People v. Espinoza

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JUVENTINO ESPINOZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
S269647
Fifth Appellate District
F079209
Tulare County Superior Court
VCF109133
January 26, 2023
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban,
Jenkins, and Cantil-Sakauye* concurred.
*
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA
S269647
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Penal Code section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have
served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their
conviction is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging
[their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (Pen. Code, § 1473.7,
subd. (a)(1); id., subd. (e)(1); all undesignated statutory
references are to this code.) To establish prejudicial error, a
defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that the
defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529
(Vivar)) and must corroborate any assertions with “ ‘ “objective
evidence” ’ ” (id. at p. 530). We note that a motion to vacate a
conviction, in contrast to a direct appellate challenge to the plea
itself, is generally filed, as here, after “the individual filing the
motion is no longer in criminal custody.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(1).)
Defendant Juventino Espinoza accepted a plea bargain in
2004 and served one year in jail. He argues that he first learned
that the plea put him at risk of losing his permanent resident
status and being deported in 2015, when he was detained by
federal immigration authorities at the airport after a return
flight to the United States. He then sought to vacate his
conviction three separate times. He asserts counsel never
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informed him of the immigration consequences of his plea and
that he would not have accepted the terms of the plea bargain if
he had been so informed. In support of his third motion, before
us now, Espinoza attached a declaration describing his
biographical history, which includes more than 20 years living
in the United States prior to conviction; a declaration from an
immigration attorney explaining that Espinoza’s convictions
place him in danger of losing his permanent residence, being
deported, and being barred from reentering the United States,
and that there were immigration-safe alternatives his counsel
could have pursued; and 30 letters from family, friends,
community members, clients, and employers documenting his
family ties, community connections, and work history. The trial
court denied his motion, as it had his previous two. The Court
of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Espinoza had not
adequately corroborated his claim that immigration
consequences were a paramount concern at the time of his plea.
We granted review to consider what constitutes a
sufficient showing of prejudicial error within the meaning of
section 1473.7. We limited the issue before us to the following:
“Did the Court of Appeal err in ruling that defendant failed to
adequately corroborate his claim that immigration
consequences were a paramount concern and thus that he could
not demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Penal Code
section 1473.7?” We hold that Espinoza has made the requisite
showing and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeal.
I.
Espinoza migrated from Mexico to Northern California in
1981, when he was 13 years old. After arriving in Oroville, he
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
earned wages as a farmworker to support his parents and
siblings. In 1986, when Espinoza turned 18, he became a lawful
permanent resident. When Espinoza was 22 years old, he
married Sandra Rose. The couple had six children together.
Espinoza’s wife and children are United States citizens and
have resided in California for their entire lives. Espinoza’s
elderly parents, eight siblings, grandchildren, and sons-in-law
also live in the United States and are either United States
citizens or lawful permanent residents. Espinoza has now lived
in the United States for over four decades.
Espinoza and his wife created a family and a home
together in California. The couple bought a home in Cutler,
where they raised their children. Their first-born child,
Juventino Espinoza, Jr., graduated from Sierra Nevada College
with a bachelor’s degree in psychology and has plans to join the
army to serve as a behavioral therapist for struggling soldiers.
Their eldest daughter, Marisol Espinoza, graduated from Milan
Institute in Fresno as a beautician. Their second daughter
attended La Sierra Military Academy. One of their sons, Juan
Carlos Espinoza, died a few months after birth.
Espinoza is the primary caregiver to his parents, who
suffer from Parkinson’s disease and diabetes. Espinoza’s
parents live with him in Cutler and rely on him for assistance
with their daily activities, including cooking, shopping, doing
laundry, administering medication, and driving to medical
appointments.
Espinoza is the main financial provider for his family.
After several years as a farmworker, Espinoza relocated with
his wife in 1991 to the Central Valley, where he worked for
Schellenberg Farms in Reedley as a farm manager. Beginning
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
in 1994, Espinoza worked for eight years as a supervisor at Abe-
El Produce in Orosi before starting his own business.
In 2003, Espinoza and several others were arrested
following an investigation into suspected methamphetamine
manufacturing. During the proceedings, it was undisputed that
Espinoza had no prior criminal history. Eventually, Espinoza
pleaded no contest to conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), felony
child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), controlling property to
manufacture a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11366.5, subd. (a)), and possession of a controlled substance
(id., § 11350, subd. (a)).
