Rickel v. Navy

Case: 20-2147 Document: 47 Page: 1 Filed: 04/18/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DAVID A. RICKEL,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Respondent
______________________
2020-2147
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. AT-1221-19-0576-W-1.
______________________
Decided: April 18, 2022
______________________
DONALD E. PINAUD, JR., Law Office of Don Pinaud, All
Florida Justice, LLC, Jacksonville, FL, argued for peti-
tioner.
ALISON VICKS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON, ALLISON KIDD-MILLER, ROBERT EDWARD
KIRSCHMAN, JR.
______________________
Before LOURIE, HUGHES, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
Judges.
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2 RICKEL v. NAVY
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
David A. Rickel appeals a decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board finding that the Department of the Navy
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have removed Mr. Rickel even absent his protected whis-
tleblowing activity. Because substantial evidence supports
the Board’s conclusion that the agency met its clear and
convincing burden, we affirm.
I
A
Mr. Rickel was a Fire Protection Specialist with the
First Coast Navy Fire and Emergency Services (Fire Ser-
vices) at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. In 2014, the De-
partment of Navy appointed him—in his role as Fire
Protection Specialist—to Assistant Chief of Training. In
this position, Mr. Rickel was responsible for determining
training requirements for the department, reviewing train-
ing records and charts, and ensuring that the Fire Services
firefighters’ certifications were maintained and current. He
was the only Fire Services employee assigned to the Fire
Services training department.
In late 2016, Mr. Rickel applied for the department’s
open Deputy Fire Chief position. Fire Chief Mark Brusoe
ultimately selected James Gray, an Assistant Chief of Op-
erations with the Fire Services. The agency promoted
Mr. Gray to Deputy Fire Chief. In an email sent to Chief
Brusoe, Mr. Rickel questioned the promotion and
Mr. Gray’s candor in his application, requesting infor-
mation about the selection process and “feedback concern-
ing his questions from the Executive Officers and from HR
personnel ‘so that [he] may be a better competitor in the
future.’” Appx8. He also “alleg[ed] that at least 5 unidenti-
fied candidates had been promoted to ‘upper level positions’
who lacked either credentials or other stated require-
ments” and “that unidentified lower level employees had
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RICKEL v. NAVY 3
failed to meet the minimum standards required for their
positions,” requesting that “a minimum requirement re-
view be conducted by a neutral third party” because “such
appointments pose[] a ‘life safety risk’ to the Navy, its ser-
vice members and their families,” and others. Appx8.
In April 2017, Deputy Chief Gray emailed Mr. Rickel
explaining that the department had taken a “big hit” on
training during the last inspection and suggesting that the
department begin addressing the concerns about its train-
ing program by getting the training records “up to speed.”
Appx10. Deputy Chief Gray shared a “Self Inspection
List”—which listed the minimum requirements for the
training records—and directed Mr. Rickel “to proceed as he
saw fit.” Appx10. In an email responding to Deputy
Chief Gray, Mr. Rickel tried to shift past and future re-
sponsibility away from himself by: questioning Deputy
Chief Gray’s authority as his supervisor; asserting that
Chief Brusoe, who was listed as his supervisor, had already
discussed those items with him; claiming that his position
as Assistant Chief of Training required him to review rec-
ords, not maintain them; disclaiming responsibility for the
inspection “hits” to their training program and blaming
such hits on supervisors’ failures; and contending that no
inspector had spoken with Mr. Rickel or asked him about
the training program. Appx10. Chief Brusoe informed
Mr. Rickel that Deputy Chief Gray was his first-level su-
pervisor and that Mr. Rickel’s position description would
be corrected to reflect that.
