Adera v. United States

Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 1 Filed: 06/02/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
HAILU ADERA,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2022-1074
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:20-cv-01040-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis.
______________________
Decided: June 2, 2023
______________________
HAILU ADERA, Alexandria, VA, pro se.
STEPHANIE FLEMING, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before CHEN, CLEVENGER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
Judges.
Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 2 Filed: 06/02/2023
2 ADERA v. US
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Hailu Adera appeals from a deci-
sion of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims
Court”) dismissing his claims as barred by the statute of
limitations. Adera v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 553 (2021)
(“Decision”). Because Mr. Adera’s claims are time barred,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Adera alleges that his physician certified that he
became “totally and permanently disabled” by August 4,
1995. 1 App. 35. 2 In 2003, he applied for a disability dis-
charge of his student loan through the guaranty agency for
his loan, USA Funds. Id. USA Funds issued a favorable
preliminary disability determination and informed Mr.
Adera that his application would be sent to the Department
of Education for review. Id. While the Department of Ed-
ucation was considering his application, Mr. Adera’s stu-
dent loan payments were suspended. Id. at 113. He
submitted a second application for disability discharge
through USA Funds in October 2004. Id. at 35. Mr.
Adera’s application was ultimately denied. Id. By Septem-
ber 2006, the Department reinstated his loan and de-
manded repayment. Id.
Mr. Adera complained to the Ombudsman responsible
for facilitating a response to his student loan dispute.
App. 35, 47–48. In November 2006, the Ombudsman sum-
marized Mr. Adera’s loan history, explaining that Mr.
Adera’s loan had been assigned to the “Educational Credit
Management Corporation (ECMC),” App. 48, and that Mr.
Adera applied for total and permanent disability with
1 Mr. Adera’s condition improved sometime around
2005, which allowed him to obtain employment with the
Federal Government, where he continues to work. App. 35.
2 App. refers to a non-confidential appendix filed by
Mr. Adera, ECF No. 40.
Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 3 Filed: 06/02/2023
ADERA v. US 3
ECMC in October 2003, and that ECMC “determined that
[he] did not meet the medical review portion of the disabil-
ity.” App. 81–82.
Mr. Adera alleges that, nearly a decade later, the De-
partment contradicted its earlier statements about ECMC
and confirmed that USA Funds was the guarantor on his
loan. App. 36. Mr. Adera then submitted inquiries under
the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),
through which he obtained several documents regarding
his current claims. Id. Those documents showed the De-
partment changed Mr. Adera’s loan status from “defaulted”
to “disabled,” effective October 29, 2003, and denied his dis-
charge application received in April 2005 because his phy-
sician had not shown he was disabled “at that time.” Id.
Mr. Adera filed suit in the Claims Court on August 12,
2020, seeking to recover $26,360.97 in payments made on
his student loan that he asserts should have been dis-
charged under § 437(a) of the Higher Education Act
(“HEA”), codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) with the applicable
regulation at 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c). 3 App. 17, 32–33,
37–38. Specifically, Mr. Adera argued that (1) the HEA
creates a money-mandating claim; (2) the Department’s de-
mand for loan repayment was an illegal exaction; and (3)
the Department’s demand for loan repayment violated his
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Appel-
lant’s Br. 2; App. 32–33. He alleged that he did not and
could not have known of his rights before 2017 because the
government’s actions were “inherently unknowable.” App.
36. He based this allegation on the Department’s failure
“to issue required notices informing [him] of its actions”
3 Because Mr. Adera submitted his final application
for disability discharge of his loan debt in October 2004, all
references to the HEA and its implementing regulation are
to the versions in effect at that time. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(effective until June 30, 2006); 34 C.F.R. § 682.402 (effec-
tive until Sept. 7, 2006).
Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 4 Filed: 06/02/2023
4 ADERA v. US
and its concealment of the status of his applications based
on “contradictory and untrue statements about their han-
dling and disposition.” Id.The Claims Court dismissed Mr. Adera’s claims as
barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Decision, 155
Fed. Cl. at 555; 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The Claims Court deter-
mined that Mr. Adera’s claims accrued by at least Novem-
ber 2006—more than a decade before he filed his
complaint—when the Ombudsman informed Mr. Adera
that he did not meet the medical requirements for a disa-
bility discharge. Decision, 155 Fed. Cl. at 559. The Claims
Court also rejected Mr. Adera’s argument that the accrual
of his claims should be suspended based on the Govern-
ment’s concealment of his claims or that his claims were
inherently unknowable because the Department’s Septem-
ber 2006 demand for repayment of Mr. Adera’s loan and
the November 2006 letter regarding his failure to meet the
requirements for a disability discharge put him on notice
that his discharge applications had been denied. Id. at
559–61.
