Western Shoshone National Council v. United States

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-5020
WESTERN SHOSHONE NATIONAL COUNCIL and
TIMBISHA SHOSHONE TRIBE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
SOUTH FORK BAND, WINNEMUCCA INDIAN COLONY, DANN BAND, BATTLE
MOUNTAIN BAND, ELKO BAND and TE-MOAK TRIBE OF WESTERN SHOSHONE
INDIANS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Treva J. Hearne, Hager & Hearne, of Reno, Nevada, argued for plantiffs-appellants
Western Shoshone National Council, et al. With him on the brief was Robert R. Hager.
Jeffrey M. Herman, Herman & Mermelstein, P.A., of Miami, Florida, argued for
plaintiffs-appellants South Fork Band, et al. With him on the brief was Stuart S.
Mermelstein.
Mark R. Haag, Attorney, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United
States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. With
him on the brief were Ronald J. Tenpas, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Sara E.
Culley, Attorney. Of counsel on the brief was Maria K. Wiseman, Office of the Solicitor,
United States Department of the Interior, of Washington, DC.
Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
Senior Judge Loren A. Smith
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-5020
WESTERN SHOSHONE NATIONAL COUNCIL, and
TIMBISHA SHOSHONE TRIBE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
SOUTH FORK BAND, WINNEMUCCA INDIAN COLONY, DANN BAND, BATTLE
MOUNTAIN BAND, ELKO BAND, and TE-MOAK TRIBE OF WESTERN SHOSHONE
INDIANS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in case no. 05-CV-558, Senior
Judge Loren A. Smith.
___________________________
DECIDED: May 22, 2008
___________________________
Before RADER, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
The Western Shoshone seek to invalidate a 1977 Indian Claims Commission
(ICC) judgment awarding compensation for the taking of the Western Shoshone’s
aboriginal lands in Idaho, Utah, Nevada, and California. The Western Shoshone also
seek additional compensation and other relief under the Treaty of Ruby Valley of 1863.
The United States Court of Federal Claims granted the United States’ motion to dismiss
the Western Shoshone’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim. Because the Appellants filed their challenge twenty-four years after the
Court of Claims affirmed the ICC’s judgment, and because legislation specifically
precludes the Appellants’ current challenge, this court affirms.
I
The Western Shoshone include numerous tribes or bands of Native American
Indians. For all of modern history, the Western Shoshone have occupied land in parts
of what are now Idaho, Utah, Nevada, and California. Before the westward expansion
of the United States, the Western Shoshone lived in extended family groups, or bands,
and congregated together for ceremonies and food gathering. Today, the Western
Shoshone live in various communities or colonies on the same land.
During the Civil War, the Union sought the natural resources of the West and
entered into a series of treaties with the Indians to ensure access to those resources.
Between July and October of 1863, the Union negotiated five treaties with various
groups of Shoshone Indians, including the Treaty of Ruby Valley (Treaty) with the
Western Shoshone, U.S.-W. Shoshone, Oct. 1, 1863, 18 Stat. 689. See Nw. Bands of
Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1945). Article 4 of the Treaty
provided that “the Shoshone[] country may be explored and prospected for gold and
silver, or other minerals; and when mines are discovered, they may be worked, and
mining and agricultural settlements formed . . . .” Article 5 defined the boundaries of
“the country claimed and occupied by” the Western Shoshone. Article 6 provided that
the President had discretion to force the Western Shoshone to move to reservations
within the territory defined by Article 5. And Article 7 provided that the United States
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would compensate the Western Shoshone $5,000 per year for twenty years for
agreeing to the Treaty’s terms.
In 1946, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 70 et. seq. (1976 ed.), to settle the Indian tribes' historical
claims against the United States for the taking of land and related actions. In sum, the
ICCA undertook to “dispose of the Indian claims problem with finality.” United States v.
Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 45 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 79-1466, at 10 (1945)). The ICCA
gave the ICC exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims brought within five years of the
passage of the Act. Section 12 of the ICCA provided:
The Commission shall receive claims for a period of five years after the
date of the approval of this Act and no claim existing before such date but
not presented within such period may thereafter be submitted to any court
or administrative agency for consideration, nor will such claim thereafter
be entertained by the Congress.
25 U.S.C. § 70k (1976). As a result, Indian claims existing on August 13, 1946 had to
be filed by August 13, 1951 or be barred forever. See United States v. Lower Sioux
Indian Cmty., 519 F.2d 1378, 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975); see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 601 F.2d 536, 538 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“The applicable statute of limitations in
the [ICCA] is a jurisdictional limitation upon the authority of the Commission to consider
claims.”).
