P. v. Spani CA4/1

Filed 5/21/13 P. v. Spani CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062281
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD237104)
GREGORY ALLEN SPANI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frederick
Maguire and Kenneth K. So, Judges. Affirmed.
Henry C. Coker, Public Defender, Randy Mize, Chief Deputy Public Defender,
Matthew Braner and Peter Will, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Donald W.
Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gregory Allen Spani appeals the order granting him probation1 after a jury found
him guilty of possessing and transporting methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11377, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).) Spani contends
the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the methamphetamine because
it was obtained as a result of an illegal search. We reject this contention and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
San Diego police officers on patrol at approximately 2:00 a.m. saw Spani driving a
vehicle with expired registration tags in a bicycle lane in a residential neighborhood.
Spani did not live in the vicinity. The officers stopped Spani and asked him for his
driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Spani's license had expired,
and the vehicle registration, which was not in Spani's name, had expired more than a year
earlier. When the officers ran a records check, they learned that Spani's license was
suspended and that he had been arrested for drug offenses. The officers arrested Spani
for driving with a suspended license, impounded the vehicle, and conducted an inventory
search. The officers found a baggie containing methamphetamine, which they
confiscated, but left a surfboard, two bicycles, a tool box, and other items inside the
vehicle. The officers completed an impound form that listed the items found in the
vehicle.
1 An order granting probation is deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal.
(Pen. Code, §§ 1237, subd. (a), 1466, subd. (b)(1).)
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Spani moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the ground it was obtained as
the result of an unlawful search of his vehicle. Specifically, he argued the search was
presumptively illegal because it was conducted without a warrant.
The People opposed the suppression motion. They argued that the police officers'
observation of Spani driving a vehicle with expired registration tags in a bicycle lane
justified the initial stop; the discovery that Spani's license had expired justified the arrest;
and the impoundment and associated inventory search of the vehicle were lawful.
In his reply papers, Spani argued the search was illegal because it was not
necessary to impound the vehicle, and the inventory search was a ruse to discover
incriminating evidence.
The court ruled the methamphetamine was properly seized because it was found
during a lawful inventory search of a vehicle subject to impoundment. The court thus
denied Spani's suppression motion.
DISCUSSION
Spani argues the inventory search of his vehicle violated his federal constitutional
right "to be secure in [his] person[], houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; see Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S.
643, 655 [holding 4th Amend. applicable to states through 14th Amend.].) Specifically,
he contends that the search was not a valid inventory search because (1) it was not done
in accordance with departmental policy requiring the removal and storage of all valuable
property from an impounded vehicle, and (2) the officers' decision to impound the
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vehicle and then undertake an inventory search was a pretext to look for contraband. As
we shall explain, these contentions lack merit.
A. Standard of Review
A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on the ground the search or seizure was unreasonable. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, "[w]e
defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment."
(People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
B. Legal Analysis
"An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in
order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a
towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage." (Whren v. United
States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 811, fn. 1.) Such a "search may be 'reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon
probable cause." (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) An inventory search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted "pursuant to standard police
procedures" (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 372 (Opperman)) or if it is
regulated by "standardized criteria" or "established routine" (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495
U.S. 1, 4 (Wells)). Such a search, however, "must not be a ruse for a general rummaging
in order to discover incriminating evidence." (Ibid.)
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The requirements of a lawful inventory search were satisfied in this case. A police
officer may impound a vehicle where, as here, the driver has a suspended license or the
vehicle registration expired more than six months before impoundment. (Veh. Code,
§ 22651, subds. (h)(1), (o)(1)(A); People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721 (Redd).)
"Having impounded the vehicle, [the officers] had authority to conduct an inventory of
the vehicle's contents 'aimed at securing or protecting the [vehicle] and its contents.' "
(Redd, at p. 721.) The record indicates the inventory search here was conducted for the
purpose of protecting the contents of the vehicle. One of the officers who arrested Spani
testified that the police department has procedures officers must follow when impounding
a vehicle, including conducting a search of the vehicle and completing a form that lists
the contents of the vehicle in order to keep track of what is delivered to the impound
yard. This testimony "established that the inventory was conducted pursuant to standard
criteria, and that [the officers were] 'not allowed so much latitude that [the search could
turn] into "a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime." ' " (Id. at
pp. 721-722.)
Spani asserts the inventory search here was unlawful because the officers did not
strictly comply with "the core parts of the policy designed to safe[guard] the owner's
property." Specifically, Spani complains that by keeping his surfboard, bicycles, and
other items in the vehicle, the officers violated written departmental policy that all
property of evidentiary or monetary value be removed from the vehicle and stored at
police headquarters or the local police station. We are not persuaded.
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As an initial matter, it is not clear from the record that the particular policy
provisions Spani relies upon apply to inventory searches. The policy manual was not
admitted as evidence in the trial court; and according to the testimony at the suppression
hearing, the provisions Spani cites are included in a section of the manual entitled
"Investigations" and thus may apply only to investigative searches. Even if we assume
arguendo that the provisions cited by Spani are applicable, failure to comply with every
detail of a written policy governing inventory searches does not invalidate such a search.