Mr. Adera appeals from the dismissal of his claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
A claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, in the
Claims Court must be brought “within six years after such
claim first accrues.” Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d
1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501); see
also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 134 (2008) (holding that § 2501 sets forth a “more ab-
solute, kind of limitations period” and is not subject to eq-
uitable tolling). “We review whether a claim is barred by
the statute of limitations de novo[.]” Katzin, 908 F.3d at
1358 (citing Brown v. United States, 195 F.3d 1334, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). In reviewing the propriety of the court’s
dismissal, we accept as true the facts alleged in the com-
plaint. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d
1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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ADERA v. US 5
Mr. Adera argues that according to Friedman v. United
States, 310 F.2d 381 (Ct. Cl. 1963), his claims would only
accrue “when the agency official has rendered or refused a
determination,” which, he argues, never happened here.
Appellant’s Br. 12–16. Mr. Adera also challenges
(1) whether the Secretary made a determination in April
2005; and (2) whether the Education Department condi-
tionally discharged his loan in 2003 and never acted on
that discharge. Id. at 17–20. Because the Department al-
legedly never made a decision or gave notice of that deci-
sion to Mr. Adera, he argues it remains an open question
“[w]hether and when the Secretary completed the adminis-
trative process.” Id. at 20.
The government argues that the Claims Court cor-
rectly found that Mr. Adera’s claims are time barred. Ap-
pellee’s Br. 12–15. Even if Mr. Adera never received formal
notice that the Department denied his discharge applica-
tions, Mr. Adera received notice in September 2006 that
the Department “reinstated [his] loan and demanded pay-
ment” and, thus, he should have known that his claims had
accrued. Id. at 13–14; App. 35. The government further
argues that Mr. Adera’s subsequent negotiations with the
Department about payments demonstrates that he knew
his discharge had not been granted. Appellee’s Br. 14; App.
35. This understanding is consistent with the Depart-
ment’s November 2006 letter to Mr. Adera indicating that
he did not meet the medical review criteria for total and
permanent disability. Appellee’s Br. 14; App. 81–82.
We first discuss the legal framework to determine the
accrual date of Mr. Adera’s claims. Next, we analyze Mr.
Adera’s claims under that framework.
A. Legal Framework
A claim against the United States first accrues on the
date when “all events have occurred that are necessary to
enable the plaintiff to bring suit.” Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). Ad-
ditionally, under the “accrual suspension” rule, “the
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6 ADERA v. US
running of the statute will be suspended when an accrual
date has been ascertained, but plaintiff does not know of
his claim.” Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). As a judicial interpretation of a legislative enact-
ment, however, this rule is “strictly and narrowly applied.”
Id. A plaintiff must show the defendant “concealed its acts
with the result that plaintiff was unaware of their exist-
ence” or that the injury was “inherently unknowable” at
the accrual date. Id. (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).
The Claims Court concluded that the earliest accrual
date for claims arising under § 682.402(c)(1)(i) is when the
Department of Education takes action on a plaintiff’s ap-
plication for loan discharge. See, e.g., Decision at 559 (cit-
ing Lankster v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 747, 755 (2009)).
We agree with the Claims Court’s analysis regarding the
accrual date.
The Claims Court in Lankster relied on our decisions
in Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1313, and Chambers v. United
States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Lankster, 87
Fed. Cl. at 754. In Martinez, we concluded that Mr. Mar-
tinez’s accrual suspension argument failed because he “was
not unaware of the existence of his injury and the acts giv-
ing rise to his claim.” 333 F.3d at 1319. Indeed, Mr. Mar-
tinez “was fully aware of the injury he had suffered at the
time he was separated from active duty[.]” Id. By contrast,
in Chambers, we held that a veteran’s claim of entitlement
to disability retirement pay did not accrue until the mili-
tary board denied or refused to hear the veteran’s claim be-
cause applying to the appropriate board was a prerequisite
to securing disability retirement pay. 4 417 F.3d at
4 While acknowledging that the denial of a veteran’s
petition—not his discharge—triggered the statute of limi-
tations in that case, we also explained that circumstances
may exist where the veteran’s failure to petition for
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ADERA v. US 7
1224–25, 1227 (“Chambers’ cause of action for disability re-
tirement benefits in the Court of Federal Claims did not
accrue until the ABCMR, the first competent board, finally
denied his claim[.]”). Applying these principles in the con-
text of loan discharges based on disability, the Claims
Court reasoned that § 682.402(c)(1)(i) required a claimant
to apply for a loan discharge before being eligible to bring
suit, meaning that the accrual date could not arise until
the Department acted on that application. Lankster, 87
Fed. Cl. at 754–55.