In 1951, various Shoshone tribes, including the Appellant Te-Moak Band of the
Western Shoshone, filed a joint petition with the ICC for the alleged taking of over 80
million acres of land, including the territory described in the Treaty of Ruby Valley.
Shoshone Nation v. United States, 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. 387, 397, 419 (1962); see also
Dann, 470 U.S. at 41-42. The petitioners also sought an accounting. See Te-Moak
Bands of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 82, 83 (1989).
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The ICC “found that the Western Shoshones were separate from the other
Shoshones and that the Te-Moak Bands were representative of the Western
Shoshones.” Te-Moak, 18 Cl. Ct. at 84 (citations omitted). As a result, the ICC
“required the Te-Moak Bands to file a separate amended petition on behalf of the
Western Shoshones.” Id.
In 1962, the ICC found that the United States had effectively taken the Western
Shoshone lands by allowing settlers and other non-native Americans to encroach upon
the lands; the parties later stipulated that the Western Shoshone’s aboriginal title was
extinguished on July 1, 1872. Shoshone Nation, 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 416; see also Te-
Moak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994, 996 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
In 1972, the ICC determined the value of taken Western Shoshone property to be
$26,145,189.89, including $4,604,00.00 for minerals extracted from the land in Nevada
before the date of the taking. See Te-Moak Band, 593 F.2d at 996.
In 1974, a group of Western Shoshone Indians called the Western Shoshone
Legal Defense and Education Fund Association (Association) attempted to intervene in
the ICC proceedings. The Association, which the federal government did not formally
recognize, contended that its lands were never taken, and that the Te-Moak Bands and
the United States had colluded to treat the title as extinguished. The Association
attempted to repudiate all sums that the Commission awarded to the Western
Shoshone. Instead the Association contended that its constituents still held legal title to
the property. The ICC dismissed the intervention as untimely. The United States Court
of Claims affirmed the decision. W. Shoshone Legal Def. & Educ. Ass’n v. United
2007-5020 4
States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. 457 (1975), aff’d, 531 F.2d 495 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 885 (1976).
In 1977, the Appellant Te-Moak Band attempted to change its position, asserting
that it still held title to the claimed land on behalf of the Western Shoshone. See Te-
Moak Band, 593 F.2d at 996. The Te-Moak Band also retained new counsel and
moved for a stay of the proceedings. Id. at 997. The ICC denied the motion to stay and
entered a final judgment awarding the Western Shoshone $26,145,189.89. Te-Moak
Bands of W. Shoshone Indians ex rel. W. Shoshone Nation v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 318 (1977), aff'd, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). In
1979, the Court of Claims affirmed the award. Te-Moak Band, 593 F.2d 994. The Clerk
of the Court of Claims certified the award to the General Accounting Office, which
deposited the amount of the award into an interest-bearing trust account for the
Western Shoshone on December 6, 1979. Dann, 470 U.S. at 42.
In 1987, the Appellant Timbisha Shoshone Tribe and two other Western
Shoshone tribes sought to intervene with the accounting claims. This action asserted
that the United States owed the Western Shoshone all revenues generated by the land
until at least 1979. Te-Moak Bands, 18 Cl. Ct. at 83-85. Furthermore, the intervenors
sought a general accounting for the United States’ alleged misuse of revenues from the
land, which had been held in trust by the United States. Id. at 84-85. The Court of
Claims denied the motion to intervene as untimely. Id. at 89.
In 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into law provisions for the
distribution of the ICC award from the trust account. Western Shoshone Claims
Distribution Act, Pub. L. No. 108-270, 118 Stat. 805 (2004). The Act provides “for the
2007-5020 5
use and distribution of the funds awarded to the Western Shoshone,” and authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate implementing regulations. Id. § 5. In 2007, the
Secretary issued regulations that establish an enrollment process to allow individuals to
apply for a share of the Western Shoshone award in the trust account. 72 Fed. Reg.
9,836 (Mar. 5, 2007).
The Appellants include two groups of Western Shoshone tribes and bands. The
first group includes the South Fork Band, Winnemuca Indian Colony, Dann Band, Battle
Mountain Band, Elko Band, and Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians (South
Fork Band). The second group includes the Western Shoshone National Council and
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe (National Council).
The Appellants originally filed their action in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia in 2003. The district court granted the United States’ motion to transfer all
but one of the claims to the Court of Federal Claims. * W. Shoshone Nat’l Council v.
