Citation Numbers: 64 Cal. 434
Judges: Concu, McKee, McKinstry, Morrison, Myrick, Rring, Sharpstein, Thornton
Filed Date: 1/15/1884
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
—From the return to the writ issued in this proceeding it appears, that the petitioner has been imprisoned under an order of commitment, made by the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco, for a contempt of court, of which he has been adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned until payment of the fine at the rate of two dollars per day for every day’s imprisonment.
The order was made by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the only questions arising out of the return are whether the act for which the petitioner has been adjudged guilty and punished constituted a punishable contempt of court; and whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in the punishment which it inflicted.
If the invectives against the person named in the letter, and others, Avho are accused of having been hired by him to aid and abet him in his design, were founded upon facts, and the petitioner, as an attorney of the court, had suggested them to the court in a regular Avay, it is not to be doubted that upon such a suggestion judicial inquiry Avould have been instituted, and that, if there Avere adduced any evidence at all to sustain the suggestion, prompt action Avould have been taken to vindicate the laAV, maintain the respect due to the court, and to protect the court and the grand jury under its supervision and legal control against persons implicated in the attempt to commit, or in the commission of such criminal acts. For it is criminal to tamper AA’itli or to attempt to tamper with a jury or judicial officers in the performance of their "duties. Bribing, or offering to bribe, corruptly influencing, or attempting to influence, a juror by means of promises or assurances of any pecuniary or other advantage, or by means of any threat, intimidation, persuasion, or entreaty, or by means of any communication, oral or Avritten, had with him, except in the regular course of proceedings, in respect to his verdict or decision in any cause or proceeding, are
But while it is the right and duty of an attorney to address himself to a court for the purpose of putting in motion the power of the court to prevent the commission of such criminal acts, or to vacate and set aside proceedings tainted by them, or to convict and punish persons guilty of them, it is altogether irregular, unlawful, and criminal to send accusatory and threatening communications to a court or jury sitting with it, while engaged in the discharge of its duties. Hone should know better the relation between court and jury, and the consideration and respect due to them, than an attorney who is an officer of the court, bound by his oath of office, “to support the Constitution and laws, to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
Unquestionably, the fact of the existence of exculpatory evidence may be brought by any citizen to the attention of the grand jury in a regular way. If such evidence exists, and they have reason to believe that it is within their reach, they may request it to be produced, and for that purpose may order the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses (§ 920, Pen. Code), to the end that the citizen may be protected from the trouble, expense, and disgrace of being arraigned and tried in public on a criminal charge for which there is no sufficient cause. A grand jury should never forget,that it sits as the great inquest between the State and the citizen, to make accusations only upon sufficient evidence of guilt, and to protect the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether from the government, from partisan passion, or private malice.
But the letter was neither written nor sent for the purpose of informing the grand jury of evidence which would explain away the charges under investigation against the petitioner’s client. It was aimless for any purpose, except to exasperate the jurors, by the aspersions upon their official conduct which it contained, or to deter them from performing their duties by the threats of public clamor which it expressed, or to create a distrust and a want of confidence in any action which might be taken as the result of their investigation, and thus to embarrass the court itself in the administration of justice.
In the punishment inflicted, the court did not exceed its jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction to punish by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding five days, or by both. (§ 1218, Code Civ. Proc.) In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it imposed a fine of five hundred dollars, and that exhausted its statutory powder of punishment; but the committal was not an additional punishment, it wras simply the written mandate or process by which the court undertook to enforce its judgment. A judgment of fine is enforcible by an execution, as on a judgment, in a civil action (§ 1214, Pen. Code; § 1006, Code Civ. Proc.), or by commitment under the criminal law. (§ 1205, Pen. Code.) A person against Avhom such a judgment has been pronounced has, therefore, the privilege, under the laAV, of paying it either by money or by imprisonment. If he pays in money there can be no commitment. If he refuses to pay in that AAray, the commitment folloAvs, as an incident to the judgment, until the judgment has been complied Avith according to law. (§§ 1215, 1456, supra; Ex parte Crittenden, 63 Cal. 534.)
The petitioner is remanded.