DocketNumber： F077198
Filed Date： 10/17/2022
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 10/17/2022
Filed 10/17/22 P. v. Limon CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F077198 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF166801A) v. SABRINA LEIGH LIMON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R. Brownlee, Judge. Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ross K. Naughton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- INTRODUCTION On August 17, 2014, Jonathan Hearn shot Robert Limon to death. At the time of this murder, Hearn was having an affair with Robert’s wife, appellant Sabrina Leigh Limon, and Hearn eventually reached a plea agreement with the prosecution to testify against her.1 A jury convicted appellant of first degree premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);2 count 1) for the death of her husband. The jury also convicted her of (1) conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2); (2) solicitation to commit murder (§ 653f, subd. (b); count 3); and (3) being an accessory to the murder (§ 32; count 6).3 In count 1, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. In count 6, she received a consecutive determinate low term of 16 months.4 Appellant raises numerous claims in the present appeal. In part, she contends that Hearn’s accomplice testimony was not properly corroborated, the evidence is insufficient for most of her convictions, prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and the trial court failed to protect her constitutional rights in permitting the jury to be exposed to extensive media coverage. We reject appellant’s arguments. Evidence independent from Hearn’s testimony conclusively connected appellant with Robert’s murder. The prosecution established that appellant was deeply in love with Hearn both before and after he killed her husband . Appellant provided Hearn with critical information that permitted Hearn to confront and shoot Robert when Robert was working alone on an unexpected extra shift on August 17, 1 Hearn is not a party in this matter. 2 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 3 The jury acquitted appellant in count 4 of an alleged attempted murder of Robert (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and it acquitted her in count 5 of allegedly mingling a harmful substance in food (§ 347, subd. (a)(1)). 4 In count 2 (conspiracy), the court imposed but stayed a term of 25 years to life. In count 3 (solicitation), the court imposed but stayed a low term of three years. 2. 2014, and she repeatedly lied and provided false leads to law enforcement during its investigation following this murder. Based on Hearn’s corroborated testimony, overwhelming evidence established appellant’s intent to solicit Robert’s murder, her intent to kill, and her intent to conspire with Hearn to commit murder. Appellant’s other arguments are wholly without merit and we affirm the judgment in its entirety. BACKGROUND In this case, the jury had to make a credibility determination. Hearn testified that appellant wanted him to kill her husband and they conspired to commit this murder. In contrast, appellant claimed that Hearn had acted alone and she had no knowledge that Hearn was going to kill Robert. We summarize the material facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. We include additional facts later in this opinion when helpful to understand the issues raised. I. Hearn’s Agreement with the Prosecution. Prior to testifying in this matter, Hearn was charged with premeditated murder, and he faced a prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In or about January 2017, however, he reached an agreement with the prosecution to testify against appellant. In exchange, Hearn was offered a prison sentence of 25 years four months based on a conviction of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm enhancement. He also pleaded to other charges.5 II. Appellant’s Open Marriage and her Affair with Hearn. Appellant, who was born in 1979, started dating Robert when she was 18 years old. They were married almost three years later. The jury learned that, around 2008, 5 Hearn was originally charged with first degree murder, along with a special circumstance allegation of lying in wait. He initially faced an indeterminate prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole or death, but the prosecution waived the death penalty before the plea agreement was reached. It was Robert’s family who first suggested that authorities should attempt to reach a plea agreement with Hearn in exchange for Hearn’s truthful testimony against appellant. 3. appellant and Robert “opened” their marriage and they began engaging in sexual activities with another couple. Over time, appellant and Robert engaged in sexual activities with other couples. Appellant told the jury that, once she and Robert opened up their marriage, she felt that their “sacred bond” had been broken. In 2012, appellant started an affair with Hearn. She told the jury that her affair with Hearn started because of what was lacking in her marriage. At some point, Robert discovered some communications between appellant and Hearn, and Robert told appellant to stop seeing Hearn. On one occasion, Robert spoke with Hearn on the telephone, telling Hearn to stay away from appellant. Hearn and appellant stopped seeing each other for a short period of time. However, by the summer of 2013 their affair had resumed. Hearn told the jury that, during his affair with appellant, she had complained to him about how Robert had opened up their marriage. According to Hearn, appellant had complained that Robert “was pretty exploitative” of her, and Robert was “objectifying” her. Hearn told the jury that, during the course of his affair with appellant, they began talking about killing Robert, which started as a joke. However, they eventually developed a plot to kill him. Phone records show that, from November 2013 until March 11, 2014, appellant and Hearn exchanged about 526 phone calls and text messages to each other. From April 25 to June 1, 2014, they had about 1,600 calls and text messages to each other. From June 2, 2014, to September 1, 2014, they had about 5,909 calls and texts to each other. Starting on or about April 25, 2014, appellant and Hearn began communicating with each other primarily through a “burner” cell phone, which Hearn provided to her. They used this burner phone extensively to communicate with each other before Robert’s murder on August 17, 2014. 4. III. The Alleged Poisoning Attempt. Hearn told the jury that he and appellant originally had a plan to poison Robert. According to Hearn, he mixed arsenic trioxide into some pudding, which he gave to appellant.6 She was going to put the poisoned pudding into Robert’s lunch for him to eat at work. At trial, however, Hearn claimed that he and appellant had developed concerns that law enforcement would be suspicious of their relationship, especially their contact through their cell phones.7 Hearn claimed at trial that he told appellant to hold off on the poisoning attempt. At trial, appellant denied any knowledge of this alleged poisoning attempt. She denied ever communicating with Hearn about this plan. During closing argument, the defense asserted that Hearn’s testimony lacked credibility because appellant had supposedly placed the poisoned pudding in her own refrigerator with her two young children in the house. It is apparent that the jury did not believe Hearn regarding appellant’s alleged role in an attempt to poison Robert. The jury acquitted her in count 4 of alleged attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and it acquitted her in count 5 of allegedly mingling a harmful substance in food (§ 347, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found the following three alleged overt acts not true as part of the charged conspiracy: (1) Hearn had mixed arsenic with pudding; (2) Hearn had delivered the pudding with arsenic to appellant’s residence; and (3) appellant had placed the pudding with arsenic in Robert’s lunch. IV. The Shooting. Robert worked for BNSF Railway. He typically worked full time in Barstow, California, but he would occasionally work an overtime shift at a BNSF shop in 6 Law enforcement recovered a bottle of arsenic trioxide near Hearn’s residence. The full bottle would have held about 100 grams, and it was about half full when it was recovered. 