United States, 357 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004). The plaintiffs filed a Second
Amended Complaint (Complaint) with the Court of Federal Claims that alleged five
claims. Count I seeks declaratory relief that the judgment of the ICC is void under Rule
of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 60(b)(4). As an alternative to Count I, Count II
alleges that the Western Shoshone are entitled to pre-judgment interest on the ICC’s
award. Count III seeks royalties on minerals mined and extracted under the Treaty of
Ruby Valley. Count IV seeks an accounting of the proceeds from the United States’ use
*
The district court transferred the remaining claim for quiet title to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada, which subsequently denied the claim. W.
Shoshone Nat’l Counsel v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207 (D. Nev. 2006).
The National Council and South Fork Band are appealing that decision to the Ninth
Circuit. See W. Shoshone, Nos. 06-16252 and 06-16214 (9th Cir.) (consolidated).
2007-5020 6
of the land. And Count V seeks damages for breach of fiduciary duties arising from the
alleged mismanagement of the land and for failure to act in accordance with the rights
and duties allegedly created under the Treaty of Ruby Valley.
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the claims under RCFC 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). W. Shoshone Nat’l Council v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 59 (2006). The court
held that Count I was untimely as a motion under RCFC 60(b)(4) or as an independent
action. The court also held that Count I failed to state a claim under RCFC 60(b)
because in prior litigation federal courts had considered and rejected the Appellants'
contentions. The court dismissed Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim, finding that the ICC judgment addressed all of the Shoshone
aboriginal title claims and that the Treaty of Ruby Valley did not recognize fee title.
The court dismissed Count III for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the claim was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC and barred by the finality provision of the ICCA, which it
determined had not been repealed when the ICC was terminated in 1978. The court
also dismissed Count IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because it found that the
Government’s liability had not been established. Finally, the court dismissed Count V
as untimely under the six-year statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
The South Fork Band and National Council filed separate notices of appeal, both
of which were timely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). This court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
2007-5020 7
II
This court reviews de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a complaint
for lack of jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim under RCFC
12(b)(6). Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Like the
trial court, in considering a motion to dismiss, this court accepts as true all well-pleaded
allegations of fact, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This court also
reviews without deference the trial court’s statutory interpretation. W. Co. of N. Am. v.
United States, 323 F.3d 1024, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In Count I of their Complaint, the Western Shoshone seek to set aside the ICC’s
judgment under RCFC 60(b) because the ICC allegedly denied them due process in
reaching its judgment. The Appellants allege that the Bureau of Indian Affairs refused
to accept a notice of discharge of the Te-Moak Band’s counsel, after the counsel—
contrary to the Te-Moak Band’s new instructions—continued to pursue a claim that the
Western Shoshone’s land had been taken and their aboriginal title extinguished.
RCFC 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void . . . .
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time . . . . This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment . . . .
R. Ct. Fed. Cl. (60)(b) (2007).
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The Western Shoshone advance two theories to try to set aside the ICC’s judgment.
They argue that the judgment is void under RCFC 60(b)(4), or that Count I is an
“independent action” which should relieve them from judgment.
In 1977, twenty-six years after filing a petition with the ICC and five years after
the ICC determined the value of their property, the Te-Moak Band sought to change
counsel and its position on the question of the taking of tribal land. The ICC considered
but denied the Te-Moak Band’s motion to stay the proceedings for this purpose.
Instead the ICC entered final judgment. The Court of Claims affirmed the ICC’s
judgment in 1979. Twenty-four years passed before the Western Shoshone filed this
complaint in 2003.
Twenty-four years is not a reasonable time to have waited to challenge the Court
of Claims’ affirmance. Confronted with a much shorter delay, this court's predecessor,
the United States Court of Claims denied a similar procedural challenge in Pueblo of
Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087 (Ct. Cl. 1981). In Pueblo of Santo
Domingo, an Indian tribe sought to withdraw from a 1969 stipulation because the tribe’s
counsel had allegedly acted contrary to the tribe’s instructions. In 1973, the ICC
entered judgment with respect to the taken Indian property, and the Court of Claims
affirmed the judgment on appeal in 1975. The tribe sought again to withdraw from the
stipulation in 1980. Id. at 1088. The Court of Claims found that Ct. Cl. Rule 152(b)
governed the tribe’s motion to set aside the stipulation as void. Id. at 1089.
