The People v. Hernandez CA4/1

Filed 9/17/13 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063102
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. MH101244)
ALVARO ALDACO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David M.
Gill, Judge. Affirmed.
Ron Boyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Joy
Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Alvaro Aldaco Hernandez was recommitted for an indeterminate term to the
custody of the State Department of Mental Health (DMH), now State Department of State
Hospitals, under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600
et seq.) Hernandez appeals, contending that treating sexually violent predators (SVP's)
differently from mentally disordered offenders (MDO's) and persons found not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGI's) violates his constitutional right to equal protection. We have
considered this argument in light of our Supreme Court's opinion in People v. McKee
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), and this court's final opinion on remand in the same
case, People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II). Based on these
opinions, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hernandez was first found to be an SVP within the meaning of the SVPA in
1999.1 In June 2007 the People filed a petition to commit Hernandez for involuntary
treatment as an SVP.2 In March 2011 a jury found Hernandez to be an SVP and the
court committed him for an indeterminate term. Hernandez appealed the commitment
order on several grounds. We rejected Hernandez's contentions, except for his challenge
to the indeterminate commitment on equal protection grounds. Based on McKee I, which
1 Hernandez was first convicted of sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl in 1967,
and a jury found him guilty of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the
age of 14 of two victims in 1988.
2 In November 2006 California voters passed Proposition 83, entitled "The Sexual
Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica's Law" amending the SVPA effective
November 8, 2006. (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) Proposition 83 changed an
SVP commitment from a two-year term to an indefinite commitment and shifted the
burden of proof for release to the SVP (id. at pp. 1183-1184), unless the DMH authorizes
a petition for release (id. at p. 1187). In contrast, an MDO is committed for a one-year
period and thereafter has the right to be released unless the People prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he or she should be recommitted for another year. (Pen. Code,
§ 2972.)
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held that the 2006 amendments to the SVPA may violate equal protection (McKee I,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1184), we reversed in part and remanded to the trial court with
directions to suspend further proceedings pending finality of the proceedings on remand
in McKee I.3 In July 2012 we issued our opinion in McKee II, upholding the
constitutionality of the amended SVPA on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court
denied review in McKee II, rendering the opinion final (McKee II, supra, 207
Cal.App.4th 1325, review den. Oct. 10, 2012, S204503), and the trial court subsequently
re-imposed the order for Hernandez to be committed to an indeterminate term.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez's constitutional argument focuses on whether the amended SVPA
violates equal protection. In McKee I, the Supreme Court held the SVPA is subject to
equal protection analysis because it "treats SVP's significantly less favorably than those
similarly situated individuals civilly committed under other statutes" including MDO's
and NGI's. (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1196, 1203, 1207.) Since individuals
within each of these categories "have the same interest at stake—the loss of liberty
through involuntary civil commitment—it must be the case that when society varies the
standard and burden of proof for SVP's . . . , it does so because of the belief that the risks
3 The Supreme Court remanded in McKee I for an evidentiary hearing on whether
disparate treatment for SVP's is justified. The court transferred "grant and hold" cases
under McKee I to the Courts of Appeal with directions to vacate their prior opinions and
reconsider in light of McKee I. The order expressed a desire to avoid unnecessary
multiplicity of proceedings and directed this court to suspend further proceedings
pending finality of the proceedings in McKee I.
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involved with erroneously freeing SVP's from their commitment are significantly greater
than the risks involved with freeing" other civil committees. (Id. at p. 1204.)
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing on whether the People could
justify disparate treatment for SVP's. The court instructed: "It must be shown that,
notwithstanding the similarities between SVP's and [other civil committees], the former
as a class bear a substantially greater risk to society, and that therefore imposing on them
a greater burden before they can be released from commitment is needed to protect
society. This can be shown in a variety of ways. For example, it may be demonstrated
that the inherent nature of the SVP's mental disorder makes recidivism as a class
significantly more likely. Or it may be that SVP's pose a greater risk to a particularly
vulnerable class of victims, such as children. . . . Or the People may produce some other
justification." (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1208, fn. omitted.)
After remand, the superior court conducted a 21-day evidentiary hearing on the
justification of disparate treatment for SVP's and concluded the People had met their
burden. On appeal, we reviewed the matter de novo. (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1338.) "When a constitutional right, such as the right to liberty from involuntary
confinement, is at stake, the usual judicial deference to legislative findings gives way to
an exercise of independent judgment of the facts to ascertain whether the legislative body
' "has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." ' " (McKee I, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 1206, italics added.) In McKee II, we concluded "[t]he People have
shown 'that the inherent nature of the SVP's mental disorder makes recidivism as a class
significantly more likely[;] . . . that SVP's pose a greater risk [and unique dangers] to a
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particularly vulnerable class of victims, such as children'; and that SVP's have diagnostic
and treatment differences from MDO's and NGI's, thereby supporting a reasonable
perception by the electorate . . . that the disparate treatment of SVP's under the amended
[SVPA] is necessary to further the state's compelling interests in public safety and
humanely treating the mentally disordered." (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1347.) The Supreme Court denied a petition for review, making McKee II final.
(McKee II, review den. Oct. 10, 2012, S204503.)
This court has, of course, followed McKee II, and other Courts of Appeal have as
well. (See, e.g., People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-1382; People
v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 47-48; People v. McCloud (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
1076, 1085-1086; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864.) While it is
clear Hernandez believes the evidence relied on in McKee II is insufficient to justify
disparate treatment of SVP's, we have carefully evaluated it and conclude otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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