7 According to Hearn, the alleged poisoning attempt occurred before he provided appellant with the burner cell phone. 5. Tehachapi, California. When Robert worked at this shop, he worked alone on a 12-hour shift. It is undisputed that, at some point during their relationship, appellant told Hearn about the general location of the BNSF shop in Tehachapi. It is also undisputed that appellant told Hearn that Robert would be working in Tehachapi on August 17, 2014. 8 It was on August 16, 2014, when appellant learned that Robert would work in Tehachapi the following day. On August 17, 2014, Hearn drove on his motorcycle to Tehachapi from Hesperia, California, where he lived. It was about a two-hour drive from Hesperia to Tehachapi. Hearn confronted Robert inside the BNSF shop in Tehachapi. He shot Robert twice at close range with a handgun. A coworker coming to relieve Robert from his shift discovered Robert’s lifeless body and called 911. Law enforcement was dispatched to the scene at approximately 6:47 p.m. on August 17, 2014.9 Law enforcement obtained surveillance footage from cameras in the area, and a potential suspect was identified. This suspect was recorded driving a motorcycle on a road in the area at around 4:15 p.m. and 4:21 p.m. This suspect was seen walking near the BNSF shop at about 5:21 p.m. and leaving that area on foot at around 5:38 p.m. The suspect was recorded driving his motorcycle at about 5:48 p.m. on a road leading away from this area. It was impossible for law enforcement to identify the suspect from the surveillance footage. 8 Appellant concedes in her opening brief that she told Hearn the “general location” of Robert’s workplace in Tehachapi. Appellant also concedes that she told Hearn that Robert would be working there during the day on August 17, 2014. 9 Robert was likely killed sometime after 5:00 p.m. Another BNSF employee saw Robert that day working on a train that had experienced a mechanical problem while in route through the Tehachapi area. The other worker briefly spoke with Robert sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. that day. It is apparent that Robert drove back to the Tehachapi shop after working on this train. 6. V. Appellant Hides Her Affair From Law Enforcement. Appellant repeatedly lied to law enforcement about her relationship with Hearn. On the night of Robert’s murder, she falsely told Detective Robert Meyer that she was not having an affair. She continued this lie in subsequent interviews with various law enforcement officials, denying any infidelity on her part or having a boyfriend. 10 VI. The Phone Records before and after the Day of the Murder. In the two weeks leading up to this murder on August 17, 2014, phone records show that appellant and Hearn often communicated. From August 1 through August 13, 2014, they exchanged 1,605 text messages. From August 14 through August 15, 2014, they exchanged 204 text and multimedia messages. On August 16, 2014, they exchanged 93 text messages. Phone records show that appellant and Hearn spoke to each other multiple times on the telephone on the day of Robert’s murder. Between about 6:30 a.m. and 8:10 a.m., Hearn called appellant’s burner phone three times, totaling about 36 minutes. At 8:11 a.m. Hearn called appellant and they spoke for about 33 minutes. At 8:47 a.m., Hearn called appellant and they spoke for about 46 minutes. At about 10:07 a.m., they had a 19-minute call. At about 12:05 p.m., appellant called Hearn, and they spoke for about 80 minutes. Hearn claimed to the jury that appellant had known he was going to drive to Tehachapi that day to confront Robert. He claimed that they had discussed how he had altered his motorcycle to avoid detection, and she had told him to be careful because Robert would likely put up a fight. In contrast, appellant told the jury that, when she spoke with Hearn that morning, he never said he was going to kill her husband. She denied discussing killing Robert or knowing about his plan. Appellant testified that it was “nothing out of the ordinary” to speak with Hearn this much on the telephone. 10 Appellant also lied to law enforcement officials multiple times about the status of her marriage. She denied having an open marriage. 7. On the day of Robert’s murder, phone records show that text messages were sent between appellant’s burner phone and Hearn’s cell phone at various times, including at 1:26 p.m., 4:22 p.m., 5:01 p.m., 5:04 p.m., and 6:57 p.m. Two text messages were sent from Hearn to appellant’s burner cell at 7:50 p.m. At about 7:50 p.m., appellant called Hearn. From 7:50 p.m. to 8:37 p.m., they exchanged four text messages. At 8:37 p.m. Hearn called appellant’s burner phone. From 8:38 p.m. on the night of Robert’s murder, until 6:48 a.m. the following morning, appellant and Hearn exchanged 56 text messages. In the days following Robert’s murder, appellant and Hearn remained in contact. On August 18, 2014, appellant and Hearn exchanged approximately 97 text messages. From August 19 to August 22, 2014, they exchanged about 312 text messages, with one multimedia text. On August 21, 2014, they spoke on the phone for about 134 minutes. From August 23 to August 27, 2014, they exchanged about 307 text and multimedia messages. On August 28, 2014, they exchanged 55 text messages. On August 29, 2014, they exchanged 53 text messages. On August 30, 2014, they exchanged 30 text messages. On August 31, 2014, they exchanged 95 text messages. In total, appellant and Hearn exchanged about 2,493 text and multimedia messages from August 1 to August 31, 2014. During that same time span, they had about 120 telephone calls. VII. The Wiretaps and Police Surveillance. About two weeks after Robert’s murder, law enforcement was alerted by certain individuals about Hearn’s involvement in appellant’s life. These individuals were a couple with whom appellant and Robert had engaged in sexual activities. Law enforcement began to focus on Hearn, subpoenaing his cell phone records on or about August 29, 2014. In or around the first week of November 2014, law enforcement began a wiretap operation to monitor appellant’s and Hearn’s communications. Law 8. enforcement also surveilled them. Through the surveillance, law enforcement believed that appellant and Hearn were in a relationship. Law enforcement recorded numerous conversations between appellant and Hearn, and some of the recordings were played at trial. During some conversations, appellant made statements that could be interpreted as showing she was happy that law enforcement had not identified anyone through deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, and she was pleased that law enforcement was not making significant progress in identifying the suspect. During a conversation recorded on November 11, 2014, Hearn told appellant that DNA