On June 15, 2017, Deputy Chief Gray instructed
Mr. Rickel to update the training records by July 15. In do-
ing so, Deputy Chief Gray provided Mr. Rickel with sup-
porting documentation to assure Mr. Rickel that such a
task was within his duties and job description as Assistant
Chief of Training. Mr. Rickel responded that the task was
outside the scope of his position. Still, he informed Deputy
Chief Gray that he would comply with the directive. About
a month and a half after his initial request, and about three
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4 RICKEL v. NAVY
weeks after the due date, Deputy Chief Gray requested a
progress update on August 3 and, having not received a re-
sponse, again on August 7, 2017. In response, Mr. Rickel
reiterated his disagreement that his job description encom-
passed maintenance of the training records and requested
a meeting with Deputy Chief Gray in the presence of a un-
ion representative. Three days later, on August 10, Captain
Michael Connor, the Executive Officer of Naval Air Station
Jacksonville at the time, 1 confirmed that the task was
within Mr. Rickel’s duties and responsibilities.
After discovering that the records were “all outdated,”
Chief Brusoe directed Mr. Rickel, in December 2018, to fix
the training records. Appx33–34. He “noted that there were
records for personnel that had ‘left years ago,’” provided in-
structions on specific updates that were needed, and di-
rected Mr. Rickel to complete the task by January 1, 2019.
Appx34. Deputy Chief Gray requested a progress update
from Mr. Rickel on January 25, 2019, over three weeks af-
ter the initial due date, reminding Mr. Rickel that the in-
spection team was due for a visit soon and that the
department wanted to avoid “a hit on something we can
have done before they get here.” Appx34. Receiving no re-
sponse, Deputy Chief Gray emailed Mr. Rickel on January
31, asking for a status report by close of business that day.
The next day, Mr. Rickel informed Deputy Chief Gray that
he had not completed the task.
During Mr. Rickel’s mid-year performance review on
February 13, 2019, Deputy Chief Gray pointed out that
Mr. Rickel had not completed certification packets and in-
formed him that personnel were concerned about having to
repeat classes or packages. Deputy Chief Gray reminded
1 Captain Brian Weiss replaced Captain Michael
Connor as the Executive Offer of Naval Air Station Jack-
sonville, and Captain Weiss was the deciding official in
Mr. Rickel’s case.
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RICKEL v. NAVY 5
him that this was part of his job description; it was his re-
sponsibility to monitor progress and to keep personnel in-
formed of their respective training timelines so that they
would not have to repeat a course. Mr. Rickel continued to
disagree.
Despite instructions from Chief Brusoe and Deputy
Chief Gray to update the training records, as of March 5,
2019, Mr. Rickel still had not completed the task. Deputy
Chief Gray informed him that he was taking the task away
from him and assigning it to himself. Deputy Chief Gray
documented, in a memorandum, the steps he took between
March 5 and March 25 to update the records, noting that it
only took about 16.5 hours to “get the folders done and in-
spection ready” and that he had updated the training rec-
ords “in addition to performing [his] duties as the Deputy
Chief.” Appx37.
Following this series of events, Chief Brusoe proposed
to remove Mr. Rickel from federal service for failure to fol-
low instructions. On June 7, 2019, Captain Brian Weiss,
the deciding official, issued his decision to remove
Mr. Rickel. The agency terminated him the next day.
B
Mr. Rickel filed an appeal with the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board alleging that his removal was the result of
unlawful retaliation against him for his protected disclo-
sures. The Board found that the agency had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Rickel had failed to
follow instructions and that the penalty of removal, though
harsh, did not exceed the tolerable bounds of reasonable-
ness.
