DocketNumber： S031326
Judges： Brown, Kennard, Werdegar
Filed Date： 5/1/1997
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/2/2024
Opinion
Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) provides that the sentence imposed on any person convicted of a felony must be enhanced by
Defendant seeks review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case. He contends that the trial court’s failure to obtain an express, personal waiver of his right to jury trial before conducting a court trial on the prior prison term allegations was reversible per se, and not subject to the harmless error analysis employed by the Court of Appeal.
Defendant’s argument presupposes the Court of Appeal properly considered the merits of his claim of error but reached the wrong conclusion. As the record in this case demonstrates, however, the appellate court erred by entertaining defendant’s claim, but reached the correct result.
Defendant did not object to the discharge of the jury that determined his guilt of the charged offenses. Nor did defendant raise an objection to the commencement of court trial of the prior prison term allegations, or otherwise bring to the trial court’s attention its failure to obtain defendant’s express, personal waiver of jury trial. Under well-settled principles of appellate procedure, defendant’s failure to object in the trial court precludes him from raising the claim for the first time on appeal. (Cf. People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-592 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093] (hereafter Saunders).)
Thus, the Court of Appeal misconceived a significant threshold issue which, under this court’s recent precedents, appears dispositive. Nonetheless, the court upheld the trial court’s determination, and its judgment is therefore affirmed. (See Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329 [48 P. 117] [decision that is correct but for wrong reason not to be disturbed on appeal].)
I. Procedural Background
Over a 10-day period, defendant committed a series of violent crimes, forcing himself into his victims’ cars and robbing them at knife point. He was charged in an amended, multicount information with three counts of robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 213, subd. (a)(2)), three counts of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), and one count of grand
The trial court granted defendant’s request to bifurcate trial of the prior prison terms from trial on the substantive crimes. The substantive crimes were tried by jury. At the time of the bifurcation motion, defense counsel said to the court, “[I] have discussed with [defendant] his option of having a jury or nonjury trial on those prior convictions, and he indicates to me that he is in fact going to waive the right to a jury trial on the prior convictions in the event that he is convicted on the case in chief “ and would “allow the court to hear those as a court trial.” The court responded, “All right. We can take that issue up later.” Defendant did not personally waive his right to jury trial on the prior prison term allegations.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts except grand theft auto. On that count, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of driving and taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 instead. The jury also found the knife-use allegations true. The trial court discharged the jury. Defendant then agreed to continue trial on the prior prison term allegations until the day of sentencing. Before the matter was continued, however, defense counsel asked defendant in open court, “Mr. Vera, you realize you have a right to . . . have the trial on your priors held today, and have your sentencing today?” Defendant replied that he did. Defense counsel then inquired, “You are willing to give up the right to have all that done today and agree that it can be done on [the same date as your sentencing]?” Defendant again responded affirmatively.
The prior prison term allegations were tried to the court on the date originally scheduled for sentencing. Defendant did not object to the commencement of court trial. Both sides waived argument, and, having reviewed the People’s documentary exhibits relating to defendant’s prior convictions and prison terms, the court found the allegations true. Defendant was sentenced to a determinate term totaling seven years, which included one-year enhancements for each of the two prior prison terms, plus an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole.
Defendant appealed, raising a variety of claims. In relevant part, defendant contended that the trial court’s finding he suffered two prior prison terms must be stricken because he did not waive his right to jury trial.
The Court of Appeal determined the trial court’s failure to obtain an express, personal waiver from defendant was error, but that the error was
II. Discussion
Defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court erred when it conducted a court trial on the truth of the prior prison term allegations without first obtaining an express, personal waiver of his right to jury trial. As this court’s decision in People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 589 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541] (hereafter Wiley), makes clear, a defendant’s right to have a jury determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation is derived from statute. Thus, defendant asserts a violation of his state-created right to have the truth of the prior conviction allegations tried by a jury “or by the court if a jury is waived.” (§ 1025; see also § 1158 [if defendant found guilty of charged offense, jury, or judge if jury trial is waived, must find whether defendant suffered previous conviction]; cf. § 969½ [if complaint amended to include allegations of prior convictions after defendant pleads guilty to charged offense, and if allegation of prior felony is denied, question must be tried by a jury unless a jury is waived].)
In Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th 580, this court reviewed a defendant’s claim that the trial court violated section 1025 by discharging the jury after it found the defendant guilty of the substantive offense but before the jurors had determined the truth of the prior conviction allegations. We concluded the defendant’s failure to alert the trial court by making a timely objection precluded the claim on appeal. (Saunders, supra, at p. 589.) Defendant is similarly precluded from asserting his claim of an ineffectual jury waiver under the same statutory scheme.
When the proceedings resumed the following day, the court indicated its understanding, confirmed by defense counsel, that defendant wished to waive the right to jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. The court then obtained an express waiver of jury trial from the defendant. The prosecutor presented certified records of the defendant’s prior convictions, and the truth of the allegations was submitted to the court. (Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 586.)
The next day, however, defense counsel stated that when she had advised the defendant to waive the right to jury trial of the prior conviction allegations, she was unaware that the jury had been discharged. She claimed that had she known of the jury’s discharge, she would not have advised her client to waive jury trial. To remedy the situation, the trial court permitted the defendant to withdraw his waiver, and a new jury was impaneled. The jury found true each of the prior conviction allegations. (Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 586-587.)
As the court in Saunders, supra, recognized, the trial court’s discharge of the first jury before that jury had determined the truth of the prior conviction allegations constituted a violation of sections 1025 and 1164.
In reaching this conclusion, Saunders applied the well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court. (Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 589-590.) Saunders emphasized
Like defendant’s claim of an ineffectual waiver of the right to jury trial, the defendant’s claim in Saunders asserted a violation of section 1025. Although the Saunders defendant claimed a denial of the right to the same jury rather than the right to jury trial, the distinction does not compel a different result. Both claims are based on an asserted violation of section 1025, the source of the right to jury trial of prior conviction allegations relating to sentencing. (Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 589.) Section 1025 establishes a defendant’s right to jury trial of alleged prior convictions by the same jury which determines guilt of the substantive offenses. The “same jury” provision reflects the statute’s unitary trial procedure, and does not constitute a statutory entitlement separate from the jury trial right itself.
In both this case and Saunders, the trial court discharged the jury after receipt of the verdicts on the substantive crimes because it understood, based on representations by defense counsel, that the defendant wished to waive jury trial on the bifurcated prior conviction allegations. (Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 586.) If defendant wished jury trial rather than court trial of the sentencing allegations, he could have pointed out the trial court’s misunderstanding before the court rendered its findings on the truth of the prior conviction allegations. The prior conviction allegations could have been properly tried to a jury impaneled for that purpose. (See id. at pp. 592-597 [no double jeopardy bar to impaneling second jury to determine truth of prior conviction allegations following return of guilty verdict in bifurcated proceeding].) As Saunders observes, the Legislature did not intend, in enacting section 1025, to create a “procedural trap” for an unwary trial court and prosecutor. (Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 590-591.)
Not all claims of error are prohibited in the absence of a timely objection in the trial court. A defendant is not precluded from raising for the first time on appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of certain fundamental, constitutional rights. (See Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 592 [plea of once in jeopardy]; People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442, 443-444 [5 Cal.Rptr.
The right to have a jury determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation does not flow from the jury trial provision of article I, section 16 of the California Constitution or the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is derived from statute. (Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586, 589.) In light of Wiley, defendant cannot claim he was deprived of the constitutional right to jury trial on the prior prison term allegations.
