Vehicle IP, LLC v. General Motors Corp.

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1259
VEHICLE IP, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and ONSTAR CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP (doing business as Verizon Wireless)
and NETWORKS IN MOTION, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Frank P. Porcelli, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for
plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Frank E. Schekenbach; Richard J.
Anderson, Michael J. Kane, Deanna J. Reichel and William R. Woodford, of
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Jonathan E. Retsky, Howrey LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for defendants-
appellees General Motors Corporation, et al. With him on the brief were Henry C.
Bunsow, Steven Yovits and Nathan A. Frederick.
Vincent J. Belusko, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of Los Angeles, California, argued
for defendants-appellees Cello Partnership (d/b/a Verizon Wireless), et al. With him on
the brief were Martin M. Noonen and Alex S. Yap.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1259
VEHICLE IP, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and ONSTAR CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP (doing business as Verizon Wireless)
and NETWORKS IN MOTION, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in
case no. 07-CV-345, Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb.
__________________________
DECIDED: January 6, 2009
__________________________
Before MAYER, BRYSON, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge PROST. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit
Judge MAYER.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Vehicle IP (“VIP”) holds the rights to U.S. Patent No. 6,535,743 (the “’743
patent”), which covers various aspects of a mobile navigation system. VIP sued
General Motors, OnStar, Cellco, and Networks in Motion (collectively, “Defendants”) in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for infringing the
’743 patent. The district court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment of
noninfringement as to all asserted claims. Vehicle IP, LLC v. Gen. Motors Corp., 578 F.
Supp. 2d 1107, 1120–21 (W.D. Wis. 2008). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The ’743 patent, which is entitled “System and Method for Providing Directions
Using a Communications Network,” describes a method and apparatus for providing
turn-by-turn directions to a mobile unit. Claim 1 is representative of the claim language
at issue:
A system for providing directions, comprising:
a server coupled to a communication network, the server operable to
determine directions from an origination location to a destination location
and to communicate the directions using the communication network,
wherein the directions comprise a plurality of segments, each segment
separated from an adjacent segment by a separator signal and comprising
a command and a notification region defined by a plurality of notification
coordinates; and
a mobile unit coupled to the communication network remote from the
server, the mobile unit operable to receive the communicated directions,
the mobile unit further operable to present automatically a particular
segment of the directions to a user if the location of the mobile unit
substantially corresponds to a notification coordinate defining the
notification region associated with that segment.
’743 patent col.31 ll.19–36 (emphasis added). The phrase “a notification region defined
by a plurality of notification coordinates” is at the heart of the dispute between the
parties and is found in each independent claim in the ’743 patent.
During claim construction, the district court first held that a “plurality” is used in
the ordinary sense of “requiring a minimum of two of something.” Vehicle IP, 578 F.
2008-1259 2
Supp. 2d at 1115. This construction is not debated by any party. 1 The court went on to
hold that (1) in accordance with its ordinary meaning, a coordinate is “any of a set of
numbers that provides the position of a point,” (2) notification coordinates are “any of a
set of numbers used to locate the position of a point in a direction segment,” and (3) a
notification region is a “location defined by two or more coordinates that provide the
position of points in near proximity to, but not including, the position of an upcoming
maneuver point.” Id. at 1115–17.
On appeal, VIP argues that the district court misconstrued those terms, and that
even under the district court’s erroneous construction Defendants’ navigation systems
infringe the ’743 patent. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
As claim construction is a matter of law, we review a district court’s claim
construction without deference. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). We evaluate a district court’s grant of summary judgment of
noninfringement de novo as well. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467
F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
A
We turn first to the district court’s construction of the term “coordinate.” Although
not explicitly included in its definition, in discussing the term the court found that “[f]or
something to be a coordinate it must have a partner so that together the coordinates
1
Although Cellco and Networks in Motion argued before the district court
that the “notification region” must be defined as a two-dimensional area, which arguably
is in tension with the district court’s construction of “plurality,” the district court did not
reach that issue. Likewise, we do not reach the issue since we affirm on other grounds.
2008-1259 3
can provide the location of a point.” Vehicle IP, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. The court
therefore found that a “mere numeric value like 200 feet[] cannot be a coordinate
without a partner.” Id.Defendants’ navigation systems operate by downloading the coordinates for an
upcoming maneuver point (sometimes called a “driving event”) and either distance or
time values. In the case of the Cellco and Networks in Motion (“Cellco”) system, the
server sends various information to a cell phone, including a “max-instruction distance,”
the coordinates of the maneuver point, and the speed of travel. The cell phone uses
some of this information to calculate a warning distance, which is then compared to the
max-instruction distance to determine when the user should receive the next instruction.