could be “the thing that sets us free. That is the thing that shows that we’re not involved, you know? That could be the thing.” Appellant responded, “Yeah—yeah— yeah.” A short time later, Hearn commented that it felt like law enforcement might use the DNA as leverage. According to Hearn, it felt like Meyer “looked at phone records and realized we’re in an affair and now [he] wants to just like bully you into saying that we’re involved with that part you know with a … with a murder now.” Appellant said, “Right.” Still later, appellant asked Hearn whether law enforcement could publicize their affair. Hearn believed it could be publicized if it was tied to this crime. Appellant noted that if it was true about the DNA, “then that is our saving—that’s right there, you know? It’s like okay good, you know?” During a call recorded on November 13, 2014, appellant and Hearn discussed what they believed to be law enforcement’s progress on the DNA analysis of two sweat drops allegedly recovered from the murder scene. Appellant relayed to Hearn her understanding that the source of one drop had been identified as “a railroad guy,” while the source of the other one had not been identified. Appellant described law enforcement’s inability to identify the source of the other drop as “a good thing.” At times, both appellant and Hearn expressed concern that law enforcement might be listening in on their conversations or watching them. Hearn expressed paranoia to 9. appellant that law enforcement might discover his secret relationship with her. On one occasion, Hearn called appellant using an internet service provider rather than his real cell phone number in an attempt to see if law enforcement was monitoring their conversations. Appellant consistently kept Hearn apprised on how the investigation was proceeding. She often called Hearn just after speaking with Meyer, or in anticipation of meeting with Meyer. On occasion, Hearn would advise appellant on what she should say when meeting with Meyer. During one recorded call, Hearn prayed with appellant for her to “have the right words” when speaking with Meyer about the investigation. Hearn and appellant prayed for appellant “to not give too much information that needs to be shared.” On November 17, 2014, Meyer told appellant that, based on some surveillance footage, it appeared that the suspect was “a white male” who was skinny and riding a motorcycle. The suspect was possibly named “Jon, J-O-N” and possibly knew Robert. Meyer asked appellant if she had any pertinent information to share, or knew how law enforcement should proceed. Instead of informing law enforcement about Hearn, appellant gave Meyer the name of two males named “John” who had worked with Robert. At trial, the prosecution established that neither of these males matched the description of the suspect that Meyer had given to appellant. Almost immediately after having this conversation with Meyer regarding the potential suspect, appellant called Hearn and asked him to call her from his station phone.11 He called her back, and she told him about the phone call with Meyer. Hearn said it sounded like someone was trying to frame them. He prayed with appellant, asking for God’s help and expressing concern that someone was trying to frame him because of his affair. 11 Hearn worked as a firefighter. 10. On November 18, 2014, Hearn informed appellant that he had talked to some lawyers that morning. She agreed to help him with money for a legal retainer. VIII. Appellant is Arrested. Law enforcement arrested appellant on November 18, 2014. 12 After her arrest, appellant finally admitted to law enforcement about her relationship with Hearn. She said she had kept the affair hidden because she was “ashamed.” After her arrest, appellant initially told law enforcement that she did not believe Hearn had killed Robert. She did not believe Hearn was capable of murder. In subsequent interviews, however, she eventually admitted that she had known “[s]hortly” after this murder that Hearn had “possibly” done it. When asked why she had not informed law enforcement if she had known Hearn was responsible, appellant responded that she had not wanted it “to be true.” She later admitted that, as of November 9, 2014, she had known Hearn had killed Robert. Appellant agreed that Hearn had coached her regarding what to say to law enforcement. She agreed that she thought Hearn was concealing their affair because it would point to him. She was asked again how soon after Robert’s death had she known Hearn had done it. She answered, “Within … not that long.” When pressed on a time frame, she said it was “pretty quick.” IX. Appellant Is Released From Custody in November 2014 and Charges were Filed Against Her in January 2017. On or about November 20, 2014, law enforcement released appellant from custody. No charges were filed against her at that time. Subsequently, however, Hearn reached a deal with the prosecution to testify against her. Charges were filed against appellant in January 2017. 12 Hearn was separately arrested that same day. 11. X. Appellant’s Trial Testimony. At trial, appellant denied discussing with Hearn that Robert should be killed. She claimed that Hearn had acted alone and she had no knowledge that Hearn was going to kill Robert. Appellant said she started a relationship with Hearn because of what was lacking in her marriage. Hearn would talk about God with her and pray, and she began to question her past lifestyle. She told the jury that her relationship with Hearn was “very spiritually based.” She had wanted to try counseling with Robert, but he did not agree. She had discussed with Hearn her possibility of leaving Robert. However, she told the jury that she never really considered leaving Robert, and she had just been fantasizing. Appellant admitted that at some point she had told Hearn about Robert’s workplace in Tehachapi. She could not recall why she had told Hearn that information. She told the jury that she gave Hearn “bits and pieces” over time regarding Robert’s shop in Tehachapi. She “possibly” gave him a description of the shop, but she denied giving a layout of it. Appellant told the jury that she had loved both men. She admitted to the jury that she had lied to Meyer about having an affair when Meyer had called her in the hours after Robert’s death. She told the jury that she was “embarrassed” about the affair, and she did not want it exposed. She claimed that Hearn had told her that the affair would cast suspicion on either him or both of them. She testified that she had wanted Robert’s murder to be solved, and she wished she had done things differently. She had been trying to protect her image, and she had never wanted to believe that Hearn was responsible for the murder. Appellant testified that she had not believed Hearn was capable of murdering Robert. She claimed she would not have been in a relationship with Hearn if she knew he had killed Robert. However, she admitted that, in her final interview with detectives, she 12. believed Hearn had killed Robert. She told the jury that she made that admission because she believed that was what law enforcement had wanted to hear. DISCUSSION We address the issues on appeal in the order that they are raised in appellant’s opening brief. Before we address appellant’s claims, we rule on her request for judicial notice, which we deny. I. We Deny Appellant’s Request for Judicial Notice. On August 30, 2021, appellant filed a request for judicial notice in this court regarding the file in People v. Jonathan Hearn, Kern County Superior Court case No. BF158339A. Appellant did not provide this court with a certified copy of this file. Although respondent was given an opportunity to file an objection to this request, it did not do so. Judicial notice is proper regarding the records from any court in California. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) An appellate court, however, will normally not grant such a request for judicial notice unless the requesting party provides certified copies. (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co. (2002)100 Cal.App.4th 736