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6 RICKEL v. NAVY
The Board also found that Mr. Rickel had established
that he had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity 2
and that such activity was a contributing factor in the de-
cision to remove him. 3 But, according to the Board, the
agency had proven “by clear and convincing evidence that
it would have removed [Mr. Rickel] even in the absence of
his protected activity.” Appx78. In making this last finding,
the Board considered the three Carr factors:
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support
of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any
2 Specifically, Mr. Rickel had established that he
had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity by “par-
ticipating in his IRA appeal” and “making protected disclo-
sures regarding the following matters”: (1) agency
managers allegedly violating HIPAA by requiring
Mr. Rickel to provide them with his personal information;
(2) the fire department allegedly “cheating” during evalua-
tion exercises; (3) Deputy Chief Gray allegedly falsifying
his resume by claiming experience that he did not have;
(4) Chief Brusoe, Deputy Chief Gray, and former Deputy
Chief James Sherer allegedly lacking the specialized expe-
rience to serve as Incident Commander during a shipboard
emergency; (5) Assistant Chief Tom Lyszkowski allegedly
being placed in an operational status before he had suffi-
ciently recovered to meet the physical requirements of his
position; and (6) the fire inspectors allegedly falsified build-
ing inspection reports being submitted. See Appx46–73.
3 Specifically, Mr. Rickel established the following
protected whistleblowing activity met the knowledge/tim-
ing test and was more likely than not a contributing factor
in the decision to remove him: (1) Mr. Rickel’s IRA appeal,
(2) his HIPAA-related disclosures, (3) his disclosures re-
garding the fire department “cheating,” and (4) his disclo-
sures regarding Deputy Chief Gray falsifying his resume.
See Appx74–78.
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RICKEL v. NAVY 7
motive to retaliate on the part of the agency’s offi-
cials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any
evidence that the agency takes similar action
against employees who did not engage in protected
activity but who are otherwise similarly situated.
Appx79 (citing Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
Regarding Carr factor one, the Board found that “the
agency presented strong evidence in support of its action.”
Appx79. The Board iterated that “the record clearly estab-
lished that [Chief] Brusoe properly directed [Mr. Rickel] to
fix the department’s training records by a particular date,
that the assigned task squarely fell within the duties and
responsibilities of [Mr. Rickel’s] position despite his ada-
mant insistence to the contrary, and, even if the excuses
[Mr. Rickel] offered might be viewed as justifying his fail-
ure to complete the task by the original date [Chief] Brusoe
set, [Mr. Rickel] had not completed updating the depart-
ment’s training records in the 2 months after that date
passed.” Appx79. The Board further noted that, “while the
penalty the agency imposed was undoubtedly harsh, the
primary basis for [Captain] Weiss’s decision to impose the
penalty of removal, [i.e., Mr. Rickel’s] failure to demon-
strate rehabilitative potential by acknowledging his mis-
conduct, expressing contrition, or accepting any
responsibility for his failure, [was] also well-supported by
the record.” Appx79–80. Thus, the Board decided, “the
strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action
weigh[ed] heavily in the agency’s favor.” Appx80.
Regarding Carr factor two, the Board found “that [Cap-
tain] Weiss had only a weak motive to retaliate against
[Mr. Rickel], and that while [Chief] Brusoe had a some-
what stronger motive to retaliate against [Mr. Rickel] on
the basis of his protected whistleblowing activity, even
[Chief] Brusoe’s motive to retaliate was tempered by the
fact that he did not suffer any significant adverse
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8 RICKEL v. NAVY
consequences as a result of [Mr. Rickel’s] protected activ-
ity.” Appx82.
Regarding Carr factor three, the Board observed that
“[t]he record contains very little evidence pertinent to [this]
factor, i.e., any evidence that the agency takes similar ac-
tions against employees who did not engage in protected
activity but who are otherwise similarly situated.” Appx82.
According to the Board, the agency did not present any ev-
idence suggesting that “it had ever disciplined a similarly
situated fire department employee who was not a whistle-
blower. At best, during questioning by agency counsel,
[Mr. Rickel] conceded that the agency had not removed an-
other whistleblower who was an employee of the fire de-
partment.” Appx82. But, as the Board stated, “the relevant
comparison is between the whistleblowing-appellant and a
similarly situated non-whistleblower,” not a comparison
between two whistleblowers. Appx82. The Board thus
found Mr. Rickel’s concession irrelevant.
