Marriage of Williams CA4/2

Filed 2/18/22 Marriage of Williams CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of JOLLYANN AND
PHILLIP WILLIAMS.
JOLLYANN BUMATAY-WILLIAMS,
E075686
Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SWD1701768)
v.
OPINION
PHILLIP WILLIAMS,
Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elaine M. Kiefer, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Philip Williams, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Westover Law Group and Andrew L. Westover, for Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Pro. per. appellant Phillip Williams appeals the trial court’s judgment, its order
denying his motion to vacate the judgment, and its order sanctioning him $2,500. We
dismiss Williams’s untimely appeal from the trial court’s judgment and otherwise affirm.
II.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Williams’s wife, Jollyann Bumatay-Williams, petitioned to dissolve their marriage
in 2017. At the end of a bench trial in September 2019, the parties stipulated that
Bumatay-Williams’s counsel would prepare a stipulated judgment that the parties would
sign and file with the court. In October 2019, Bumatay-Williams filed two unidentified
judgments. About a week later, she filed a “Judgment on Dissolution with Child(ren).”
In support of that judgment, Bumatay-Williams’s counsel submitted a “Declaration of/re:
Entry of Judgment Without Signature of Other Party.” Counsel explained that he filed
the stipulated judgment without Williams’s signature because he could not obtain
Williams’s signature.
The trial court rejected the judgment because a party to the action, the Riverside
County Department of Public Social Services (the Department), did not sign it.
Bumatay-Williams therefore filed a “Judgment for Dissolution on Reserved Issues (FL-
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As discussed below, Williams provided an inadequate record on appeal. We
discuss only the facts and procedural history we can sufficiently glean from the
inadequate record.
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180) on Dissolution with Child(ren)” (the judgment) on December 23, 2020. According
to Bumatay-Williams’s counsel, the only difference between the judgments filed in
October and December was that the Department signed the December judgment but not
the October judgment. The trial court entered judgment later that day.
Forty-five days later, on February 6, 2020, Williams moved to set aside the
judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)).
Williams argued the judgment should be vacated because Bumatay-Williams filed it
without his input and he disagreed with some of its terms. While that motion was
pending, Bumatay-Williams moved for sanctions against Williams, which he opposed.
On September 3, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions and
Williams’s request for an order (RFO) related to child support. The trial court denied the
motion because the judgment’s terms were identical to the terms of the parties’ stipulated
judgment that they agreed to at the end of the trial. The trial court also denied Williams’s
RFO as moot. The trial court sanctioned Williams $2,500 for bringing the motion and
filing the RFO. Williams filed a notice of appeal later that day.
III.
DISCUSSION
In his notice of appeal, Williams states he appeals from a default judgment and an
order or judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 904.1, subdivision (a)(3)-(13)
entered on September 3, 2020. In his opening brief, Williams says his appeal is from a
“final judgment of the Riverside County Superior Court and is authorized by the Code of
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Civil Procedure, section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1)(4) & subdivision (b).” Bumatay-
Williams argues Williams’s notice of appeal is deficient because the trial court never
entered a default judgment and the Code of Civil Procedure sections Williams cites in his
opening brief are inapplicable.
Although it is not entirely clear, Williams’s opening brief indicates that he appeals
the December 23, 2019 judgment, the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate that
judgment, and its order sanctioning him. “‘[N]otices of appeal are to be liberally
construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was
trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or
prejudiced.’” (D’Avola v. Anderson (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 358, 361.) Although the trial
court did not enter a default judgment, Williams’s notice of appeal states he is appealing
from a judgment and an order or judgment entered on September 3, 2020. The only
judgment relevant to the trial court’s September 3 proceedings is the December 23, 2019
judgment Williams sought to vacate at the September 3 hearing.
Liberally construing his notice of appeal, it is reasonably clear that Williams
intended to appeal the trial court’s December 23, 2019 judgment and its order denying his
motion to vacate that judgment. It is also reasonably clear that Williams appeals from the
trial court’s other orders entered on September 3, 2020.