, 743; People v. Meza (1984)162 Cal.App.3d 25
, 33; People v. Preslie (1977)70 Cal.App.3d 486
, 495.) Although exceptions may exist, the requesting party has the burden to show good cause for not furnishing certified copies. (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 743; People v. Preslie, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 495, fn. 8.) We have not been provided with any records, let alone certified copies, from the file of Hearn’s criminal matter in the superior court. Appellant does not explain why a copy of this file was not furnished. We cannot notice records which we do not possess and cannot review. Accordingly, appellant’s request for judicial notice is denied. 13. II. Appellant Has Forfeited Her Claim that the Trial Court Erred in Denying a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal; in any Event this Claim Fails on its Merits Because Hearn’s Accomplice Testimony Was Sufficiently Corroborated. Appellant contends that nothing corroborated Hearn’s accomplice testimony that she solicited, conspired and aided in Robert’s murder. 13 She seeks reversal of her convictions for murder (count 1), conspiracy (count 2) and solicitation (count 3). A. Background. At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1) as to all counts. The motion was deferred until the close of the defense case. When the motion was heard, defense counsel stated that the motion was only addressing count 5, which charged appellant with willfully mingling a poison with food (§ 347, subd. (a)(1)). The court denied the motion, determining the jury should consider the charge in count 5. The minute order reflects that the motion pursuant to section 1118.1 was heard and denied only as to count 5. B. Analysis. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal regarding count 1 (murder), count 2 (conspiracy) and count 3 (solicitation). She maintains that, when Hearn’s testimony is eliminated, nothing tends to connect her to the charges of murder, conspiracy, or solicitation. She asserts that she must be acquitted in counts 1, 2 and 3, and retrial is barred. We disagree. 13 With CALCRIM No. 335, the jury was instructed to treat Hearn as an accomplice for all of the charged crimes. An accomplice is “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (§ 1111.) Respondent correctly notes that Hearn is not an accomplice to the solicitation charged in count 3. However, the statute under which count 3 was charged has its own corroboration provision. (§ 653f, subd. (g).) Thus, respondent concedes that the alleged deficiency in corroboration for the solicitation charge in count 3 must nevertheless be addressed. We note that the jury was correctly instructed with CALCRIM No. 441 regarding the corroboration requirement specifically for the solicitation charge. 14. As an initial matter, appellant has forfeited this claim. In any event, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal because Hearn’s accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated. 1. This claim is forfeited. When this motion was argued below, defense counsel informed the trial court to only address count 5, which charged appellant with willfully mingling a poison with food (§ 347, subd. (a)(1)). As a result, the court did not analyze the remaining charges when it denied the motion. Appellant argues that this claim should not be deemed forfeited. According to appellant, the motion was made in a timely manner as to all counts, and the court was required by section 1118.1 to grant a judgment of acquittal as to counts 1, 2 and 3 because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain those charges. In the alternative, appellant raises ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent does not raise forfeiture. Instead, because appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal originally applied to all counts, respondent takes the position it is appropriate to review the merits of this claim. We disagree with both parties and we determine that this claim is forfeited. In general, a defendant is not required to articulate specific grounds in a motion for acquittal. (People v. Cole (2004)33 Cal.4th 1158
, 1213; People v. Belton (1979)23 Cal.3d 516
, 521–522.) However, when a defendant directs his acquittal motion only to specific counts or enhancements, the trial court may limit its attention to the evidence bearing on the counts or enhancements specified in the motion, and need not test every charge and allegation for sufficient evidentiary support. (People v. Goss (1992)7 Cal.App.4th 702
, 707; People v. Ceja (1988)205 Cal.App.3d 1296
, 1303–1304.) Here, although the acquittal motion originally applied to all counts, defense counsel specifically directed the court to consider only the charge in count 5. As such, 15. the claim that appellant now raises on appeal must be deemed forfeited. She focused the court away from analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence as to the charges in counts 1, 2 and 3. Thus, she cannot argue that the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct. (See People v. Partida (2005)37 Cal.4th 428
, 435.) Accordingly, this claim is deemed forfeited. In any event, however, we also conclude that this claim fails on its merits.14 2. The trial court did not err. Despite asking the trial court to focus on count 5 when the motion for judgment of acquittal was argued below, appellant contends that the court should have granted the motion for counts 1, 2 and 3 as a matter of law. According to appellant, Hearn’s testimony was not sufficiently corroborated to support those charges. We disagree. The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. (People v. Huggins (1997)51 Cal.App.4th 1654
, 1656.) The question is whether substantial evidence exists for each element of the charged offense. (Ibid.) We independently review a trial court’s ruling under section 1118.1. (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1213.) A motion under section 1118.1 made at the close of a prosecutor’s case-in- chief focuses on the state of the evidence as it stood at that point. (People v. Houston (2012)54 Cal.4th 1186
, 1215.) We review de novo whether an accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated. (People v. Pedroza (2014)231 Cal.App.4th 635
, 650.) Such evidence 14 Because we also address and reject this claim on its merits, we need not address any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because appellant cannot show she was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s performance. (See People v. Holt (1997)15 Cal.4th 619
, 703 [defendant not entitled to relief on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he made insufficient showing as to prejudice].) 16. must tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, but it does not need to corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testified. (§ 1111; People v. Perez (2018)4 Cal.5th 421
, 452.) Corroborating evidence may be circumstantial or slight, and it is entitled to little consideration when standing alone. (People v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 452.) “The evidence ‘is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2001)26 Cal.4th 334
