Peterson v. Chaix

In their petition for rehearing plaintiffs urged that the written memorandum did not constitute the whole of the agreement between the parties; but that there were conditions, resting in parol, which were an essential part thereof, and that the case presents an instance "where a verbal contract is entire, and a part only in part performance is reduced to writing," and hence parol testimony was admissible to establish the complete agreement. We do not think that an extended discussion is called for in disposing of plaintiffs' contention. It may be conceded, and as we understand defendants' position they admit, that where the contract appears to be merely an incomplete memorandum, or to be partly in writing and partly in parol, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show what the mutual stipulations were. But this is true only as to such matters concerning which the written memorandum is silent or as to which terms are used which import ambiguity or uncertainty — i. e., which on their face admit of doubt as to what the parties meant by their use. There is another principle to be observed, namely, that whatever the law implies from a contract in writing is as much a part of the contract as that which is therein expressed; and to the extent that the contract, with that which the law implies, is clear, definite and complete, it cannot be added to, varied or contradicted by extrinsic evidence. A still further principle is not to be overlooked, namely, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that a contract was partly written and partly oral, if the matter proposed to be made part of the contract by such evidence is inconsistent with the terms of the writing. We may add a still further and salutary rule, which has been recently given careful and extended discussion by this court, in the case of Hale Bros. Inc. v. Milliken,ante, p. 344, [90 P. 365], and it is this: While it is competent in construing a contract to show the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and acts of the parties under the contract, as tending to show how they understood it, still this cannot be done to the extent of varying or contradicting a written contract, where such contract is certain, complete and unambiguous. The foregoing principles are stated to be the law in the very well reasoned case, supported by cited authorities, of Faulkner v. SmithWallpaper Co., 88 Iowa, 169, [45 Am. St. Rep. 230, 55 N.W. 200]. In that case the memorandum read as follows: "On demand I promise to deliver to the order of E. F. Fisher Eight hundred dollars (less twenty per cent discount), in wall paper, at wholesale prices, good, clean, assorted stock out of my store on Fifth Street, Des Moines, Iowa. No storage. Lew Smith Wall Paper Co." The defendant pleaded that, at the date of making the order, and of its acceptance by Fisher, the wholesale price for good, clean, assorted wallpaper, and the price upon which said order was based, and at which said paper was to be delivered by the defendant to, and accepted by, the payee was agreed upon, and set forth on a card then shown Fisher; that the schedule of prices printed upon the card was then agreed upon between the parties to said order as the then wholesale prices at which paper was to be delivered, and said card accompanied the order, as a part of it, and a part of the contract fixing the wholesale price of said paper. Defendant was permitted to prove at the trial that, when the contract was made between the parties, he handed the plaintiff's assignor a card, having printed thereon a price list of wallpaper, and that he was to take the paper mentioned in the contract at the prices stated on the card. It was not attached to or made part of the written contract or referred to in it. The evidence was objected to, as tending to vary and contradict the written contract of the parties. Defendant claimed that the evidence was admissible as constituting part of the contract; that, though it was on a separate piece of paper, still it was in fact but a part of and altogether constituted but one contract. The Iowa supreme court held that the lower court erred in admitting the evidence. In speaking of the terms "wholesale price," the court said: "There is no claim that the schedule of prices, as set forth on the card introduced in evidence, was to be a part of the written contract, and was omitted by accident, mistake, oversight or fraud. No such issue is presented. The evidence objected to would work a material change in the terms of the contract. It shows that the paper was to be received at a price which was agreed upon when the contract was executed, and outside of the provisions of the written contract. It measured the amount of paper that should be received under the written contract by the then wholesale market price, when the written contract measured the amount of paper to be delivered under it by the wholesale price at the time of demand made for the goods."

In the case here the sole controversy relates to the quantity of grapes which defendants agreed to receive. It is true the contract is silent as to the agreement of defendants to receive any of the grapes. But they did receive them and no question arises as to this. The law would have implied an agreement to pay at the stipulated price for all grapes received by them of the quality named. True, also, that the contract is silent as to the varieties of the grapes, but as all bore the same price and as no dispute arose upon this point the fact is immaterial. So, also, as to the omission to state when the delivery was to be made or whence the grapes were to come. Reduced to the actual matter in controversy, the sole dispute was whether plaintiffs could prove by parol testimony that defendants had agreed to receive all of plaintiffs' crop, or to receive 166 tons of grapes in excess of the "250 tons more or less," specified in the written memorandum. It is not necessary to repeat the observations upon this point heretofore made. We are still of the opinion that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to materially add to the quantity mentioned in the memorandum. The principle invoked by respondents, when rightly applied, affords them no relief.

For the reasons stated in our former opinion and herein, the judgment and order are reversed.

Hart, J., and Burnett, J., concurred.

The following is the former opinion above referred to, rendered February 20, 1907: