In re G.C. CA4/2

Filed 5/3/16 In re G.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
E064313
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. J260991)
v.
OPINION
G.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander
and Christopher B. Marshall, Judges. Affirmed.
MaryBeth LippSmith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen Chenelia and Scott C.
Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Following a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that defendant and
appellant G.C. (minor) committed first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459,
460). Minor was thereafter declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in the
custody of his father. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that the evidence was
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s true finding that he entered the victim’s home
with an intent to commit theft or any felony. We reject minor’s contention and affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2015, Beverly Seals lived on Sonoma Road in Adelanto. Around
10:30 that morning, she was alone in her home when she heard a thump. She believed it
might be her son, a truck driver, who was living with her but had been gone for three
days. She looked out a front window and did not see her son’s car. However, she heard
her dog barking “terribly,” “hysterical[ly],” “really fiercely” outside on the north side of
the house from his dog run.
Seals then investigated why her dog was barking and went to the bedroom
overlooking the dog run. When Seals looked out the bedroom window, she noticed that
her dog seemed to be barking at the house rather than at the fence, where he usually
barked at neighborhood cats. Seals then walked toward the bathroom. The bathroom is
located on the north side of the house, in the corner behind the bedroom that overlooks
the dog run. Seals noticed the bathroom door was closed a little bit, which was unusual
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because she keeps her bathroom door open. Seals opened the bathroom door, and saw
minor standing in the bathtub holding a piece of window screen in his hand. She had
never seen minor before.
Seals asked minor, “ ‘What are you doing in here?’ ” Minor responded, “ ‘David
told me to do this.’ ” Minor also stated, “ ‘I didn’t think nobody lived here.’ ” Seals
asked minor how he could have believed her house was vacant when the yard had a
barking dog, flowers, and a barbeque pit. After about two to three minutes of questioning
minor, Seals told him that she had to call the police and exited the bathroom to retrieve
her phone. Minor then ran out of the house through the front door.
A deputy responded to Seals’s house and she gave the deputy a description of
minor. A neighbor and her son came over to Seals’s house. Together they were able to
find minor’s photograph on Facebook. When Seals saw the photograph, she identified
minor as the person in her bathroom. Seals then contacted law enforcement and showed
Deputy Molly Leiker a picture of minor. A couple days later, Deputy Leiker showed
Seals a different photograph of minor, and Seals positively identified minor as the
suspect. About six weeks later, Deputy Brian Walsh came to Seals’s house and drove her
to another location where she identified minor in person as the individual she
encountered in her bathroom.
In defense, minor offered an alibi defense. He testified that he was at his aunt’s
house from 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. on May 10, 2015, until 12:00 p.m. on May 11, 2015, the
day and time of the burglary. Minor explained that he had stayed up late in his bedroom,
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playing video games with his girlfriend until they went to sleep. Minor denied that he
was the person Seals found in her bathroom.
Minor’s aunt purported to corroborate minor’s alibi. She testified that she saw
minor before he went to sleep on May 10, 2015, and that he was asleep in his bedroom
until 11:30 a.m. or 12:00 p.m. on May 11, 2015.
Following argument, on July 22, 2015, the juvenile court found true that minor
committed first degree residential burglary.
On August 19, 2015, the juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court and
placed him on probation in the custody of his father on various terms and conditions.
On August 21, 2015, minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
Minor argues the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s true
finding that he entered the victim’s home with the intent to commit theft or any felony.
Rather, he postulates on appeal that he entered the victim’s home as a prank or dare at the
urging of his friend. We disagree.
“Where the juvenile court has sustained a petition, an attack on the sufficiency of
the evidence to support that ruling is governed by the substantial evidence rule.” (In re
Andrew I. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 572, 577.) When a minor challenges the sufficiency
of the “evidence to support the judgment, our review is circumscribed. [Citation.]
We review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there
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is substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under
the governing standard of proof.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.)
Further, we review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
[asking whether] any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a
defendant [here, minor] has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role
as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial
review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, italics omitted.)
