People v. Button

Filed 8/17/17
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D070341
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN337266)
EDWARD BENJAMIN BUTTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed.
Allison L. Ehlert, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and
Christine Yoon Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for
publication with the exception of part III.A.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found Edward Benjamin Button guilty of one count of corporal injury to a
spouse or roommate (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 (count 1), and one count of assault
by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 2). With
respect to both counts, the jury found true the allegation that Button personally inflicted
great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).2 The trial court imposed a
sentence of 240 days in the custody of the Sheriff, stayed execution of the portion of the
sentence that Button had not yet served (220 days), and placed Button on formal
probation for three years.
On appeal, Button claims that the People failed to present sufficient evidence that
he was not acting in self-defense when he punched the victim in the face, breaking her
nose and causing her to suffer a concussion. In the unpublished portion of this opinion,
we conclude that there is plainly evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably
found that Button did not act in self-defense.
Button also claims that the jury's true findings on the serious felony allegations
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) must be reversed because the findings are premised on an invalid
stipulation entered into between the People and the defense pursuant to which Button
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) defines "serious felony" as including "any felony
in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an
accomplice." (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
2
effectively admitted the truth of the allegations. Button contends that the stipulation is
invalid because the trial court failed to admonish him pursuant to Boykin-Tahl3 and their
progeny with respect to the constitutional rights that he was foregoing by entering into
the stipulation, and also failed to advise him of the penal consequences of the stipulation.
We conclude that the trial court was not required to provide the admonishments because
the stipulation did " 'not have the definite penal consequences necessary to trigger the
Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 164, 171 (Cross).)
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.4
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The People's evidence
1. Button punches the victim in the face twice
At the time of the charged offenses, Button and the victim,5 B.D., were students at
Palomar College. They had been in a dating relationship for approximately a year and a
3 (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin); In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 122
(Tahl).)
4 Button also filed a petition for habeas corpus (In re Button, D071889) that we
deny by way of a separate order filed today.
5 As of January 1, 2017, California Rules of Court, rule 8.90 (Rule 8.90) became
effective. Rule 8.90, subdivision (b) requires appellate courts to "consider referring to"
certain individuals "by first name and last initial or, if the first name is unusual or other
circumstances would defeat the objective of anonymity, by initials only," in order to
protect those individuals' privacy. The list of people to whom this rule applies includes
victims of crimes. (Rule 8.90(b)(4).) After consideration, we have decided to refer to the
victim in this case by her initials, in order to try to provide the victim with some measure
of anonymity.
3
half and had previously been engaged. Their engagement ended a couple of weeks prior
to the incident giving rise to the charged offenses.
Although their engagement had ended, on the day before the incident, Button and
B.D. had sexual intercourse. According to B.D., Button told B.D. that they could
continue to be "lovers" if she would agree not to reveal the nature of their relationship to
anyone.
The next day, B.D. and Button had a class together. During class, B.D. learned
that a group of Button's friends were going to a restaurant after class. One of the friends
invited B.D. to come along. While B.D. was gathering her belongings after class,
everyone left without her. Shortly thereafter, B.D. called Button a couple of times and
sent him some text messages. She received no immediate response.
Later that day, B.D. received a call from Button. B.D. asked Button to meet her so
that they could talk. They agreed to meet in front of a building on campus. When Button
arrived to the meeting, he appeared to be very upset. His hands were clenched and his
face and voice conveyed anger. Button accused B.D. of telling two of his friends that
they were still dating. B.D. denied the accusation, and Button called her a liar.
B.D. took off her glasses because she was crying. She then stepped forward with
her arms open in order to give Button a hug. Button grabbed both of B.D.'s biceps and
began squeezing her. B.D. was shocked and struggled to get free. Once B.D. escaped
Button's grasp, she slapped Button across the face with an open hand.
4
Button immediately punched B.D. in the face, twice. B.D.'s hands were at her
sides at the time Button punched her. B.D. bent over and blood rushed into her mouth.
Immediately after the incident, the two walked to a health services office on campus.
2. Button's statement to police
Officer Stephen Wilson, a police officer at the college, responded to the health
services office. According to Officer Wilson, immediately upon seeing Officer Wilson,
Button said, "I know, I know, I did it, I punched her, you might as well arrest me now."
Button held his arms out and gestured as if he wanted Officer Wilson to handcuff him.
