Chae v. Yellen

Case: 22-2017 Document: 29 Page: 1 Filed: 04/25/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
BYUNGMIN CHAE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
JANET YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
UNITED STATES,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2022-2017
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:20-cv-00316-TMR, Judge Timothy M. Reif.
______________________
Decided: April 25, 2023
______________________
BYUNGMIN CHAE, Elkhorn, NE, pro se.
MARCELLA POWELL, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New
York, NY, for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
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2 CHAE v. YELLEN
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, AIMEE LEE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; MATHIAS RABINOVITCH, Office of
Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation,
United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
New York, NY.
______________________
Before NEWMAN, PROST, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Byungmin Chae appeals the decision of the
United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”), which
sustained the denial of Mr. Chae’s application for a cus-
toms broker license. 1 The CIT affirmed the ruling of United
States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or
“CBP”) that Mr. Chae did not achieve the required passing
grade of at least 75 percent on the Customs Broker License
Examination (“CBLE”), which Mr. Chae sat for in April
2018. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2) (stating that the Secretary
of the Treasury “may conduct an examination to determine
the applicant’s knowledge of customs and related laws, reg-
ulations and procedures, bookkeeping, accounting, and all
other appropriate matters”); 19 C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4) (es-
tablishing “75 percent or higher” as the passing grade on
the CBLE). On appellate review, we affirm the decision of
the CIT denying Mr. Chae’s customs broker license appli-
cation. 2
1 Chae v. Yellen, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2022) (“CIT Op.”).
2 The CBLE is administered twice a year. 19 C.F.R.
§ 111.13(b). “Applicants who fail the examination and do
not receive a passing score can retake the exam without
penalty.” Sec’y Br. 4 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(e)). The rec-
ord before us does not state whether Mr. Chae has retaken
the exam.
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CHAE v. YELLEN 3
BACKGROUND
The CBLE is an 80-question, multiple-choice examina-
tion administered by Customs. The directions for the exam
state that “[e]ach question has a single best answer.”
J.A. 413 (Apr. 25, 2018 CBLE, Directions) (emphasis in
original). It is an open book examination, and applicants
are “responsible for having the following references:”
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States . . .
Title 19, Code of Federal Regulations . . .
Instructions for Preparation of CBP Form 7501 . . .
Right to Make Entry Directive 3530-002A
Id.The examination is initially scored by Customs. After
this initial scoring, 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f) and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1641(e) provide a multitiered system of administrative
and judicial review. If the passing grade of 75% is not at-
tained, the applicant may request an initial administrative
review by the Broker Management Branch of CBP’s Office
of Trade. See 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f). If the applicant’s score
remains below 75% after this initial review, the applicant
may request a second round of administrative review by
the “appropriate Executive Director” of CBP’s Office of
Trade. Id. If an applicant’s score remains below 75% after
exhausting these two levels of administrative review, the
decision to deny a customs broker license may be judicially
appealed to the CIT. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641(e)(1). If the ap-
plicant’s requested relief is still not granted, another level
of judicial review is available, by appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
Mr. Chae initially received a score of 65% on the April
2018 CBLE. J.A. 330. After being notified of this result,
he appealed to CBP’s Office of Trade’s Broker Management
Branch, requesting review of thirteen questions. J.A. 333.
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4 CHAE v. YELLEN
The Broker Management Branch awarded Mr. Chae credit
for two additional answers, raising his score to 67.5%. J.A.
351.
Mr. Chae then appealed the Broker Management
Branch’s decision to the Executive Assistant Commissioner
of CBP’s Office of Trade, requesting review of the remain-
ing eleven questions for which Mr. Chae was denied credit
in his initial administrative appeal. J.A. 354. The Execu-
tive Assistant Commissioner awarded Mr. Chae credit for
three more of his answers, raising his score to 71.25%. J.A.
398.
Mr. Chae then judicially appealed to the CIT, seeking
review of five of the remaining questions for which he had
not received credit. 3 CIT Op. at 1348. The CIT granted Mr.
Chae credit for one question, raising his score to 72.5%.
CIT Op. at 1353. However, his score remained below 75%.
Mr. Chae appeals to our court. He focuses on three of
the remaining questions for which he was denied credit,
pointing out that a decision in his favor on two of these
questions will raise his score to the passing grade 75%.
Chae Br. 3. At issue are Questions 5, 27, and 33 of the
April 2018 CBLE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing CBP’s ultimate licensing decision, “[c]on-
sistent with the broad powers vested in the Secretary [of
the Treasury] for licensing customs brokers under
19 U.S.C. § 1641, the denial of a license can be overturned
only if the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
3 Mr. Chae initially appealed the Executive Assis-
tant Commissioner’s decision to the CIT requesting review
of seven of the remaining questions for which he had not
received credit. J.A. 296. However, Mr. Chae withdrew his
challenges to two of those questions. CIT Op. at 1348 n.3.
