Simon v. DOJ

Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 1 Filed: 02/05/2020
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ANTHONY W. SIMON,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent
______________________
2019-1982
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DA-1221-18-0396-W-2.
______________________
Decided: February 5, 2020
______________________
ANTHONY W. SIMON, Lancaster, TX, pro se.
MICHAEL DUANE AUSTIN, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
JOSEPH H. HUNT, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, ROBERT
EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
______________________
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 2 Filed: 02/05/2020
2 SIMON v. DOJ
Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Simon (“Simon”) appeals from the final deci-
sion of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”)
denying his request for corrective action on his nonselec-
tion for a position with the Bureau of Prisons. Because we
agree with the Board that the agency proved by clear and
convincing evidence that it would not have selected Simon
even absent his protected whistleblowing activity, we af-
firm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Simon’s Application
In September 2017, the Bureau of Prisons issued an in-
ternal, merit promotion vacancy announcement for the po-
sition of Human Resource Specialist within the agency’s
Labor and Management Division. S.A. 2; S.A. 29. The an-
nouncement explained that the position’s duties included
“both labor and employee relations functions,” such as dis-
cipline and discharge issues, grievance and appeal pro-
cessing, and contract interpretation and negotiation. S.A.
30. The announcement also indicated that there were two
positions for this job available: one in Washington, D.C.
and one in Grand Prairie, Texas. S.A. 29.
Simon timely applied for the position at the GS-11, 12,
and 13 levels, but he limited his application to the Grand
Prairie location. S.A. 2; S.A. 37. Simon was found best
qualified for the position at the GS-12 level, and listed on
the merit promotion certificate for Grand Prairie at the GS-
12 level. 1 His application was then referred to the
1 Simon was found qualified, but not best qualified,
at the GS-11 level. J.S. 2. Simon did not qualify for the
position at the GS-13 level because he did not meet the
time-in grade requirement. S.A. 2.
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SIMON v. DOJ 3
recommending official, Christopher Wade. S.A. 2. Wade
ultimately referred two other individuals, J.H. and J.S., to
the selecting official, Cristina Griffith. S.A. 3. J.H. and
J.S. were found best qualified for the position at the GS-11
level and listed on the merit promotion certificate for Cen-
tral Office (Washington, D.C.). S.A. 2–3. On December 15,
2017, Griffith selected J.H. for a position in Washington
D.C. S.A. 3. On March 26, 2018, Griffith signed the GS-12
merit promotion certificate for Grand Prairie, indicating
that she did not wish to select anyone for that position, in-
cluding Simon. S.A. 3. Two days later, Griffith selected
J.S. for the remaining Human Resources position, but
again designated that position for Washington D.C., rather
than Grand Prairie. S.A. 3.
Very soon thereafter, Simon filed a complaint regard-
ing his nonselection with the Office of Special Counsel
(“OSC”). S.A. 3. In his complaint, Simon alleged that the
agency failed to select him for the Human Resources Spe-
cialist position as a reprisal for Simon’s past “whistleblow-
ing and/or protected activities,” i.e., activity protected
under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8), (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
S.A. 27. Simon alleged that his prior OSC and union activ-
ities, as well as his past appeals to the Board, were the ba-
sis for the agency’s retaliatory animus. S.A. 27. Simon
noted that Griffith had knowledge of three of these prior
OSC complaints, and that the hiring action at issue in his
complaint was the same action that he had cited in those
prior matters. S.A. 27. That is, Simon had been rejected
for the same Human Resources Specialist position on three
prior occasions, and had filed OSC complaints in response
to the agency’s decisions.
On June 18, 2018, OSC informed Simon that, based on
its evaluation of his complaint, it had made a final deter-
mination to close his file. S.A. 27. OSC explained that Si-
mon’s only evidence in support of his assertion that his
nonselection was retaliatory was the fact that he was in-
cluded on the merit promotion certificate for Grand Prairie,
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 4 Filed: 02/05/2020
4 SIMON v. DOJ
and that this evidence was not sufficient. S.A. 27. Despite
Griffith’s involvement in and knowledge of Simon’s past
OSC complaints, OSC concluded that there was “a multi-
tude of legitimate bases for not selecting a candidate for a
position.” S.A. 27. OSC also explained that it had no basis
for further review of claims that it previously adjudicated.
OSC made a final determination to close Simon’s file, but
notified Simon of his right to seek corrective action from
the Board because he had alleged a violation under 5
U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9). S.A. 28.
