Castronovo v. Castronova CA4/1

Filed 1/20/23 Castronovo v. Castronova CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CATHERINE CASTRONOVO et al., D079272
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
00045254-PR-TR-CTL)
MARY ELLEN CASTRONOVO, as
Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Judge. Affirmed.
Samantha Castronovo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Catherine Castronovo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sandra Bonds-Hickey; Karcher Harmes and Kathryn E. Karcher, for
Defendant and Respondent.
Following a bench trial in a probate proceeding, Catherine and
Samantha Castronovo appeal from the trial court’s order denying their
petition to invalidate a trust and trust amendment created by their late
mother, Mary Castronovo.1
As we will explain, we conclude that neither Catherine nor Samantha
have asserted meritorious appellate arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s order denying the petition to invalidate.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mary and Sam Castronovo had three children: Mary Ellen, Catherine,
and Samantha. In 2007, Mary and Sam each created a will, which set forth
the following disposition of their property after the last of them died: $10,000
to Samantha “with consideration for past consideration paid to her”; one-
eighth of the net estate to Catherine “with consideration for past
consideration paid to her”; one-eighth of the net estate to each of three
grandchildren; and the balance of the net estate to Mary Ellen, including “the
residence and contents.” Sam died in June 2015. A few months after Sam’s
death, Mary created a trust titled The Mary F. Castronovo Trust Dated
September 30, 2015 (the Trust), which named Mary and Mary Ellen as co-
trustees.
The Trust stated that upon Mary’s death, the property of the Trust
would be distributed as follows: (1) Mary Ellen would get real property in
Alameda, California, as well as all Trust assets that remained after the
distributions to other parties; (2) Samantha would get $10,000; (3) Catherine
would get one-eighth of the Trust assets; and (4) three grandchildren would
each get one-eighth of the Trust assets. The Trust stated that for both
1 Because the relevant family members all share the same last name, we
will refer to them by their first names for the sake of clarity, and we intend
no disrespect by doing so.
2
Samantha and Catherine, the amount of each of their distributions was “with
consideration for past distributions paid to her.”
In February 2017, Mary created a First Amendment to the Trust (the
First Amendment). The First Amendment changed the distribution of the
Trust assets in the following respects: (1) Mary Ellen was given an
additional real property, located in Oceanside, California; and (2) the $10,000
given to Samantha would be reduced by any damages caused by Samantha or
her family to a real property in San Diego, owned by the Trust, where
Samantha was residing.
Mary died on June 28, 2017, making Mary Ellen the sole trustee of a
now-irrevocable trust.2
On November 27, 2017, Catherine and Samantha (represented by
counsel) filed a petition to invalidate the Trust and the First Amendment (the
Invalidation Petition). The Invalidation Petition alleged three theories of
invalidity: (1) Mary lacked capacity to create the Trust and the First
Amendment; (2) Mary was unduly influenced by Mary Ellen in creating those
documents; and (3) Mary created the Trust and First Amendment under a
mistake of fact which arose from diminished mental capacity or undue
influence.
On March 5, 2018, Mary Ellen, on behalf of herself as a beneficiary,
filed a petition seeking an order disinheriting Samantha and Catherine on
2 The parties inform us that Mary Ellen died in September 2021. The
respondent’s brief, filed by the Trust, explains that this action may continue
in Mary Ellen’s name pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 368.5.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 368.5 [“An action or proceeding does not abate by the
transfer of an interest in the action or proceeding or by any other transfer of
an interest. The action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the
original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding.”].)
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the grounds that their petition violated the Trust’s no contest clause (the
Disinheritance Petition).
In June 2019, Catherine (represented by counsel) filed an ex parte
application requesting an order requiring a preliminary distribution to
Catherine from the Trust estate in the amount of $10,000. On July 5, 2019,
the trial court granted the request on the condition that Catherine execute a
note for the amount of the distribution secured by her residence, with the
Trust to be placed in secured position immediately behind prior secured
creditors.
On November 8, 2019, Catherine (now representing herself), filed an ex
parte application stating that she objected to the lien as a condition of the
preliminary distribution. On November 19, 2019, the trial court denied the
ex parte application, explaining that it was an improper request for
reconsideration of its July 5, 2019 ruling.
The trial court held a bench trial on the Invalidation Petition and the
Disinheritance Petition. The trial took place on six days between November
2020 and April 2021. The Trust was represented by counsel during the trial.
Samantha and Catherine represented themselves. The trial was held
remotely due to the pandemic. Several witnesses testified in addition to
Samantha, Catherine and Mary Ellen. Those witnesses included (1) Mary’s
estate planning attorney; (2) an attorney whom Mary retained in 2016 to
start the process of evicting Samantha from real property; (3) Mary’s primary
care physician; and (4) a social worker who interacted with Mary in the
hospital in 2017.
The trial court ruled from the bench on the last day of trial and then
issued a written ruling on May 18, 2021. The trial court denied both the
Invalidation Petition and the Disinheritance Petition.
4
With respect to the Invalidation Petition, the trial court explained that
Samantha and Catherine had not met their burden to establish that Mary
created the Trust or the First Amendment under circumstances indicating
lack of capacity or undue influence.3
The trial court explained that “the only testimony offered suggesting
Mary lacked capacity was from Catherine and Samantha,” which was
“contradicted by no less than four professionals, two of whom Mary did not
hire.” The trial court explained, “There is simply no independent evidence
that Mary did not understand the nature of her actions in executing the
Trust or the [First] Amendment, the nature of her property or the nature of
her relations, or those persons whose interests are affected by the Trust and
the [First] Amendment. There is simply no evidence that Mary suffered from
any mental deficit that would rebut the presumption that she had capacity
when she executed the Trust and the [First] Amendment.”
Regarding undue influence, the trial court explained that “the
professionals’ testimony rebuts Catherine and Samantha’s arguments on this
theory.” The trial court stated that “the only evidence suggesting undue
influence is Samantha’s and Catherine’s unpersuasive self-serving
testimony,” but that “[t]he professionals’ testimony demonstrates that none of
the factors of undue influence is present.” Among other things, the
professionals “each testified that Mary was not vulnerable. There is no
evidence that Mary Ellen ever assumed authority over Mary or that other
tactics of undue influence existed. . . . There was no evidence of coercion
presented to the Court.”
3 Moreover, because the cause of action alleging mistake of fact was
premised solely on the theory of lack of capacity or undue influence, the trial
court ruled that claim was also not meritorious.
5
With respect to the Disinheritance Petition, the trial court determined
it was not meritorious because a reasonable person could have concluded
there was a reasonable likelihood that the relief requested in the Invalidation
Petition would be granted after further investigation or discovery.
Samantha and Catherine both filed notices of appeal and appellate
briefs. Samantha and Catherine are both self-represented.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Catherine’s Appellate Briefing
Catherine filed both an opening appellate brief and a reply brief.
Catherine’s opening brief contains 19 pages of discussion, and her reply brief
contains 15 pages of discussion.
We begin our discussion of Catherine’s briefing by reviewing the rules
governing an appellant’s burden to submit briefing that conforms to the
applicable rules and sets forth cogent and cognizable legal argument. “The
most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed
correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and
ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (City of Santa Maria v.
Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “In order to demonstrate error, an
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the
record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has waived a point urged
on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.
[Citations.] Similarly, we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions [it] wants us to adopt.” (Id. at
pp. 286-287.) A party’s brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate
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heading or subheading . . . , and support each point by argument and, if
possible, by citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
“Appropriate headings require litigants to ‘ “present their cause
systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of
ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the
exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it
from the mass.” ’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
“ ‘Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority
other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for
appellate review.’ ” (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428,
1457.) “ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine
the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ” (Flores v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 204
(Flores).) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
1014, 1075.)
We are mindful that Catherine represents herself, which, for a person
untrained in the law may be a difficult task. Nevertheless, “as a party
appearing in propria persona, [she] ‘is entitled to the same, but no greater,
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Tanguilig v. Valdez
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.) “ ‘[A]s is the case with attorneys, [self-
represented] litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.’ ” (Stover v.
Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31; see also Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th
at p. 205 [“The same rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona as to
any other party.”].)
