas. Chi. Coating, 892 F.3d at 1169–70
(citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
In Texas, the standard of review applied to summary
judgment in a deed construction case “is tied directly to
whether the deed is clear on its face.” BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Chevron Midcontinent, L.P., 528 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tex.
App. 2017). An unambiguous deed is reviewed de novo,
looking only to the four corners of the document and em-
ploying the usual canons of textual construction. Id. (citing
Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P.,
473 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App. 2015)). Interpretation of
an ambiguous deed, i.e., a deed with two or more reasona-
ble interpretations, presents a mixed question of law and
fact, as a court may consider parol evidence regarding in-
tent. Id. That said, “[a] deed is not ambiguous merely be-
cause certain provisions of the deed conflict or appear to be
internally inconsistent.” Id.Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 7 Filed: 01/20/2022
ANDERSON v. US 7
DISCUSSION
The Landowners concede that they would not have any
interests remaining in the corridor if fee simple interests
were conveyed under the subject deeds. See Appellants’
Br. 2. Indeed, “[i]f the railroad company owns the land in
fee simple, then the Government cannot have committed a
taking and the analysis ends.” Chi. Coating, 892 F.3d
at 1170 (citing Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1533). Therefore, we
first review whether the Falkner, Brown, and George deeds
conveyed fee simple interests.
We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that Texas
Electric Railway Co. v. Neale, 252 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1952),
is controlling in this action. The deed in Neale contained
the following language:
(1) Know All Men By These Presents: That We . . .
do by these presents grant, sell and convey . . . the
following described piece or parcel of land, to-wit:
(2) [detailed description of land]
(3) It being the intention of this deed to convey a
strip of land 100 feet wide for 550 feet, and 80 feet
wide for the balance of the way through the prop-
erty of J J Dean in the Tomas de la Vega Eleven
League Grant.
(4) It is further understood herein that the above
strip of land is conveyed upon the further condition
and consideration that said Southern Traction
Company will, as soon as it begins operation, estab-
lish a stop on the right of way hereinabove conveyed
about the center thereof for the purpose of letting
passengers on and off its cars which stop shall be
as near a street crossing as possible and said Co.,
shall forever keep up and maintain said stop when
so established, and said company further agrees to
allow to be opened and dedicated as streets across
said right of way such streets as may be opened by
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 8 Filed: 01/20/2022
8 ANDERSON v. US
grantors herein, it being understood that the prop-
erty through which this right of way is given is to
be opened up as an addition to the city of Waco,
...
(6) However, this deed is made as a right-of-way
deed for an Interurban Railway from Dallas to
Waco, Texas, and in case said railway shall not be
constructed over said land then this conveyance
shall be of no effect.
Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 452–53 (emphases added).
Faced with conflicting language in the Neale deed, the
Texas Supreme Court examined Texas case law and artic-
ulated the following rules for interpreting such deeds:
First . . . a deed which by the terms of the granting
clause grants, sells and conveys to the grantee a
“right of way” in or over a tract of land conveys only
an easement; and second . . . a deed which in the
granting clause grants, sells and conveys a tract or
strip of land conveys the title in fee, even though in
a subsequent clause or paragraph of the deed the
land conveyed is referred to as a right of way.
Id. at 453 (emphasis added) (citing Right of Way Oil Co. v.
Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 157 S.W. 737 (Tex. 1913)
(easement conveyed where granting clause recited: “I . . .
have and do hereby grant . . . for the purpose of construct-
ing, operating and maintaining its railroad, the right of
way, two hundred feet in width, over and upon the above-
described tract of land” (emphasis added)); Calcasieu Lum-
ber Co. v. Harris, 13 S.W. 453 (Tex. 1890) (fee simple inter-
est conveyed where granting clause recited “a strip of land”
even though deed later referred to the land as a “right-of-
way”); Brightwell v. Int’l-Great N. R.R. Co., 49 S.W.3d 437(Tex. 1932) (fee simple interest conveyed where granting
clause recited “a strip of (200) Two Hundred feet in width
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 9 Filed: 01/20/2022
ANDERSON v. US 9
of land” even though deed later referred to a “right of
way”)).
