Holloway v. Department of the Interior

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is
not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-3280
CLEVELAND B. HOLLOWAY,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Respondent.
__________________________
DECIDED: April 8, 2005
__________________________
Before MAYER, LOURIE, and RADER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Cleveland B. Holloway appeals the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection
Board holding that the Department of the Interior (“agency”) did not violate the
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (“WPA”), when it refused to
reinstate him as a GS-11 geologist after a voluntary leave of absence for pursuit of
political office. Holloway v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. DE1221980017-M-1 (MSPB Mar.
30, 2004). We affirm.
We must affirm the board’s decision unless we determine that it is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or if not
supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); Cheeseman v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 791 F.2d 138, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The board has jurisdiction over
Holloway’s individual right of action (“IRA”) appeal if he first exhausts his administrative
remedies before the Office of Special Counsel and makes non-frivolous allegations that:
(1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure under 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
decision not to reinstate him. See Briley v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 236 F.3d
1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schmittling v. Dep’t of the Army, 219 F.3d. 1332, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2000). If jurisdiction is established, the agency will not be required to
reinstate Holloway if it demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the alleged whistleblowing
disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Carr v. Social Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 1999). In deciding an IRA appeal, it is not legal error for the board to decide a
case based on the agency’s affirmative defense rather than first deciding whether the
appellant has proved that his disclosures were protected by the WPA. See Yunus v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a board denial
of an IRA appeal based only upon the board’s finding on the merits that the agency
proved its affirmative defense).
Holloway first alleges that the board improperly established jurisdiction over his
case when it failed to address the second jurisdictional criterion: determining whether he
raised a non-frivolous allegation that his alleged whistleblowing disclosures constituted
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a contributing factor in the agency’s refusal to reinstate him. While it is true that the
administrative judge in the initial decision established board jurisdiction without
addressing this criterion, the full board in its final decision correctly found this misstep to
be harmless and affirmed the finding of jurisdiction because the record showed that
Holloway had, in fact, made the requisite allegation. Because substantial evidence
supports the board’s jurisdictional finding, the board did not err by not remanding to the
administrative judge on the question of jurisdiction. Further, the board’s decision
establishing jurisdiction moots Holloway’s request for a jurisdictional hearing.
Holloway’s two-fold attack upon the board’s evaluation of the merits also fails.
He asserts that: (1) the board erred by finding, based only upon the agency’s affirmative
defense, that the agency would have taken the same personnel action regardless of any
whistleblowing activity; and (2) absent his evidence of a protected whistleblowing
disclosure, the board could not have found that the agency proved its affirmative
defense by clear and convincing evidence. First, the board had discretion to decide the
order in which it addressed the merits of Holloway’s IRA appeal, and it did not err by
beginning, and ending, its evaluation by considering first the agency’s affirmative
defense. See Yunus, 242 F.3d at 1372. Second, because the board was not obligated
to first consider Holloway’s evidence of protected disclosures, the board did not err by
considering only the agency’s evidence when evaluating its affirmative defense. The
board’s finding that the agency would have taken the same action in the absence of any
alleged whistleblowing is substantially supported by the fact that an agency hiring freeze
was in place at the time of Holloway’s resignation and request for reassignment.
04-3280 3