“Whether the evidence presented at trial is direct or circumstantial, . . . the relevant
inquiry on appeal remains whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Towler (1982) 31
Cal.3d 105, 118-119.) “ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury [or trier of fact] to acquit a
defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one
of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury [or trier of fact],
not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be
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reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a
defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.)
In order to establish the crime of burglary, the prosecution must prove, as relevant
here, an unlawful entry into a residence with the intent to commit a larceny or any felony.
(Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 863, fn. 18;
People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1051.) The crime is complete upon entry into
the defined structure with the larcenous intent, regardless of whether any theft takes
place. (People v. Allen, supra, at p. 863, fn. 18; People v. Montoya, supra, at pp. 1051-
1052; In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540 [“One may be liable for
burglary upon entry with the requisite intent, regardless of whether the felony or theft
actually committed is different from that originally contemplated, or whether any felony
or theft actually is committed. [Citation.]”].)
“Because intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof, it may be inferred from all the
facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245; People v. Moody (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) Many cases
have held that evidence of surreptitious entry, flight upon confrontation, and failure to
provide a reason for being on the premises constitute sufficient evidence from which a
finder of fact may infer the intent to commit theft sufficient for conviction of burglary.
(People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41-42 [Our Supreme Court concluded there was
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sufficient evidence to support a burglary conviction based on the circumstances that the
defendant entered the victim’s apartment surreptitiously, hid in her bathroom with the
lights out, and denied having done so.]; People v. Martin (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 334,
339 [Flight from the scene of a burglary, without reasonable explanation, is evidence
from which intent may be inferred.]; People v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941, 947
[codefendant made an unauthorized entry into a vacant home at 1:00 a.m. and ran out the
back door after a police officer yelled, “ ‘[F]reeze’ ”; the “late hour and sudden flight
upon discovery support the inference [he] entered with intent to steal”]; People v. Lopez
(1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 93, 98; People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 704 [an intent
to commit theft at the time of entry may be inferred from flight from the premises].)
Indeed, “[b]urglarious intent [can] be reasonably and justifiably inferred from the
unlawful and forcible entry alone.” (People v. Michaels (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 194,
199; see People v. Martin, supra, at p. 339; People v. Stewart (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d
687, 690-691; People v. Walters (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 547, 551 [“The felonious intent
to commit theft may be inferred from the unlawful entry alone. [Citation.]”].)
“Whether the entry was accompanied by the requisite intent is a question of fact
for the jury.” (People v. Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245.) “ ‘An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the trial court can be set
aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of
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fact].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see People
v. Rehmeyer (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1765.)
Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to conclude he entered Seals’s home
with the requisite intent. Minor’s quarrel with the evidence appears to be that there is no
evidence to show he actually took anything or that he admitted to intending to steal
anything. Rather, he believes his statement to Seals that a friend told him “ ‘to do this’ ”
and his entry during daytime hours while Seals’s dog barked “fiercely” supports a finding
that he entered the home on a dare or as part of a prank. Minor’s arguments are
unavailing. Contrary to minor’s suggestions, direct evidence of a suspect taking anything
during a burglary or a suspect admitting to have entered a home with the intent to steal is
not required. Moreover, minor’s statement to Seals and the time of day of the entry while
Seals’s dog barked “hysterically” also do not support the claim the evidence was
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding he entered the home with an intent to
commit larceny.
The evidence established minor entered Seals’s home through a bathroom
window. He was found by Seals in the bathroom tub holding a piece of window screen in
his hand. When asked why he was in the home, minor had no legitimate explanation.
Additionally, as soon as Seals stated she was calling the police, minor fled the home.
Although on appeal minor claims his statement that “ ‘David told me to do this’ ”
supports a finding he entered the home on a dare or as part of a prank, at trial minor
testified that he was not in the home and was misidentified. Further, even if minor was
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told to enter the home by “David,” that does not suggest he entered without the requisite
intent. In addition, a daytime burglary would be more likely to find no one home,
depending on the day. As in the above-mentioned cases, it is reasonable for a trier of fact
to infer from minor’s unusual conduct that minor had felonious intent in entering the
residence, even though his actions were unsuccessful due to interruption by Seals.
Accordingly, circumstantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that minor
entered the home with an intent to commit larceny.
