Ramirez v. City of San Jose CA6

Filed 3/8/23 Ramirez v. City of San Jose CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SANDRA LINARES RAMIREZ et al., H048019
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 16CV297131)
v.
CITY OF SAN JOSE,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellants Sandra Linares Ramirez1 and Camila Alvarez, by and through her
guardian ad litem Sandra Linares Ramirez (together, appellants), appeal from the
judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent
the City of San Jose (City).2 After Aldo Juan Alvarez (the decedent) was killed in a light
1
We note that the notice of appeal filed shows appellant’s name as Sandra Linares
Ramires, but the complaint filed in the trial court shows appellant’s name as Sandra
Linares Ramirez. We will use Ramirez in this opinion consistent with the record on
appeal.
2
The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Santa
Clara Valley Transportation Authority and its employee William Welch (together,
SCVTA). The court’s ruling on SCVTA’s motion is not before us in the instant appeal
and is the subject of a separate appeal (see case No. H049181.) That matter was
transferred to the First Appellate District for disposition in August 2022 and remains
pending (see Garcia v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (A165839, app.
pending).) Appellants also initiated two further appeals, which we dismissed as filed in
error and for failure to timely procure the record on appeal, respectively. (See case Nos.
H049371 and H049372).
rail train collision, appellants filed a government claim with the City pursuant to the
Government Claims Act (the Act). The claim named only the decedent and his
passenger, plaintiff Lauro Garcia,3 and did not identify appellants. Thereafter, appellants
filed suit against the City for negligence and wrongful death. The City filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that appellants had failed to comply with the Act because
they had not filed a claim on their own behalf. On appeal, appellants contend that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because they substantially complied with
the Act and the failure to be named in the decedent’s claim was merely a clerical error.
We conclude that appellants did not substantially comply with the Act by virtue of the
claim presented on behalf of the decedent and affirm the judgment in favor of the City.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2015, the decedent was driving a vehicle with Garcia as his sole
passenger. The decedent made a left turn across a set of light rail tracks in San Jose and
was struck and killed by a light rail train. Garcia sustained several injuries as a result of
the collision. Sandra Linares Ramirez is the decedent’s surviving spouse and Camila
Alvarez is his only child.
Appellants retained counsel, who presented separate claims to the City and
SCVTA on behalf of Garcia and the decedent. The claim presented to the City on behalf
of the decedent named the decedent as claimant, described the circumstances of the injury
as “inadequate signal lights, signal warning at crossing of street by light rail train. Train
collided with claimant & killed claimant,” and described the loss as simply “fatality.”
The amount claimed was $2,500,000, for which the stated basis was, again, “fatality.”
The claim named Garcia as the sole “other injured person.” Appellants did not file any
additional or separate claims and neither Garcia’s nor the decedent’s claims named them
as claimants, described any injury to them, or claimed any sums on their behalf.
3
A plaintiff in the underlying proceeding, Garcia is not a party to this appeal.
2
In June 2016, appellants and Garcia filed a complaint for damages, asserting
claims of negligence, wrongful death, and negligent entrustment against defendants. The
complaint did not allege compliance with the Government Claims Act as required by
Government Code section 810, et seq.4 SCVTA and the City filed their respective
answers denying the allegations in the complaint.
In March 2019, SCVTA and the City both filed motions for summary judgment, or
in the alternative, summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims. The City argued, in
relevant part, that appellants failed to file tort claims as required by the Act and were
barred from maintaining the suit. Specifically, the City asserted that each heir in a
wrongful death action must present a claim. While the decedent had filed a claim, that
claim neither identified his heirs, Ramirez and Alvarez, nor claimed any sum on their
behalf, nor was implicitly made on their behalf. The City argued that appellants were
required to file their own claims prior to filing suit, had failed to do so, and were now
time-barred from curing the defect and presenting individual claims. Appellants opposed
the City’s motion, asserting that triable issues of fact existed as to whether the
Government claim submitted on behalf of the decedent was sufficient to inure to the
benefit of his widow and child.
In August 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all
claims asserted by Ramirez and Alvarez; granted summary adjudication to SCVTA and
the City on Garcia’s cause of action for negligent entrustment; and treated the City’s and
SCVTA’s motions as motions for judgment on the pleadings as to Garcia’s cause of
action for negligence and granted the motion with leave to amend the complaint. In
granting summary judgment, the trial court found that Ramirez and Alvarez did not
present claims to the City and that the claim submitted on the decedent’s behalf did not
provide sufficient notice of claims by any other individuals. The court held that Ramirez
4
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise
indicated.