, 370.) The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, and witness credibility is not considered. (People v. Pedroza, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.) To show a lack of corroboration, appellant relies on People v. Braun (1939)31 Cal.App.2d 593
(Braun). This opinion does not assist her. In Braun, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s judgment due to insufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony. (Braun, supra, 31 Cal.App.2d at p. 605.) The defendant had associated with the actual perpetrators of the charged crimes, and the trial evidence had suggested that the defendant had had an opportunity to participate in those crimes. (Id. at p. 601.) According to the Braun court, however, these circumstances only raised a suspicion of guilt that the defendant had advised, encouraged and participated in the crimes. (Ibid.) When the accomplice’s testimony was ignored, the remaining evidence did not provide substantial proof that the defendant “either advised or encouraged the commission of the robbery in question.” (Id. at p. 602.) Appellant contends that, similar to Braun, nothing shows that she advised or encouraged the commission of this murder apart from Hearn’s testimony. We disagree. As we explain below, evidence connects appellant to this murder even when Hearn’s testimony is not considered. Braun is distinguishable and it does not establish error. 17. a. Appellant is connected to this murder because she informed Hearn about Robert’s unique work schedule. It is undisputed that, at some point during their relationship, appellant told Hearn about Robert’s general work location in Tehachapi. It is also undisputed that appellant learned on August 16, 2014, that Robert would work in Tehachapi the following day, and she gave this information to Hearn.15 Robert rarely worked in Tehachapi and, when he did, he was alone. These facts corroborate Hearn’s testimony that appellant had knowledge of Hearn’s plan to kill Robert, and that she encouraged Hearn to commit this murder. It was appellant who informed Hearn where Robert generally worked in Tehachapi and, critically, it was appellant who told Hearn about Robert’s unexpected and previously unscheduled shift in Tehachapi on August 17, 2014. This information directly connects appellant to this crime because, without this information, Hearn would not have known he could drive about two hours to Tehachapi that day and confront Robert alone at his place of work. This evidence strongly suggests that Hearn was telling the truth. We reject appellant’s argument that we must find direct corroboration of her specific criminal intent. To the contrary, section 1111 requires that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by evidence that merely tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. As such, we will not require more than what the statute expressly states. Because it is undisputed that appellant told Hearn where to find Robert, and she provided Hearn with information about Robert’s change in work schedule, evidence apart from Hearn’s testimony connected her to the commission of this murder. Appellant focuses on an evidentiary conflict that existed regarding when Hearn learned that Robert would be working in Tehachapi on that fatal day. Hearn told the jury 15 Appellant concedes in her opening brief that she told Hearn the “general location” of Robert’s workplace in Tehachapi. Appellant also concedes that she told Hearn that Robert would be working there during the day on August 17, 2014. 18. that he had known one or two weeks earlier that Robert would be working in Tehachapi on the day that he killed Robert. As appellant notes, however, Hearn’s recollection in this regard was impeached at trial. It is undisputed that Robert was asked to cover this shift the day before. As a result, Hearn must have learned about Robert’s unexpected shift in Tehachapi no earlier than the day before this murder took place. Appellant suggests that, because of this evidentiary discrepancy, corroboration cannot exist. Appellant acknowledges that this court cannot reweigh credibility, but she argues that we should reject those portions of Hearn’s testimony where “he shifted blame for the murder to appellant.” She contends that his testimony is highly suspicious and designed to save himself. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Although Hearn’s recollection at trial in this regard was clearly erroneous, that does not alter our conclusion that sufficient corroboration occurred. Regardless of Hearn’s inability to recall accurately when he was told that Robert would be working in Tehachapi on August 17, 2014, it is overwhelmingly apparent it was appellant who provided Hearn with this information. Thus, sufficient corroboration exists because it was clearly appellant who informed Hearn about Robert’s new and unique work schedule. Therefore, evidence exists apart from Hearn’s testimony which directly connects appellant to Robert’s murder. Finally, appellant disputes the significance of the fact that she told Hearn the general location of Robert’s worksite in Tehachapi. Some trial evidence suggested it was very difficult to find this shop because it was not prominently marked. This worksite was an industrial shop within a series of commercial buildings. Most of the other shops were also not marked.16 16 Hearn testified that, in May 2014, he went on a scouting trip to Tehachapi in an effort to find the BNSF facility. At trial, he claimed that he informed appellant during a telephone call that he was searching for Robert’s worksite that day. During this scouting trip in May 2014, Hearn located the BNSF facility and took photographs of it with his cell phone. Hearn told the jury that, while he was driving home that day, he told 19. Appellant argues that the BNSF shop’s location in Tehachapi can be easily found on the Internet.17 This argument does not alter our conclusion that sufficient corroboration exists. Regardless of whether or not Hearn could have found the shop without appellant’s assistance, it is undisputed that she did inform Hearn of the shop’s general location, and she gave Hearn the critical information that Robert would be working there on August 17, 2014. Her decision to provide this information connects her to the charges of murder (count 1); conspiracy to commit murder (count 2); and solicitation for this murder (count 3). As we discuss below, however, this is not the only evidence that provides corroboration of Hearn’s accomplice testimony. The totality of the circumstances surrounding appellant’s actions, along with evidence of her motive for Robert’s death, further support a finding of corroboration. b. The totality of the circumstances supports a finding of corroboration. Appellant’s overall conduct and her relationship with Hearn may be considered when examining whether corroboration exists. (People v. Romero and Self (2015)62 Cal.4th 1
