Chevalier v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-5176
REYNAULT CHEVALIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Reynault Chevalier, of Sonyea, New York, pro se.
Elizabeth A. Speck, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With
her on the brief were Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant
Director.
Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
Judge Francis M. Allegra
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-5176
REYNAULT CHEVALIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in 08-CV-511, Judge Francis M.
Allegra.
__________________________
DECIDED: June 2, 2009
__________________________
Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Reynault Chevalier (“Chevalier”) appeals from the dismissal of
his suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims alleging that he was unlawfully
arrested and seeking at least $700,000 in damages. Chevalier v. United States, No. 08-
CV-511, slip op. at 2 (Ct. Fed. Cl. July 25, 2008). Because the Court of Federal Claims
did not have jurisdiction over Chevalier’s complaint, we affirm.
Chevalier is an inmate in the New York state prison system. In 2007, he brought
the present action seeking compensation for his alleged arrest and imprisonment by
Secret Service officers in November, 2005. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the
complaint sua sponte, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Chevalier’s alleged injuries, which sounded in tort. Id. at 1. Chevalier appealed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). “We review the judgment of the
Court of Federal Claims to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction de novo.” Ontario Power
Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Southfork Sys.,
Inc. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]o establish jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act for a suit for money damages, ‘a plaintiff must identify a separate
source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages,’ in other words, ‘that
source must be “money-mandating.”’” Ferreiro v. United States, 501 F.3d 1349, 1351-
52 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc in relevant part)). Liberally construed, Chevalier’s complaint implicates
two possible sources of substantive law: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1495; and (2) the Takings
Clause. We address each in turn.
First, Chevalier argues that the Court of Federal Claims erred by failing to take
into account “Court of Federal Claims, (CFC) Section §131.36: Miscellaneous Cases -
Damages for unjust conviction of offense against the United States & Imprisonment.”
Pet’r’s Aff. in Supp. of a Mot. to Proceed as a Poor Person Appeal at 1 (“Affidavit”). We
presume that Chevalier is quoting from a section of a treatise, because there is no
section 131.36 in any statute or regulation concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims. We construe Chevalier’s brief as invoking the unjust conviction statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1495, which states:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of
an offense against the United States and imprisoned.
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The specific requirements for a claim of unjust conviction are set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2513:
(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and
prove that:
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground
that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on
new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as
appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or
reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the
stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts,
deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no
offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the
District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause
or bring about his own prosecution.
(b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or
pardon wherein such facts are alleged to appear, and other evidence
thereof shall not be received.
(c) No pardon or certified copy of a pardon shall be considered by the
United States Court of Federal Claims unless it contains recitals that the
pardon was granted after applicant had exhausted all recourse to the
courts and that the time for any court to exercise its jurisdiction had
expired.
(d) The Court may permit the plaintiff to prosecute such action in forma
pauperis.
(e) The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed $100,000 for
each 12-month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly
sentenced to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration
for any other plaintiff.
As our predecessor court has held, “when [§§ 1495 and 2513] are read together
it becomes manifest that the sections confer jurisdiction on [the Court of Federal Claims]
only in cases where there has been conviction and in which the other conditions set out
in section 2513 are complied with.” Grayson v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 866, 869
(1958). Chevalier cannot satisfy the requirements of §§ 2513(a) and (b). Chevalier
2008-5176 3
admits that his “conviction has not been reversed in any respect” and that he does “not
have an officially documented conviction reversal at the present time.” Affidavit at 2.
Section 1495 therefore does not provide the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction
over Chevalier’s claims.
Second, Chevalier appears to argue that the Secret Service confiscated certain
possessions in violation of his constitutional rights—presumably his rights pursuant to
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “When property has been seized pursuant
to the criminal laws . . ., such deprivations are not ‘takings’ for which the owner is
entitled to compensation.” Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Seay v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 32, 35 (2004) (“The reason
that these claims do not amount to a taking is because items properly seized by the
government under its police power are not seized for ‘public use’ within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.”). Chevalier’s allegations concerning the allegedly wrongfully
confiscated items make clear that all of the items were seized in the course of the
criminal investigation into Chevalier’s conduct. He therefore has alleged no takings
claim over which the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction.
The Court of Federal Claims therefore properly granted the government’s motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We decline to address the remainder of
Chevalier’s arguments on appeal, because they each concern either the merits of his
underlying claim or the validity of his criminal conviction, rather than the jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Federal Claims.
2008-5176 4