At the time, Espinoza did not speak English; his attorney
used a Spanish-speaking assistant to communicate with him
before his plea. The assistant told Espinoza to plead no contest
and “everything was going to be fine.” Espinoza never discussed
the immigration consequences of the plea with his attorney, who
did not advise him that pleading to these charges would put him
in danger of losing his permanent resident status, being
deported, and being barred from reentering the United States.
It appears he relied on the reassurance of his attorney’s
assistant that, if he pleaded no contest, “everything was going
to be fine.”
When Espinoza’s plea was taken, the court provided him
with the following advisement, pursuant to section 1016.5: “If
you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of
the offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws
of the United States.” Espinoza explained in his declaration: “I
took the warning to be a general one that the court had to give
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
everyone who pleads guilty. I did not understand it to have
applied to me as a legal permanent resident who was in the
United States legally, my attorney at the time did not mention
to me that my plea would have immigration consequences.” It
appears the court made no further inquiry into Espinoza’s
understanding or offer to answer any questions he might have
had. He asserts that if he had known, he would not have
accepted the plea and would instead have taken the case to trial
or agreed to a longer sentence in exchange for an immigration-
safe plea.
Following Espinoza’s plea, he was placed on five years of
probation and ordered to serve 365 days in jail. According to
Espinoza, he was not informed by his attorney that his plea
agreement included jail time. Nevertheless, he served the jail
term called for by the plea bargain. Upon release, Espinoza
returned to being the family’s main financial provider. He
started his own lawn services and gardening business. He was
well-known and involved in the community. He volunteered,
went to church, and took part in numerous community
organizations. His wife, five children, two sons-in-law, several
grandchildren, and his parents and siblings continue to reside
in the United States.
In 2015, more than a decade after his convictions and the
service of his jail term, Espinoza left the country for a trip.
When he returned to the United States, he was questioned by
immigration officials, and they seized his permanent residence
card. He asserts it was during that encounter that he became
aware of the immigration consequences of his plea.
In 2017, Espinoza filed a nonstatutory motion to vacate
his conviction. He filed additional motions under section 1473.7
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in 2018 and 2019. In each motion, Espinoza maintained that he
had not been aware of the immigration consequences of his plea
and that had he been aware, he would have sought a plea with
lesser immigration consequences or taken his case to trial. The
trial court denied all three motions, each time without an
evidentiary hearing. Espinoza appealed the third denial, and
the Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted review.
II.
To prevail under section 1473.7, a defendant must
demonstrate that his conviction is “legally invalid due to
prejudicial error damaging [his or her] ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) The defendant must first
show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that
his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.
“[P]rejudical error . . . means demonstrating a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
We apply independent review to evaluate whether a
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he
would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its
immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.)
“ ‘[U]nder independent review, an appellate court exercises its
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy
the rule of law.’ ” (Ibid.) When courts engage in independent
review, they must give deference to the trial court’s factual
determinations if they are based on “ ‘ “the credibility of
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witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
But when the trial court’s findings “derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,” the trial court and the
reviewing court “ ‘are in the same position,’ ” and no deference
is owed. (Id. at p. 528.) Because the trial court here conducted
no evidentiary hearing, there is no basis for deference, and “it is
for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent
judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section
1473.7.” (Ibid.)
The record establishes that Espinoza did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea. Although
the trial court provided a general advisement under section
1016.5 that his conviction may have immigration consequences,
Espinoza’s attorney never advised him that pleading no contest
to the charges at issue would result in his deportation. After his
conviction, rather than living in hiding, Espinoza started his
own business, joined community organizations, and became
well-known in his local community. Moreover, he took an
international commercial flight to the United States, which
predictably required subjecting himself to the scrutiny of United
States immigration officials, which is not consistent with the
behavior of a person who understood that his convictions
effectively ended his lawful resident status. (See People v.
Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 770 [“It goes without saying
that someone who understood his criminal conviction made him
automatically deportable would not voluntarily contact
immigration authorities and advise them of his presence in the
country.”].) The remaining question is whether Espinoza
established prejudicial error.
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability a
defendant would have rejected a plea offer if he had understood
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its immigration consequences, courts must “consider the totality
of the circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
“Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.” (Id. at pp. 529–530, citing Lee v.