Button told Officer Wilson that when he met B.D. in front of the building where
the incident took place, he was upset that B.D. was telling people that they were still
together. Button also admitted to starting the fight by grabbing B.D.'s arm.6 According
to Button, after grabbing B.D.'s arm, B.D. slapped him on the side of the face, and he
punched her. Button told Officer Wilson that he knew he was wrong for punching B.D.
and that he knew he was going to go to jail. At no time during their conversation did
Button say that he had acted in self-defense.
3. B.D.'s injuries
B.D. suffered a concussion as a result of the blows to her face. In addition, B.D.
suffered three acute fractures of her facial bones—a hairline fracture through her left
6 At trial, B.D. testified that Button grabbed both of her arms.
5
nasal bone and two additional fractures through the frontal process of the maxillary
bones.7 B.D. eventually underwent surgery in order to treat the injuries.
B. The defense
Three students who had been at the lunch with Button and who witnessed the
incident from a considerable distance, testified. The witnesses stated that B.D. struck
Button first, and that Button then struck B.D.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's implicit finding that Button did not
act in self-defense
Button claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's implicit
finding that he was not acting in self-defense when he punched B.D. in the face.
1. Governing law
a. The law governing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, "the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "[T]he
court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
7 The jury was told that the frontal process of the maxillary bones are "the most
posterior or deepest part of the nasal bones where they connect with the maxillary
sinuses."
6
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 557,
578.)
b. Relevant law pertaining to self-defense
In order to act in lawful self-defense, a defendant must have "reasonably believed
he was in imminent danger of violence, reasonably believed the immediate use of force
was necessary to defend himself, and used no more force than was reasonably necessary
to defend against the threat." (People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 733, 747.) "[T]he
People have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act
in self-defense" in order to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses.
(People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal. App. 4th 1413, 1429.)
2. Application
In finding Button guilty of the charged offenses, and thereby implicitly finding
that Button did not act in lawful self-defense, the jury could have reasonably relied on
evidence that Button was angry at the outset of the incident, that he instigated a physical
confrontation with the victim, that he punched the victim twice in the face with sufficient
force to cause three fractures and a concussion, and that he told a responding officer that
he was guilty and should go to jail. (See pt. II.A, ante.) Evidence that Button was angry,
instigated a physical confrontation, and made statements evincing a consciousness of
guilt shortly after the incident all support a finding that Button did not punch B.D.
because he "reasonably believed the immediate use of force was necessary to defend
himself." (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 747.) Evidence that Button punched B.D.
7
twice in the face with sufficient force to cause three broken bones and a concussion (see
pt. II.A, ante) supports a finding that Button acted with more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend against B.D.'s open hand slap. (See ibid.)
Button's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Button argues that evidence
that he "immediately" punched B.D. in response to her slap "suggest[s] that he was trying
to protect himself against any further aggression on B[.D.]'s part." While the jury might
have found that Button's punches were an attempt to prevent further aggression from
B.D., the jury also could have reasonably found that Button punched B.D. out of anger
rather than a reasonable belief in the need to defend himself.
Button also argues that "the amount of force . . . was not unreasonable under the
circumstances," noting that there was evidence that B.D. outweighed Button by 120
pounds. In support of this contention, Button argues that in determining whether a
defendant acted in lawful self-defense, the question is "not whether the force used
appears excessive in hindsight but whether it appeared reasonably necessary to avert
threatened harm under the circumstances at the time." (People v. Ross (2007) 155
Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1057.) We agree with the Ross court's observation. However, as the
Ross court also stated, the question of whether a defendant used excessive force is
ordinarily "a question entrusted to the jury." (Ibid.) In this case, despite evidence that
B.D. weighed considerably more than Button, a reasonably jury could have found that
Button's two forceful punches were excessive, given evidence that B.D. had slapped
Button only once with an open hand and had her arms down at her sides at the time
Button punched her.
8
Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's
implicit finding that Button did not act in self-defense.
B. The trial court was not required to admonish Button pursuant to Boykin-Tahl and
their progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that Button personally
inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.
Button claims that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him pursuant to
Boykin-Tahl and their progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that Button
personally inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.
1. Factual and procedural background
The amended information in this case alleged, with respect to both counts 1 and 2,
that Button "personally inflicted great bodily injury upon [B.D.], not an accomplice to the
above offense, within the meaning of . . . section 1192.7, [subdivision] (c)(8)." During
the trial, the following colloquy occurred:
"[The prosecutor]: [I]t is stipulated between the parties that the
defendant Edward Benjamin Button personally inflicted great bodily
injury upon [B.D.] within the meaning of Penal Code section
1192.7[, subdivision] (c)(8) as to counts one and two.