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CHAE v. YELLEN 5
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
Kenny v. Snow, 401 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 706).
Within that framework, decisions as to individual
CBLE questions are reviewed for support by substantial
evidence, as detailed in Kenny:
Underpinning a decision to deny a license arising
from an applicant’s failure to pass the licensing ex-
amination are factual determinations grounded in
examination administration issues—[including]
the allowance of credit for answers other than the
official answer—which are subject to limited judi-
cial review because “[t]he findings of the Secretary
[of the Treasury] as to the facts, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”
401 F.3d at 1361 (quoting 19 U.S.C § 1641(e)(3)). In Kenny,
we also wrote that “[o]n questions of substantial evidence,
we review the decisions of the Court of International Trade
‘by stepping into [its] shoes . . . and duplicating its review.’”
Id. (quoting Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. Micron
Tech., Inc., 266 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
The CIT has granted examinees credit on appeal when:
(1) the omission of relevant statutory or regulatory
language would result in the question falsely char-
acterizing the applicable provision, (2) the inclu-
sion or omission of language would result in “the
question’s incorrect use of” a relevant term, or (3)
the inclusion or omission of language would result
in the question “not contain[ing] sufficient infor-
mation [for an applicant] to choose an answer.”
CIT Op. at 1353 (first citing Harak v. United States, 30 Ct.
Int’l Trade 908, 928 (2006); and then quoting O’Quinn v.
United States, 24 Ct. Int’l Trade 324, 328, 100 F. Supp. 2d
1136, 1140 (2000)).
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6 CHAE v. YELLEN
DISCUSSION
To achieve a passing score of at least 75%, Mr. Chae
must obtain credit for at least two of the three questions
discussed in this appeal. Mr. Chae argues that there is
more than one correct answer among the multiple choices
for Question 5, that Question 27 was not sufficiently clear,
and that Question 33 does not provide sufficient infor-
mation to reach the answer selected by Customs. See Chae
Br. 1–2. Conversely, the appellees maintain that there is
a single “best answer” to each question. Sec’y Br. 13, 15,
19.
I.
Question 5
Question 5 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
5. Which of the following customs transactions is
NOT required to be performed by a licensed cus-
toms broker?
A. Temporary Importation under Bond
B. Transportation in bond
C. Permanent Exhibition Bond
D. Trade Fair Entry
E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry
J.A. 417 (emphasis in original).
1. Parties’ Arguments
Mr. Chae selected choice E. Customs designated choice
B as the correct answer.
Mr. Chae does not dispute that choice B is a correct an-
swer; he argues that choice E is also correct. He argues
that “E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry” is correct because
“there is no ‘foreign trade zone entry’ term itself in the reg-
ulation,” and therefore “there is no reason to believe the
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CHAE v. YELLEN 7
entry here is the type of port of entry as claimed by CBP.”
Chae Br. 1. Mr. Chae asserts that, because the term does
not exist within Title 19 of the C.F.R., examinees who are
new to the industry will interpret the term to mean “the
act of bringing [goods] to the U.S. territory,” also noting
that “some shipments can be cleared if you claim your own
goods” under 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(2)(i). Chae Br. 1.
At the CIT, Mr. Chae argued that the “common under-
standing” of the term “entry” could reasonably refer to the
process of “admission” set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1).
See CIT Op. at 1354–55.
The appellees argue that 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a) supports
their position. See Sec’y Br. 13–14. Section 111.2(a)(1) re-
cites a general requirement for a person to obtain a cus-
toms broker license to transact customs business:
General. Except as otherwise provided in para-
graph (a)(2) of this section, a person must obtain
the license provided for in this part in order to
transact customs business as a broker.
19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(1). To support CBP’s selected answer,
appellees point to § 111.2(a)(2), which lists “[t]ransactions
for which license is not required” as follows:
(i) For one’s own account. . . .
(ii) As [an] employee of [a] broker . . . .
(iii) Marine transactions. . . .
(iv) Transportation in bond. . . .
(v) Noncommercial shipments. . . .
(vi) Foreign trade zone activities. . . .
19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(2).
