Ip Innovation, L.L.C. v. ecollege.com

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1571, 05-1153
IP INNOVATION, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ECOLLEGE.COM,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
DIGITALTHINK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
DOCENT, INC.,
Defendant-Cross Appellant.
___________________________
DECIDED: November 29, 2005
___________________________
Before NEWMAN, RADER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas determined that the defendants did not infringe U.S. Patent No.
4,877,404 (the ’404 patent). Finding no reversible error, this court affirms the
decision of the district court.
I.
On May 29, 2002, IP Innovation, the owner of the ’404 patent, sued
WebCT and Thomson Learning for infringement of the ’404 patent. IP Innovation
later amended its complaint to add six additional defendants. Five of the eight
defendants eventually settled. Only eCollege.com, DigitalThink, and Docent (the
defendants) continued to litigate the case against them.
Before trial, the district court granted summary judgment of non-
infringement to the defendants because the accused products do not satisfy two
limitations under the court’s claim construction. See IP Innovation, L.L.C. v.
WebCT, Inc., Civil Action No. H-02-2031 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 1, 2004) (Summary
Judgment Order); IP Innovation, L.L.C. v. WebCT, Inc., Civil Action No. H-02-
2031 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2004) (First Claim Construction Order); IP Innovation,
L.L.C. v. WebCT, Inc., Civil Action No. H-02-2031 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2004)
(Second Claim Construction Order); IP Innovation, L.L.C. v. WebCT, Inc., Civil
Action No. H-02-2031 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2004) (Amended Claim Construction
Order). The district court reached its claim construction after a Markman hearing
and extensive briefing by the parties, though it provided no explanation in its
orders for the meaning attributed to the claims.
After prevailing on summary judgment, the defendants unsuccessfully
moved for attorney fees. IP Innovation, L.L.C. v. WebCt, Inc., Civil Action No. H-
02-2031 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2004) (Order Denying Attorney Fees). IP Innovation
appeals the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement. Docent cross
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appeals the denial of attorney fees. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2000).
II.
This court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment
under the law of the regional circuit. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the law of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, this court reviews the grant or denial of
summary judgment without deference. Condrey v. Suntrust Bank Of Georgia, ---
F.3d ---, 2005 WL 2857452, at *4 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
In an exceptional case, a court may award attorney fees. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 285. “Although the determination of whether a case is exceptional is a
question of fact reviewed for clear error, this court reviews a district court's
decision to award attorney fees in an exceptional case only for abuses of
discretion.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc).
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for sanctions under
the law of the regional circuit. See Nystrom v. Trex Co., 2005 WL 2218632 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit reviews the denial of a motion for
sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Test Masters Educ. Serv. Inc. v. Singh, ---
F.3d ---, 2005 WL 2650945, at *16 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
III.
Infringement entails a two-step process: “First, the court determines the
scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted . . . [and second,] the properly
04-1571, 05-1153 3
construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.” Cybor Corp.,
138 F.3d at 1454 (citations omitted). “Step one, claim construction, is a question
of law, that we review de novo. Step two, comparison of the claims to the
accused device, is a question of fact, and requires a determination that every
claim limitation or its equivalent be found in the accused device.” N. Am.
Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (internal citations omitted).
In Phillips, this court explained: “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that
‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus, this court’s analysis begins with a
review of the claim terms which “‘are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in
the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to
begin claim interpretation.” Id. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art
is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including
the specification.” Id.In the ’404 patent, the parties dispute the district court’s interpretation of
two limitations: (1) embedded in a series of interrelated screens (the embedded
limitation); and (2) operatively connected (the operatively connected limitation).
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The embedded limitation appears in all three of the ’404 patent’s independent
claims. Claim 1 is representative:
1. An interactive computer software system permitting a user to take a
pre-selected computer course or access a pictorial data base,
comprising:
....
