People v. Caudillo

BIRD, C. J., Concurring.

I have given this case considerable thought, and I find I am compelled to sign the opinion of the majority since the legislative history of Penal Code section 461 indicates that the Legislature intended that rape per se could not be deemed “great bodily injury.” This court must give full weight to that intent, whatever our personal views concerning this most serious offense.

The offenses committed by appellant on the victim in this case were “outrageous, shocking and despicable,” as themajority state. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 575.) It has been noted that “[i]n the crime of. rape, the victim is not only deprived of autonomy and control, experiencing manipulation and often injury to the envelope of the self, but also intrusion of inner space, the most sacred and most private repository of the self. It does not matter which bodily orifice is breached. Symbolically they are much the same and have, so far as the victim is concerned, the asexual significance that forceful access has been provided into the innermost source of ego.” (Bard & Ellison, Crisis Intervention and Investigation of Forcible Rape, The Police Chief (May 1974) at pp. 68, 71.)

However, personal repugnance toward these crimes cannot be a legitimate basis for rewriting the statute as it was adopted by the Legislature. It is precisely because emotions are so easily called into play in such situations that extra precaution must be taken so that this court follows the legislative intent and not our own predelictions or beliefs. This court has no choice in this matter. It must accept the Legislature’s intent despite any personal feelings to the contrary. This court must accord the words of statutes their plain meaning and has done so in this case. However, the Legislature is the proper governmental body to consider whether rape per se is a basis for the enhancement of punishment and to so provide if they deem it appropriate.