, 32.) The totality of appellant’s conduct and her relationship with Hearn provides additional corroboration connecting her to the murder. Appellant repeatedly lied to law enforcement. She was asked multiple times if she was having an affair, and she consistently failed to disclose her relationship with Hearn until she was arrested in November 2014. As appellant concedes, her lies reasonably suggest a consciousness of guilt. When coupled with the information that she provided to appellant he had located Robert’s workplace in Tehachapi. Appellant argues in her opening brief that nothing independently connects her with this particular testimony and evidence. We agree with appellant in that regard. No independent evidence links appellant to Hearn’s scouting trip in May 2014. 17 Appellant has not asked this court to take judicial notice of this information. Accordingly, we make no findings in this regard. 20. Hearn regarding where and when to find Robert, a reasonable inference may be drawn that appellant had an intent to kill. During a recorded interview after she was arrested, Meyer expressed concern to appellant about how Robert must have felt when Hearn suddenly appeared at his workplace with a gun. In response to Meyer’s statements, appellant replied that she had “just wanted to know if he suffered. And, he said he didn’t suffer.” Respondent contends that appellant’s response to Meyer shows, or at least suggests, that she had talked to Hearn about this murder. 18 In contrast, appellant asserts that her statement to Meyer is open to various interpretations and it does not necessarily indicate that she knew in advance that Robert’s murder would occur. Although appellant’s statement is subject to different interpretations, a reasonable inference may be drawn from it that appellant had talked to Hearn about the manner of Robert’s death. When coupled with other evidence in this record, appellant’s statement about knowing that Robert did not suffer strongly suggests she was part of a plot to commit this murder. Other examples exist. Before she was arrested, law enforcement began to surveil both Hearn and appellant. A wiretap operation was started to monitor their communications. Law enforcement recorded numerous conversations, and some of the recordings were played at trial. During a conversation recorded on November 11, 2014, Hearn told appellant that DNA could be “the thing that sets us free. That is the thing that shows that we’re not involved, you know? That could be the thing.” Appellant responded, “Yeah—yeah—yeah.” A short time later, Hearn commented that it felt like law enforcement might use the DNA as leverage. According to Hearn, it felt like Meyer “looked at phone records and realized we’re in an affair and now [he] wants to just like bully you into saying that we’re involved with that part you know with a … with a murder now.” Appellant said, “Right.” Still later, appellant asked Hearn whether law 18 Meyer did not ask appellant what she had meant. 21. enforcement could publicize their affair. Hearn believed it could be publicized if it was tied to this crime. Appellant noted that if it was true about the DNA, “then that is our saving—that’s right there, you know? It’s like okay good, you know?” During a call recorded on November 13, 2014, appellant and Hearn discussed the DNA analysis of two sweat drops allegedly recovered from the murder scene. Appellant believed one drop had been identified as “a railroad guy,” while the source of the other one had not been identified. Appellant described law enforcement’s inability to identify the source of the other drop as “a good thing.” In a different exchange, Meyer told appellant that they had received a secret witness tip that they should focus on a skinny white male named “Jon, J-O-N” who drove a motorcycle and possibly knew Robert. Meyer asked appellant if she knew in which direction the investigation should proceed. Although Meyer’s description matched Hearn, appellant did not name Hearn but, instead, named two former coworkers of Robert’s who were named John. She then called Hearn and immediately told him to call her back from a different phone. Appellant later admitted to the police that she had done so because she was “thinking maybe someone was listening” to their calls. These various recorded exchanges show that appellant was actively trying to conceal Hearn’s identity from law enforcement. Coupled with appellant’s lies and her disclosure to Hearn about where and when Robert was working in Tehachapi, reasonable inferences may be drawn that demonstrate appellant’s intent to kill. Finally, appellant admitted to detectives after she was in custody that she had known “pretty quick” after Robert’s murder that Hearn had been responsible. The parties dispute whether or not this fact tends to corroborate Hearn’s testimony that appellant intended for Robert to die. Appellant contends this only shows her knowledge of the murder at some point after it was committed. While it certainly establishes her knowledge after the fact, a reasonable inference may be drawn that she knew before Robert’s murder that Hearn was going to shoot him. Indeed, the jury learned that, 19 22. days after Robert’s murder, she texted Hearn saying how sexy he was and she adored him. Two days later she again texted him, saying how much she loved and missed him. On another occasion 25 days after Robert’s murder, she texted Hearn that she had bought him something “practical” that “will one day be something we share in our home.” All of these examples provide sufficient grounds for the jury to draw a reasonable inference appellant had planned Robert’s murder with Hearn. A jury could reasonably conclude from the totality of the evidence that appellant would not have remained in a romantic relationship with Hearn after Hearn’s involvement in Robert’s murder came to light unless she had conspired with Hearn from the inception. c. Appellant had a motive for Robert’s death. Evidence that a defendant had a motive to commit the charged crime can be used to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony. (See People v. Szeto (1981)29 Cal.3d 20
, 28.) Here, the jury learned that appellant was not just having a physical affair with Hearn. Instead, she had intense feelings for him. Both before and after Robert’s murder, she repeatedly expressed her love for him and her belief that they had a future together. In February 2014, about six months before Robert was murdered, appellant gave Hearn a Valentine’s Day card. She repeatedly wrote that she loved him, and she expressed how much he meant to her. She wrote that she loved him “for trusting me with your heart, your pride, your wisdom and soul.” She also stated her love for him because she was the one “you choose to care for” and he had brought a “special meaning” to her life. She loved him “for hopes and faith in our future together.” She concluded the card by stating she loved him “for so many reasons” and she had only written a few, “but in all that years bring to us, I never want you to forget that you were made for me, [and] I was made for you.” In another undated card, she again expressed her love for him. She wrote that he was her love, and he was her “amazing blessing that God has given me.” She wrote that 23. she wanted to love him “in God’s love and live together in God’s will.” She wrote that they had been blessed by God “to have this chance . . . To love each other.” She wrote that she cherished his love and “the blessings” God had given them. She included a passage from the Bible describing God’s love and the need to love one another. As noted above, about 19 days after Robert’s murder, appellant texted Hearn saying how sexy he was, she loved him, she adored him, and missed him. On another occasion 25 days after Robert’s murder, she texted Hearn that she had bought him something they would one day share in their home. From September 5 to September 12, 2014, appellant texted Hearn about 20 times, indicating that she loved him and missed him. On October 5, 2014, she texted Hearn that he was her “partner in this life to live for God. I’m so ready to live life fully with you. I WILL wait on God’s time and trust in His plan. But I’m READY FOR US! I