(c) a graphics computer sub-system operatively connected to said host
computer sub-system, said graphics computer sub-system
executing said course upon interrogation by said host computer
sub-system wherein said course includes a series of interrelated
pictures displayed by said graphics computer sub-system, said
series of pictures defining a course responsive to input data from
the user and interactively dialoguing with the user as the user
progresses through said pre-selected course or data base; and
(d) wherein said pre-selected computer course comprises a distributed
program embedded in said series of interrelated pictures.
’404 patent, col. 8, l. 49-col. 9, l. 3 (emphasis added). The district concluded:
In claims 1, 11, and 14 of the ’404 Patent, “embedded in a series of
interrelated screens” means:
The patent covers a program whose graphic elements include their
instructions in a single file for each screen with all of the control
codes being directly accessible on the consumer screen.
Amended Claim Construction Order, slip op. at 1 (emphasis added).
The specification supports the district court’s interpretation. Turning first
to the background section, prior art systems suffered from a saving format that
was unalterable during the use of the program. ’404 patent, col. 1, ll. 11-15.
Specifically, “[r]eferences to pictures [in prior art systems] are embedded in the
control program along with all the other programming codes necessary to create
a functional course.” Id., col. 1, ll. 40-43 (emphasis added). In contrast:
The present invention inverts the normal construction of a course.
Where prior art systems embed picture references into a control
program, thus, producing a large executable file containing
thousands of programming language command lines, the present
04-1571, 05-1153 5
invention embeds the control commands necessary to run the
course into the graphic pictures the author and operator see.
These control commands are called microscripts, and may be
visible or invisible graphical elements of the complete picture
presented to the human operator.
Id., col. 1, ll. 51-60 (emphasis added). Thus, “the invention . . . execut[es] the
distributed ‘program’ that is embedded into the numerous pictures or screens, as
opposed to the more universal ‘compiled’ program [of prior art systems].” Id., col.
5, ll. 45-50 (emphasis added). These pictures or screens may, in turn, be stored
on a disk as individual ASCII coded files, though each picture file is to be totally
self-contained such that modification of one does not affect the others. Id., col. 1,
l. 68-col. 2, l. 3; col. 2, ll. 28-29.
Thus, the inventor specified that “the invention” requires an association of
command codes with individual pictures or screens. Moreover the invention
permits alteration of each picture or screen (e.g., by changing the associated
command codes) without affecting the other pictures or screens. The district
court properly articulated that the invention’s graphic elements (i.e., pictures and
screens) must include their own instructions, which allows independent
modification of each graphic element.
In addition, the district court also properly determined that the instructions
(i.e., command codes) for a given picture or screen must be stored in a single
file. IP Innovation concedes that the specification only discloses a “single file”
embodiment, see id., col. 1, l. 68-col. 2, l. 3, but argues against importing this
limitation into the language of the claims. The ’404 patent, however, repeatedly
uses the phrase “the present invention” or “the invention of the present
disclosure” in describing its inventive features (including the embedded
04-1571, 05-1153 6
limitation), rather than the phrase “in the present embodiment” or “in one
embodiment.” See, e.g., id., col. 1, ll. 51-52; col. 2, ll. 16-20, 53-59, 62-64; col. 3,
ll. 11, 45-47, 56-60; col. 5, ll. 47-50, 57-58; col. 7, ll. 17-25. In contrast, the ’404
patent uses the term “embodiment” in reference to non-inventive features, such
as the graphic monitor and memory components. See, e.g., id., col. 4, ll. 63-66.
The only other reference to “embodiments” in the ’404 patent is common
boilerplate language that does not specifically address the inventive features in
any detail. Id., col. 4, ll. 17-28; col. 8, ll. 43-47.
Thus, the ’404 patent does not disclose multiple embodiments having
different implementations of the embedded limitation as suggested by
IP Innovation. Rather, the 404 patent’s narrow characterization of what “the
invention” covers in reference to the embedded limitation supports a construction
requiring location of all of the command codes for a given picture or screen within
a single file.