Nor can defendant assert a violation of the constitutional requirement that a jury trial waiver in a criminal proceeding be made “by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) The failure to obtain a defendant’s express waiver of the right to jury trial in a criminal prosecution constitutes a violation of the state constitutional mandate. (People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 448 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 881 P.2d 298].) Where the whole cause—substantive offenses and sentencing allegations—is tried in a unitary proceeding, a constitutionally effective waiver of jury trial is required. (Cf. People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 94 [77 Cal.Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721]; People v. Zavaleta (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 422, 429-430 [6 Cal.Rptr. 166]; People v. Ysabel (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 259, 263 [82 P.2d 476].) When the defendant seeks to bifurcate the determination of the truth of the prior conviction allegation from determination of the defendant’s guilt of the charged crimes, however, only the statutory right to jury trial is implicated in the trial of the sentencing allegations. Since there is no constitutional right to have the jury determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation (Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 586, 589), it follows that the failure to obtain an express, personal waiver of the right to jury trial of prior conviction allegations does not constitute a violation of the state constitutional mandate.
Defendant argues the protection afforded by the state constitutional requirement that jury trial be personally and expressly waived attaches whenever the Legislature grants a defendant the right to jury trial. Defendant insists there is no distinction between a right to jury trial created by statute and the right to jury trial that is constitutionally derived. We conclude the language and structure of the constitutional provision belie such an interpretation.
We are aware of no decision by a California court addressing the question whether the state constitutional requirement of an express, personal waiver of jury trial attaches to a nonconstitutional jury trial right. That the constitutional requirement relates solely to the jury trial right guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution appears to be presumed. (Cf. People v. Moreno (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 564, 573-579 [279 Cal.Rptr. 140] [concluding state constitutional jury trial clause does not guarantee jury trial of special circumstances allegations, and rejecting defendants’ argument that failure to obtain waiver of jury trial of special circumstances allegations is reversible per se as violation of Cal. Const., article I, section 16].)
In sum, the deprivation of the statutory right to jury trial on the prior prison term allegations does not implicate the state or federal constitutional right to jury trial. Absent an objection to the discharge of the jury or commencement of court trial, defendant is precluded from asserting on appeal a claim of ineffectual waiver of the statutory right to jury trial of prior prison term allegations.
Although the Court of Appeal correctly recognized that defendant’s claim of a violation of his statutory right to jury trial of the prior prison term allegations did not implicate the state or federal constitutional right to jury trial, the court determined nevertheless that defendant’s claim was properly preserved on appeal. Relying on decisions involving an invalid waiver of the defendant’s right to jury trial on a special circumstance allegation in a murder prosecution, the Court of Appeal invoked the rule of Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343 [100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175] (hereafter
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that defendant need not have objected in the trial court in order to preserve his claim on appeal because he was asserting a deprivation of federal due process is contrary to recent pronouncements by this court regarding the inapplicability of Hicks to similar circumstances. (People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77], cert. den. _ U.S. _ [116 S.Ct. 927, 133 L.Ed.2d 855] (hereafter Wims).) Consistent with the reasoning in Wims, we conclude an asserted deprivation of the statutory right to have a jury determine the truth of a prior prison term allegation does not constitute a claim of federal constitutional dimension.
In Wims, the trial court committed error when it failed to instruct the jury on the elements of a sentence enhancement for use of a deadly and dangerous weapon alleged pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b). (Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 302-303.) The defendants argued the error violated the federal Constitution. In rejecting the defendants’ assertion of federal constitutional error, Wims specifically determined the trial court’s error did not deprive the defendants of their rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 309-311.) The Wims court disagreed with the defendants’ assertion that the error denied the defendants “a state-created liberty interest in the exercise of jury sentencing discretion in contravention of Hicks v. Oklahoma[, supra,] 447 U.S. 343 . . . .” (Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In Hicks, the United States Supreme Court declared that where “a State has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant’s interest in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion [citation], and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the States.” (Hicks, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 346 [100 S.Ct. at p. 2229].)