To rebut Mr. Chae’s contentions, the appellees point to
19 C.F.R. § 146.62, titled “Entry” within Part 146 of Title
19 governing “Foreign-Trade Zones,” and argue that a
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8 CHAE v. YELLEN
“question or answer choice need not reflect the precise
wording of the regulation in order to be valid.” Sec’y Br. 13–
14 (quoting Harak, 30 Ct. Int’l Tr. at 922). The appellees
assert that “E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry” reasonably re-
fers to making entry of merchandise from a foreign trade
zone as governed by § 146.62, and that this type of entry is
not exempted from the license requirement set forth in
19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(1).
2. Analysis
Mr. Chae argued to the CIT that “E. Foreign Trade
Zone Entry” in Question 5 does not reasonably clarify
whether it is referring to entry into a foreign trade zone as
governed by 19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1) or entry from a foreign
trade zone as governed by 19 C.F.R. § 146.62. Because the
parties “agree[d] that the process of admission set forth in
[19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1)] does not constitute ‘customs busi-
ness’ that is required to be performed by a licensed customs
broker,” CIT Op. at 1354, we find that CBP’s decision to
deny Mr. Chae credit for Question 5 is not supported by
substantial evidence.
However, granting Mr. Chae credit for his answer to
Question 5 does not, in and of itself, provide the requisite
passing score on the CBLE.
II.
Question 27
Question 27 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
27. Which of the following mail articles are not
subject to examination or inspection by Customs?
A. Bona-fide gifts with an aggregate fair retail
value not exceeding $800 in the country of ship-
ment
B. Mail packages addressed to officials of the U.S.
Government containing merchandise
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CHAE v. YELLEN 9
C. Diplomatic pouches bearing the official seal of
France and certified as only containing documents
D. Personal and household effects of military and
civilian personnel returning to the United States
upon the completion of extended duty abroad
E. Plant material imported by mail for purposes of
immediate exportation by mail
J.A. 425.
1. Parties’ Arguments
Mr. Chae selected choice B. Customs designated choice
C as the correct answer.
Mr. Chae argues that Question 27 was not sufficiently
clear. He states that “cbp can not [sic] assume all packages
quoted in the exam are all international,” so “[a package’s
origin] is not clear if it was not provided.” Chae Br. 2. Mr.
Chae argues that a person taking the examination could
reasonably infer that answer B is referring to packages of
domestic origin. Mr. Chae further argues that “some mer-
chandises are allowed to pass free of duty without issuing
an entry which is not subject to examination or inspection
by CBP” under 19 C.F.R. § 145.37, noting that “without is-
suing an entry cbp can still inspect” is not in Title 19 of the
C.F.R. Chae Br. 2.
Section 145.37 specifies three classes of merchandise
that “shall be passed free of duty without issuing an entry”:
(a) Mail articles for copyright. Mail articles
marked for copyright which are addressed to the
Library of Congress, to the U.S. Copyright Office,
or to the office of the Register of Copyrights, Wash-
ington, DC . . .
(b) Books, engravings, and other articles. [Cer-
tain books, engravings, etchings, and other arti-
cles] when they are addressed to the Library of
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10 CHAE v. YELLEN
Congress or any department or agency of the U.S.
Government.
(c) Official government documents. Other mail
articles addressed to offices or officials of the U.S.
Government, believed to contain only official docu-
ments, [though] [s]uch mail articles, when believed
to contain merchandise, shall be treated in the
same manner as other mail articles of merchandise
so addressed.
19 C.F.R. § 145.37.
The appellees argue that CBP’s designated best answer
is supported by other portions of 19 C.F.R. § 145, including:
§ 145.2(b) Generally. All mail arriving from out-
side the Customs territory of the United States
which is to be delivered within the Customs terri-
tory of the United States . . . is subject to Customs
examination . . .
§ 145.38 Mail articles bearing the official seal of a
foreign government with which the United States
has diplomatic relations, accompanied by certifi-
cates bearing such seal to the effect that they con-
tain only official communications or documents,
shall be admitted free of duty without Customs ex-
amination.
The appellees argue that it is unreasonable for an ex-
aminee to argue that the examination question could relate
to domestic shipments, for the purpose of the exam is “to
determine the applicant’s knowledge of customs and re-
lated laws, regulations and procedures, bookkeeping, ac-
counting, and all other appropriate matters.” Rudloff v.
United States, 19 Ct. Int’l Tr. 1245, 1246–47 (1995) (quot-
ing 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2)). The appellees state that “[a]
reasonable examinee would presume that all answer
choices concerned an importation of mail articles into the
United States.” Sec’y Br. 16.
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CHAE v. YELLEN 11
The appellees then argue that Mr. Chae’s reliance on
19 C.F.R. § 145.37 is “misplaced,” as section 145.37(c) “dis-
tinguishes between mail articles that contain only official
documents and mail articles that contain merchandise.”