Although Mr. Rickel “identified numerous incidents
during which unnamed fire department employees alleg-
edly committed misconduct for which they allegedly re-
ceived no punishment,” the Board found that:
(1) Mr. Rickel was not “in a position to know whether any
particular employee received discipline for any particular
act of misconduct”; (2) it was not clear “whether these un-
named employees were whistleblowers or not” or whether
Mr. Rickel “would have been in a position to know whether
any of these employees had engaged in whistleblowing ac-
tivity”; and (3) “none of the incidents [Mr. Rickel] described
involved an employee who failed to follow a supervisor’s in-
structions with respect to performing a particular duty en-
compassed within the responsibilities of that employee’s
position.” Appx83. The Board accordingly found “that the
incidents [Mr. Rickel] identified” do not support or estab-
lish that he “was treated more harshly than a similarly-
situated non-whistleblower.” Appx83–84.
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RICKEL v. NAVY 9
The Board ultimately “conclude[d] that neither party
has offered evidence relevant to the third Carr factor” and
that, “[i]n accordance with Whitmore,” it was “appropriate
to remove consideration of the third Carr factor in this
case.” Appx84 (citing Whitmore v. Dep’t of Lab., 680 F.3d
1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The Board further concluded
that, “given the strength of the agency’s evidence in sup-
port of its action against [Mr. Rickel] and the relative
weakness of any motive to retaliate against [him], particu-
larly with respect to the decision-maker, [Captain] Weiss,”
the agency had “carried its burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence that it would have removed
[Mr. Rickel] even in the absence of his protected whistle-
blowing activity.” Appx84.
Mr. Rickel timely petitioned for review. We have juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
II
“The scope of our review of a decision of the Board is
limited.” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1321. By statute, we set aside
the judgment of the Board only if the decision is “(1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c).
III
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) prohibits an agency from penaliz-
ing its employees for whistleblowing. “An employee who be-
lieves he has been subjected to illegal retaliation must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he made a
protected disclosure that contributed to the agency’s action
against him.” Smith v. GSA, 930 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2019). “If the employee establishes this prima facie case of
reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden of persuasion shifts
to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that
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10 RICKEL v. NAVY
it would have taken ‘the same personnel action in the ab-
sence of such disclosure,’ which we sometimes refer to as a
showing of ‘independent causation.’” Miller v. DOJ,
842 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In
determining whether the agency has carried its burden,
the Board considers the three nonexclusive Carr factors.
See Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323.
Here, Mr. Rickel concedes that the agency “sufficiently
proved that [he had] failed to follow instructions” and “that
the penalty of removal did not exceed the tolerable bounds
of reasonableness.” Appellant’s Br. 13–14. He also “does
not contest that as to the first Carr factor, ‘the strength of
the [a]gency’s evidence in support of removal,’ the [a]gency
presented substantial evidence that this factor weigh[s] in
favor of the [a]gency meeting its burden.” Id. at 27–28 (ci-
tation omitted). Nor does he take issue with the Board’s
findings as to the second Carr factor—i.e., “that [Captain]
Weiss had a ‘weak’ motive to improperly retaliate against
him” or that Chief Brusoe “had a ‘stronger’ motive [than
Captain Weiss] to do so.” Id. at 28. Rather, Mr. Rickel chal-
lenges only the Board’s application of the third Carr factor.
A
Mr. Rickel first contends that the Board failed to con-
sider Captain Weiss’s testimony and therefore improperly
disregarded evidence relevant to Carr factor three. Cap-
tain Weiss had testified that: (1) before Mr. Rickel, he had
not terminated an employee for one charge of failure to fol-
low instructions during approximately 23 years of his 25-
year naval career; and (2) he “was not . . . aware of any
other supervisor ever terminating an employee at the GS-
11 Level (like [Mr.] Rickel) for a single charge of failure to
follow instructions.” Appellant’s Br. 18 (emphasis omitted).