The court in Wims found the rationale of Hicks inapplicable to California’s statutory scheme for firearm-use sentence enhancements. As the court explained, “[defendants here suffered no deprivation of state-mandated jury
Here, similar to Wims, the denial of a statutory entitlement to a jury finding on the truth of a prior prison term sentence-enhancement allegation is markedly different from the deprivation of state-mandated jury discretion that occurred in Hicks. Like the weapon-use sentence enhancement scheme at issue in Wims, the determination of the truth of a prior prison term allegation does not require the jury to perform a discretionary sentencing function. Rather, the jury is charged with factfinding, i.e., determining whether or not the allegation of the prior prison term is true. (Cf. Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 309-310; cf. People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [distinguishing capital jury’s constitutionally mandated exercise of vast discretion from guilt phase jury’s role as fact finder].)
The fact that, in this case, the court rather than a jury determined the truth of the prior prison term allegations does not make the reasoning of Wims inapplicable here. Defendant claims he was denied the right to jury trial on the truth of the sentence enhancement allegations. He does not assert, nor does the record in this case suggest, he was denied a fair trial. As we shall explain, because defendant was afforded a fair determination of the truth of the prior prison term allegations by the trial court sitting as a trier of fact, he was afforded “due process of law under Hicks." (Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 311.)
“[T]rial by jury ... is fundamental to the American scheme of justice” (Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 149 [88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491]; see also id. at p. 153 [88 S.Ct. at pp. 1449-1450]), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment thus guarantees an accused the right to jury trial in a criminal case. (Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 149 [88 S.Ct. at pp. 1447-1448].) As a matter of federal due process, the states must afford their criminal defendants the right to jury trial
There is, however, no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on sentence enhancement allegations. (Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 303-309; Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 585; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 93 [106 S.Ct. 2411, 2419-2420, 91 L.Ed.2d 67] [no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even when imposition of sentence depends on factual findings].) Indeed, the majority of states and the federal government eschew jury determination of the truth of alleged prior convictions. (People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 76 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83].) Thus, the substitution of a fair court trial for jury trial on a sentence enhancement allegation does not constitute a violation of federal due process. So long as defendant received a fair court trial on the truth of the prior prison term allegations—and he does not contend otherwise—his claim of ineffectual waiver does not constitute a federal due process claim. The Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded, therefore, defendant’s claim was preserved for appellate review.
III. Conclusion and Disposition
Defendant’s claim that he was deprived of his statutory right to jury trial on the prior prison term allegations does not implicate the state or federal constitutional right to jury trial or the federal due process clause. He was therefore obligated to bring the alleged error to the attention of the trial court in order to preserve his claim for appellate review. Defendant failed to object to the discharge of the jury or otherwise indicate to the trial court his desire for jury trial of the prior prison term allegations. He was thus precluded from arguing for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred by conducting a court trial on the truth of the prior prison term allegations without having first obtained from defendant an express, personal waiver of jury trial. As this court explained a century ago, “[t]he defendant can not remain silent and take the chance of a favorable issue, and, losing, urge as [a] ground for reversal an error, which, but for his silence, might never have found its way into the case. His failure to object justly gives rise to the inference that at the time he saw no injury being done [to] him, and he can not complain on being met here by a barrier arising from his own omission.” (People v. Kramer (1897) 117 Cal. 647, 651 [49 P. 842].)
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., and Chin, J., concurred.
Section 1025 states in relevant part: “When a defendant who is charged in the accusatory pleading with having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged against him, he must be asked whether he has suffered such previous conviction. If he answers that he has, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and must, unless withdrawn by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having suffered such previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that he has not, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or by the court if a jury is waived. . . .”
Section 1158 provides in relevant part: “Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he is charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must unless the answer of the defendant admits such previous conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction. . . .”
Section 1164, subdivision (b) states: “No jury shall be discharged until the court has verified on the record that the jury has either reached a verdict or has formally declared its inability to reach a verdict on all issues before it, including, but not limited to, the degree of the crime or crimes charged, and the truth of any alleged prior conviction whether in the same proceeding or in a bifurcated proceeding.”