People v. J.S.

Filed 12/5/16
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
D070163
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J138205)
v.
J.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D070164
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SJ13146)
v.
J.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carolyn
M. Caietti, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Brendon
W. Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent the People
(D070163).
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent San
Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (D070164).
While J.S. was a dependent of the juvenile court, a delinquency petition was filed
alleging that she committed vandalism and used force and violence against another
minor. The juvenile court declared her a "dual status" child, making her both a dependent
and a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 241.1, subd. (e).)1 On appeal, J.S. argues
that: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petition and
declaring her a dual status youth, (2) the court erred by detaining her in juvenile hall
pending placement in a residential treatment facility, and (3) she was prejudiced by being
declared a ward.2 We reject J.S.'s arguments and affirm the judgment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not
initially file a respondent's brief in this matter. However, J.S. appealed in both her
dependency and delinquency cases. Thus, the Agency (Agency) and the People are both
proper respondents. By separate order, we consolidated the appeals for purposes of this
opinion.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2015, J.S. was hospitalized multiple times because of suicide attempts and
cutting herself. She was approximately 13 years old at the time. J.S. had been raped by
her biological father when she was between the ages of six and nine, and suffered from
sexual trauma, night terrors, feelings of detachment, difficulty falling asleep and staying
asleep, and concentration problems. Since 2014, J.S.'s family had been referred to San
Diego Child Protective Services 13 times based on allegations of physical abuse,
emotional abuse, general neglect, and sexual abuse. In May 2015, the court ordered J.S.
placed in a group home. As a result of J.S's family's unwillingness and inability to care
for her, J.S. became a dependent of the juvenile court in July 2015.
In January 2016, J.S.'s mother moved out of state. J.S. reported that she was sad
without her family and wanted to be near them. That month, J.S. destroyed property at
the school associated with her group home. She damaged computers, broke a door, and
poured paint on the floor. J.S. had a history of discipline problems resulting from her
defiant and disruptive behavior.
In early February 2016, while at a psychiatric hospital, J.S. engaged in an
altercation with another patient, 14-year-old Olivia G. J.S. pulled Olivia's hair and
punched her in the face several times. The San Diego Police Department arrested J.S.
and transported her to juvenile hall. A delinquency petition was filed alleging that J.S.
unlawfully used force and violence on the person of Olivia in violation of Penal Code
section 242, a misdemeanor.
3
At the time of the detention hearing, the San Diego County Probation Department
(Probation Department) recommended that J.S. remain detained in juvenile hall because
she posed a risk to herself and to the community as a result of her escalating violent
behavior, history of substance abuse, and mental health needs. The court ordered that
J.S. remain detained in juvenile hall and undergo a competency evaluation. The court
further ordered the Probation Department and the Agency to meet and confer in order to
determine whether the dependency or delinquency system would better serve J.S.'s needs.
Dr. Michael Stewart conducted a competency screening of J.S. He noted that she
had a significant history of behavioral and emotional instability, relating in part to
significant traumas she had suffered during her childhood, chronic family instability, and
stress. Dr. Stewart concluded that J.S. had posttraumatic stress disorder and major
depressive disorder with psychotic features, and that she abused cannabis. He further
found that J.S. was competent to stand trial and that there was no indication that she
posed an imminent danger to herself or others.
The Probation Department and the Agency met to discuss services and
recommendations for J.S. After discussing the matter, they jointly recommended that it
would be in J.S.'s best interests for her to continue to receive rehabilitative and mental
health services through the Agency. This recommendation was based on J.S.'s age, her
significant history of suicide attempts, her lack of criminal sophistication, and her lack of
delinquency history. The agencies also recommended that the court dismiss the
delinquency petition once J.S. was placed in a suitable dependency placement.
4
Shortly thereafter, in late February 2016, the San Diego County District Attorney
amended the delinquency petition against J.S. to add allegations pertaining to the
vandalism incident at J.S.'s school. The Probation Department requested a continuance
of the delinquency proceedings to allow the agencies to discuss the new offense, because
their prior recommendation was based solely on the battery charge. The juvenile court
granted the request for a continuance and ordered the Agency and the Probation
Department to meet and confer regarding whether J.S. should be designated a dual status
youth.