Finally, the district court also properly determined that the command
codes for a given picture or screen must be directly accessible from the computer
screen. IP Innovation contends that this feature has absolutely no relation to the
term “embedded.” To the contrary, the ’404 patent states: “[t]he microscript may
be embedded anywhere in the pixel pattern of the screen.” Id., col. 2, ll. 30-31
(emphasis added). Embedding the microscript in the pixel pattern of the screen
means that it must be directly accessible without reference to another file. In
other words, a user need not access another file to obtain the command code
when it is already present in the pixel pattern of the screen. This discussion in
04-1571, 05-1153 7
the specification supports the district court’s requirement that the code be directly
assessable on the screen.
The prosecution history confirms the district court’s interpretation. During
prosecution, the ’404 patent applicant amended the claims to incorporate the
“embedded” limitation to traverse a prior art rejection. The applicant also
included remarks that distinguished the claimed invention over prior art touch
screen displays, which allegedly did not disclose the “MicroScript principle as
disclosed and claimed by the Applicant[.]” Contrasting the claimed invention
from these prior art displays, the ’404 patent applicant explained: “[t]his invention
visibly, physically, and electronically connects the button to its command,
embodied as a MicroScript” by embedding the MicroScript code in each picture
or screen. This explanation reaffirms the district court’s construction requiring
direct accessibility of the command code.
In brief, the district court properly construed the embedded limitation to
mean providing graphical elements (i.e., individual pictures or screens) with
corresponding instructions (i.e., command code) in a single file for each graphical
element, such that all of the control codes for a given graphical element are
directly accessible on the consumer screen. The narrow characterization of the
invention in the specification and file wrapper do not permit IP Innovation’s
broader interpretation.
As to the operatively connected limitation, this limitation appears in two of
the ’404 patent’s three independent claims. Claim 1 is representative:
04-1571, 05-1153 8
1. An interactive computer software system permitting a user to
take a pre-selected computer course or access a pictorial data
base, comprising:
....
(c) a graphics computer sub-system operatively connected to said
host computer sub-system, said graphics computer sub-system
executing said course upon interrogation by said host computer
sub-system wherein said course includes a series of interrelated
pictures displayed by said graphics computer sub-system, said
series of pictures defining a course responsive to input data
from the user and interactively dialoguing with the user as the
user progresses through said pre-selected course or data base;
....
’404 patent, col. 8, l. 49-col. 9, l. 3 (emphasis added). The district court
construed the operatively connected limitation to mean “the graphics computer
subsystem communicates with the host computer subsystem through an
unmediated mechanism.” Amended Claim Construction Order, slip op. at 1. To
the contrary, the broad language “operatively connected” does not require
communication through an unmediated mechanism.
Claims 1 and 11 use the phrase “operatively connected” to describe the
communications that take place between a graphics computer sub-system and a
host computer sub-system during operation. The claim language does not state
or suggest, however, that these communications must be done on a non-
mediated communication mechanism. While the specification does contemplate
a non-mediated communication mechanism, see ’404 patent, col. 4, ll. 58-59, the
particular communication mechanism in any given system has nothing to do with
the ’404 patent’s improvement over the prior art. In other words, the manner in
which the host system and the graphics system communicate has no bearing on
the modification of one picture or screen without affecting the other screens.
04-1571, 05-1153 9
This feature was the ’404 patent’s key innovation as outlined in the specification
and prosecution history. Thus, this court agrees with IP Innovation that the
operatively connected limitation does not require communication over an
unmediated communication mechanism.
Having determined the proper interpretation of the disputed claim
limitations, the analysis shifts to an examination of the accused products. In all
of the accused products, an HTML file for the first screen is downloaded and
displayed when a user initiates the program. Once the first screen has been
displayed, a user then selects a hyperlink to navigate to the next screen, which
causes the browser to download an HTML file for the next screen and display
that next screen for the user. These screens may be edited independently,
without affecting the other screens. Accordingly, IP Innovation contends that
these screens satisfy the embedded limitation as claimed. IP Innovation
acknowledges, however, that a hyperlink itself is not the actual command code
located in the HTML file, but submits a hyperlink is a graphical representation of
the command code which can be made visible using a “right click” function that is
analogous to the transcriber function disclosed in the ’404 patent. See ’404
patent, col. 7, l. 62-col. 8, l. 6.