7
We have closely reviewed both of Catherine’s briefs. Although lengthy,
Catherine’s appellate briefing does not make any specific legal arguments, is
not organized under specific argument headings, and does not support its
discussion with any citations to the record or to any appropriate legal
authority. Because of these deficiencies, we are unable to ascertain the legal
arguments, if any, that Catherine intends to advance. We therefore conclude
Catherine has forfeited her appellate claims by not adequately developing
them in the manner required for appellate review.
B. Samantha’s Appellate Briefing
Samantha filed an opening appellate brief setting forth five pages of
substantive discussion. Samantha’s brief advances cognizable legal
arguments, accompanied by citation to legal authority, and it attempts to
provide citations to the record. Although Samantha’s arguments are
disorganized and challenging to follow, we conclude that they are sufficiently
developed for us to address them on the merits.
1. The Trial Court’s Exclusion of Two Witnesses on Relevance
Grounds
We first address Samantha’s contention that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence about the circumstances of Mary’s death. We apply an
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s decision to
exclude evidence. (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 46 [“ ‘ “A trial court’s
exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for
abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”].)
a. Dr. Magana
In her arguments challenging the trial court’s evidentiary rulings,
Samantha principally focuses on the contention that the trial court erred
8
with respect to its rulings concerning Dr. Marisa Magana, whom Samantha
and Catherine called as a witness at trial.
Dr. Magana works in the intensive care unit at the hospital where
Mary died. Dr. Magana had no specific memory of treating Mary in the
hospital. However, Samantha attempted to have Dr. Magana authenticate
and provide testimony about a hospital record relating to Mary’s death,
which Samantha referred to as a “death summary.”
Due to difficulties arising from the remotely-held trial, Dr. Magana did
not have the death summary in front of her during her testimony and was
accordingly unable to answer questions about it. Samantha asked the trial
court whether it would “be possible to complete questioning for this moment
but reserve the right to bring [Dr. Magana] back” after she had the document
in front of her. Opposing counsel responded by moving to have Dr. Magana
excused altogether on the ground that Dr. Magana did not have any
information that was relevant to the issues before the court, namely the
validity of the Trust and the First Amendment. The trial court agreed with
opposing counsel and excused Dr. Magana. As the trial court explained, “The
topic of the lawsuit is, as counsel pointed out, not a wrongful death action.”
Samantha challenges the trial court’s ruling, which she characterizes
as “not allow[ing]” the death summary “to be uploaded during a remote trial.”
Samantha argues that “[i]n a regular courtroom trial she could have simply
walked the evidence across the room to be authenticated.” In support of her
argument that “[t]he trial court erred in not allowing evidence to be uploaded
during the remote hearing” (underscoring omitted), Samantha cites an
9
inapposite provision of the Evidence Code4 and she generally asserts that the
trial court’s ruling violated “[o]ne of the basic rules of evidence.”
Samantha’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling fails because it does not
grapple with the basis for the trial court’s ruling concerning Dr. Magana.
Samantha focuses only on her inability to upload the death summary
document during the remotely-held trial. However, regardless of Samantha’s
problems with attempting to present the document to Dr. Magana during the
remotely-held trial, Samantha was ultimately unable to obtain Dr. Magana’s
testimony regarding the document for a different reason, which she does not
acknowledge or address in her appellate briefing. Specifically, the trial court
ruled that Dr. Magana’s testimony would not be relevant to any of the issues
presented at trial.
Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350), and “[t]he
trial court has broad discretion . . . in determining the relevance of evidence”
(People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 900). Here, the Invalidation
Petition alleged Mary lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she
executed the Trust in September 2015 and the First Amendment in February
2017. Mary died on June 28, 2017, after a brief hospitalization, which began
on June 23, 2017. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the
circumstances surrounding Mary’s death in June 2017, which was several
months after she executed the First Amendment in February 2017 were not
relevant to those issues.
4 Specifically, Samantha quotes Evidence Code section 911, which states
that a person does not have a privilege to refuse to be a witness or produce
evidence. That provision is inapplicable here because the issue is whether
the trial court was within its discretion to make the challenged evidentiary
ruling, not whether any witness had a privilege to refuse to participate.
10
Throughout her appellate briefing, as she did during the trial,
Samantha makes statements suggesting that the issues properly before the
trial court included an exploration of Mary Ellen’s role during Mary’s death.