Such a search need not "be conducted in a totally mechanical 'all or nothing' fashion."
"The allowance of the exercise of judgment based on concerns related to the purposes of
an inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment." (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at
p. 4.) Here, one of the police officers who arrested Spani testified, based on his training
and 20 years of experience, that when performing the inventory search required whenever
a vehicle is impounded, police routinely leave surfboards, bicycles, luggage, and other
such personal belongings inside the vehicle so that the owners may retrieve them from
the impound yard. Following such standard police practice, even though unwritten,
renders a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Needham (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 260, 266-267; People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 375 (Green);
People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 891-892 (Steeley).)
Spani also argues that the vehicle impoundment and associated inventory search
were unconstitutional because they were merely a ruse for police to conduct an
investigative search. Spani does "not disput[e] that subjectively an officer could have
genuinely decided to tow [the] vehicle rather than search it for contraband." But, he
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claims the officers' decisions to arrest him and to impound the vehicle, after learning of
his prior arrests for drug offenses, and their failure to store his personal belongings at a
police facility, indicate the officers "were much less concerned about protecting [his]
property than searching through it." The trial court, however, concluded the decision to
impound the vehicle was made for legitimate reasons and not "for purposes of harassment
or abuse." The record supports that conclusion.
At the hearing on Spani's motion to suppress evidence, one of the arresting officers
testified he based his decision to impound the vehicle on the facts that Spani's license was
suspended, he was arrested, and the vehicle registration expired more than six months
earlier. These are statutorily authorized (and therefore reasonable) grounds upon which
to impound a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 22651, subds. (h)(1), (o)(1)(A), (p); Redd, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 721; Steeley, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 892.) The officer further testified
that when deciding whether to impound a vehicle, he considers whether the driver is
alone, whether a properly licensed person is available to drive the vehicle, whether he
suspects the driver is lying or trying to conceal something, the time of day, and whether
the stop occurs near the driver's residence. Although the officer's testimony regarding
suspicion of lying or concealment might suggest an investigative motive, the other
circumstances considered by the officer indicate the decision to impound the vehicle was,
as a whole, "based on factors other than using it as a pretext to engage in a search for
criminal activity." (People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 326.) Substantial
evidence thus supports the trial court's finding that the decision to impound the vehicle
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Spani was driving was not a ruse to search for incriminating evidence.2 Accordingly,
once the officers properly decided to impound the vehicle, they were permitted to
conduct an inventory search. (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 373; Redd, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 721.)
At oral argument, Spani's counsel urged us to hold the inventory search invalid
based on three federal appellate decisions. (See U.S. v. Cartwright (7th Cir. 2010) 630
F.3d 610; U.S. v. Proctor (D.C. Cir. 2007) 489 F.3d 1348; U.S. v. Rowland (8th Cir.
2003) 341 F.3d 774.) Of course, these lower federal court decisions are not binding on
us. (See, e.g., People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 233; People v. Crittenden (1994)
9 Cal.4th 83, 120, fn. 3.) They are also not on point. The Proctor court held an
inventory search was unreasonable when police officers' decision to impound the vehicle
violated the department's written policy, and the officers conducted an inventory search
under conditions where the policy expressly prohibited such a search. (489 F.3d at
pp. 1354-1356.) Here, by contrast, Spani's counsel conceded the impoundment was
proper, and the inventory search itself was authorized by standard police procedure. In
Rowland, the court held an inventory search was pretextual when law enforcement
officers impounded a vehicle; "called for a drug-sniffing dog to be brought to the scene";
"sifted through the vehicle's contents searching only for and recording only incriminating
evidence"; and "testified the search was partly conducted to investigate the possibility
2 To the extent we are required to review claims of pretext de novo, we agree with
the trial court's assessment of the evidence. (Cf. People v. Valenzuela (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1208 [whether decision to stop taxicab to conduct administrative
inspection was pretextual was subject to de novo review].)
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Rowland might be trafficking narcotics." (341 F.3d at pp. 780, 782.) As we discussed
earlier, the record here discloses no comparable circumstances suggesting the search of
Spani's vehicle was pretextual. Finally, the Cartwright court "held that minor deviations
from department policy" — there, the failure to make a complete list of the property
found in the impounded car — "do not render an inventory search unreasonable." (630
F.3d at p. 616.) Here, the deviation complained of was even more minor, for it concerned
not the taking of the inventory but the post-inventory storage of certain items. We thus
conclude that none of these decisions supports invalidation of the inventory search
conducted in this case.
In sum, we hold that the impoundment and associated inventory search of the
vehicle Spani was driving were reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
We also hold that because contraband discovered during a lawful inventory search may
be seized and used as evidence in a criminal prosecution (Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th
at p. 374), the trial court correctly denied Spani's motion to suppress.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
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