The predecessor to RCFC 60(b), Ct. Cl. Rule 152(b) “commands that the motion
shall be made within a ‘reasonable time.’” Id. (citing Andrade v. United States, 485 F.2d
660, 664 (Ct. Cl. 1973)). The Court of Claims enforced the timeliness requirement
2007-5020 9
strictly because “Congress has expressed its desire that the special Indian claims
litigation be wound up by having terminated the operations of the ICC in 1978.” Id. As
a result, the court held that the tribe’s attempt “to withdraw from a stipulation entered
nearly twelve years ago falls egregiously outside the permissible range of delay.” Id.This court has adopted as its own law the decisions of the Court of Claims. See
Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In view of Pueblo
of Santo Domingo and the Appellants’ twenty-four year delay, the “reasonable time”
requirement of RCFC 60(b) bars the Appellants’ tardy challenge under RCFC 60(b)(4).
This court detects nothing in the record or arguments in this case that compel departure
from the rule and guidance in Pueblo of Santo Domingo.
The National Council argues that an "independent action" like Count I is not
subject to the timeliness requirement of RCFC 60(b). Even construing Count I as an
independent action (which this court does not accept), this claim would still confront a
problem with the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Section 2501 provides:
“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be
barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). Count I challenges alleged procedural defects in ICC
proceedings before the Court of Claims’ affirmance in 1979. Thus, the National
Council’s claim first accrued well outside the six-year statute of limitations of § 2501.
The National Council suggests that the claim did not accrue because the ICC did
not submit a final report of its judgment to Congress. The National Council purports to
have only recently discovered this fact. These allegations, however, do not alter the
accrual date for this claim. The United States Court of Claims affirmed the Western
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Shoshone judgment in 1979. The Western Shoshone Distribution Act authorized
distribution of the General Accounting Office trust account according to the ICC
judgment. Thus, the Court of Claims, the United States Congress, and the General
Accounting Office have treated the ICC judgment as final for decades. None of these
institutions or their actions depended on submission of a final report from ICC. Further,
as the Court of Claims pointed out, a 1978 ICC Final Report (and a 1990 book that
reproduced a chart from that final ICC report) fully disclose that the ICC did not intend to
issue a report to Congress reiterating that the Western Shoshone case was complete.
The absence of a final report should have been apparent for decades. See Fallini v.
United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The question whether the pertinent
events have occurred is determined under an objective standard; a plaintiff does not
have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of
action to accrue.” (citation omitted)).
Because this court finds that Count I is untimely either under RCFC 60(b)(4) or
as an independent action, the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim. The trial court thus appropriately dismissed it under RCFC 12(b)(1). As
a result, this court does not reach whether Count I fails to state a claim under RCFC
12(b)(6).
As an alternative to Count I, in Count II the Western Shoshone seek to recover
$14 billion as pre-judgment interest on the ICC’s award from the stipulated date of the
taking, 1872, until the date of the award. The Appellants do not challenge on appeal the
Court of Federal Claims’ finding that the ICC judgment fully compensated the Western
2007-5020 11
Shoshone for extinguishing their aboriginal title. The Appellants argue they are entitled
to interest based on treaty title.
Aboriginal title is the right to exclusive possession that Indian tribes hold as the
occupants of the land when the United States arrived. Treaty title is the equivalent of
fee title that the United States has acquired by treaty. A taking of property held under
treaty title requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment, including interest. See
Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(discussing the distinction between aboriginal and treaty title); Three Affiliated Tribes of
Ft. Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 690 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (“Interest
from the time of taking is automatically included in order to satisfy the demands of the
Fifth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
Thus, this court must inquire whether the Treaty of Ruby Valley recognized that
the Western Shoshone held fee title. The United States Supreme Court has addressed
that question and determined that the Treaty did not recognize such title. Instead of
acknowledging “any exclusive use and occupancy right or title of the Indians,” the
Treaty was “a treaty of peace and amity with stipulated annuities for the purposes of
accomplishing those objects and achieving that end.” Nw. Bands, 324 U.S. at 346. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized, the Treaty
“acknowledged the territories claimed by the Shoshones without ‘recognizing’ title so as
to establish a property interest compensable under the Fifth Amendment.” United
States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1200 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Nw. Bands, 324 U.S. at
348).
2007-5020 12
Appellants argue that the Supreme Court in Northwestern Bands interpreted only
the Box Elder Treaty, not the Treaty of Ruby Valley. Appellants seek to distinguish
those two treaties because the former included an amendment that expressly stated
that treaty title was not conveyed, while the latter treaty did not. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court’s reasoning and conclusions cover the Treaty of Ruby Valley. In
Northwestern Bands, the Supreme Court discussed all of the treaties in which the Union
entered with the Shoshone Indians in 1863 that were “similar in form.” 324 U.S. at 343.