"The court: So stipulated?
"[Defense counsel]: So stipulated.
"[The prosecutor]: So stipulated."
Immediately thereafter, the court instructed the jury that it was "to take all of those
facts as contained in [the stipulation] as having been conclusively proved."
The jury found Button guilty of both charged offenses and, with respect to both
offenses, found true that "in the commission of the . . . offense, [Button] personally
9
inflicted great bodily injury upon [B.D.], within the meaning of . . . section 1192.7[,
subdivision] (c)(8)."
2. Governing law
a. Boykin-Tahl and their progeny
In Cross, the California Supreme Court summarized well established law
governing admonishments that a trial court must provide and the waivers that a court
must obtain before accepting a guilty plea to a charged offense:
"When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is
required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. (See
Boykin[, supra,] 395 U.S. [at pp.] 243–244. . . .) As a prophylactic
measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional
rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right
to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit
a personal waiver of each. ([Citation]; see Boykin, at pp. 243–244;
In re Tahl[, supra,] 1 Cal.3d [at pp.] 130–133. . . .) Proper
advisement and waiver of these rights, conducted with 'the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable,' are necessary 'to make sure
[the accused] has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
of its consequence.' (Boykin, at pp. 243–244.)" (Cross, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 170.)
The Cross court explained that in In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 857 (Yurko), the
California Supreme Court held that Boykin-Tahl's requirements apply when a defendant
"admits the truth of a prior conviction allegation that subjects him to increased
punishment." (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 170.) The Cross court explained the
rationale of Yurko as follows:
"We explained [in Yurko]: 'Because of the significant rights at stake
in obtaining an admission of the truth of alleged prior convictions,
which rights are often of the same magnitude as in the case of a plea
of guilty, courts must exercise a comparable solicitude in extracting
an admission of the truth of alleged prior convictions. . . . As an
10
accused is entitled to a trial on the factual issues raised by a denial of
the allegation of prior convictions, an admission of the truth of the
allegation necessitates a waiver of the same constitutional rights as
in the case of a plea of guilty. The lack of advice of the waivers so
to be made, insofar as the record fails to demonstrate otherwise,
compels a determination that the waiver was not knowingly and
intelligently made.' [Citation.] We concluded that 'Boykin and Tahl
require, before a court accepts an accused's admission that he has
suffered prior felony convictions, express and specific admonitions
as to the constitutional rights waived by an admission. The accused
must be told that an admission of the truth of an allegation of prior
convictions waives, as to the finding that he has indeed suffered such
convictions, the same constitutional rights waived as to a finding of
guilt in case of a guilty plea.' " (Ibid.)
The Cross court also explained that Boykin-Tahl requirements do not apply in
certain circumstances:
"[O]ur case law since Yurko has drawn a distinction between, on one
hand, 'a defendant's admission of evidentiary facts which [does] not
admit every element necessary to conviction of an offense or to
imposition of punishment on a charged enhancement' and, on the
other, 'an admission of guilt of a criminal charge or of the truth of an
enhancing allegation where nothing more [is] prerequisite to
imposition of punishment except conviction of the underlying
offense.' (People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 570, 577 (Adams).)
The requirements of Boykin-Tahl and Yurko apply to the latter type
of admission but not the former. [Citation.] [¶] In Adams, for
example, we held that a mere stipulation to being on bail 'does not
admit the truth of . . . every fact necessary to imposition' of
additional punishment under section 12022.1 and therefore 'does not
have the definite penal consequences necessary to trigger the
Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171.)
Thus, "Boykin-Tahl requirements do not apply to a stipulation of 'evidentiary facts,
even facts crucial to a conviction,' if the stipulation does not encompass 'all of the
evidentiary facts necessary to imposition of the additional penalty.' " (Cross, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 171.)
