In re Hansen CA4/1

Filed 9/16/14 In re Hansen CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re BRAE HANSEN D063983
on (San Diego County
Super. Ct. No. SCD207862)
Habeas Corpus.
THE COURT:
Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relief granted.
Brae Hansen in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
and Charles C. Ragland, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
FACTS
In 2009, a jury convicted petitioner Brae Hansen of first degree murder and
vicarious use of a firearm. The jury also found true the special circumstance that the
murder was committed by lying in wait. The court sentenced Hansen to life without the
possibility of parole. Hansen was 17 at the time she committed the crime.
DISCUSSION
In her petition for writ of habeas corpus, Hansen contends that Penal Code
section 190.5 (undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), which governs
sentencing of juveniles found guilty of murder in which certain special circumstances are
found true, violates the Constitution's Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Hansen's petition is premised on a recent Supreme Court decision,
Miller v. Alabama (2012) __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Miller), which held that a state
statute imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for those
under the age of 18 who commit murder violates the Eighth Amendment and that such
sentences may be imposed only after the court considers the "distinctive attributes of
youth" and how those attributes "diminish the penological justifications for imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders." (Id. at p. 2465.)
At the time Hansen filed her writ petition, the California Supreme Court was
reviewing the same question raised by Hansen: whether existing authority interpreting
section 190.5, subdivision (b), as creating a presumption in favor of a sentence of life
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution under
the principles announced in Miller. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal. 4th 1354
(Gutierrez).)
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We stayed further proceedings involving Hansen's petition pending the final
outcome of Gutierrez. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that Miller precludes an
interpretation of section 190.5 as creating a presumption of life without parole and that
previous sentencing determinations premised on such a presumption require resentencing.
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1390-1391.)
After the Supreme Court filed its decision, we requested an informal response
from the Attorney General regarding the effect of Gutierrez on Hansen's petition. In that
response, the Attorney General concedes that relief should be granted and the case
remanded for resentencing.
As the Attorney General recognizes, relief is warranted. In its sentencing
memorandum, the prosecution informed the court that under governing authority, section
190.5 creates a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole. When the court sentenced Hansen, it applied this presumption in favor of a
sentence of life without parole and found no basis for reducing the sentence. As
discussed in Gutierrez, although we do not fault the trial court for dutifully applying the
law as it stood at the time, such a presumption raises serious constitutional concerns that
require a remand for resentencing.
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DISPOSITION
We may grant relief without issuing an order to show cause or writ of habeas
corpus when the petitioner's custodian concedes that the requested relief must be granted.
(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 728, 740, fn. 7.) Given the Attorney General's
concession, we conclude no useful purpose could reasonably be served by issuance of an
order to show cause and/or plenary disposition of the matter. The conviction is vacated.
The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing not inconsistent with Miller and
Gutierrez.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
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