Contrary to IP Innovation’s contention, the transcriber function disclosed in
the ’404 patent has nothing in common with the right click function in the accused
products. Rather, the disclosed transcriber function converts unreadable
command code to a human readable font. Notably, the command code in the
’404 patent is still “embedded” in the pixel format of the screen prior to
04-1571, 05-1153 10
transcription, albeit in an unreadable format. ’404 patent, col. 7, l. 58-col. 8, l. 15.
In other words, the code is literally present on the screen but illegible (e.g.,
converted to hash marks or rendered in a color that matches the background
color). In contrast, the command code in an HTML file is not physically present
on the screen. Rather, HTML files direct a browser to retrieve various graphic
files and arrange those graphic files in relation to text in generating a screen
displayed for the user. The generated screen does not actually contain the
HTML command codes themselves; instead, the generated screen is simply a
picture created based on the command codes contained in the HTML file.
By way of analogy, a building does not contain its architectural blueprints
“embedded” thereon. Rather, blueprints determine the location of various pieces
to assemble the building, similar to the manner in which an HTML file is used to
create a picture in the accused products. In contrast, IP Innovation’s disclosed
transcriber is analogous to a magnifying glass used to read the fine print at the
bottom of a form contract – the text is physically “embedded” thereon, but is
simply so small that it is invisible to the naked eye until “converted” or
“transcribed” to a larger size. For at least this reason, the district court properly
concluded that the accused products do not satisfy the embedded limitation, and
thus properly granted summary judgment of no literal infringement.
In addition, the accused products do not satisfy the embedded limitation
under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE). Rather, because the ’404 patent
applicant added the embedded limitation and argued this distinction in traversing
the noted prior art rejection during prosecution, DOE coverage is unavailable.
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See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736
(2002) (narrowing amendment for purposes of patentability); Eagle Comtronics,
Inc. v. Arrow Communication Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(argument-based estoppel); Elkay Mfg. Co. v. EBCO Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (argument-based estoppel). There has been no showing that
any of the so-called Festo exceptions to prosecution history estoppel applies
here. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). Thus, the
district court properly granted summary judgment of non-infringement under the
DOE as well.
Finally, because this court concludes the accused products do not satisfy
the embedded limitation literally or under the DOE, this court need not address
whether or not the accused products satisfy the operatively connected limitation.
Therefore this court affirms the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.
IV.
In Docent’s cross appeal, Docent alleges the district court abused its
discretion in denying its motion for attorney fees. Specifically, Docent argues
that it presented the district court with substantial evidence demonstrating the
baseless nature of IP Innovation’s suit. Docent faults IP Innovation for not
explaining the nature of its case or its infringement position after receiving
Docent’s source code. Essentially, Docent argues that IP Innovation should
have stipulated to non-infringement rather than forcing the defendants to brief the
04-1571, 05-1153 12
summary judgment issues. Docent accuses IP Innovation of being a patent “troll”
that sought to exact a settlement to avoid litigation expenses.
Contrary to Docent’s position, IP Innovation provided both the trial court
and this court with a plausible infringement theory under the claim construction
adopted by the district court and also under IP Innovation’s proposed claim
construction. While both courts rejected IP Innovation’s theories, they were not
so implausible as to suggest the district court abused its discretion in denying the
attorney fee award. Moreover, five companies with products similar to the
defendant’s products took a license to the patented technology, which
inferentially supports IP Innovation’s argument that it had reasonable grounds
upon which to initially bring suit against Docent. Thus, this record does not
suggest that the district court abused its discretion in denying Docent’s motion for
attorney fees.
V.
In conclusion, because the district court properly determined that the
accused products do not satisfy the embedded limitation, this court affirms the
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement to the defendants. Additionally,
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Docent’s motion
for attorney fees, this court also affirms the denial of the fee award requested by
Docent.
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