The Agency and the Probation Department met and conferred again to discuss
J.S.'s services. This time, they recommended that J.S. be designated a dual status youth.
Based on the nature of J.S.'s offenses, her troubled past, and her self-harming behavior,
both agencies agreed that her mental health rehabilitative needs should be addressed by
both agencies via dual jurisdiction services. The Agency sought placement for J.S. at
Vista Del Mar, a residential treatment facility in Los Angeles, and was working diligently
to move forward with that placement. The Probation Department and the Agency
recommended that J.S. remain detained at juvenile hall until a placement was secured for
her.
In March 2016, the court held a jurisdiction hearing. J.S. admitted the vandalism
charge as a misdemeanor in exchange for dismissal of the battery charge. The court
accepted J.S.'s admission, designated the vandalism charge a misdemeanor, and
continued the matter for disposition.
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At the disposition hearing, the Probation Department and the Agency both
recommended designating J.S a dual status youth because the dependency system alone
had not been successful in rehabilitating her. J.S.'s counsel requested that the
delinquency case be dismissed. The court refused to dismiss the delinquency case
because of concerns over J.S.'s safety, as well as the safety of others. The court adjudged
J.S. a ward under section 602 and designated her a dual status youth under section 241.1,
subdivision (e). The court ordered that the Agency serve as the lead agency and that the
dependency court serve as the lead court in the matter.
J.S. volunteered to go to Vista Del Mar. The Agency informed the court that a bed
at the facility would be available later that week and requested that the court approve the
out-of-county placement and travel. The court granted the Agency's requests and ordered
that J.S. be detained in juvenile hall until a bed became available at a residential
treatment facility.
DISCUSSION
I
The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Designating J.S. a Dual Status Youth
J.S. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by designating her a "dual
status" child. She contends that the juvenile court should have dismissed the delinquency
petition against her and designated her solely a dependent of the juvenile court. We
reject these arguments.
"In California, the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a minor can be invoked in two
ways: (1) by a dependency petition (§ 300), which alleges the child's home is unfit due to
6
parental abuse or neglect; or (2) by a delinquency petition, which accuses the child of
either disobedience or truancy (§ 601) or the violation of a law that defines a crime
(§ 602)." (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 30, 42.) "The dependency and delinquency
systems serve overlapping but slightly different aims . . . . Whereas the dependency
system is geared toward protection of a child victimized by parental abuse or neglect, the
delinquency system enforces accountability for the child's own wrongdoing, both to
rehabilitate the child and to protect the public." (Id. at p. 46.) "Although California
juvenile courts address the needs of dependent and delinquent minors differently, some
minors who come before the court seem to fall under both systems. . . . In general,
however, California law prohibits a minor from simultaneously being declared a
dependent child and a delinquent ward." (Ibid.)
"In 2004, the Legislature created a small exception to the ban on dual jurisdiction.
Section 241.1, subdivision (e) allows a minor to be designated a 'dual status child,' and
treated simultaneously under the court's dependency and delinquency jurisdiction, but
only in accordance with a precise written protocol." (In re W.B., supra, 55 Cal.4th at
pp. 46-47.) The bill creating the exception was cosponsored by the Judicial Council of
California and the Children's Law Center of Los Angeles to address the situation some
children face when they are "caught between the dependency and delinquency juvenile
justice systems" and "need the interventions of both [systems]." (Assem. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 129 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 5,
2004.) The sponsors of the bill recognized that the existing ban on dual jurisdiction
"inhibit[ed] the state's 'ability to address in a comprehensive and effective manner the
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multifaceted concerns and needs associated with these children.' " (Sen. Health &
Human Services Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 129 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as
amended March 8, 2004.) The sponsors noted that dual jurisdiction protocols would
ensure that "the county and the court [would] have new flexibility and resources and tools
to address the needs of the youths in question" and that the child welfare and probation
agencies would not provide duplicative services. (Ibid.) San Diego County is one of 18
counties in the state that has established a written protocol "to allow the county probation
department and the child welfare services department to jointly assess and produce a
recommendation that the child be designated as a dual status child, allowing the child to
be simultaneously a dependent child and a ward of the court." (§ 241.1, subd. (e);
Protocol for Coordination Between County of San Diego's Probation Department and
Health and Human Services Agency/Child Welfare Services in Crossover Youth Matters
Before the Juvenile Court (July 2015)
[as of Dec.