need you my Jonathan!!” On October 18, 2014, she texted Hearn saying she loved him “[d]eeply” and it was a love that she had “never felt before.” On November 1, 2014, she texted him about mundane tasks that she needed to accomplish. She finished her text asking how “the love of my life” was that morning. On November 2, 2014, she texted Hearn telling him he was “such an amazing man of many God given gift’s [sic] and talents. I feel overwhelmed by your know how, but I feel privileged to be able to be a part of you, and blessed to have your love in the many wonderful ways that I do. Thank you for giving me YOU. I cherish all of what I have with you Jonathan!” After her arrest, appellant told Meyer that she would talk to Hearn about raising her children, and they talked about “how badly” things in her life “were being done.” When speaking with other detectives, she denied feeling relieved that Robert was gone, but she admitted that she had started to build a future with Hearn. She was asked if that 24. plan for a future was still true knowing that Hearn had killed Robert. She answered, “I just thought we were gonna [sic] uh, live under the Bible and live … live right.” In addition to showing appellant’s love for Hearn, the prosecution introduced evidence that strongly suggested appellant was not happy in her marriage. She disclosed to law enforcement after her arrest that Robert was often “distracted” on Web sites and his phone, and, although they remained friends, he was “somewhere else” emotionally. She told Meyer that it was “just a crazy experience” when they first opened their relationship sexually with another couple. She told Meyer that opening their relationship had caused “troubles” but Robert had told her it was “just sexual.” Appellant admitted to Meyer that she and Robert had allowed “some things” to come into their marriage that she felt had “damaged” them. She would tell Robert, but “he wouldn’t hear of it.” Appellant had discussed divorce with Robert stemming from the “partying and too much drinking” but everything would be “all good” the next day. Finally, the prosecution established that appellant may have had a financial interest in Robert’s death. Robert had a life insurance policy of $300,000. Per that policy, appellant received $300,591.70 in October 2014. Appellant also had an opportunity to receive a financial settlement with BNSF because Robert had died at work. In October 2014, appellant sought a “fair settlement” with BNSF.19 As of this trial, however, no settlement was reached.20 d. Our conclusions. Based on this record, the trial court did not err when it failed to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal regarding counts 1, 2 and 3. It was appellant who informed Hearn about Robert’s unexpected extra shift in Tehachapi on August 17, 2014. Based on 19 Hearn claimed at trial that appellant had wanted a settlement with BNSF of around $1 million. 20 BNSF paid for Robert’s funeral expenses up to $15,000. Appellant asked the company to donate any unused portion of that money to the church. 25. that critical information, Hearn was able to drive about two hours to confront Robert when he was alone. In addition, appellant repeatedly lied to law enforcement about her relationship with Hearn, and she provided some false leads regarding potential suspects. Moreover, some of her recorded conversations with Hearn strongly suggested she was happy that law enforcement had not discovered the killer. Based on a statement appellant made to Meyer, a strong inference exists that appellant had asked Hearn whether Robert had suffered when Hearn killed him. Finally, the prosecution established that appellant was deeply in love with Hearn both before and after he killed her husband. The jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that appellant would not have remained in a romantic relationship with Hearn unless she had conspired with Hearn from the inception. Setting aside Hearn’s testimony, evidence from the prosecution’s case overwhelmingly and conclusively connected appellant to this murder. Thus, sufficient corroboration of Hearn’s testimony occurred.21 Therefore, the court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, and appellant’s arguments are without merit. We will not reverse appellant’s judgment based on an alleged failure to corroborate Hearn’s accomplice testimony. III. Substantial Evidence Supports Appellant’s Conviction for Solicitation in Count 3. In count 3, appellant was charged with soliciting Hearn on or about and between March 19, 2014, and August 17, 2014, “to commit or join in the commission” of Robert’s murder. The jury convicted appellant of this charge (§ 653f, subd. (b)). Appellant argues that, if the trial court properly denied her motion for a judgment of acquittal as to count 3 and/or that claim was deemed forfeited, then reversal of this 21 Because appellant’s claim focuses on an alleged lack of corroboration, we do not address the elements needed to establish appellant’s guilt for the charges alleged in counts 1, 2 and 3. In any event, we address those elements below when resolving appellant’s claims that insufficient evidence supports these convictions. 26. conviction is still warranted due to an absence of substantial evidence to establish that she requested or asked Hearn to kill Robert. A. Standard of review. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and decide whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could make the necessary finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must be reasonable, credible and of solid value. We presume every inference in support of the judgment that the finder of fact could reasonably have made. We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. We cannot reverse the judgment merely because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. D’Arcy (2010)48 Cal.4th 257
, 293.) B. Analysis. Appellant again contends that Hearn’s accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. She asserts that nothing independently shows that she solicited Hearn to kill Robert. She also argues that Hearn’s testimony failed to establish the elements of solicitation. We disagree. Hearn’s testimony regarding the solicitation was sufficiently corroborated, and his testimony represents substantial evidence supporting the conviction in count 3. The crime of solicitation for murder must be proven by the testimony of two witnesses, “or of one witness and corroborating circumstances.” (§ 653f, subd. (g).) The purpose of section 653f is to guard against a conviction for solicitation “based on the testimony of one person who may have suspect motives.” (People v. Phillips (1985)41 Cal.3d 29
, 76.) The elements of solicitation are an offer or invitation to another to commit a crime, and the intent that the crime be committed. (People v. Wilson (2005)36 Cal.4th 309
, 328.) The crime of solicitation is complete as soon as the verbal request is 27. made with the requisite intent, and is punishable regardless of the agreement of the person solicited or any overt act. (Ibid.) In this case, Hearn’s testimony and corroborating circumstances satisfy the requirements of section 653f, subdivision (g). We have already explained that the circumstances amply demonstrate appellant’s involvement in Robert’s murder.22 She provided the key information to Hearn that permitted this killing to occur in Tehachapi while Robert was working alone. Further, the totality of the remaining record shows that she tried to hide her relationship with Hearn from law enforcement, and a strong inference may be drawn from the record that she knew in advance that Hearn was going to kill Robert. As such, the jury was permitted to consider Hearn’s testimony in determining if the prosecution had established the crime of solicitation. (See People v. Maldonado (1999)72 Cal.App.4th 588
