People v. Griffin CA2/3

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Griffin CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B319157
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA146930)
v.
DOMINICK DONNELL GRIFFIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Olivia Meme, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, David E. Madeo and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
After a jury convicted Dominick Griffin of robbery, the trial
court sentenced him to the middle term. On appeal, Griffin
contends his sentence should be vacated and the matter
remanded for resentencing under recent amendments to Penal
Code1 section 1170 providing that if a defendant experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma that was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense, then the
lower term is the presumptive term. We reject his contention and
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In March 2017, Ricardo Ramirez was working at a gas
station. When he went outside to help someone at a gas pump, a
disguised man, later identified as Griffin, pointed a gun at
Ramirez, pushed him back into the store, and demanded money.
Ramirez gave Griffin money from the cash register, but Griffin
demanded that Ramirez open the safe or he’d kill Ramirez.
Fearing he would be shot, Ramirez tried to push the gun away. A
struggle ensued during which a shot was fired but did not hit
anyone. Griffin then pointed the gun again at Ramirez, who gave
him money. Griffin fled in a nearby car. A fingerprint recovered
from the crime scene led investigators to Griffin, who was
arrested two years later. At that time, Griffin admitted to law
enforcement that he committed the robbery at the behest of a
friend to whom Griffin owed rent money. His friend drove them
to the store, gave Griffin a gun, mask and gloves, and told him to
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
get the money. Griffin said that the gun discharged accidentally
when Ramirez grabbed it.2
Griffin was charged with second degree robbery (§ 211) and
with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A jury found
Griffin guilty as charged.
At his sentencing hearing on March 17, 2022, Griffin’s
defense counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum stating
that a court generally should impose the lower term if certain
mitigating factors are present, citing section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6).
In addition, Griffin and his fiancée submitted letters. In
his letter, Griffin said that his mother and grandmother raised
him until he was eight years old, when he was put into foster
care until he turned 18 years old. He had a passion for sports,
and after graduating from high school, played football at college
in Santa Rosa. Lacking funds, he left college after just two
months. Griffin returned to Los Angeles and reconnected with
his mother. Learning that his grandmother had died sent Griffin
into a “downward spiral of depression” that still follows him. He
and his mother were homeless, living place to place and sleeping
on couches or floors when allowed. In 2012, he began working in
security services but could not get approved for an apartment due
to his lack of credit and rental history. He had two children. In
2014, his children’s mother attacked him with a broom, but he
was the one who was arrested and charged with a crime. In
2
At a hearing on a motion to suppress his statement, Griffin
denied committing the robbery, saying he only confessed to avoid
an attempted murder charge. The trial court denied the motion
and found that Griffin’s statement to law enforcement was not
coerced.
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2019, he reunited with his children’s mother, with whom he now
had three children and was about to have a fourth. For the first
time, he was approved for an apartment, which gave him a sense
of joy that surpassed the depression he had suffered. Griffin
asked to be given a chance to help others affected by crime.
Griffin’s fiancée wrote that during the 17 years she had
known him, Griffin had always been a loving and caring person.
Despite his childhood struggles and growing up in foster care, he
maintained a positive outlook and was an amazing, hands-on
father. Because she was having a difficult pregnancy, Griffin was
the family’s sole provider. Without him, their family was facing
homelessness. She also pointed out that the robbery had been
committed five years earlier and Griffin had not been in trouble
since.
The trial court acknowledged having read the sentencing
memorandum and letters and said it understood that Griffin had
a “difficult childhood” and that his childhood “wasn’t good,” but
his “difficult childhood does not excuse [his] behavior.” The trial
court noted that Griffin had no prior felony convictions and only a
couple of misdemeanors and he had not been incarcerated for any
significant amount of time. It then sentenced Griffin to the
middle term of three years for the robbery plus the low term of
three years for the firearm enhancement.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2022, a trial court may only impose
the upper term “when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime” that justify imposing a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and the defendant has stipulated to
the facts underlying those circumstances or those facts have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the trier of fact.