11
Applying this law to the facts in Cross, the Supreme Court concluded that a
stipulation pursuant to which the defendant admitted that he had suffered a prior
conviction that "authorized the trial court to impose a greater punishment on [the
defendant] if the jury found that he was guilty of the charged offense" (italics added),
required Boykin-Tahl warnings. (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 174.)8 The Cross court
reasoned in part:
"In Adams, we said that a stipulation has 'definite penal
consequences' if it establishes 'every fact necessary' to support an
'additional punishment.' (Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 578, 580;
[citation].) A stipulation may establish every fact necessary to
support an increased punishment even if the trial court decides not to
impose that punishment. Thus, our cases suggest that the phrase
'definite penal consequences' means definite exposure to additional
punishment. Because the stipulation here established every fact
necessary to expose Cross to a penalty beyond the four-year
maximum term available . . . , it resulted in a definite penal
consequence. '[N]othing more was prerequisite to imposition of [the
elevated] punishment except conviction of the underlying
offense . . . .' (Adams, at p. 577.)" (Id. at p. 175.)
b. The law governing serious felony allegations
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) contains a list of serious felonies9 and provides in
relevant part:
8 The Cross court explained that, pursuant to the statutory scheme at issue, "Cross's
prior conviction exposed him to a prison term of two, four, or five years instead of two,
three, or four years," and that "[t]he trial court sentenced Cross to the maximum term of
five years." (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 168.)
9 "While most of the categories of serious felonies set forth in subdivision (c) are
based on defined offenses, subdivision (c)(8) . . . include[s] as [a] serious felon[y] 'any'
felony in which the defendant 'personally inflicts great bodily injury' on a
nonaccomplice . . . . (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)[(8)].) Thus, while a robbery, rape or
murder conviction is ipso facto a serious felony conviction, a conviction for an offense
12
"As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the
following: . . . (8) any felony in which the defendant personally
inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an
accomplice . . . ."
The Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (b)) provides for
enhanced penalties for those previously convicted of a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (e),
1170.12, subd. (c)), and defines serious felony by reference to section 1192.7, subdivision
(c). (See §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b) ["Notwithstanding any other provision of
law . . . a prior serious . . . conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) . . . [A]ny
offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state"].)
Section 969f states:
"(a) Whenever a defendant has committed a serious felony as
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the facts that make the
crime constitute a serious felony may be charged in the accusatory
pleading. However, the crime shall not be referred to as a serious
felony nor shall the jury be informed that the crime is defined as a
serious felony. This charge, if made, shall be added to and be a part
of the count or each of the counts of the accusatory pleading which
charged the offense. If the defendant pleads not guilty to the offense
charged in any count which alleges that the defendant committed a
serious felony, the question whether or not the defendant committed
a serious felony as alleged shall be tried by the court or jury which
tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty. If the defendant pleads
guilty of the offense charged, the question whether or not the
defendant committed a serious felony as alleged shall be separately
admitted or denied by the defendant."
which does not fall within any of the subsections of subdivision (c) other than subdivision
(c)(8) . . . is not a serious felony conviction unless it can be established that the
offender . . . personally inflicted great bodily injury on a non-accomplice in the
commission of the offense." (People v. Yarbrough (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 469, 474
(Yarbrough).)
13
"[T]he legislative history of section 969f shows that it was enacted in order to
prequalify a crime as a serious felony in the event of a defendant's future conviction of
another serious felony." (People v. Leslie (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 198, 204 (Leslie); see
also Yarbrough, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 477 ["The legislative history of Penal Code
section 969f demonstrates that it was intended to identify serious felony offenses for the
sole purpose of enhancing future convictions"].)
3. Application
The parties have not cited, and our own independent research has not uncovered,
any case law extending the requirements of Boykin-Tahl to a stipulation that has the
effect of "prequalify[ing] a crime as a serious felony in the event of a defendant's future
conviction of another serious felony." (Leslie, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 204.) In
Cross, the California Supreme Court stated that a stipulation must have " 'definite penal
consequences . . . to trigger the Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 171, italics added.) Button does not dispute that the true findings on the serious felony
allegations premised upon the parties' stipulation had no penal consequences in this case.
However, he notes that"[b]ecause the true findings on the [serious felony] allegations
renders [Button's] conviction a strike offense, he now faces the risk of a significantly
enhanced punishment in a future prosecution — no less than the doubling of his term of
imprisonment on a future felony conviction." (Italics added.) Button contends that
"there is no principled reason why a court should be required to give Boykin-Tahl
warnings when the risk of punishment is immediate, but not when it is possible but
uncertain."