, 598 [once corroboration sufficiently establishes the accomplice’s believability, the accomplice’s testimony may establish many other facts not related in the independent testimony].) Hearn told the jury that, during his affair with appellant, they had increasingly negative discussions about Robert. Towards the end of 2013 or the beginning of 2014, they began discussing Robert’s demise. It was a “joke” at first. Hearn told the jury that he could not remember who had mentioned it first, but it turned into something that materialized. It would be “simpler” if Robert were gone. According to Hearn, he and appellant had “a plot to kill her husband.” They planned to conceal their crime and then have a future together, including marriage. Hearn testified that divorce was not an appealing option for appellant. Hearn told the jury that, at some point while they were using the burner phone, appellant told him to kill Robert. 22 The standard for corroboration under section 653f is the same as required under section 1111. Both statutes require sufficient independent evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the charged offense. (People v. MacEwing (1955)45 Cal.2d 218
, 223–224.) 28. Appellant argues that Hearn’s testimony is insufficient to establish her solicitation for murder because he said they had mutually discussed Robert’s demise. She also notes that, according to Hearn, she told him to kill Robert after the alleged poison plot had already ended and they had decided to halt their plans for three or four months. We reject these arguments. Regardless of when appellant told Hearn to kill Robert, Hearn made it clear that she asked or invited him to commit murder, and she intended for it to occur. (See CALCRIM No. 441.)23 Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could make the necessary finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty in count 3. We will not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility, and we cannot reverse the judgment merely because the evidence could be reconciled with contrary findings. The evidence in this record is reasonable, credible and of solid value. Therefore, appellant’s arguments are without merit and reversal of count 3 is not appropriate. IV. Substantial Evidence Supports Appellant’s Conviction for Conspiracy in Count 2. In count 2, appellant was charged with conspiring with Hearn to commit murder on or about and between March 19, 2014, and November 18, 2014. The jury convicted appellant of this charge (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant again contends that Hearn’s accomplice testimony was not properly corroborated. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish two elements of the charged conspiracy: (1) that she intended to agree and did agree with Hearn to kill Robert; and (2) that she intended that Hearn would intentionally and unlawfully kill. She 23 The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 441, and told that appellant was guilty of solicitation if the prosecution proved the following: (1) appellant requested or asked or invited another person to commit or join in the commission of the crime of murder; and (2) appellant intended that the crime of murder be committed. 29. asserts that none of the overt acts which the jury found true evidenced her intent to kill. She claims that Hearn was the “mastermind” of the plot to murder Robert, and Hearn exercised control over her. She maintains that, if the trial court properly denied her motion for a judgment of acquittal as to count 2 and/or that claim was deemed forfeited, then reversal of this conviction is still warranted due to an absence of substantial evidence to establish the elements of conspiracy. We disagree. A criminal conspiracy exists where there is an unlawful agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, and an overt act occurs in furtherance of that agreement. (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); People v. Prevost (1998)60 Cal.App.4th 1382
, 1399.) Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: (1) the intent to agree or conspire, and (2) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. (People v. Martin (1982)135 Cal.App.3d 710
, 722.) There must be substantial evidence to show the conspirators not only intended to agree but also intended to commit the elements of the target offense. (People v. Prevost, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.) In this matter, the jury found true certain overt acts in support of this conspiracy, including that (1) Hearn purchased a cellular phone to escape law enforcement detection; (2) appellant used that cellular phone; (3) appellant provided information to Hearn regarding the BNSF shop location in Tehachapi; (4) appellant informed Hearn that Robert would be working in Tehachapi on August 17, 2014; and (5) Hearn shot and killed Robert on August 17, 2014. Ample evidence from this record supports these findings, and, from them, a reasonable inference exists that appellant intended for Hearn to kill Robert, and they intended to hide their conspiracy from law enforcement. Appellant, however, asserts that other interpretations may be drawn from the evidence. She argues that she merely used the burner phone to prevent Robert from finding out about her continuing affair. She also contends that she told Hearn about Robert’s work schedule so she could facilitate her affair and spend time with Hearn. She concedes that, by informing Hearn about Robert’s 30. work schedule, she “clearly aided” Hearn in carrying out his plan of killing Robert. However, she maintains that her “verbal acts” are insufficient to prove her intent to conspire or her intent to kill. Appellant’s various arguments are unpersuasive. Direct evidence of a defendant’s intent to kill rarely exists. Thus, such intent “may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s acts.” (People v. Sánchez (2016)63 Cal.4th 411
, 457.) Appellant’s actions in this matter, coupled with the circumstances of the crime, sufficiently support the jury’s determination that appellant held an intent to conspire with Hearn, and she intended for Hearn to kill Robert. The jurors had the exclusive role to judge all questions of fact submitted to them, including the credibility of the witnesses. (See CALCRIM No. 226; § 1127.) It is clear that the jury resolved the various credibility disputes unfavorably for appellant. Although appellant can point to other interpretations that may be drawn from the record, substantial evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could have decided beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of conspiring with Hearn to kill Robert. Finally, appellant asserts that, during closing arguments, the prosecutor focused on her actions after the date of the murder when asking the jury to find her guilty of conspiracy. She contends that the prosecutor likely did this because there was no evidence (aside from Hearn’s testimony) to establish her intent to conspire before the murder occurred. We disagree. Regardless of how the prosecutor argued this issue to the jury, overwhelming evidence exists in this record that appellant agreed with Hearn to kill Robert, and she intended that Hearn would intentionally and unlawfully kill. We will not reverse the judgment merely because the evidence can be reconciled with contrary findings. (See People v. D’Arcy,supra,