Sec’y Br. 16. The appellees point out that, under section
145.37(c), mail articles containing only official documents
are passed free of duty without issuing an entry, while ar-
ticles containing merchandise shall be treated in the same
manner as other mail articles of merchandise so addressed.
See 19 C.F.R. § 145.37(c) supra. Thus the packages con-
taining merchandise mentioned in choice B are subject to
Customs examination in accordance with 19 C.F.R.
§ 145.2(b).
The appellees also argue that section 145.37(c) is not
responsive to Question 27, asserting that section 145.37(c)
“does not address whether certain mail articles are subject
to ‘examination’ by CBP, but rather concerns how the arti-
cles should be treated for entry and duty purposes.” Sec’y.
Br. 17.
2. Analysis
The CIT concluded that “Customs’ decision to deny
[Mr. Chae] credit for Question 27 was supported by sub-
stantial evidence.” CIT Op. at 1361. The CIT determined
that “Customs determined reasonably that Question 27
presumes that the mail articles described in the question
are imported into the United States” based on the purpose
of the CBLE as recited in 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2) and the
references recommended to the examinees in the CBLE’s
directions. Id. at 1360. The CIT also determined that
19 C.F.R. § 145.37(c) distinguishes mail articles that con-
tain official documents from those that contain merchan-
dise. Id. at 1361. The CIT further held that:
19 C.F.R. § 145.37 . . . is not responsive to question
27, which instructs the applicant to determine
“[w]hich of the following mail articles are not sub-
ject to examination or inspection by Customs.”
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12 CHAE v. YELLEN
19 C.F.R. § 145.37 does not address whether cer-
tain mail articles are subject to “examination” or
“inspection” by Customs. Rather, this provision ad-
dresses whether the articles “shall be passed free
of duty without issuing an entry.” Whether an arti-
cle “shall be passed free of duty” is a distinct ques-
tion from whether an article “shall be subject to
examination or inspection by Customs.” On this ba-
sis, 19 C.F.R. § 145.37 does not support plaintiff's
selection of answer choice (B).
CIT Op. at 1361 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
We agree with the CIT that the regulations are suffi-
ciently clear, and that choice B is not a reasonable selection
in light of 19 C.F.R. §§ 145.2(b), 145.37(c), and 145.38. Sec-
tion 145.2(b) states that “[a]ll mail arriving from outside
the Customs territory of the United States which is to be
delivered within the Customs territory of the United
States . . . is subject to Customs examination.” Under
§ 145.37(c), “mail articles [addressed to offices or officials
of the U.S. Government], when believed to contain mer-
chandise, shall be treated in the same manner as other
mail articles of merchandise so addressed.” Thus the pack-
ages in choice B cannot be exempted by section 145.37(c) as
Mr. Chae argues, and must be subject to Customs exami-
nation under section 145.2(b), regardless of any difference
in meaning between “shall be passed free of duty” and “ex-
amination or inspection by Customs.” Section 145.38 di-
rectly supports answer choice C.
Mr. Chae’s additional arguments do not negate the con-
clusion that choice C is the best answer. CBP’s decision to
deny Mr. Chae credit for his answer to Question 27 is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and thus the CIT’s decision
as to this question is affirmed.
III.
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CHAE v. YELLEN 13
Question 33
Question 33 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
33. What is the CLASSIFICATION of current-
production wall art depicting abstract flowers and
birds that is mechanically printed, via lithography,
onto sheets of paper, the paper measuring .35 mm
in thickness that have been permanently mounted
onto a backing of .50 mm thick paperboard?
A. 4911.91.2040
B. 4911.91.3000
C. 4911.99.6000
D. 9701.10.0000
E. 9702.00.0000
J.A. 426 (emphasis in original).
1. Parties’ Arguments
Mr. Chae selected choice E. Customs designated choice
B as the correct answer.
Mr. Chae argues that the wording of Question 33 does
not provide sufficient information to identify the correct
answer. Chae Br. 2 (pointing to ambiguity in Question 33,
stating that “no further detail is identified”). Mr. Chae fo-
cuses on the term “current-production,” arguing that the
term should be construed as describing a “process which
was not discontinued” and that Question 33 identifies “no
further detail on this shipment.” Chae Br. 2. Accordingly,
he asserts that the production date of the lithograph in
Question 33 is ambiguous. The classification that Mr.
Chae selected, 9702.00.0000, covers “[o]riginal engravings,
prints and lithographs, framed or not framed,” with no
mention of the age of the products. Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (2017) Basic Edition
(“HTSUS”), Chapter 97, p. 97-2.
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14 CHAE v. YELLEN
The appellees describe this question as “evaluat[ing]
the ability of an applicant to interpret and apply the
HTSUS” and its General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”).