Both the warning distance and the max-instruction distance are scalars; in other words,
they are what the district court called “numeric values.” Similarly, the GM OnStar®
(“GM”) system downloads driving event coordinates and up to three distance or time
offsets, each of which is also a scalar. In part because it found that numeric values like
those downloaded by Defendants’ systems cannot be coordinates, the district court held
that Defendants did not infringe the ’743 patent. Vehicle IP, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–
18.
VIP argues that the patentees did not limit the term “coordinate” in the ’743
patent, and therefore the term must be “broadly defined.” And while VIP agrees that the
term should be construed according to its ordinary meaning, VIP does not believe the
court’s construction reflects that meaning. Instead, VIP argues that the ordinary
meaning of a coordinate is “any one of a set of numbers used in specifying the location
of a point on a line, in space, or on a given plane or other surface.” VIP presses us to
2008-1259 4
find that this construction allows for a numeric distance offset “so long as that offset
specifies the location of a point.”
Regardless of whether the district court correctly identified the term’s ordinary
meaning, however, we agree with the district court’s conclusion. The ’743 patent claims
and the prosecution history indicate that the patentees did not contemplate scalar
values serving as notification coordinates.
The term “coordinate” appears twice in the language of independent claims 1, 23,
35, and 56. Although the first mention of the term is as a plurality (“notification
coordinates”), the second time, the term is used in the singular: a direction “segment” is
presented when “the location of the mobile unit substantially corresponds to a
notification coordinate defining the notification region.” In the ’743 patent, the mobile
unit’s location is identified using a GPS device. ’743 patent col.2 ll.64–col.3 l.1. To
compare a notification coordinate to the mobile unit’s location, as required by the
claims, the notification coordinate necessarily must be of the same kind or type as the
mobile unit location coordinates. The location of the mobile unit is expressed in terms
of latitude and longitude, and cannot “substantially correspond” to a scalar value, such
as 500 meters. No meaningful comparison between the two is possible. The plain
language of the claims precludes the possibility that a coordinate can be a scalar.
The prosecution history lends further support to the conclusion that a scalar
cannot serve as a “coordinate” as that term is used in the ’743 patent. On March 14,
2001, the Examiner rejected claims 23 and 35 as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No.
5,126,941 (the “Gurmu patent”). In traversing the rejection based on the Gurmu patent,
the applicants stated:
2008-1259 5
The present invention differs fundamentally from Gurmu. The
present invention teaches and claims that the location of the vehicle is
compared . . . to the notification coordinate. It is apparent that the location
is determined independently of the notification coordinate to be able to
compare the vehicle location to the notification coordinate. This
fundamental difference is not taught, shown, or suggested by Gurmu.
J.A. 2191. If the location of the mobile unit must be determined independently of the
notification coordinate, then the notification coordinate necessarily must provide an
absolute location (as opposed to a location by reference to the mobile unit’s position).
VIP’s argument to the effect that this is not a clear disclaimer is to no avail. See 800
Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recognizing
that prosecution disclaimer is “typically invoked to limit the meaning of a claim term that
would otherwise be read broadly,” but consulting the prosecution history in that case “as
support for the construction already discerned from the claim language and confirmed
by the written description”).
VIP maintains that while a distance offset standing alone might not be a
coordinate, “the distance offset identifies a specific location in advance of a driving
event.” In other words, a distance offset of 500 meters should be read as “500 meters
from the maneuver point.” Once armed with the maneuver point’s latitude and
longitude, the argument goes, the system could calculate the latitude and longitude of
the distance offset—in effect, transforming a scalar value into coordinates properly
comparable to those at the maneuver point. But again, this interpretation is precluded
by the plain language of the claims, which require comparison between the current
location and a single notification coordinate. Further, a scalar and a maneuver point
taken together do not define a second point at the distance offset, but instead define a
circle centered at the maneuver point with a radius equal to the scalar value. To
2008-1259 6
pinpoint precisely where on that circumference the distance offset lies requires
something more. For these reasons, we agree with the district court and hold that a
distance offset of the type used in Defendants’ systems is not a “coordinate” as the term
is used in the ’743 patent.