United States (2017) 582 U.S. __, __–__ [137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967–
1969] (Lee); see People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872–
873 (Mejia).) Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of
obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea,
as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the
likely term if he were convicted at trial. (See People v. Martinez
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564 (Martinez).) These factors are not
exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to
relief.
A defendant must provide “ ‘objective evidence’ ” to
corroborate factual assertions. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 530.) Objective evidence includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the
defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel,
and evidence of the charges the defendant faced. (See Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531; Lee, supra, 582 U.S. at p. __
[137 S.Ct. at p. 1961].)
Espinoza supported his section 1473.7 claim with evidence
regarding his biographical history and ties to the United States;
his lack of a criminal record; his community involvement
following his conviction; and a declaration from an immigration
law expert explaining that he could have pleaded to alternative,
immigration-safe dispositions. In the proceedings below, the
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district attorney and the Attorney General opposed Espinoza’s
motions to vacate his convictions. The Attorney General has
since reversed his position and now agrees that Espinoza’s
evidentiary showing establishes prejudicial error within the
meaning of section 1473.7. Applying our independent judgment,
we weigh all relevant circumstances, with no single factor being
dispositive in our consideration of the totality, and reach the
same conclusion.
A.
Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities. (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal. 5th at p. 530.) “[W]hen long-standing noncitizen
residents of this country are accused of committing a crime, the
most devastating consequence may not be a prison sentence, but
their removal and exclusion from the United States.” (Id. at
p. 516.) Depending on the strength of a defendant’s community
ties, “the prospect of deportation” may be “ ‘an integral part’ ” or
“ ‘the most important part’ ” of the defendant’s “calculus in
responding to certain criminal charges.” (Ibid.) Community ties
may be established by length of residence; immigration status;
lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to family,
friends, or the community; work history or financial ties; or
other forms of attachment. (Id. at p. 530; see People v.
Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324–325 (Rodriguez);
People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 581 (Lopez); People
v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610 (Soto).)
Objective evidence of a defendant’s community ties
includes facts provided by a defendant’s declaration or
declarations from family members, friends, colleagues,
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community members, or other acquaintances. (Vivar, supra, 11
Cal. 5th at p. 530; see Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 581;
People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 73; Soto, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 610; Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 324–325.) The Court of Appeal erred by disregarding
Espinoza’s declaration on the basis that it did not constitute
objective evidence. We made clear in Vivar that a defendant’s
declaration is one form of objective evidence relevant to a
prejudicial error inquiry. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.)
In Vivar, we held that a defendant’s substantial ties to the
United States were an important factor in support of granting
relief. Vivar “was brought to this country at age six . . . , and he
attended schools, formed a family, and remained here for 40
years.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) “At the time of his
plea, he had two children, two grandchildren, and a wife, all of
whom are citizens and all of whom resided in California. . . .
Vivar had virtually no ties to Mexico, spoke Spanish ‘like an
American,’ and found it ‘difficult to function in Mexican society
because people treat [him] like an outsider.’ ” (Ibid.) We
concluded that these facts provided objective evidence of “Vivar’s
concern about the immigration consequences of his plea
options,” supporting a finding of prejudicial error. (Ibid.)
Similarly, the Courts of Appeal have found a defendant’s
strong community ties to provide compelling evidence in support
of a finding of prejudicial error. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 698, 708 [prejudice established where the
defendant moved to the United States at the age of 13, his entire
family lived here, and he lacked meaningful ties to his country
of origin]; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [compelling
evidence of prejudice where the defendant lived in the United
States since he was 14 years old, and his wife and child lived
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
here, as well as his mother and siblings]; see also People v.
Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011; Soto, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 610.)
The facts here are no less compelling. Espinoza has spent
most of his life in the United States. He came to California when
he was 13 years old. At the time of the plea, Espinoza had lived
in California for 23 years. His wife and five children were
United States citizens. His parents and siblings lived in the
United States. He was the financial provider for his family. As
Espinoza puts it, “[e]verything important in his life” at the time
he entered his plea “was in the United States.” (Cf. People v.
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 209 [“a
deported alien who cannot return ‘loses his job, his friends, his
home, and maybe even his children’ ”].) Espinoza’s deep and
long-standing ties are undisputed and weigh in favor of finding
that he would have considered immigration consequences to be
of paramount concern in deciding whether to accept a plea
agreement.