3
and Alvarez had failed to comply with the claims presentation requirements of the Act
and their claims were therefore barred as a matter of law. On January 3, 2020, judgment
was entered for the City against Ramirez and Alvarez on all claims and against Garcia on
his negligent entrustment claim. Appellants timely appealed from the judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion when it granted summary
judgment in favor of the City based on appellants’ failure to comply with the claim
presentation requirements of the Act. Appellants argue that they substantially complied
with the Act’s claim presentation requirements prior to filing suit, asserting that although
the tort claim named decedent, rather than themselves, as claimant, it should nevertheless
be understood as having been filed on behalf of appellants. They argue that the claim
provided the City actual notice of the decedent’s death, that extending the decedent’s
claim to his heirs is consistent with the policy concerns of the Act, and that it would be a
miscarriage of justice to permit the City to benefit from what appellants describe as
“essentially a clerical error.” Finally, appellants assert that extending the decedent’s
claim to his heirs would not prejudice the City because the City can face only one
wrongful death action regardless of the number of heirs.
The City counters that appellants failed to file their own claims under the Act and
cannot rely upon the claim filed on behalf of the decedent to cure the defect. The City
further argues that the deadline to present a claim has passed, such that appellants are
now time-barred from presenting claims. The City asserts that appellants’ causes of
action are barred regardless of the single joint cause of action available for a wrongful
death claim.
A. Standard of Review
A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that “there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant meets their burden of
4
showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more
elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “On appeal, we
review the record and the determination of the trial court de novo, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the losing parties. [Citation.]” (Brown v. El
Dorado Union High School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1022.)
B. The Government Claims Act
As a general rule, the Act requires a plaintiff to present a public entity with a
timely written claim for damages before filing suit against it. The claim must include a
“general description” of the alleged injury “so far as it may be known at the time of
presentation of the claim.” (§§ 905, 911.2, 945.4.) Critical to the matter before us, the
claim must include the name of the claimant and must be presented and signed by the
claimant or a person acting on his behalf. (§§ 910, 910.2.) The failure to file such a
claim is “fatal to [a] cause of action.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12
Cal.3d 447, 454.)
Because much of appellants’ briefing focuses on the purpose of the Act and the
apparent inequity created by its application in this case, we briefly summarize the
purpose behind the Act and its claim presentation requirements. “ ‘The intent of the Tort
Claims Act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against governmental entities. Rather,
the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated
circumstances. . . . The act creates a bond between the administrative claim and the
judicial complaint. Each theory of recovery against the public entity must have been
reflected in a timely claim. . . .’ [Citation.] The aim of the tort claim statutes is to
provide sufficient information to enable the public entity to investigate claims and settle,
if appropriate, without the expense of litigation, and to take the potential claim into
account in fiscal planning.” (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060 (Castaneda).) “ ‘It is not the purpose of the claims
5
statutes to prevent surprise. . . . It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied
even in the face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the claim.’ ” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183,
191.)
C. Appellants Did Not Comply with the Act’s Claim Presentation Requirements
Appellants never filed tort claims on their own behalf and they were not named as
claimants in the decedent’s tort claim filed with the City. They argue that because their
counsel filed a claim on behalf of the decedent, thereby putting the City on notice,
appellants were in substantial compliance with the Act’s claim presentation requirements.
We are compelled to reject the argument based on long-standing statutory and case
authority.
“Where a claimant has attempted to comply with the claim requirements but the
claim is deficient in some way, the doctrine of substantial compliance may validate the
claim ‘if it substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements . . . even though it
is technically deficient in one or more particulars.’ ” (Connelly v. County of Fresno
(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 38.) “The test for substantial compliance is whether the face
of the filed claim discloses sufficient information to enable the public entity to make an
adequate investigation of the claim’s merits and settle it without the expense of
litigation.” (Id.)
“However, the substantial compliance doctrine has application only when there is
a defect in form but the statutory requirements have otherwise been met. [Citations.]
The doctrine has no application when, as here, there has been a failure to comply with all
of the statutory tort claim requirements.” (Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA
Medical Center (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 729, 733 (Nguyen).) The insurmountable challenge
appellants face is that they are neither named as claimants in the decedent’s claim, nor
did they file their own claims. Because the Act requires (1) presentation of a claim that
(2) includes the claimant’s name, they did not comply with all of the Act’s requirements.
6
(See § 910 [claim presented must include claimant’s name]; Nelson v. County of Los
Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 797 (Nelson) [“the statutory requirements have not
been met by a person who has not filed a claim.”].) Having failed to comply with the
threshold requirement of filing or being named in a claim at all, appellants cannot
demonstrate that their claim is substantially compliant. (See Hall v. City of Los Angeles
(1941) 19 Cal.2d 198, 202 [“Substantial compliance cannot be predicated upon no
compliance”]; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d
1071, 1082-1083 [doctrine cannot cure a total omission of an essential element from a
claim].)
Nor do we read the substantial compliance doctrine as permitting appellants to
step into the decedent’s shoes for the purpose of determining their compliance with the
Act. “Generally, each claimant must file his or her own tort claim. When people suffer
separate and distinct injuries from the same act or omission, they must each submit a
claim. One claimant cannot rely on a claim presented by another. [Citation.]”
(Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062; see also Nguyen, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 732-734 [claim filed for injured child does not permit parents to sue for negligent
infliction of emotional distress].) Numerous cases have applied this rule to require
different claimants asserting survival and wrongful death theories arising from the same
transaction to file their own claims. (See Nelson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796-797
[separate tort claims required for survival cause of action by injured decedent and
wrongful death claim by mother]; Lewis v. City and County of San Francisco (1971) 21
Cal.App.3d 339, 341 [wrongful death plaintiff could not rely on decedent’s pre-death tort
claim for her personal injuries]; Petersen v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757,
768 (Petersen) [claim for wrongful death filed by the spouse of a decedent did not excuse
the decedent’s children from filing their own claims for wrongful death].)
We discern no basis in this case to depart from the well-settled rule that one
claimant may not rely on a claim filed by another where their injuries are separate and
7
distinct. The decedent’s claim in this matter was circumspect in its description of the
claimed injury and devoid of any reference to his heirs, much less any injuries suffered
by them or sums claimed on their behalf. While the decedent’s claim placed the City on
notice of the collision and his death, it was insufficient to serve as a claim filed by or on
behalf of appellants. On its face, the decedent’s claim presents a survival claim (i.e., an
action for his personal injuries while alive), rather than a wrongful death claim. (See
Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063.) Appellants’ claims were for the
wrongful death of decedent and negligence. While those causes of action arose out of the
same transaction as any claims that the decedent might have brought, appellants’ alleged
injuries were separate and distinct. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264 [“Unlike a cause of action for wrongful death, a survivor cause
of action . . . is instead a separate and distinct cause of action which belonged to the
decedent before death but, by statute, survives that event.”].) Accordingly, appellants
could not use the decedent’s tort claim describing his injury as a substitute for their own
wrongful death claim.
Extending the decedent’s claim to his heirs, as appellants seek, would be
inconsistent with the Act’s purpose of encouraging investigation and settlement. The
City is entitled to know which claimants are asserting claims. Without a claim naming
the heirs or any injured party other than the decedent and Garcia, the City was not placed
on notice to fully investigate and evaluate its potential liability, including for example,
investigating particular defenses it could assert against particular heirs. (See Nelson,
supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 793-795 [discussing damages available in a wrongful death
action].) It is against this backdrop that we conclude that appellants were required, and
neglected, to file tort claims with the City prior to filing suit. Because appellants did not
themselves comply with the Act, they cannot state a cause of action.
Finally, appellants argue that the City would not be prejudiced by permitting their
suit to proceed because the City faces only one wrongful death action regardless of the
8
number of heirs. California’s “one action” rule for wrongful death claims provides that
only one cause of action may be brought for an individual’s wrongful death and that all
persons entitled to sue must be joined in order to recover. (Adams v. Superior Court
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 76-77.) “A tortfeasor waives the protection of the one action
rule by settling with less than all the known heirs if such heirs are not a party to the
action.” (Romero v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 211, 214.)
Although there can be only one action for wrongful death, “each heir has a personal and
separate cause of action” for wrongful death. (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (2003) 53
Cal.App.4th 801, 807-808.) Further, “a bar against recovery by one heir . . . does not
preclude recovery by others.” (Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d
690, 693.) Requiring each claimant to present a claim, such that a public entity is
necessarily informed of all potential heirs’ claims, is therefore consistent with the one
action rule and its joinder of claims. Moreover, the factually similar case, Petersen,
expressly rejected the idea that the one action rule overrides the Act’s claim presentation
requirements, observing that “each heir should be regarded as having a personal and
separate cause of action.” (Petersen, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at pp. 766-767.)
We cannot find a basis on which to distinguish this case from any of the above-
cited authorities which hold that an injured party is prohibited from relying on a claim
filed by another party where the injury suffered by each party is separate and distinct. As
in those cases, appellants’ causes of action arose out of the same incident as decedent’s
claim. However, each of their injuries was separate and distinct from those suffered by
the decedent. Because neither appellant filed a claim, and because there is nothing in the
decedent’s claim to suggest it was filed on behalf of his heirs, with no mention of any
damages incurred by any heirs, the trial court properly resolved the wrongful death
claims against appellants.
We acknowledge that summary judgment for the City on each of appellants’
claims is a harsh consequence for what the appellants describe as a “clerical error.” Yet
9
the purpose of presenting a claim is not merely to notify a public entity that an event
occurred, but to permit the entity to investigate and evaluate its potential liability. The
claims presented to the City in this case did not permit such investigation and evaluation.
Absent compliance with the claim presentation requirements, appellants’ claims against
the City may not proceed.
III. DISPOSITION
The January 3, 2020, judgment is affirmed.
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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________
Grover, J.
_______________________________
Danner, J.
Ramirez, et al. v. City of San Jose
H048019