People v. Mateos CA3

Filed 1/4/23 P. v. Mateos CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C095620
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
STKCRFECOD20150007171)
v.
JUAN MATEOS, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Juan Mateos, Jr., was originally sentenced to life with the possibility of
parole for attempted premeditated murder, plus a consecutive 20 years for an attached
firearm enhancement, with other firearm enhancements imposed and stayed. This court
affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing on multiple firearm
enhancements. Upon remand, the trial court struck two firearm enhancements, including
the 20-year enhancement previously imposed, lifted the stay on a third firearm
enhancement, and imposed a consecutive low term of three years for that enhancement.
1
Defendant appeals for the second time, arguing that newly enacted Senate Bill No.
81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81), which amended
Penal Code section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider when
deciding whether to strike enhancements in the interest of justice, required the trial court
to strike the three-year firearm enhancement. (Statutory section citations that follow are
found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.)
We note that a subsequent enactment, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15), which took effect on June 30, 2022, made technical,
nonsubstantive changes to section 1385 that do not affect the issues on appeal.
We disagree with defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted premeditated murder. (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a).) The jury also found several firearm enhancements true, including that
during the offense, defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
At the initial sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a life sentence plus 20
years for the intentional and personal discharge of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)), and imposed and stayed 10-year terms for each of the remaining firearm
enhancements. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but remanded for the trial
court to consider its newfound discretion to strike the firearm enhancements under Senate
Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). (People v. Mateos (Nov. 20, 2020, C085250)
[nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant was resentenced in January 2022. At the hearing, defendant argued
Senate Bill 81 mandated dismissal of all three firearm enhancements, and that even if
dismissal was not required, the court should nevertheless exercise its discretion to strike
2
the firearm enhancements. According to defense counsel, striking the firearm
enhancements was mandatory under Senate Bill 81 because each of the enhancements
could result in a sentence of over 20 years.
The trial court rejected defendant’s Senate Bill 81 argument, stating, “That’s not
my reading of the new law. His underlying crime puts him over the 20-year mark, so that
one doesn’t apply.” After considering defendant’s youthfulness, upbringing, criminal
history, substance abuse, and his testimony at trial, which the court found credible, the
court struck the 20-year term for the intentional and personal discharge of a firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) in the interests of justice. The court also struck the
10-year section 12022.53, subdivision (b) firearm enhancement, which it had previously
imposed and stayed. The court lifted the stay on the section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement, and imposed a consecutive low term of three years for the
enhancement given defendant’s youthfulness when he committed the crime. Defendant
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining Senate Bill 81 did not
require it to strike the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancement. He argues
that Senate Bill 81 mandates dismissal of the three-year enhancement because it “could
result” in a total sentence of more than 20 years when considered together with his
consecutive life term. This argument is not meritorious.
I
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss a sentence
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 373-374.) A trial court may abuse its discretion where “its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it,” “ ‘where the trial
3
court was not “aware of its discretion” ’ ” to dismiss a sentencing allegation under section
1385, or “where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.”
(Carmony, at pp. 377-378.)
“Because ‘all discretionary authority is contextual’ [citation], we cannot determine
whether a trial court has acted irrationally or arbitrarily in refusing to strike a [sentencing]
allegation without considering the legal principles and policies that should have guided
the court’s actions.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Thus, whether the
trial court in this case abused its discretion depends on the scope of that discretion under
section 1385. We review this question of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v.
Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.)
II
Senate Bill 81 and Amended Section 1385
Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 “to specify factors that the trial court must
consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in
the interest of justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) As amended,
section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides in relevant part:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is
in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited
by any initiative statute.
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider
and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. [¶]
4
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20
years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)-(2).)
It is this mitigating circumstance--whether the application of the three-year
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years--that is at issue here. We turn
now to that question of interpretation.
The rules governing statutory construction are well established. Fundamentally,
the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.