Mr. Rickel asserts that this testimony should have been
treated as “evidence of how the [a]gency has treated other
employees charged with a single count of failure to follow
instructions” and that it “was reversible error” not to
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RICKEL v. NAVY 11
consider this testimony because Carr requires the Board
“to consider all evidence when evaluating and applying the
three prong test.” Id. at 21. We disagree.
Under Carr factor three, the Board “examines the
agency’s treatment of non-whistleblower employees ac-
cused of similar misconduct.” Siler v. EPA, 908 F.3d 1291,
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “The third Carr factor looks at ‘any
evidence that the agency takes similar actions against em-
ployees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
similarly situated.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 842 F.3d at 1262).
Here, Captain Weiss’s testimony does not address or iden-
tify any employee who engaged in misconduct similar to
Mr. Rickel’s. Rather, Captain Weiss testified that he was
unaware of an employee who had engaged in similar con-
duct and whom the agency had terminated. In the absence
of other record evidence, such testimony suggests only that
there is no record evidence regarding whether the agency
has taken similar actions with respect to employees who
are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly sit-
uated. See Ingram v. Dep’t of the Army, 777 F. App’x 980,
983–84 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Though the absence of evidence
regarding similarly situated employees cannot favor the
government, ‘the absence of any evidence relating to Carr
factor three can effectively remove that factor from the
analysis.’” (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374) (citing
Siler, 908 F.3d at 1299)).
Moreover, “[f]or an employee to be considered similarly
situated to an individual who is disciplined, it must be
shown that the conduct and the circumstances surrounding
the conduct of the comparison employee are similar to those
of the disciplined individual.” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326–27
(emphasis added). So, here, there would need to be some
evidence tying Captain Weiss’s testimony to an actual em-
ployee and, more specifically, to a comparison employee
that had engaged in misconduct similar to Mr. Rickel’s.
Even if Captain Weiss’s testimony did suggest that no em-
ployee has been disciplined in a similar manner to
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12 RICKEL v. NAVY
Mr. Rickel, this does not lay the foundation for establishing
that a comparison employee exists. See Whitmore, 680 F.3d
at 1373–74 (“Differences in kind and degrees of conduct be-
tween otherwise similarly situated persons within an
agency can and should be accounted for to arrive at a well
reasoned conclusion regarding Carr factor three, particu-
larly where, as here, there was only a single person in the
record for which a comparison can be made . . . .”). And no
such evidence otherwise exists in the record.
B
Mr. Rickel also argues that, “[i]n a case such as this,
where all officials involved in removal are found to have to
some extent an improper motive to remove the employee,
and at least one has a ‘stronger’ improper motive[,] . . . jus-
tice and a furtherance of the intent of Congress requires
that an agency provide some degree of evidence as to Carr
factor three, not that it be wholly ignored.” Appellant’s
Br. 22. In other words, Mr. Rickel asserts that we “should
create a bright-line rule” requiring the agency to “produce[]
some evidence in support of Carr factor three” to meet its
burden in removal cases where the Board finds that there
is “some motivation to retaliate against the [removed] em-
ployee, and one or more [of the decision makers] has more
than a ‘weak’ motive.” Id. We decline to do so.
The third Carr factor is one of “three nonexclusive fac-
tors” the Board considers when evaluating whether an
agency has “show[n] by clear and convincing evidence that
it would have taken ‘the same personnel action in the ab-
sence of [a protected] disclosure.” Smith, 930 F.3d at 1365
(citation omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). These “fac-
tors are merely appropriate and pertinent considerations
for determining whether the agency” has carried this bur-
den. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374. But, as we have repeat-
edly explained, “Carr imposes no affirmative burden on the
agency to produce evidence for each of the three factors.”