Here, the granting clause in the Falkner deed reads:
“[W]e C. Falkner and wife Emma J. Falkner . . . grant, bar-
gain, sell and convey unto the said Texas Central Railroad
Company all that piece or parcel of land, situate, lying and
being in the County of McLennan, State of Texas, and de-
scribed as follows: . . . .” J.A. 82–85 (emphasis added). As
in Neale, this granting clause unambiguously conveys a
piece or parcel of land, not an easement right of way. Well-
settled Texas law instructs that the granting clause con-
trols, even if the deed later refers to the conveyed land as a
right of way. Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 453. As the Texas Su-
preme Court stated in 1932, and again in 1952, this rule
“has become a rule of property under which titles and se-
curities of immense value have been acquired in [Texas],
and it should not now be disturbed or changed.” Id. at 455
(quoting Brightwell, 49 S.W.2d at 439).
The Landowners argue that we should follow the more-
recent ruling in BNSF Railway Co. v. Chevron Midconti-
nent, L.P., 528 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tex. App. 2017), instead of
Neale. Appellant’s Br. 12–16. However, the BNSF deci-
sion is distinguishable from both Neale and the present ac-
tion. In BNSF, the granting clause at issue conveyed “unto
the said party . . . and unto its successors and assigns, for
a right of way, that certain strip of land hereinafter de-
scribed, as the same has been finally located over, through
or across the following tracts of land . . . .” 528 S.W.3d
at 130. The BNSF court noted that “the language in the
granting clause d[id] not clearly convey only a strip of land,
but rather straddle[d] the line between the two different
types of deeds, blending elements of both together.” Id.Thus, Neale was not dispositive in BNSF because the
granting clause at issue in BNSF was ambiguous. Id.
at 135. BNSF does not help the Landowners in this action
because the granting clauses of the Falkner, Brown, and
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 10 Filed: 01/20/2022
10 ANDERSON v. US
George deeds clearly convey only a piece or parcel of land;
they are not ambiguous like the granting clause in BNSF.
The Landowners also contend that the deeds conveyed
easements because they also granted the right to take nat-
ural resources, such as stone, timber, earth, and other ma-
terials, from the land, a grant that would have been
superfluous if the land was conveyed in fee simple. Appel-
lant’s Br. 17–19. This argument, however, was settled by
Calcasieu Lumber, Brightwell, and Neale. The deeds at is-
sue in those cases also contained similar grants of the right
to take materials from the land. See Neale, 252 S.W.2d
at 455 (acknowledging that the deeds in Calcasieu Lumber
and Brightwell also conveyed the right to take materials
from the land). Regardless, “[u]nder Neale, the unambigu-
ous granting clause would knock out any contradictory lan-
guage repugnant to that conveyance, which would mean
reading the natural resource right allocation as being a re-
dundancy.” BNSF, 528 S.W.3d at 133 & n.8 (explaining
that the conveyed right to take and use “all of the wood,
water, stone, timber and other material on said strip of
land” was relevant there only because the deed in BNSF
did “not have an unambiguous granting clause”). Here, the
unambiguous granting clause knocks out as redundant the
subsequent language in the deeds that contradict the fee
simple conveyance. We therefore hold that the granting
clauses of the deeds at issue unambiguously conveyed fee
simple interests and not easements despite the presence of
contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds.
CONCLUSION
The Falkner, Brown, and George deeds conveyed fee
simple interests and not easements. Accordingly, we
Case: 21-1445 Document: 36 Page: 11 Filed: 01/20/2022
ANDERSON v. US 11
affirm the summary judgment granted by the Court of Fed-
eral Claims in favor of the appellee.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.