2, 2016]; Assembly Bill 129 Protocols
[as of Dec. 2,
2016].)
"Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300
and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare services
department shall . . . initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the
minor and the protection of society." (§ 241.1, subd. (a).) The county probation
department and the child welfare services department recommend to the juvenile court
8
whether the child should be a dependent child, ward of the court, or dual status child.
(§ 241.1, subds. (a), (e).) "Once the recommendations of both departments are presented
to the juvenile court, it remains for the court to 'determine which status is appropriate for
the minor.' " (In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 1495, 1506; § 241.1, subd. (a).)
We review the juvenile court's determination under section 241.1 regarding the
designation applied to a child who qualifies as both a dependent and a ward of the court
for abuse of discretion. (In re M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.) " 'To show
abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.] . . . [W]e will not lightly substitute our decision for
that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to
support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is
substantial evidence to support them." (Id. at pp. 1506-1507.)
We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it designated
J.S. a dual status child. J.S. had been in the dependency system for more than a year
before a delinquency petition was filed against her. During that time, she received
extensive services, including ongoing therapy and placement in a group home where she
received assistance with developing coping mechanisms. Despite the services that she
received through the Agency as a dependent, J.S. continued to act out. She engaged in
multiple physical altercations, including with a student at her school and individuals at
the hospital, vandalized classrooms on at least two occasions, threatened a teacher,
engaged in self-harming behavior, and exhibited suicidal behavior. It is thus clear that
9
the services the Agency had provided to J.S. were not sufficient to address her complex
rehabilitative needs and hold her accountable for her actions. Based on the record before
us, the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded that J.S. would benefit from being
a dual jurisdiction child. As a ward of the court, J.S. would be subject to probation
conditions aimed at holding her accountable for her actions, including reporting to a
probation officer, complying with a curfew and restrictions on travel, participating in
counseling and education directed by the probation officer, paying restitution, and
requiring her to participate in substance abuse treatment if directed by the probation
officer.
We further conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
declined to dismiss the delinquency petition against J.S. The juvenile court may dismiss
a delinquency petition "if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the
person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that he or she
is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation." (§ 782.) In this case, the court found both
that it would not serve the interests of justice to dismiss the petition and that J.S. needed
further rehabilitation and treatment. These findings are supported by the evidence in the
record. As we have detailed, services through the dependency system did not sufficiently
address J.S.'s problems. She continued to engage in acts that were harmful to herself and
others. In fact, her aggressive behavior escalated while she was receiving services
through the dependency system. Thus, she required further rehabilitation and treatment.
Although it is clear that J.S. suffered serious trauma in the past and required
significant mental health services, she also continued to engage in harmful, destructive
10
behavior. As a result, she could also benefit from "the delinquency system[, which]
enforces accountability for the child's own wrongdoing, both to rehabilitate the child and
to protect the public." (In re W.B., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 46.) Because J.S. continued to
pose a threat to herself and the public, the court could have reasonably concluded that it
would not serve the interests of justice to dismiss the delinquency petition.
Based on foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by designating J.S. a dual status child and declining to dismiss the delinquency
petition against her.
II
The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Detaining J.S. at Juvenile Hall
J.S. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by detaining her at juvenile
hall until a suitable placement became available. Specifically, she challenges her
detention at juvenile hall after she was adjudicated a ward of the court. She argues that
she should have been released to the Agency until a suitable placement was available.
We reject J.S.'s argument.
"The statutory scheme governing juvenile delinquency is designed to give the
court 'maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular
ward before it.' [Citation.] Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile court law . . . .