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Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1)(4) authorizes appeals
“[f]rom an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict” while Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (b) authorizes
appeals from “[s]anction orders or judgments of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less
against a party.”
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We therefore conclude Williams’s notice of appeal is sufficient to address the
issues he raises in his opening brief, particularly given that we can discern no prejudice to
Bumatay-Williams. (See D’Avola v. Anderson, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 361.)
Nonetheless, we dismiss Williams’s appeal from the trial court’s December 23, 2019
judgment as untimely. (See Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide
Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 [appellate court must dismiss late
appeal].)
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California Rules of Court rule 8.104(a)(1) provides the general rule for filing a
timely notice of appeal: “a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶]
(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment,
showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of
appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of
judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or
[¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”
But Williams moved to vacate the judgment on February 6, 2020, 45 days after the
December 23, 2019 judgment. The time to file a notice of appeal is extended when, as
here, a motion to vacate the judgment is filed. Rule 8.108(c) provides, “If, within the
time prescribed by rule 8.104 to appeal from the judgment, any party serves and files a
valid notice of intention to move—or a valid motion—to vacate the judgment, the time to
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All further references to “rules” are to the California Rules of Court.
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appeal from the judgment is extended for all parties until the earliest of: [¶] (1) 30 days
after the superior court clerk or a party serves an order denying the motion or a notice of
entry of that order; [¶] (2) 90 days after the first notice of intention to move—or
motion—is filed; or [¶] (3) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (Italics added.)
There is nothing in the record suggesting that Williams was served with the trial
court’s September 3, 2020 order denying his motion to vacate, so rule 8.108(c)(1)’s 30-
day deadline is inapplicable.
Williams moved to vacate the judgment on February 6, 2020, so the 90-day
deadline under rule 8.108(c)(2) fell on May 6, 2020.
One hundred eighty days after the December 23, 2019 judgment was Saturday,
June 20, 2020, so the 180-day deadline under rule 8.108(c)(3) fell on June 22, 2020. (See
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 10, 12, 12a.)
The deadline for Williams to appeal the December 23, 2020 judgment was
therefore extended until only May 6, 2020 because this is the earliest of the three
timeframes in rule 8.108(c)(1)-(3).
Williams did not appeal the judgment until September 3, 2020, so his appeal of the
judgment is untimely by several months. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider his
appeal of the judgment must dismiss it. (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized
Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56.)
But because Williams appealed the trial court’s orders denying his motion to
vacate and sanctioning him $2,500 on the same day they were entered, his appeal was
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timely. (See rule 8.406(a)(1).) And because both orders are appealable, we have
jurisdiction to consider them. (See Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852,
857, fn. 3 [order denying motion to vacate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473 is appealable]; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd (d) [sanctions order entered
after final judgment is appealable].)
As to the sanctions order, Williams does not cite the record, provide any relevant
authority, or make any reasoned argument. We therefore conclude Williams forfeited
any challenge to the order. (See Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226
Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205 [appellant must “support the arguments in its briefs by
appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations” and
failure to do so forfeits argument]; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [appellant must cite appropriate authority and failure to do
forfeits argument]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785
[appellant must make reasoned argument and failure to do so forfeits argument].)
Although Williams provides some argument about the trial court’s order denying
his motion to vacate, he does not cite anything in the record. He has therefore forfeited
any argument that the trial court erroneously denying his motion. (Bernard v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1205.) Williams forfeited his challenge to the
trial court’s order for the additional reason that he did not provide an adequate record.
The trial court stated at the September 3, 2020 hearing that it was denying Williams’s
motion to vacate the judgment because the judgment accurately reflected the parties’
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agreement reached at the end of the trial. But in his record on appeal, Williams did not
provide any records or transcripts from the trial or a copy of the judgment. Because we
cannot properly determine whether the trial court erroneously denied Williams’s motion
to vacate on the inadequate record he provided, we must affirm the trial court’s order
denying the motion. (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2020) 78
Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
Williams’s appeal from the trial court’s December 23, 2020 judgment is
dismissed. The trial court’s orders denying Williams’s motion to vacate the judgment
and sanctioning him $2,500 are affirmed. Bumatay-Williams may recover her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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