People v. Gansereit CA3

Filed 1/25/23 P. v. Gansereit CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----
THE PEOPLE,
C095587
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. CRF2101944,
v. CRF182098, CRF1913802)
ZACKARY JONATHAN GANSEREIT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Zackary Jonathan Gansereit pleaded no contest to vehicle theft,
vandalism, receiving stolen property, and misdemeanor evading a peace officer. The trial
court imposed an aggregate four-year four-month split sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends the sentence on the vandalism count should have
been stayed under Penal Code section 654.1 Finding no merit in the contention, we will
affirm the judgment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
The victim noticed her Chevrolet Trax was missing on October 27, 2018. Two
day later a sheriff’s deputy saw defendant driving the Trax and attempted a traffic stop.
Defendant fled in the Trax and was able to evade the deputy. Two days after that, the
deputy saw defendant walking in a parking lot and stopped him. Defendant admitted he
had been driving the Trax and that he had attempted to flee from the deputy because he
knew he was driving a stolen vehicle and did not want to go to jail. He explained that he
parked the Trax near an orchard and directed someone else to light the vehicle on fire
because he knew the vehicle was stolen and did not want to be linked to it. The deputy
located the vehicle, confirmed that it was the stolen Trax, and noted that it had been
damaged by fire.
In case No. CRF182098 (case 098), defendant pleaded no contest to vehicle theft
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor evading
a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)). The parties stipulated to a factual basis
from the relevant Yuba County sheriff’s report. After defendant entered his plea, but
before he was sentenced, he pleaded no contest in case No. CRF1913802 (case 802) to a
count of receiving stolen property (§ 496d). If the judge in case 098 permitted defendant
to complete a drug treatment program in exchange for probation, defendant would
receive similar treatment in case 802. Defendant did not successfully complete the
treatment program. The trial court sentenced him to four years four months in the two
cases, to be served as a split sentence with 730 days in jail and the remainder on
mandatory supervision. The sentence included eight months for the vandalism in case
098 (arranging to burn the vehicle), which the trial court found was a separate act from
the vehicle theft.
After defendant was released to mandatory supervision, he pleaded no contest
to a count of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) in case No. CRF2101944 (case 944).
The trial court imposed a three-year sentence concurrent to the sentence in case 098.
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Defendant filed a notice of appeal, which we construed to include all three cases
and their respective sentencing dates.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the sentence on the vandalism conviction in case 098 should
have been stayed under section 654 because the burning of the vehicle was committed
with the single objective of completing the vehicle theft.
Section 654 applies not only where there was a single act, but also where there
was a course of conduct that violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted
an indivisible transaction. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551.) “[I]f the
evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the
independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations
were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court.’ ”
(People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) Trial courts have broad latitude to
determine whether a defendant harbored one or more objectives, and we uphold their
findings on appeal if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support them.
(People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.) We review the trial court’s
determination of a defendant’s separate intents and objectives for sufficient evidence in a
light most favorable to the judgment, and presume in support of the trial court’s
conclusion the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the
evidence. (People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640-641.)
Here, the trial court determined the vehicle theft and later vandalism of the vehicle
were separate acts. Defendant said he directed that the vehicle be lit on fire because he
knew it was stolen and he wanted to hide evidence of his link to the vehicle. The
objective of the vandalism was not merely incidental to the theft; indeed, the act of
destroying the vehicle to hide the evidence of the theft was inconsistent with the objective
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of the theft itself. Defendant’s statements to law enforcement provided sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the two crimes were separate acts
with separate intents.
Defendant cites People v. Guzman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1023 for the proposition
that the vandalism and theft were part of the same course of conduct and objective
because defendant had not reached a place of safety with the stolen vehicle. But
defendant did not burn the vehicle during the theft or during his flight from law
enforcement. Defendant parked the vehicle near an orchard, left it there, and directed
someone else to burn it. People v. Brumley (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 124 is also
distinguishable because the criminal acts in that case, receiving stolen cattle with the
intent to conceal them from the owner and then branding the cattle to prevent
identification by the owner, both related to concealing the cattle from the owner. (Id. at
pp. 130-131.)
The trial court did not err when it declined to stay the vandalism sentence under
section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
HULL, J.
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