Sec’y Br. 18 (quoting CIT Op. at 1363). The GRIs are prin-
ciples that govern the classification of goods under the
HTSUS and must be applied in numerical order. See BASF
Corp. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1324, 1325–26. GRI 1
states that “classification [of goods] shall be determined ac-
cording to the terms of the headings and any relative sec-
tion or chapter notes.” HTSUS, GRIs, GN p.1.
Furthermore, we have written that “[s]ection and chapter
notes ‘are not optional interpretive rules, but are statutory
law, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202.’” Aves. in Leather, Inc. v.
United States, 423 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quot-
ing Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States, 347 F.3d 922, 927
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
The appellees support CBP’s designation of choice B as
the best answer by citing HTSUS 4911.91.3000, which co-
vers:
Other printed matter, including printed pictures
and photographs: Other: Pictures, designs and pho-
tographs: Printed not over 20 years at time of im-
portation: Other: Lithographs on paper or
paperboard: Over 0.51 mm in thickness.
HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-4.
The appellees note that the lithograph in Question 33
is described as wall art mechanically printed onto sheets of
“paper measuring .35 mm in thickness that have been per-
manently mounted onto a backing of .50 mm thick paper-
board.” J.A. 426; see also Sec’y Br. 18. Thus “the combined
thickness of the lithograph and its mounting is 0.85 mm,”
Sec’y Br. 19, which is the thickness that should be used for
classification purposes, as explained in HTSUS Chapter
49, Additional U.S. Note 1:
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CHAE v. YELLEN 15
1. For the purposes of determining the classifica-
tion of printed matter produced in whole or in part
by a lithographic process, the thickness of such
printed matter is that of the thinnest paper con-
tained therein, except that the thickness of a per-
manently mounted lithograph is the combined
thickness of the lithograph and its mounting.
HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-1. Thus the appellees argue that
the wall art in Question 33 is a lithograph “[o]ver 0.51 mm
in thickness.” Id. at p. 49-4; see also Sec’y Br. 19.
To rebut Mr. Chae’s contentions, the appellees argue
that “the term ‘current production’ refers to the time in
which the merchandise was printed, and, thus, reasonably
means that the printed lithography is not over 20 years
old.” Sec’y Br. 19–20. The appellees state that “[t]he ques-
tion does not contain the phrase ‘current production pro-
cess’ and ‘[e]xaminees cannot be permitted to reach
conclusions by taking a portion of the question and formu-
lating their own factual scenarios.’” Id. at 20 (quoting
Dunn-Heiser v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Tr. 552, 559–60
(2005)). Appellees also note that “[e]xaminees . . . are not
permitted to ‘unilaterally rewrite the question.’” Id. (quot-
ing Dunn-Heiser, 29 Ct. Int’l Tr. at 560).
The appellees also argue Mr. Chae’s answer, choice E,
cannot be correct considering HTSUS Chapter 97, Note 2:
2. For the purposes of heading 9702, the expression
“original engravings, prints and lithographs”
means impressions produced directly, in black and
white or in color, of one or of several plates wholly
executed by hand by the artist, irrespective of the
process or of the material employed by him, but not
including any mechanical or photomechanical pro-
cess.
HTSUS, Chapter 97, p. 97-1 (emphasis in original).
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16 CHAE v. YELLEN
2. Analysis
HTSUS Chapter 97, Note 2 explicitly excludes litho-
graphs produced by “any mechanical or photomechanical
process” from heading 9702. Id. Although the description
of “current-production” strains the application of “[p]rinted
not over 20 years at time of importation,” it is not incon-
sistent. J.A. 426; HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-4. We agree
with the CIT “that Customs’ decision to deny [Mr. Chae]
credit for [Q]uestion 33 was supported by substantial evi-
dence.” CIT. Op. at 1364.
We conclude that CBP’s decision to deny Mr. Chae
credit for his answer to Question 33 is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and thus the CIT’s decision as to this
question is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the CIT’s decision on Questions 27 and 33.
Thus even though we find CBP’s denial of credit for Ques-
tion 5 unsupported by substantial evidence, Mr. Chae can-
not attain a passing grade of at least 75%. Absence of a
passing grade on the CBLE constitutes lawful grounds for
denial of Mr. Chae’s application for a customs broker li-
cense. See Kenny, 401 F.3d at 1361 (“Among the lawful
grounds for denying a license is the failure to pass the li-
censing examination.” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2); 19
C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4); 19 C.F.R. § 111.16(b)(2))). CBP’s de-
nial of Mr. Chae’s application is not arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law. The CIT’s decision is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Each party shall bear its costs.