People v. Martinez CA3

Filed 3/2/23 P. v. Martinez CA3
*Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C093077
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 09F04716)
v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
CHRISTINA MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In August 2011, a jury found defendant Christina Martinez guilty of first degree
murder, robbery, and burglary and found true robbery-murder and burglary-murder
special circumstances. On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s murder conviction but
vacated the robbery and burglary convictions because the charges were untimely brought.
1
Thereafter, defendant sought resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2 The
trial court denied defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage, finding the record
established defendant was ineligible for resentencing on multiple grounds.
Defendant appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, we affirmed, agreeing with
the trial court that the jury’s special circumstance findings barred her from resentencing
as a matter of law. (People v. Martinez (Mar. 21, 2022, C093077) [nonpub. opn.].)
Our Supreme Court granted review and ultimately transferred the matter back to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of its recent
decision, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). We now conclude, and the
People concede, that the trial court’s denial of the petition is inconsistent with section
1172.6 and Strong. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts3 are taken from our unpublished opinion following defendant’s
direct appeal. (People v. Hammons (Jan. 12, 2015, C069317) [nonpub. opn.].)4 In July
2004, defendant participated in a home invasion robbery and burglary with her boyfriend
and codefendant, Robert Lee Hammons, and two teenage boys. During the robbery,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 as
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. Although defendant filed her petition under former section 1170.95, we will refer
to it as section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
3 We provide this summary of facts from People v. Hammons solely for context and
do not rely on these facts for our analysis or disposition here. (See § 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
4 We construed defendant’s request for judicial notice as a motion to incorporate by
reference the record in her direct appeal and our corresponding opinion, and granted the
motion.
2
Hammons encountered a man who lived in the home and beat him to death with a
steering wheel locking device known as “the Club,” which Hammons took from the
victim’s couch. One teenage accomplice testified that as the victim lay unconscious on
the ground, defendant grabbed speaker wire and stood watch over his body, prepared to
choke him if he revived.
Defendant was tried by jury in August 2011. The jury found defendant guilty of
first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory (§ 187, subd. (a)); first degree
robbery while acting in concert (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); and first degree burglary.
(§ 459.) It also found true the special circumstances allegations of killing while engaged
in a robbery and burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The trial court sentenced defendant
to life without possibility of parole for the murder with special circumstances. It imposed
and stayed terms for robbery and burglary under section 654. On appeal, we vacated
defendant’s convictions for robbery and burglary because they were brought after the
statute of limitations had run. We affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The
Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for review.
On April 20, 2016, the California Supreme Court summarily denied defendant’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In December 2018, Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., partially commuted
defendant’s sentence to a total of 13 years to life, based on defendant’s “exemplary
conduct in prison” and her “efforts to put the impacts of her prior abuse [from childhood
and from Hammons] behind her.”
On January 17, 2019, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 in propria persona. Her declaration stated that she was prosecuted under a
theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
and that she could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes made to
sections 188 and 189. She also erroneously stated that she pleaded guilty or no contest to
murder. Defendant requested appointment of counsel.
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The trial court appointed counsel and set a briefing schedule. Following briefing,
but without holding a hearing, the trial court denied the petition in a written order finding
that defendant failed to make the required prima facie showing. Specifically, it noted the
split in appellate authority regarding whether a true finding on felony-murder special
circumstances alone defeats a section 1172.6 petition in light of People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788, 798 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). It stated
that even if it followed the line of cases requiring a court to independently review the
evidence to determine if she could still be convicted of murder under the amended section
189, subdivision (e), defendant’s petition failed because the evidence in the record of
conviction supported a finding that defendant was a major participant in the burglary and
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court further found
(1) the evidence supported a finding defendant aided and abetted the victim’s murder;
(2) the record demonstrated that defendant would still be convicted of murder as a matter
of law under Banks and Clark; and (3) defendant proffered no new evidence warranting
an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant timely appealed the denial of her petition. On August 18, 2020, while
defendant’s petition for resentencing was pending, the federal district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny defendant’s federal habeas petition (28
U.S.C. § 2254). (Martinez v. Johnson (E.D.Cal. Aug. 18, 2020, No. 2:16-cv-1302 MCE
AC) 2020 WL 4793992.)