14
We disagree. A punishment that is "possible but uncertain"10 (italics added),
does not constitute a " 'definite penal consequence[ ]," as that phrase has been used in
California cases applying Boykin-Tahl. (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171, italics
added.) While an admission of a prior conviction that exposes a defendant to additional
potential punishment in that case is "sufficiently like a plea of guilty to require the same
procedural protections" (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal. 4th 1132, 1177, citing Yurko,
supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863), the same cannot be said of the admission of a serious felony
allegation that has no immediate penal consequence and as to which any future
consequences would be incurred only upon a conviction for an offense committed in the
future—an event that may or may not occur.
In Yurko, the court reasoned that the prospect of additional severe punishment in
the case in which the admission of the prior conviction is made warranted mandating
Boykin-Tahl requirements. (See Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863 ["Because of the
significant rights at stake in obtaining an admission of the truth of allegations of prior
convictions, which rights are often of the same magnitude as in the case of a plea of
guilty, courts must exercise a comparable solicitude in extracting an admission of the
truth of alleged prior convictions"].) The Yurko court explained:
"Undoubtedly the particular rights waived by an admission of the
truth of the allegation of prior convictions are important. Although
there is not at stake a question of guilt of a substantive crime, the
practical aspects of a finding of prior convictions may well impose
upon a defendant additional penalties and sanctions which may be
even more severe than those imposed upon a finding of guilt without
10 We quote here from Button's reply brief.
15
the defendant having suffered the prior convictions. Thus a finding
of prior convictions may foreclose the possibility of probation
[citation], may extend the term for the basic crime to life
imprisonment [citation], and may substantially extend the time
served on such a life sentence before the defendant becomes eligible
for parole." (Id. at p. 862.)
In contrast, in this case, Button was not exposed to any additional penalties or
sanctions as a result of the stipulation. While Button cites the Cross court's statement
that "our cases suggest that the phrase 'definite penal consequences' means definite
exposure to additional punishment" (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 175), it is clear that
the Cross court was talking about definite exposure in the case in which the allegation is
admitted, and not potential exposure in a hypothetical future case. This is made clear by
the fact the very next sentence of the Cross opinion explained that the defendant's
admission of the prior conviction exposed the defendant to additional punishment in that
case. (See ibid. ["Because the stipulation here established every fact necessary to expose
Cross to a penalty beyond the four-year maximum term available . . . , it resulted in a
definite penal consequence"].)
The Supreme Court has also made clear that Yurko does not apply where the
"admission of the priors . . . [does] not . . . subject [the] defendant to an increased
penalty." (People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1184 (Ramirez).) In Ramirez, a
death penalty case, defense counsel stated, at the outset of the penalty phase, that the
defendant would stipulate to having suffered three prior convictions. (Id. at p. 1183.) On
appeal, the defendant claimed that "his stipulation to the priors was improper under
[Yurko, supra,] 10 Cal. 3d 857, because . . . defendant did not expressly waive his
16
privilege against self-incrimination or his right to a jury or court trial on the prior
convictions." (Ibid.) The Attorney General argued that "Yurko is not applicable in this
context, because defendant's stipulation to the priors was not analogous to the admission
of the truth of a sentence enhancement as in Yurko, but was instead comparable to a
stipulation to the admission of a subsidiary evidentiary matter." (Ibid.) The Ramirez
court concluded that "[t]he Attorney General's position is well taken." (Ibid.) The court
reasoned:
"Unlike the defendant's stipulation in [Yurko], supra, 10 Cal. 3d 857,
which automatically subjected the defendant to an increased
sentence under the California habitual criminal law and thus was
somewhat comparable to a guilty plea as to which a waiver of rights
is constitutionally required (see Boykin[, supra,] 395 U.S. [at p.]
242; [Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d at pp. 132–133), defendant's admission
of the priors in this case did not inevitably subject defendant to an
increased penalty. Here, the priors were simply evidence in
aggravation that the jury was to consider along with all of the other
aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase.
Neither Yurko nor any other California decision requires an on-the-
record waiver of rights by the defendant when the defendant or
defense counsel stipulates to the admission of a subsidiary item of
evidence of this nature." (Id. at pp. 1183-1184.)
As in Ramirez, Button's stipulation did not "automatically subject[ ] the defendant
to an increased sentence" (Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal. 3d 1158 at p. 1183), and for this
reason, is not akin to a prior conviction stipulation triggering Yurko's requirements.
(Ramirez, supra, at pp. 1183–1184.)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not required to admonish Button
pursuant to Boykin-Tahl and its progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that
Button personally inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.
17
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
NARES, J.
18