B
VIP also asserts that Defendants’ systems infringe the ’743 patent even under
the district court’s claim construction, with each system allegedly infringing in a different
manner. VIP argues that the Cellco system infringes when it downloads a “polyline”
made up of a series of latitude and longitude coordinates that define the region between
the max-instruction distance and the maneuver point. VIP believes that between these
polyline coordinates lies a region which would meet the district court’s construction of a
“notification region,” thereby infringing the ’743 patent.
In contrast, the GM system uses two distance offset points in conjunction with the
maneuver point to dictate when directions are provided to the user. The first point is an
early “preparation” distance offset, which alerts the user that a maneuver is
approaching. Next is the “immediate” distance offset, which alerts the user that the time
has come to execute the maneuver. VIP contends that an infringing notification region
is created between the preparation and immediate distance offsets.
Regarding the Cellco system, VIP did not raise this argument before the district
court, and thus is barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. See Sage Prods.,
Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). VIP points to various
places in its summary judgment briefs where it stated that between Cellco’s max-
instruction distance and maneuver point “is a series of coordinates, also downloaded
2008-1259 7
from the server, that form the polyline and further define the region.” While it is true that
VIP made this statement more than once, asserting the fact that a polyline is created or
further defines a region is not equivalent to arguing that there might be more than one
notification region created by Cellco’s system; further, VIP never indicated that a
notification region could be defined by anything besides the maneuver point and the
max-instruction distance. Merely invoking words such as “polyline” or “coordinates” is
not enough to preserve a point of appeal. As to Cellco, then, VIP’s claim is dismissed.
VIP’s arguments as to GM’s system were properly raised before the district court,
but VIP simply cannot prevail under the court’s construction. The court excluded scalar
values from serving as “coordinates” which could define a notification region. We
agree. Since both the preparation and immediate distance offset points are scalar
values, the region defined by those values cannot be a “notification region” as
necessary to infringe the ’743 patent.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment
of noninfringement.
2008-1259 8
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1259
VEHICLE IP, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and ONSTAR CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP (doing business as Verizon Wireless)
and NETWORKS IN MOTION, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in
case no. 07-CV-345, Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb.
MAYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, because the district court has misconstrued the terms
“coordinate” and “notification region.” The plain ordinary meaning of “coordinate” is
quite broad and not limited to a longitude latitude pair. In mathematics, there are many
types of coordinate systems and the common ground is that they all define a point. For
instance, in a curvilinear system, coordinates are defined with a fixed origin point, and a
scalar distance offset from that point along a known curve, such as a section of road. A
distance offset necessarily has a “partner” to define a point, as offsets are necessarily
set off from another known point. A coordinate should not be construed to exclude
defining a point by an offset from another point along a known path.
Moreover, I cannot conclude that because the mobile unit receiving its location
with a GPS device determines its location as a longitude, latitude, and altitude in space,
we must therefore construe coordinate to have the same format to allow for comparison.
Any point described by one coordinate system may be easily converted to another
coordinate system for direct comparison. Appellees contend that the plain language of
the claims precludes any conversion for comparison purposes because the claim recites
using only a single notification coordinate. I am not convinced because a coordinate in
this usage appears to be a single unique point in space among many points that
collectively define a notification region, not just part of the description of a point. Further
support is found in the claims because a notification region is defined by a plurality of
notification coordinates. A plurality of points is required to define a region in space. It is
consistent to use coordinate in the singular to describe a single point within such a
region. Also, the specification often uses coordinate in the singular in the term
“geographical coordinate,” which is clearly a point in space.
I therefore agree with VIP that a coordinate can be anything that describes a
particular point on a line, on a plane or surface, or in space. This includes a numeric
value (a scalar) describing an offset to a fixed point along a known curve.
While not reached by the majority, I also believe that the district court has
misconstrued “notification region.” There is nothing in the specification to suggest that a
notification region cannot include the point corresponding to the driving event. I believe
the district court erred by assuming that a notification region must only include points
2008-1259 2
ahead of the driving event in order for the invention to be useful. I agree that when a
driver using the system approaches a driving event at speed, a notification to the user
that he or she must perform a maneuver would not be useful, and could even be
dangerous, unless it occurred well prior to reaching the driving event. However, the
district court erred by assuming that the user would approach the driving event at
speed. The driving event could be at a stop sign, or in some other situation where the
user is not in motion but is at the point where the user must make a maneuver. In these
cases, the notification region would include the point of the driving event.
I would reverse the construction of both coordinate and notification region and
remand to review infringement under the correct construction.
2008-1259 3