After Espinoza accepted the plea and served jail time, he
returned home to care for his family and community. He became
the caregiver for his elderly parents who suffer from severe
medical conditions. He ran his own business to provide for his
family. He volunteered, went to church, and took part in
numerous community organizations. These facts lend credence
to Espinoza’s assertion that his community ties were important
to him at the time of his plea.
Espinoza’s case is unlike instances where courts have
found insufficient community ties to support a finding of
prejudicial error. In People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063,
1077, for example, the Court of Appeal concluded that a
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defendant’s connection to the United States was too tenuous to
support an inference that he might not have knowingly accepted
a plea deal with immigration consequences. The defendant,
Bravo, moved to the United States at age 18. (Id. at p. 1076.)
At the time of his plea, he had lived here for four and a half
years. (Ibid.) Although Bravo had a girlfriend and a baby in the
United States, the court found those relationships insufficient
to establish a probability that Bravo would have rejected his
plea deal. (Id. at pp. 1075–1076.) “[T]he offenses making
[Bravo] a candidate for mandatory deportation were domestic
violence and child cruelty against [his girlfriend and baby,
respectively],” which undermined the argument that Bravo
would have rejected his plea offer based on those relationships.
(Id. at p. 1076; see People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
654, 665 [finding no prejudice where defendant “had just
arrived” in the United States].)
In sum, a defendant’s deep and long-standing ties to the
United States are among the totality of circumstances that can
support an inference that immigration consequences were of
paramount concern at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea.
Espinoza has demonstrated his ties to the United States, and
those ties weigh in favor of a finding of prejudicial error.
B.
Another consideration is whether alternative,
immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the
defendant’s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s
case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes
involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies
with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of
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comparable offenses without immigration consequences. (See
Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 325; Mejia, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 873; Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564.)
These matters can be placed in the record by either party.
Espinoza had no prior criminal history at the time of his
plea. This fact is relevant because a defendant without an
extensive criminal record may persuasively contend that the
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea
without immigration consequences. (See Rodriguez, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 325 [“The record does not indicate that in
2005 Rodriguez extensively trafficked in methamphetamine or
had such a serious criminal record that the prosecution would
necessarily have been unwilling to enter an immigration-
neutral plea.”].)
Additionally, Espinoza presented evidence from an
immigration attorney that there were alternatives the
prosecution could have offered that would not have resulted in
mandatory deportation. Espinoza pleaded no contest to
conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), felony child abuse (§ 273a,
subd. (a)), controlling property to manufacture
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5) and to
possessing cocaine (id., § 11350). The immigration attorney’s
declaration identified alternative offenses without deportation
consequences to which Espinoza might have been able to plead.
The Court of Appeal said “[w]e need not pass upon the
practical likelihood” that Espinoza could have bargained for an
immigration-safe plea because “the focus is on whether
Espinoza would have pursued such an alternative resolution
notwithstanding its viability.” (People v. Espinoza (May 28,
2021, F079209) [nonpub. opn.] (Espinoza).) While it is true that
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the key question under section 1473.7 is “ ‘what the defendant
would have done’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528), a
relevant consideration is the probability of obtaining a more
favorable outcome (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564), and
that inquiry is informed by whether the defendant would have
had reason “to expect or hope” that a plea deal without
immigration consequences “would or could have been
negotiated” (id. at p. 567). Espinoza’s lack of a criminal record,
combined with the declaration of the immigration attorney,
support his assertion that he had reason to expect or hope for a
plea bargain without immigration consequences. This enhances
the “credibility of [the] defendant’s claim” that he “would have
rejected the plea bargain” had he been properly advised. (Id. at
p. 568.)
C.
In denying relief, the Court of Appeal observed that
Espinoza did not express contemporaneous confusion, as Vivar
did. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.) But unlike
Vivar, who was aware of the immigration consequences of his
plea “at or near the time of his plea” (id. at p. 530), Espinoza has
declared that he did not discover those consequences until more
than a decade after his plea (ante, at p. 5). The Court of Appeal
also questioned Espinoza’s credibility because he did not submit
evidence from his plea counsel, as Vivar did. (Vivar, at pp. 530–
531.) But by the time Espinoza filed the motion at issue in this
appeal, it had been 15 years since the plea. Both the district
attorney and Espinoza’s counsel represented to the court that
they tried, without success, to contact the attorney who
represented Espinoza at the time his plea was entered. As the
Attorney General observes, “the robust evidence introduced in
Vivar will not be available in most cases — especially where
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defendants do not learn about the immigration consequences of
their pleas until years or decades later.”