On March 21, 2022, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s section
1172.6 petition based on the jury’s special circumstance findings. Thereafter, we denied
defendant’s petition for rehearing, with an order modifying the opinion, without a change
in judgment.
DISCUSSION
In a supplemental brief following transfer from the Supreme Court, defendant
argues the trial court erred in denying her petition for resentencing at the prima facie
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stage by relying on the special circumstance findings in view of Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
698. The People concede that the holding in Strong compels reversal and remand in this
case. We agree with the parties.
A. Legal background
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), effective January
1, 2019, was enacted to amend the felony-murder rule and eliminate the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; People v.
Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 275.) To that end, Senate Bill
1437 amended sections 188 and 189 and added section 1172.6.
Section 189, subdivision (e) now limits the circumstances under which a person
may be convicted of felony murder. As relevant here, a participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a), defining first degree murder,
in which a death occurs, is liable for murder if the person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of section 190.2. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6 to delineate the resentencing petition
process for a “person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Once a
defendant submits a petition and the court performs an initial review for missing
information and appoints counsel for defendant, subdivision (c) of section 1172.6
provides: “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall
hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show
cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
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B. Eligibility for relief with special circumstances present
Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that for the purposes of those special
circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a),
which include robbery and burglary, an aider and abettor must have been a “major
participant” and have acted “with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 190.2, subd.
(d); Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798.) Thus, on its face, a special circumstance finding
satisfies the requirements for accomplice murder liability even after Senate Bill 1437.
(§ 189, subd. (e).)
Since defendant’s conviction, however, the Supreme Court has refined the analysis
for who qualifies as a major participant acting with reckless indifference to human life in
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522. In Banks, the Supreme
Court identified a series of considerations, none of which are “necessary, nor is any one
of them necessarily sufficient,” for determining whether a defendant was a major
participant: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that
led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”
(Banks, at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
Similarly, in Clark, the Supreme Court found “ ‘reckless indifference’ ” to
“encompass[] a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct
aim . . . .” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) It also provided a nonexhaustive list of
factors to consider in making this determination, including use of or awareness of the
presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
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restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat
the confederates might represent, and efforts to minimize risks. (Id. at pp. 618-623.)
In Strong, the Supreme Court addressed the impact of Banks and Clark on section
1172.6 petitions for defendants with special circumstance findings. The Supreme Court
found that “Banks and Clark both substantially clarified the law governing findings under
[] section 190.2, subdivision (d)” such that they “represent the sort of significant change
that has traditionally been thought to warrant reexamination of an earlier-litigated issue.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 706, 717.) Consequently, special circumstance findings
made before Banks and Clark “do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima
facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437. This is true even if the trial evidence would
have been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.” (Strong, at p. 710.)
Thus, a defendant with a special circumstance finding applying for relief through a
section 1172.6 petition may still be ineligible for relief, but it must be determined beyond
a reasonable doubt the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life under the Banks/Clark analyses. (Strong, at p. 721.) And
though a special circumstance finding can be challenged through a habeas corpus
petition, “nothing in section 1172.6 says that a defendant must always do so before
seeking resentencing.” (Strong, at p. 713.) Thus, in light of Strong, reversal and remand
is appropriate.5
5 In view of our conclusion here, we need not address defendant’s arguments that
the trial court also committed procedural error under People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952 and People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965. We simply note that the trial
court is required to follow all applicable legal and procedural requirements on remand.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court
to allow the trial court to consider whether defendant has made a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6.
KRAUSE , J.
We concur:
RENNER , Acting P. J.
BOULWARE EURIE , J.
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