The Court specifically referenced the Western Shoshone treaty and stated that
“nowhere in any of the series of treaties is there a specific acknowledgment of Indian
title or right of occupancy.” Id. at 348. The Supreme Court read the amendment to the
Box Elder Treaty, but it did not find that the amendment’s absence from the Treaty of
Ruby Valley implied that the Union intended to convey title.
Moreover, this court does not find any language in the Treaty of Ruby Valley that
suggests that the Union intended to convey title to the Western Shoshone. As Article 6
of the Treaty reflects, the Union merely permitted the Western Shoshone to continue
occupying the lands defined by Article 5. Permissive occupation does not imply a grant
of title. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1955) (finding
that for the Government to convey rights “there must be the definite intention by
congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely permissive
occupation”).
Further, the United States’ actions after adopting the Treaty are inconsistent with
an interpretation that the Treaty of Ruby Valley conveyed title. Rather, the United
States’ actions confirm that it considered the territory covered by the Treaty to be in the
2007-5020 13
public domain. “School lands were granted. National forests were freely created. The
lands were opened to public settlement under the homestead laws . . . .” Nw. Bands,
324 U.S. at 346 (citations omitted). The United States administered the territory “as
though no Indian land titles were involved.” Id.; see also Te-Moak Bands, 18 Cl. Ct. at
83.
Because the Treaty of Ruby Valley did not recognize that the Western Shoshone
held fee title in the disputed territory, this court agrees with the Court of Federal Claims
that Count II fails to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6).
In Count III, the Western Shoshone seek royalties on minerals mined and
extracted under the Treaty of Ruby Valley. The Government argues in part that the
finality provision of the ICCA bars the Appellants’ claim for royalties. The South Fork
Band responds that ICCA does not bar Count III because the Treaty of Ruby Valley is
ambiguous with respect to the payment of royalties after 1882, and that Count III seeks
royalties that accrued after 1946.
The finality provision of the ICCA provides: “A final determination against a
claimant made and reported in accordance with the Act shall forever bar any further
claim or demand against the United States arising out of the matter involved in the
controversy.” 25 U.S.C. § 70u(b) (1976) (omitted 1978). The ICC found that the
Western Shoshone’s aboriginal title had been extinguished in 1872 and awarded the
Western Shoshone $26,145,189.89 for all claims arising out of territory described in the
Treaty of Ruby Valley and to which they claimed aboriginal title.
The Court of Claims affirmed the ICC determination. The award included
$4,604,600 for minerals extracted from the land in Nevada before the taking. Thus, the
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ICC conclusively resolved the Western Shoshone’s claim for royalties. Cf. Dann, 873
F.2d at 1200 (finding on remand from the Supreme Court that the ICC’s judgment with
respect to the Treaty of Ruby Valley and the Western Shoshone’s interest in the territory
described in it barred the Danns from “asserting the tribal title to grazing rights just as
clearly as it bars their asserting title to the lands”); W. Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini,
951 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The Commission's general finding that title had been
extinguished therefore also operates to bar the Shoshone from asserting hunting and
fishing rights based on the Treaty of Ruby Valley.” (citation omitted)). Because the
finality provision of the ICCA limits the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and
because that provision bars Count III, the Court of Claims correctly dismissed the claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1).
Counts IV and V fail for the same reason. Count IV seeks an accounting of the
proceeds from the Government’s use of the land described in the Treaty of Ruby Valley.
Count V seeks damages for the Government’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty arising
from the alleged mismanagement of the land described in the Treaty and for failure to
act in accordance with the rights and duties allegedly created under the Treaty.
Assuming that the Treaty imposed a fiduciary duty on the Government, the finality
provision of the ICCA and the Court of Claims’ affirmance of the ICC’s final
determination with respect to the Western Shoshone’s aboriginal rights to the territory
extinguished any claim for an accounting or breach of fiduciary duty with respect to that
territory or such revenue. Indeed, the Te-Moak Bands included a claim for an
accounting in their original petition to the ICC. The ICC considered that claim in
reaching its final determination, and, as discussed above, in 1987 the Court of Claims
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dismissed as untimely a motion by the Appellant Timbisha Shoshone Tribe and two
other Western Shoshone tribes to intervene to pursue accounting claims allegedly
arising after the 1946 cutoff date prescribed by the ICCA. See Te-Moak Bands of W.
Shoshone, 18 Cl. Ct. at 83-85, 89.
This court therefore affirms the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the
Appellants’ claims under RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
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