For example, in her appellate brief Samantha states that Mary Ellen “had
access to [Mary] in the days before her passing and made decisions about
[Mary’s] care that caused her questionable needless passing with sedative
care rather than ‘lifesaving’ care.” She also contends that Mary Ellen made
“critical decisions regarding the care of [Mary]” that “eventually led to the
decision of her being given a med that caused cardiac arrest” and did not
allow “basic resuscitation to be performed to bring [Mary] to life again.”
(Underscoring omitted.) However, as the trial court reasonably concluded
during the trial, such allegations were not within the scope of the issues
presented by the Invalidation Petition, which was focused on the question of
whether Mary lacked capacity or was subject to undue influence at the time
she created the Trust and the First Amendment.
At oral argument, Samantha argued that testimony about the
circumstances of Mary’s death was relevant, and should have been admitted
by the trial court, based on what she referred to as “the slayer’s rule.”
Although Samantha did not provide a citation for that rule, we infer she is
referring to Probate Code section 250. That provision states that “[a] person
who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any of
the following: (1) Any property, interest, or benefit under a will of the
decedent, or a trust created by or for the benefit of the decedent or in which
the decedent has an interest . . . .” (Prob. Code, § 250, subd. (a).) It also
states that “[a]ny nomination in a will or trust of the killer as executor,
trustee, guardian, conservator, or custodian which becomes effective as a
result of the death of the decedent shall be interpreted as if the killer had
11
predeceased the decedent.” (Id., § 250, subd. (b)(3).) As we understand
Samantha’s argument, evidence about the circumstances of Mary’s death was
relevant to show that Mary Ellen was disqualified as a beneficiary and as a
trustee under Probate Code section 250. For two reasons, we reject
Samantha’s attempt to rely on “the slayer’s rule” to establish that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding evidence about the circumstances of
Mary’s death. First, Samantha did not identify “the slayer’s rule” when
arguing in the trial court for the admission of testimony about the
circumstances of Mary’s death. Accordingly, the trial court cannot be faulted
for failing to allow testimony on that basis. Second, the Invalidation Petition
did not seek relief against Mary Ellen based on Probate Code section 250.
Thus, even if Samantha had requested that certain testimony be admitted
based on Probate Code section 250, the trial court would have been within its
discretion to exclude it as irrelevant to any issue raised by the pleadings.
b. Dr. Levin
Samantha’s appellate briefing also takes issue with a second
evidentiary ruling by the trial court excluding evidence about the
circumstances of Mary’s death.
Samantha and Catherine sought to present the expert testimony of
Dr. Mark Levin. During trial, before allowing Samantha or Catherine to
elicit expert testimony from Dr. Levin, the trial court permitted opposing
counsel to conduct voir dire examination of him. During voir dire
examination, Dr. Levin testified that the scope of his expert opinion
concerned only whether there was a possibility that Mary might have
survived on June 28, 2017, if more aggressive measures were used to treat
her. Dr. Levin also stated that he had no opinion about Mary’s mental
capacity or whether she was subject to undue influence. After voir dire,
12
opposing counsel moved to exclude Dr. Levin on the ground that his planned
testimony was “absolutely irrelevant to the claims in this case, which are the
claims that the 2015 Trust and the 2017 [First] Amendment should be
declared void because of undue influence or lack of mental capacity.” The
trial court granted the motion to exclude Dr. Levin, explaining that “[t]he
witness can offer no expert opinion on any issue relevant to these
proceedings.”
Samantha does not present any specific legal argument challenging the
trial court’s ruling regarding Dr. Levin, but she does complain in general that
“[m]edical expert testimony was not allowed” even though “[t]he medical
expert was ready and available to give . . . testimony at trial.” Whatever
specific legal challenge Samantha might intend to raise with respect to the
trial court’s ruling regarding Dr. Levin, it would fail for the same reason as
the challenge regarding the evidence Samantha sought to illicit through Dr.