[Citation.] [T]he juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion in the disposition of
juvenile matters [citation]." (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 393, 411.) Juvenile courts
have broad discretion " ' "to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect
public safety." ' " (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1152.) "[T]he court [can]
11
choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles
accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public. [Citation.] . . . [T]he court
[does not] necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most restrictive placement
before other options have been tried." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 480, 507;
§§ 727, subd. (a)(1), 730, subd. (a) [if the minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the court
can make any reasonable order for the custody of the minor, including placing the minor
in juvenile hall].)
" 'An order of disposition, made by the juvenile court, may be reversed by the
appellate court only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. . . .' [Citation.] It is not
the responsibility of this court to determine what we believe would be the most
appropriate placement for a minor. This is the duty of the trial court, whose
determination we reverse only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason." (In re
Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1135; see also In re Michael D. (1987) 188
Cal. App. 3d 1392, 1395.)
After the juvenile court adjudged J.S. a ward of the court, it continued her
detention at juvenile hall until a bed became available at a residential treatment facility.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's order. J.S. had assaulted a student
at her school and had engaged in three separate physical altercations during her
hospitalization, including the incident in which she grabbed Olivia by the hair and
punched her in the face six times. J.S. also caused significant property damage at her
school and engaged in self-harming behavior. It was thus clear that J.S. posed a danger
to herself and also to other persons and their property. On these facts, it was reasonable
12
for the juvenile court to determine that J.S. should remain in juvenile hall until an
appropriate residential treatment facility placement was available for her.
J.S. relies on In re Bianca S. (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1275 to argue that the
juvenile court cannot detain a minor in juvenile hall simply because the Agency does not
have a suitable placement available for the minor at the time of the court's order. Bianca
S. is not applicable in this case. In Bianca S., the district attorney had filed delinquency
petitions against two juvenile dependents, alleging they committed petty theft and
vandalism. (Id. at p. 1274.) The probation officer's detention report recommended
detaining the minors in juvenile hall and suggested that alternative placements were
unavailable. (Id. at pp. 1274-1275.) The juvenile court ordered the minors detained in
juvenile hall pending further hearing. (Id. at p. 1274.) On review, this court concluded
that detention at juvenile hall was inappropriate because there was no evidence of an
"urgent necessity" for the detention, as required under sections 635 and 636. (Bianca S.,
at pp. 1274-1275.)
Bianca S. involved detention of minors at the detention phase of the case and was
governed by sections 635 and 636, which require a showing of an "urgent necessity" for
detention. In contrast, the case before us concerns J.S.'s detention at juvenile hall after
she was adjudicated a ward of the court. As we explained, the juvenile court is afforded
broad discretion and flexibility in crafting dispositional orders, including placement
decisions. Based on the significant evidence in the record that J.S. posed a risk to herself
and others, we conclude that the juvenile court did not act beyond the scope of reason
13
when it decided to detain her in juvenile hall until a bed was available for her at Vista Del
Mar or another residential treatment facility.
III
J.S. has not Shown That the Collateral Consequences of the Juvenile Court's Orders
Warrant Reversal
J.S. argues that the juvenile court's orders adjudicating her a ward of the court,
designating her a dual status child, and detaining her in juvenile hall after disposition
should be reversed because the collateral consequences of those orders will prejudice her.
Specifically, she contends that these orders may impact her in the areas of military
service, obtaining a driver's license, employment, public benefits and housing. Further,
she cites to research indicating that juvenile incarceration harms rather than rehabilitates
minors.
J.S. has not cited to any legal authority to support her argument that the collateral
consequences of the court's orders require reversal. In any event, although J.S. may
suffer some collateral consequences as a result of her delinquency adjudication, the fact is
that she engaged in wrongful conduct and poses a risk to herself and others. The juvenile
court therefore had to craft orders aimed at both rehabilitating J.S. and protecting the
public. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 411; In re E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1152.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's orders in this case because the
court's orders were intended to enforce accountability for J.S.'s conduct, were aimed at
providing her rehabilitative services, and were intended to protect the public.
14
Accordingly, we reject J.S.'s argument that the potential collateral consequences of the
juvenile court's orders require reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
NARES, J.
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