People v. Longoria CA4/3

Filed 3/1/23 P. v. Longoria CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G061584
v. (Super. Ct. No. 18CF1152)
VINCENT SAMUEL LONGORIA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert
A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Vincent Samuel Longoria appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted
him of carjacking and vandalism. He argues the trial court erred by failing to stay
execution of his sentence on the vandalism conviction pursuant to Penal Code section
654.1 The Attorney General agrees, as do we. Accordingly, we reverse this aspect of
Longoria’s sentence and remand with directions. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
Brian N. was taking an afternoon break from his restaurant job. He was
sitting in the driver’s seat of his Toyota, which was parked in a lot near the restaurant.
His car keys were on his lap, and the driver-side door was open.
Brian N. saw a man, later identified as Longoria, approaching him.
Longoria said he “needed” or “wanted” the car and grabbed the keys from Brian N.’s lap.
A struggle ensued. As Brian N. was trying to get out of the car, Longoria dragged him
out by the shirt. Longoria shoved Brian N. against a nearby Nissan, creating a dent in its
side. After Longoria punched him in the ribs and face, Brian N. fell to the ground.
Longoria then got into the Toyota and drove off.
An information charged Longoria with felony carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a);
count 1) and misdemeanor vandalism of the Nissan (§ 594, subd. (a); count 2).
A jury found Longoria guilty on both counts. Without objection, the court
sentenced him to five years in state prison on count 1 and 180 days in county jail on
count 2, to be served concurrently.2 The court awarded Longoria 226 days of total credit.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence on count 2 was not reflected in
the original and amended abstracts of judgment. When there is a discrepancy between
the two, the oral pronouncement controls and we have “inherent power to correct such
clerical error on appeal, whether on our own motion or upon application of the parties.”
(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.)
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DISCUSSION
Longoria contends, and the People concede, the sentence imposed on count
2 should have been stayed under section 654. We agree.
“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The
“‘act or omission’” may be either “a discrete physical act [or] a course of conduct
encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016)
2 Cal.5th 307, 311 (Corpening).) “Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple
punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry . . . .” (Ibid.) First, we
“examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based upon
a single physical act.” (Id. at p. 312.) “If so, the defendant may not be punished more
than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single
act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct
reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Id. at p. 311.)
“Although the question of whether defendant harbored a ‘single intent’
within the meaning of section 654 is generally a factual one, the applicability of the
statute to conceded facts is a question of law.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d
321, 335 (Harrison).) Generally, we will correct a section 654 error “‘regardless of
whether the point was raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as error on
appeal.’” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.)
After review of the appellate record, we agree with the parties that
Longoria’s conduct “reflects a single ‘intent and objective’”: the forceful taking of the
Toyota. (Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 313.) To gain access to the vehicle he
intended to carjack, Longoria pulled Brian N. out of the driver’s seat and pushed him
against the Nissan. The force from the push dented the Nissan. Nothing in the record
points to another reason why Longoria would have intended to damage the Nissan. The
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offense of vandalism, therefore, was “merely incidental to” or was “the means
accomplishing or facilitating” the carjacking. (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 335.)
Accordingly, the vandalism sentence must be stayed under section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to stay execution of sentence on count 2, prepare an amended
abstract of judgment that reflects the sentence on count 2 is stayed under section 654, and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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