Magana. As we have explained, the trial court was well within its discretion
to conclude that evidence concerning Mary’s death was irrelevant to the
matters at issue during the trial.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding on
Undue Influence
Samantha’s final challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Catherine and Samantha failed to meet
their burden to prove Mary was subject to undue influence when she created
the Trust or First Amendment. We apply a substantial evidence standard
when, as here, we review a challenge to a trial court’s findings of fact during
a bench trial. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “Under
this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to
support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most
13
favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings.” (Ibid.)
The definition of “undue influence,” as defined by statute in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 15610.70, subdivision (a), applies in probate
litigation. (Prob. Code, § 86.) “ ‘Undue influence’ means excessive persuasion
that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that
person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70,
subd. (a).) As the statutory language provides, in determining undue
influence a court should consider the vulnerability of the victim, the
influencer’s apparent authority, tactics used to unduly influence, and the
equity of the result. (Ibid.)
In its ruling, the trial court set forth a lengthy explanation of the
evidence that led it to find that Samantha and Catherine did not meet their
burden to establish that Mary was subject to undue influence at the time she
executed the Trust or the First Amendment. Specifically, as the trial court
observed, multiple professionals testified that they did not see any indication
that Mary Ellen exercised undue influence over Mary. These professionals
included Mary’s primary care doctor, the estate planning attorney who
drafted the Trust and the First Amendment, and the social worker who met
with Mary in the hospital shortly before her death. The trial court concluded
that “[t]he professionals’ testimony demonstrates that none of the factors of
undue influence is present.”
Based on our review of the trial transcript, the trial court’s description
of the evidence is accurate, and its finding regarding undue influence is
supported by substantial evidence. Multiple witnesses offered testimony that
reasonably supports the trial court’s finding that Catherine and Samantha
14
failed to meet their burden to prove that Mary was subject to undue influence
when she entered into the Trust and the First Amendment.
With respect to the trial court’s finding on undue influence, Samantha
contends that “the judge in the trial court did bad law and erred in his
decision by saying the only professionals’ opinions were in support of Mary
Ellen.” Samantha points to two instances of witness testimony that, in her
view, undermine the trial court’s finding regarding undue influence. We
consider each in turn.
First, Samantha argues that Mary’s estate planning attorney, Michael
McCarthy, testified that “he had not been present with [Mary] 24/7 and could
not guarantee there was no undue influence.” Although Samantha does not
provide an exact record citation, she is apparently referring to the following
exchange during her examination of McCarthy:
“Q. Can you be sure [Mary] had no input from anyone
regarding the trust in between the meetings you had with her
forming the draft through the signing of the final document?
“A. No, she could have talked to anybody.
“Q. So you’re not sure if there was anyone, if anyone else,
influencing how the draft and final document was written?
“A. I saw no influence.
“Q. You saw no influence based—is it correct that you saw no
influence based only on what you saw at your professional
offices?
“A. Correct.
“Q. And is it true that there were many hours, if not days, in
between creating the drafts and then signing the final document?
“A. Very true.”
15
We understand the point that Samantha effectively highlighted
through her cross-examination: there could have been influence brought to
bear on Mary that McCarthy did not witness. However, on appeal, in a
review for substantial evidence “ ‘ “[i]t is not our role to reweigh the evidence,
redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to
support it.” ’ ” (Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
283, 292.) Despite McCarthy’s limited opportunities to interact with and
observe Mary during the period when she entered into the Trust and the
First Amendment, the trial court nevertheless was entitled to credit
McCarthy’s testimony and to give it weight as one component of its finding
that Samantha and Catherine failed to meet their burden to prove that Mary
was subject to undue influence when she executed those documents.
Second, Samantha argues that the social worker who interacted with
Mary during her last hospitalization in June 2017 “admitted in testimony she
had not verified Mary Ellen was carrying paperwork that showed she had
power of attorney to make life and death decisions for Mary.” In our
assessment, this fact has little, if any, relevance to the issue of whether
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on undue influence. As
we have explained, the relevant time frame for the undue influence claim is
during September 2015 and February 2017 when the Trust and the First
Amendment were executed. Whatever a social worker may have been told
about a power of attorney during Mary’s last hospitalization in June 2017 is
not relevant to whether Mary was subject to undue influence in earlier time
periods.
16
In sum, we conclude that Samantha has not succeeded in establishing
that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding on undue
influence.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the Invalidation Petition is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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