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(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); see generally People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459, 464–465.) Also, if the defendant has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, that
contributed to commission of the crime, then the court shall
impose the lower term, unless the trial court finds that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(A).) A finding, for example, that childhood trauma
contributed to the commission of the crime raises a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the lower term. (See People v. Banner
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 240–241.)
Here, the People argue that Griffin forfeited the right to
raise section 1170, subdivision (b), on appeal because he did not
raise it below. However, defense counsel cited the section in her
sentencing memorandum and submitted letters from Griffin and
his fiancée, which the trial court would have understood were
relevant to mitigation. We therefore conclude that the
memorandum and letters were sufficient to preserve the issue for
appeal.
As we understand it, Griffin’s substantive argument is that
his evidence triggered the lower term presumption, but the trial
court failed to “properly” consider and weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The problem with this argument, as
the People point out, is it presupposes that the trial court found
the lower term presumption applied. Although the trial court
stated that Griffin had a troubled childhood, describing it as not
good and “difficult,” the trial court did not then find that any
childhood trauma was a contributing factor to his commission of
the robbery. Only when a finding connecting trauma to the
commission of the crime is made does the lower term
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presumption arise. A trial court then considers whether
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones, to rebut the
presumption.
The record here shows that the trial court found to the
contrary. That is, the trial court said that Griffin’s childhood
experiences did not “excuse” his behavior. To be sure, whether
Griffin’s past experiences excused the robbery is not the point.
The point is whether childhood trauma contributed to
commission of the crime. Even so, and despite the trial court’s
inartful language, we presume that the trial court understood
and followed the applicable law where the record is silent on the
point. (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1096–
1097.) Nothing in the record rebuts this presumption, especially
given that defense counsel cited section 1170, subdivision (b), to
the trial court (albeit in a sentencing memorandum and not at
the hearing) and submitted letters citing mitigating factors, and
the trial court referred to Griffin’s childhood at the hearing.
Therefore, we presume that the trial court found that the lower
term presumption did not apply.
Alternatively, if it is Griffin’s argument on appeal that his
evidence compelled a finding that the lower term presumption
applied as a matter of law, then we disagree with that argument
as well. Rather, what term to impose generally rests in the trial
court’s sound and informed discretion. (§ 1170, subd. (b); see
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390–1391.) Griffin
did not explain why or how any childhood trauma contributed to
his decision to rob Ramirez. Indeed, the record contains
alternative explanations for why he committed the crime;
namely, he owed a friend money. While the trial court would
have been within its discretion to infer that childhood trauma
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contributed to Griffin’s commission of the crime, we cannot find
that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to draw that
inference when Griffin offered no clear reason to do so.
Finally, we disagree with Griffin’s contention that a proper
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
would have led the trial court to impose the lower term. First,
and as we have said, the trial court did not find that the lower
term presumption applied and therefore it did not have to
determine whether aggravating circumstances nonetheless
weighed in favor of a term other than the lower term. Second,
the trial court did consider the mitigating circumstances Griffin
raised; for example, his troubled childhood, that his criminal
history consisted of only a couple of misdemeanors, and he had
not served time in jail or prison. The trial court explicitly
referred to these mitigating factors on the record.
As for other factors that Griffin mentions on appeal but
were not argued to the trial court, his age was not a mitigating
factor. Defendants who committed their crimes when under the
age of 26 are entitled to a presumptive lower term. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6)(B).) Griffin was two months past his 26th birthday when
he committed the robbery. Therefore, the presumption based on
youth did not apply.
Griffin next argues that his friend induced him to commit
the crime and that Griffin complied out of a desire to provide for
his family. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(a)(5) [others
induced defendant to participate in crime, although defendant
had no apparent predisposition to do so]; id., rule 4.423(a)(8)
[desire to provide necessities for family motivated defendant’s
crime].) Aside from not presenting these factors to the trial court,
Griffin testified at a hearing to suppress his statements to law
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enforcement that he did not commit the crime at all. Also, Griffin
did not clearly say he committed the crime to help his family.
Rather, he told law enforcement he committed it because he owed
rent money to a friend.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Griffin to the middle term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
LAVIN, J.
RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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