DocketNumber: Crim. No. 11506
Citation Numbers: 252 Cal. App. 2d 125, 60 Cal. Rptr. 78, 1967 Cal. App. LEXIS 1490
Judges: Wood
Filed Date: 6/28/1967
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
In a nonjury trial the defendant was adjudged guilty of burglary of the second degree. He appeals from the judgment.
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for arresting or searching him, and that the court erred in receiving in evidence certain articles which allegedly were obtained from him by illegal arrest and search.
Burglary was committed at the office of Mr. Avery, at 936 Huntington Drive in San Marino, sometime after he left his office on the evening of February 24, 1965, and before he returned there on the morning of February 25, 1965, and various articles, including draperies, a silver dollar, and keys, were stolen from the office.
On February 25, 1965, about 12:30 a.m., while uniformed Officer Kaupp was traveling westerly in a patrol car on Hungtington Drive in San Marino, he saw a man, who was carrying a large bundle, running westerly on the sidewalk on that street. The officer drove to the next street intersection, turned his car around the divider (space in middle of street
The officer did not have a search warrant or warrant of arrest. He did not advise the defendant of his constitutional rights.
Mr. Avery, as a witness, identified the draperies (Exhibit 3), the silver dollar (Exhibit 1), and the set of keys (Exhibit 2) as some of his property which was stolen from his office.
The defendant did not testify, and did not call any witness in his behalf.
When the prosecution offered the silver dollar, keys, and draperies in evidence, the defendant objected thereto on the ground that they were obtained by illegal search in that the officer did not have probable cause for arresting him. The objection was overruled.
Appellant asserts that the crucial question is whether at the time of the arrest the officer had probable cause for making the arrest. If the arrest was proper the search, which was incidental to the arrest, was legal. “A peace officer may . . . arrest a person; . . . Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.” (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3.) “Probable cause for an arrest is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.' ’ (People v. Fischer, 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 [317 P.2d 967].) In the present ease, soon after midnight, while a uniformed police officer of the City of San Marino was traveling on Huntington Drive in an area where expensive residences were on the north side of the street and commercial buildings were on the other side of the street, he saw the defendant running on the north sidewalk and carrying a large bundle. After the officer had driven past the defendant, and while the officer was proceeding to and returning from the next street intersection, the defendant stopped running. As of the time the officer observed and talked with the defendant on the sidewalk, it would have been reasonable for the officer to conclude that defendant’s explanation of his running and carrying a large bundle of draperies in such an area, at that late hour of the night, was false and indicative of consciousness of guilt of theft of the draperies. It is apparent that most of defendant’s statements
A further contention of appellant is that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that the allegations of prior convictions were true. Defendant had denied allegations of the information that he had been convicted previously of three felonies. No evidence was presented regarding those allegations. The minutes of June 19, 1965 (the date defendant was adjudged guilty) recite: “The Court finds the priors to be true. ’ ’ Upon motion of the People the record on appeal has been augmented to include the file of the superior court and particularly a minute order therein which shows that on June 30,1965, the superior court made a nunc pro tunc order striking from the minutes of June 19, 1965, the finding that the alleged priors were true. In view of said nunc pro tunc order, there is, of course, no finding of the trial court regarding the alleged prior convictions, and consequently there is no useful purpose to be served by referring further to this contention.
The judgment is affirmed.
Fourt, J., and Lillie, J., concurred.