Corrigan v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2006-5097
JOHN L. CORRIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
John L. Corrigan, of Auburn, Washington, pro se.
Dawn S. Conrad, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With
her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen,
Director, and Kathryn A. Bleeker, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Jon J.
Canerday, Trial Attorney, Office of General Counsel, National Credit Union
Administration, of Alexandria, Virginia.
Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
Judge Emily C. Hewitt
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2006-5097
JOHN L. CORRIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
DECIDED: March 14, 2007
___________________________
Before RADER, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and LINN, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
On summary judgment, the Court of Federal Claims denied Mr. Corrigan’s
overtime and travel expense claims. Because the Court of Federal Claims committed
no reversible error, this court affirms.
I
Mr. Corrigan presented overtime pay claims for the period beginning in
December, 1999. Mr. Corrigan’s claims include (1) "training travel on Sundays," (2)
"training travel on both non-working days and working days during regularly scheduled
and non-scheduled working hours," (3) "claimed ‘commuting’ time for overnight travel
away from duty station," and (4) " claimed ‘commuting’ time for travel to and from work
site within the official duty station.” Corrigan v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 589, 591
(2005).
After both the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the General Services
Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) denied Mr. Corrigan’s claims in their entirety, he
filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking overtime pay under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 201-206 (2000), and under the Federal Employee
Pay Act (FEPA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542, 5544, 5546. Mr. Corrigan’s suit also included claims
for reimbursement of denied travel expenses under, inter alia, the Federal Travel
Regulations (FTR), 41 C.F.R. §§ 300-304 (2004). Corrigan v. United States., 68 Fed.
Cl. 589, 591 (2005).
The Court of Federal Claims granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Mr.
Corrigan’s FLSA overtime claims that accrued before October 20, 2001 as time-barred.
Id. at 593. Next, the court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment for
the remaining FLSA claims because Mr. Corrigan was exempt from FLSA coverage. Id.
at 593-595. The court also noted, with regard to his FEPA claims, that Mr. Corrigan
conceded that he had not received written authorization to work overtime. As such, the
Court of Federal Claims determined that Mr. Corrigan was not eligible for overtime pay
because he did not receive the required written approval. Id. at 596. Lastly, the court
granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment on Mr. Corrigan’s travel
expense claims. Id. at 601.
On reconsideration, Mr. Corrigan argued that his time-barred overtime claims
deserve equitable tolling and treatment as continuing claims. Corrigan v. United States,
70 Fed. Cl. 665 (2006). The court dismissed these contentions because Mr. Corrigan
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had not raised equitable tolling and the continuing claims doctrine during the original
suit. 1 The trial court also declined to reconsider issues it had clearly decided on Mr.
Corrigan’s overtime pay claims. Id. at 669-672. Because GSBCA opinions do not bind
the trial court, it properly refused to rely on Mr. Corrigan’s reference to Peter C.
Thurmon, GSBCA No. 15562-TRAV, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31, 516 (June 27, 2001). Corrigan, 70
Fed. Cl. at 673. Mr. Corrigan then filed an appeal to this court.
BACKGROUND
On November 14, 1999, Mr. Corrigan began work for the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) as a credit union examiner at the grade of CU-9. Credit union
examiners generally work out of their homes and travel to the credit unions for
examinations. Mr. Corrigan began work in the Los Angeles, California, workplace. His
CU-9 examiner position was classified as non-exempt from the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). On January 14, 2001, NCUA promoted Mr. Corrigan to a
CU-11 examiner and assigned him a district of credit unions. Mr. Corrigan’s CU-11
position was exempt from the FLSA. As voluntarily requested by Mr. Corrigan, he was
reassigned to a new duty station in Seattle, Washington, effective April 8, 2001.
Corrigan v. United States., 68 Fed. Cl. 589, 591 (2005).
As an examiner, Mr. Corrigan travels extensively on official business. For
example, in March 2001, Mr. Corrigan drove his personal vehicle to Seattle, Washington
during a work detail in advance of his voluntary reassignment. During his detail, he
stayed with relatives. Mr. Corrigan submitted a travel voucher for the constructive cost
1
The Court of Federal Claims also voluntarily looked at the merits of Mr. Corrigan’s equitable
tolling and continuing claims doctrine arguments; however, the court’s ruling remained unchanged.
Corrigan v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 665 (2006).
2006-5097 3
of staying with his relatives. The NCUA denied reimbursement for this expense. Id. at
597.