Vivar did not suggest that the circumstances of that case
constitute minimum requirements for establishing prejudicial
error. A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required
to provide the declaration of plea counsel. (People v. Manzanilla
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 909.) Nor is a defendant required to
submit contemporaneous documentation from the time of the
plea. Rather, the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires
consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,” which
necessarily involves case-by-case examination of the record
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–530), and no specific kind
of evidence is a prerequisite to relief. As noted, the burden rests
with the defendant to establish entitlement to relief. In addition
to submitting declarations, both parties are entitled to request
an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).) The more robust
and inclusive a record, the greater the opportunity for effective
persuasion and meaningful judicial review. And the inquiry into
a defendant’s state of mind may often involve the weighing of
credibility and circumstantial evidence.
Having considered the totality of the circumstances here,
we conclude that Espinoza has shown a reasonable probability
that he would have rejected the plea and either gone to trial or
sought a different, immigration-safe bargain if he had
understood the consequences of the plea. Espinoza’s deep and
longstanding ties to the United States, along with those to his
family and community, support the conclusion that immigration
concerns would have been paramount to him at the time of his
plea. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 516–517.) In addition,
Espinoza’s lack of criminal history at the time of his plea and
the immigration attorney’s declaration identifying alternative
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immigration-safe dispositions suggest that he had reason to
expect or hope for a different plea agreement without
immigration consequences. (See Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 567; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
We also find it significant that the Attorney General
agrees Espinoza is entitled to relief. Although we are not
required to accept this concession, it suggests that any remand
for further development of the record will serve only to delay the
relief to which both parties now agree Espinoza is entitled.
While a remand for reconsideration and the development of the
record may be advisable in other cases, we are satisfied that the
evidence here establishes a reasonable probability that
Espinoza would have rejected the plea if he had understood its
immigration consequences.
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CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the
Court of Appeal with directions to remand the case to the trial
court for entry of an order granting Espinoza’s section 1473.7
motion to vacate his conviction.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.*
*
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
17
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Espinoza
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 5/28/21 – 5th Dist.
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S269647
Date Filed: January 26, 2023
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Tulare
Judge: Steven D. Barnes
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Stephen K. Dunkle and Sarah S. Sanger for
Defendant and Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Kahn A. Scolnick, Daniel R. Adler, Emily R.
Sauer, Patrick J. Fuster and Matt Aidan Getz for Alyssa Bell, Reuven
Cohen, Ingrid V. Eagly, Gilbert Garcetti, Meline Mkrtichian, Ronald J.
Nessim, Gabriel Pardo and Jennifer Resnik as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Defendant and Appellant.
Stanford Law School Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Jayashri Srikantiah
and Yulie Landan for Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Asian Law
Caucus, Alameda County Public Defender’s Office, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California, California Collaborative for
Immigrant Justice, Centro Legal de la Raza, Community Legal
Services in East Palo Alto, Dolores Street Community Services,
Dreamer Fund, Immigrant Alliance for Justice and Equity, Immigrant
Legal Defense, Jewish Family & Community Services East Bay,
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Open
Immigration Legal Services, Organization for the Legal Advancement
of Raza, Public Counsel, San Francisco Office of the Public Defender,
San Joaquin College of Law New American Legal Clinic, Santa
Barbara County Immigrant Legal Defense Center, Silicon Valley De-
Bug, Stand Together Contra Costa, Tahirih Justice Center, University
of California Davis Immigration Law Clinic, University of California
Irvine Criminal Justice Clinic and University of California Irvine
Immigrant Rights Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan,
State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel P.
Siegel, Deputy State Solicitor General, Darren K. Indermill, David
Andrew Eldredge and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General,
and Kimberly M. Castle, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Stephen K. Dunkle
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle
222 East Carrillo Street, Suite 300
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
(805) 962-4887
Samuel P. Siegel
Deputy State Solicitor General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3917