B. The Board’s Decision
On June 19, 2018, Simon filed an appeal of the agency’s
nonselection decision to the Board. S.A. 3. Simon alleged
that the agency failed to select him in retaliation for: (1) his
prior OSC complaints; and (2) his prior Individual Right of
Appeals (“IRA”) before the Board. S.A. 5. In support of his
appeal, Simon noted that he had been found “best qualified
for Human Resource Specialist 4 times (Emp & Lbr Rel)
(Labor Management Relations Specialist).” S.A. 24. On
April 8, 2019, the administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an in-
itial decision, finding that Simon’s OSC complaints and
IRAs are protected whistleblowing activities, but denying
Simon’s request for corrective action. S.A. 5.
First, the AJ explained that Simon failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that his OSC com-
plaints were a contributing factor in his nonselection. S.A.
5. Although Griffith was involved in the prior nonselection
decisions, the AJ explained that there was no evidence “as
to if or when Griffith, or anyone involved in the selection
process for the vacancy at issue in this appeal, knew about
[the OSC complaints].” S.A. 5. Accordingly, without any
evidence of Wade or Griffith’s knowledge of the OSC com-
plaints, the AJ could not conclude that Simon established
by preponderant evidence that his prior OSC complaints
were a contributing factor in his nonselection. S.A. 5.
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 5 Filed: 02/05/2020
SIMON v. DOJ 5
With respect to Simon’s IRAs, the AJ found that Wade
and Griffith’s knowledge of the appeals and the timing of
the nonselection decision were sufficient to establish by
preponderant evidence that Simon’s prior IRAs were a con-
tributing factor in his nonselection. S.A. 6. Both Wade and
Griffith had testified at the hearing in one of the prior
IRAs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0269-W-1, which oc-
curred sometime between March 16, 2016 and August 12,
2016. In that appeal, the appellant alleged, inter alia, that
the agency failed to select him for a GS-12 Human Re-
sources Specialist/Employee and Labor Relations position
in retaliation for his protected whistleblowing activity.
S.A. 5. Wade had similarly served as the recommending
official for that nonselection and Griffith, though not the
selecting official, had reviewed the applications and given
them to the selecting official. S.A. 5–6. On August 14,
2017, Griffith signed an agreement, on behalf of the
agency, to settle two of the prior IRAs. The signed settle-
ment agreement occurred just four months before she se-
lected J.H. for the Washington D.C. position on December
15, 2017. S.A. 6. Accordingly, the AJ determined that Si-
mon established by preponderant evidence that his prior
IRAs were a contributing factor in his nonselection. S.A. 6.
Based on this finding, the burden shifted to the agency
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would
have taken the same action even absent the disclosure or
other protected activity. See Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy,
66 F.3d 279, 283–84 (Fed. Cir. 1995). After considering the
evidence, the AJ found that the agency had met this bur-
den. The agency presented evidence that, although the po-
sition was initially advertised in both Washington, D.C.,
and Grand Prairie, there was “a particular need” for Hu-
man Resources Specialists in Washington, D.C. S.A. 7. At
the time of the selection process at issue in this appeal,
there were no Human Resources Specialists in Washington
D.C. S.A. 8 (“In fact, Griffith testified, there were three to
four unfilled Human Resources Specialist positions in
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 6 Filed: 02/05/2020
6 SIMON v. DOJ
Washington, D.C.”). The agency testified that it histori-
cally had difficulty filling these D.C. positions due to a lack
of qualified applicants willing to relocate, likely due at
least in part to the higher cost of living. S.A. 8. Accord-
ingly, because several highly qualified applicants, includ-
ing J.H. and J.S., had applied for the Washington, D.C.,
location, the agency decided to take advantage of the situ-
ation and only hire for that location. S.A. 8. Based on this
evidence, the AJ concluded: “[A]s the appellant only ap-
plied for the Grand Prairie location, he would not have
been selected regardless of his protected activity.” S.A. 8.
The AJ also noted that Wade and Griffith’s decisions
did not appear to be motivated by the appellant’s prior
IRAs. S.A. 7–8. During the hearing, Griffith testified that
she had also selected another applicant, K.B., but K.B. de-
clined the job offer. S.A. 9. Like J.H. and J.S., K.B. had
also applied for the position at the Washington, D.C. loca-
tion. S.A. 9. K.B. was a Union president and had repre-
sented Simon at an IRA hearing of which Griffith had
knowledge and had participated. S.A. 9 (“Notably, the rec-
ord shows that on August 8, 2017, K.B. executed the same
settlement agreement Griffith later signed in [the IRAs]”).