Smith, 930 F.3d at 1366; see also Staley v. Dep’t of Veterans
Case: 20-2147 Document: 47 Page: 13 Filed: 04/18/2022
RICKEL v. NAVY 13
Affs., No. 2020-2127, 2021 WL 2965007, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
July 15, 2021) (“An agency is not required to produce evi-
dence with respect to each and every one of these factors.”).
The proper inquiry still remains whether the agency would
have taken the same action, absent the whistleblowing. See
Smith, 930 F.3d at 1366; Miller, 842 F.3d at 1257 (“The is-
sue . . . is whether substantial evidence supports the
Board’s determination that the [agency] showed independ-
ent causation by clear and convincing evidence.”); Ingram,
777 F. App’x at 983 (“Carr does not require that each of the
three factors individually weigh in favor of the agency.”).
Indeed, we have repeatedly stated that the agency “need
not produce evidence with regard to each of the[] factors,
nor must each factor weigh in favor of the agency for [it] to
carry its burden.” Robinson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 923
F.3d 1004, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
While we have said that “the Board cannot ignore rec-
ord evidence relevant to the existence and strength of any
motive to retaliate or the treatment of similar employees,”
Smith, 930 F.3d at 1366, what Mr. Rickel requests—with
his bright-line rule proposal—is that we enhance an
agency’s burden of production with respect to Carr factor
three in all removal cases where Carr factor two nominally
favors the employee. Mr. Rickel would have us review the
Board’s findings with respect to each Carr factor inde-
pendently and then apply a different standard if the evi-
dence for Carr factor two favors the employee and if there
is no evidence pertinent to Carr factor three. 4 But we have
4 In doing so, Mr. Rickel ignores the Board’s express
observation that Chief “Brusoe’s motive to retaliate was
tempered by the fact that he did not suffer any significant
adverse consequences as a result of [Mr. Rickel’s] protected
activity.” Appx82; see Amirmokri v. DOE, 310 F. App’x 410,
414 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Board’s determination that the
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14 RICKEL v. NAVY
said that “the absence of any evidence relating to Carr fac-
tor three can effectively remove that factor from the analy-
sis.” Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374; see Ingram, 777 F. App’x
at 983–84 (“Though the absence of evidence regarding sim-
ilarly situated employees cannot favor the government, ‘the
absence of any evidence related to Carr factor three can ef-
fectively remove that factor from the analysis.’” (citation
omitted)). Because the agency need not prove every factor
weighs in its favor, the absence of evidence related to Carr
factor three is not fatal to the agency.
We instead “consider the record as a whole and balance
the Carr factors to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the Board’s finding that the [agency] clearly and
convincingly proved it would have removed [the employee]
independent of his protected disclosures.” Robinson, 923
F.3d at 1019; see also Ingram, 777 F. App’x at 984 (“The
lack of evidence on the third Carr factor appears neutral,
and we hold substantial evidence supports the AJ’s finding
that the evidence supporting the first two Carr factors car-
ries the Army’s burden.”). And our consideration of Carr
factors one and two should not transform the Board’s three-
factor balancing test into a production requirement for the
agency with respect to Carr factor three simply because
Carr factor two weighs nominally in the employee’s favor.
Thus, while it is true that “the absence of any evidence con-
cerning Carr factor three may well cause the agency to fail
its case overall,” it will not necessarily do so. Whitmore, 680
F.3d at 1374; Siler, 980 F.3d at 1299.
Deputy Director of Nuclear Operations had little or no mo-
tive to retaliate was amply supported by evidence that the
supervisor had suffered no adverse consequences from
Mr. Amirmokri’s protected disclosures.”).
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RICKEL v. NAVY 15
IV
It is not for this court to reweigh evidence on appeal.
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that
the agency met its clear and convincing burden, particu-
larly when “considering the evidence in the aggregate, in-
cluding the strength of Carr factor one.” Robinson, 923
F.3d at 1020.
AFFIRMED
No costs.