(People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063; People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237,
240.) “To determine legislative intent, we turn first, to the words of the statute, giving
them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Flores, at p. 1063.) When the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court need go no further. (Ibid.) But when
the statutory “language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look
to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to
be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative
construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant focuses on the plain meaning of the words “could result” as used
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) to argue that if there is a “possibility” of a term
longer than 20 years, a trial court must dismiss an enhancement. (See, e.g.,
https://perma.cc/4GMP-6LUF (Dec. 8, 2022) [“could” is ordinarily used to indicate a
possibility, even if slight or uncertain].) In his view, adding a three-year term to his
indeterminate life sentence, of which he must serve at least seven years before becoming
eligible for parole (§ 3046, subds. (a)-(b)), creates a possibility that his sentence will
exceed 20 years, and, therefore, the court erred in determining section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(C) did not apply.
The problem with defendant’s interpretation is that it would preclude imposition
of all enhancements to any indeterminate life term. If that is what the Legislature
intended, it does not appear on the face of the amended statute.
5
And nothing in the legislative history of Senate Bill 81 suggests the Legislature
intended to preclude a trial court from imposing an enhancement on an indeterminate
term under any circumstance. To the contrary, the legislative history of Senate Bill 81
reveals the Legislature intended to provide guidance to trial courts for when to exercise
discretion to strike an enhancement, but not that it intended to deprive the courts of the
ability to impose an enhancement when warranted in the interests of justice. (See, e.g.,
Sen. Rules Com. Bill Analysis (Aug. 30, 2021) at p. 1 [“This bill provides guidance to
courts by specifying circumstances for a court to consider when determining whether to
apply an enhancement”]; Assem. Com. on Public Safety Bill Analysis (June 29, 2021) at
p. 3 [noting author’s statement that Senate Bill 81 was intended to clarify parameters for
imposing enhancements for the purpose of improving fairness in sentencing while
retaining a judge’s authority to apply an enhancement to protect public safety].)
Notably, Senate Bill 81 was based on a recommendation from the Committee on
Revision of the Penal Code. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Bill Analysis (June 29,
2021) at p. 4.) That committee recommended that “judges should retain authority to
impose sentence enhancements in appropriate cases,” including to protect public safety.
(Ibid.) Interpreting section 1385 to strip judges of that authority as it relates to
indeterminate sentences, as defendant’s interpretation essentially does, runs contrary to
the recommendation upon which Senate Bill 81 was based.
While we do not quarrel with the plain meaning of the word “could,” we find
defendant’s urged interpretation fails to properly consider that word in the context of the
statute as a whole. “ ‘[W]e cannot read the words of a statute in isolation, ignoring their
context. We must read a statute as a whole and attempt to harmonize its elements by
considering each clause or section in the context of the overall statutory framework.
[Citation.] We are obligated to select the construction that comports most closely with
the apparent intent of the Legislature, to promote rather than defeat the statute’s general
purpose and to avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd and unintended
6
consequences.’ ” (Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 32, 46.)
These rules of statutory construction lead us to consider the broader meaning of
whether it is “the application of” defendant’s three-year enhancement that could lead to a
sentence of over 20 years. Under statutory authority that existed when the Legislature
passed Senate Bill 81, we think not.
As the People correctly point out, defendant was sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole for the attempted premeditated murder conviction and three
consecutive years for the firearm enhancement. Section 669 provides that, “[w]henever a
person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run consecutive to
any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of imprisonment shall be
served first and no part thereof shall be credited toward the person’s eligibility for parole
as calculated pursuant to section 3046 or pursuant to any other section of law that
establishes a minimum period of confinement under the life sentence before eligibility for
parole.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) Thus, because defendant must serve the three-year firearm
enhancement before beginning his indeterminate term, all years served after completion
of the firearm enhancement will be based on defendant’s life sentence, not application of
the enhancement. Any sentence length beyond 20 years, therefore, would not result from
the three-year firearm enhancement but rather would result from the life sentence itself.
We presume that the Legislature was aware of section 669 when it passed Senate Bill 81
amending section 1385. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [“the
Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the
time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and amended statutes ‘ “in the light of
such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them” ’ ”].)
Senate Bill 81 did not mandate that the trial court dismiss the three-year firearm
enhancement. Accordingly, the court did not err in imposing the enhancement.
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MAURO, J.
HOCH, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
8