The agency also sent Mr. Corrigan to Montana from November 26-30, 2001, then
to Anaheim, California from December 3-7, 2001, and on to Utah from December 10-14,
2001. Instead of traveling back to Seattle on the weekends, Mr. Corrigan decided to
stay with his son in southern California between the November and December 2001
details. Mr. Corrigan rented a car during his weekends in southern California without
his supervisor’s authorization and sought reimbursement for the rental car. Id. at 598.
On another occasion, Mr. Corrigan traveled to Orlando, Florida for an August 11–
16, 2002 conference. Mr. Corrigan reserved a one-way airline ticket from Seattle to
Orlando and a one-way airline ticket from Fort Lauderdale to Seattle. He traveled back
to Seattle on August 24, 2002, eight days after the end of his official travel. On the last
day of the conference in Orlando (August 16, 2002), Mr. Corrigan traveled to Fort
Lauderdale and spent the night at a Holiday Inn Express. The NCUA denied Mr.
Corrigan’s request for reimbursement of his lodging expense at the Holiday Inn
Express. Id. at 599.
On September 29, 2002, Mr. Corrigan traveled on official business from Seattle,
Washington to Alexandria, Virginia to attend a training session. The training session
ended at 12 noon on October 4, 2002. On October 2, 2002, Mr. Corrigan advised his
supervisor via email that he would forego a non-stop flight from Dulles International
Airport to Seattle on the afternoon of October 4, 2002, and would instead take an
October 5, 2002 flight from Reagan National Airport. Mr. Corrigan’s supervisor advised
him that reimbursement of lodging expenses for the night of October 4, 2002 was not
2006-5097 4
authorized because he could return to Seattle on the afternoon of October 4, 2002. Id.
at 600.
II
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment by the Court of Federal Claims
de novo, with justifiable factual inferences being drawn in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), aff'd, 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Corrigan’s claims accrued prior to October
20, 2001 because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. While the statute
of limitations is generally two years, the limitation can be three years for willful
violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2000). The court used three years for the statute of
limitation. Corrigan, 68 Fed. Cl. at 593; Corrigan, 70 Fed. Cl. at 669. The court
correctly noted that Mr. Corrigan’s equitable tolling and continuing claims doctrine
arguments present new legal theories, not properly brought for the first time on a motion
for reconsideration. Corrigan, 70 Fed. Cl. at 668. Furthermore, the court voluntarily
performed an extensive analysis on the merits and properly found that Mr. Corrigan, in
any event, would not prevail under these new legal theories. Id. at 669-671.
Mr. Corrigan contends that the Court of Federal Claims abused its discretion by
dismissing his post October 20, 2001 FLSA overtime claims on summary judgment.
However, in his motion for reconsideration and again in his brief to this court, Mr.
Corrigan did not point to any facts in dispute to show summary judgment was not
proper. As such, the Court of Federal Claims properly declined to reconsider summary
judgment on these overtime claims.
2006-5097 5
The Court of Federal Claims properly found that Mr. Corrigan was not entitled to
overtime pay under FEPA because he did not meet the written authorization
requirement. 5 C.F.R. § 550.111(c). Mr. Corrigan presented no written authorization for
any of his overtime. Corrigan, 68 Fed. Cl. at 596. Therefore, the court properly entered
summary judgment.
The Court of Federal Claims also correctly found the claimed travel expenses
were not allowable under the Federal Travel Regulations (FTR). 41 C.F.R. §§ 300-304(2004). First, Mr. Corrigan’s claim for lodging with relatives in Seattle was not allowable
because he failed to offer any substantial additional costs incurred by his relatives due
to his lodging with them as required in 41 C.F.R. § 301-11.12(c). Corrigan, 68 Fed. Cl.
at 597. Second, Mr. Corrigan’s rental car expense for two weekends in California was
not allowable because his supervisor did not specifically authorize this expense as
required by 41 C.F.R. § 10.450. Id. at 598. Third, Mr. Corrigan’s lodging expense at
the Holiday Inn Express in Fort Lauderdale, Florida was not allowable because the
expense was not incurred for official business as required by 41 C.F.R. § 301-2.4. Id. at
599. Finally, Mr. Corrigan’s lodging expense in Alexandria, Virginia when he could have
returned to his home duty station was not allowable because the lodging expense was
not authorized as required by 41 C.F.R. 301-11.20. Id. at 600-601. The Court of
Federal Claims properly analyzed the travel expenses under 41 C.F.R. §§ 300-304.
Corrigan, 68 Fed. Cl. 589.
2006-5097 6
Accordingly, this court finds no abuse of discretion or factual error. This court
affirms the dismissal of Mr. Corrigan’s time-barred overtime claims and the grant of
summary judgment as to the other overtime claims and the travel expense claims.
AFFIRMED
2006-5097 7