The AJ rationalized that, if Griffith harbored discrimina-
tory animus against Simon for his prior IRAs, it would have
been “highly unlikely that Griffith would have selected
K.B. who helped [Simon] pursue at least some of those ap-
peals.” S.A. 9. After considering the record, the AJ deter-
mined that the agency proved by clear and convincing
evidence that it would not have selected the appellant even
absent his protected whistleblowing activity. S.A. 9.
Simon did not petition the Board to review the AJ’s in-
itial decision and it became the final decision of the Board.
Simon timely appealed to this court, and we have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
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SIMON v. DOJ 7
II. DISCUSSION
Our jurisdiction to review Board decisions is limited.
By statute, we must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is
“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
The parties do not dispute the AJ’s finding that Simon
established a prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblow-
ing. “If the employee establishes its prima facie case of re-
prisal for whistleblowing, the burden of persuasion shifts
to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that
it would have taken ‘the same personnel action in the ab-
sence of such disclosure.’” Kewley v. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quot-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2)). In determining whether the
agency has met this “clear and convincing” standard, we
consider the Carr factors: (1) the strength of the agency’s
evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and
strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any ev-
idence that the agency takes similar actions against em-
ployees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
similarly situated. Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Although Simon challenges the Board’s finding that
the agency proved its case by clear and convincing evi-
dence, he does not challenge any particular finding by the
AJ on the Carr factors. Rather, Simon generally argues
that the agency violated his rights under the Whistle-
blower Protection Act and the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act when it failed to select him for the Hu-
man Resources Specialist position. Appellant Br. 2. Simon
asserts that the AJ “failed to take into account [the fact
that] AD Griffith, or Cristopher Wade, had reason to
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 8 Filed: 02/05/2020
8 SIMON v. DOJ
retaliate.” Appellant Br. 1. We find, however, that the AJ
properly applied the Carr factors and that substantial evi-
dence supports the AJ’s conclusion that the agency proved,
by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken
“the same personnel action in the absence of such disclo-
sure.” Kewley, 153 F.3d at 1361.
With respect to the first and second Carr factors, sub-
stantial evidence demonstrated that the agency had other
reasons for its nonselection and that its decision was not
retaliatory. S.A. 6–9. For example, although the agency
originally posted positions for both the Washington, D.C.
and Grand Prairie offices, it decided to only hire for the
Washington D.C. position after receiving several highly-
qualified applications for that location. S.A. 8. The AJ
found that the agency historically had difficulty filling
these positions due to a lack of qualified applicants willing
to relocate to Washington, D.C. S.A. 8. It is undisputed,
moreover, that Griffith offered a position to K.B., who had
represented Simon in a prior IRA hearing involving Grif-
fith and her testimony. S.A. 9. And the AJ determined
that Griffith and Wade’s testimony about their motives, as
well as Griffith’s job offer to K.B., demonstrated that the
agency officials did not have a strong motive to retaliate.
S.A. 8–9.
With respect to the third Carr factor, the AJ explained
that the factor was not significant because there was no
evidence regarding whether the agency has taken similar
actions with respect to employees who are not whistleblow-
ers but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr does not
require that each of the three factors individually weigh in
favor of the agency. Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d
1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Though the absence of evi-
dence regarding similarly situated employees cannot favor
the government, ‘the absence of any evidence relating to
Carr factor three can effectively remove that factor from
the analysis.’” Ingram v. Dep’t of the Army, 777 Fed. Appx.
Case: 19-1982 Document: 19 Page: 9 Filed: 02/05/2020
SIMON v. DOJ 9
980, 983–84 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d
at 1374 (internal citations omitted)).
Therefore, in considering the three Carr factors, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports the AJ’s find-
ing that the agency would not have been selected for the
position, regardless of his protected activity.
Simon also argues that the AJ improperly excluded ev-
idence related to Griffith’s testimony in the prior IRAs be-
fore the Board and contends that such evidence is relevant
to the immediate appeal. Appellant Br. 3–4. We disagree.
While Griffith’s knowledge of the IRAs is relevant to the
question of whether the agency would have made the same
nonselection decision in the absence of the IRAs, Simon of-
fers no explanation as to why the substance of Griffith’s
testimony in those IRAs is pertinent to the inquiry before
us.
Finally, Simon contends that the agency violated his
rights to a veteran’s preference, as required by the Veter-
ans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”). But
Simon never raised this issue before the Board. “A party
in an MSPB proceeding must raise an issue before the ad-
ministrative judge if the issue is to be reserved for review
in this court.” Bosley v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 162 F.3d
665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we decline to ad-
dress Simon’s VEOA argument because it is waived.
III. CONCLUSION
The Board’s decision denying Simon’s request for cor-
rective action is supported by substantial evidence and is
not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or con-
trary to law or regulation. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the Board’s final decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.