20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) instructs that if a student borrower
“becomes permanently and totally disabled (as determined
in accordance with regulations of the Secretary), then the
Secretary shall discharge the borrower’s liability on the
loan.” Turning to the corresponding regulations, 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.402(c)(1)(i) states that “[i]f the borrower satisfies the
criteria for a total and permanent disability discharge . . .
the balance of the loan is discharged . . . and any payments
received after the date the borrower became totally and
permanently disabled as certified under § 682.402(c)(2),
are returned to the sender.” Section 682.402(c)(1)(i) also
states that “[i]f the Secretary has made an initial determi-
nation that the borrower is totally and permanently disa-
bled,” the loan will be “conditionally discharged for up to
three years from the date that the borrower became totally
and permanently disabled, as certified by a physician.” Id.
We agree that Mr. Adera’s claims to remedy an allegedly
improper discharge decision do not accrue unless and until
he applied to the Department for discharge of his loan and
the Department denied or otherwise refused to act on his
disability retirement pay may trigger the statute of limita-
tions, such as when the veteran “has sufficient actual or
constructive notice of his disability, and hence, of his enti-
tlement to disability retirement pay, at the time of dis-
charge.” Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1226 (citing Real v. United
States, 906 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 8 Filed: 06/02/2023
8 ADERA v. US
application. Decision, 155 Fed. Cl. at 559 (citing Lankster,
87 Fed. Cl. at 755).
B. Mr. Adera’s Claims
Because Mr. Adera did not bring his claims within six
years of their accrual, we agree with the Claims Court that
his claims are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Decision, 155
Fed. Cl. at 558.
Mr. Adera asserts that there is no evidence that the
Department “ever rendered the mandatory decision,” sug-
gesting his claims never accrued for purposes of the six-
year statute of limitations. Appellant’s Br. 16. We disa-
gree. Contrary to Mr. Adera’s arguments on appeal, the
Department did deny Mr. Adera’s discharge application
and notified him of that decision. Mr. Adera’s first
amended complaint alleges that the Department commu-
nicated in November 2006, via the Ombudsman, that his
discharge application had been denied. App. 35; see also
App. 81–82. He further alleges that the Education Depart-
ment “reinstated” his loan and “demanded repayment” in
September 2006, App. 35, consistent with the Department
having denied his earlier applications. Based on his receipt
of the Department’s November 2006 letter and September
2006 loan reinstatement and demand for repayment, Mr.
Adera “knew” that his discharge applications had been de-
nied. Even if the Department never provided Mr. Adera
formal notice of its decision denying his discharge applica-
tions, these events show that Mr. Adera “should have
known” his discharge applications had been denied. See
Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319 (agreeing that “accrual of a
claim . . . is suspended . . . until the claimant knew or
should have known that the claim existed” (emphasis
added)); see also Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River
Rsrv., Wyo. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[A] plaintiff does not have to possess actual
knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of
action to accrue.” (quoting Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d
1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Yet Mr. Adera did not file his
initial complaint until August 12, 2020, nearly 14 years
Case: 22-1074 Document: 56 Page: 9 Filed: 06/02/2023
ADERA v. US 9
after he should have known about his claims in 2006. De-
cision, 155 Fed. Cl. at 556; App. 17.
Mr. Adera further alleges that “the government’s ac-
tions were inherently unknowable” and that “the govern-
ment concealed the status of [his] applications” until he
received responses to his Privacy Act and FOIA requests
between 2017 and 2019. App. 36. We agree with the
Claims Court that this appears to be an attempt to invoke
the accrual suspension rule. Decision, 155 Fed. Cl. at 558;
Welcker, 752 F.2d at 1580 (requiring claimant to show de-
fendant “concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff
was unaware of their existence” or that the injury was “in-
herently unknowable” at the accrual date) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Even if Mr. Adera is correct that he
received additional information about the denial of his
claims for the first time in 2017, that additional infor-
mation alone does not support suspending the accrual of
his claims. See Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319 (declining to
suspend accrual based on later acquisition of additional ev-
idence because claimant knew he had been discharged).
Rather, the salient facts are that Mr. Adera had sufficient
knowledge that the Department denied his discharge ap-
plications by November 2006 and he did not file a claim
until August 2020.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Adera’s other arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.