Minor argues that reliance on the cases where the appellate courts have stated
intent can be inferred solely from unlawful entry or flight from the victim’s home is
misplaced because “those courts have not actually upheld a finding of specific intent
based on unlawful entry [or flight] alone.” (See People v. Martin, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d
at pp. 336, 339 [evidence showed the drug-addicted defendant was found running from a
doctor’s office in which a drug cabinet had been disturbed and pills were scattered];
People v. Stewart, supra, 113 Cal.App.2d at p. 691 [the defendant entered the home in
middle of night, ate the victim’s food, gave away or traded the victim’s property, and
offered no explanation for his actions]; People v. Martone (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 392,
393-394 [the defendant broke a stranger’s door at 2:00 a.m. and had no explanation for
why he was there or had a wrench]; People v. Moody, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 363 [the
defendant entered a home at night and was found with his arms outstretched toward a 15-
year-old girl in a night gown].) Minor’s attempts to distinguish the above-cited cases are
futile because a trier of fact could reasonably conclude minor entered the Seals residence
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with the requisite intent without additional factual circumstances as suggested by minor.
Moreover, even if we were to agree that, given the absence of any additional
circumstances, a trier of fact may just reasonably have concluded that minor entered the
home on a dare without the requisite intent, reversal is not warranted. (E.g., People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 644.) As we have stated, a reviewing court’s opinion that
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Lewis, at pp. 643-644; People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.) The juvenile court in this case disbelieved minor’s
story, and our role on appeal is simply to determine whether its findings in support of the
burglary convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. The record here contains
substantial circumstantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding on the question
of minor’s felonious intent.
We are also unconvinced by minor’s attempt to compare the circumstances of his
case to those in In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, in which the Court of
Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence of a minor’s intent to steal from her
grandmother’s home for purposes of a first degree burglary conviction. (Id. at pp. 740-
742.) There, the minor, a 17-year-old ward who had run away from her juvenile
placement, entered her grandmother’s locked and vacant home without permission to
throw a going-away party before she was to be sent to her mother’s home. (Id. at
pp. 737-738.) A neighbor observed 30 to 40 people at the house and told the minor the
partygoers needed to leave; the minor agreed and everyone but a few friends left, but the
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next day the neighbor saw the minor and another boy in the house and told them again to
leave. (Id. at p. 739.) The minor’s grandmother later discovered several items were
missing, including six bottles of liquor, and her Direct TV bill included charges for a
boxing match and six adult movies on the date of the minor’s party. (Id. at p. 740.) The
juvenile court found the burglary allegations true, noting that utilities were used and
alcohol was consumed in the minor’s presence. (Id. at p. 738.)
The Court of Appeal, however, found this insufficient to create an inference of
felonious intent, observing that the trial court had also found it could not tell what the
minor did while she was at the home. (In re Leanna W., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th. at
p. 741.) Because the evidence did not show the minor actually took or consumed alcohol,
the Court of Appeal held the mere possibility that the minor drank raised only suspicion
about her intent that did not form a sufficient basis for an inference of fact. (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal also observed that entry with intent to use a home’s utilities could form
the basis for a burglary conviction. However, it held that while it was clear the minor had
entered the grandmother’s home without permission and the evidence indicated some use
of utilities, the evidence also showed many other people were in the house, and the
prosecution had presented no competent evidence to show she actually used the utilities
or that she entered the house to use the utilities. (Id. at pp. 741-742.) Under these
circumstances, the Court of Appeal held there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that the minor committed a burglary of her grandmother’s home.
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In this case, the prosecution’s evidence of minor’s intent is not sheer speculation.
Unlike the circumstances of In re Leanna W., minor was the only person seen in Seals’s
house at the time of the alleged burglary. There was no evidence of any relationship or
acquaintance between minor and any occupant of the residence. There was no suggestion
of any legitimate reason for minor to be inside the home. Minor entered the home
without permission through the bathroom window and was caught in the bathroom tub
holding part of the bathroom window screen. He had no reasonable legitimate
explanation to be in the home and immediately fled the home when Seals stated she
would have to call the police. Seals identified minor as the only person who entered her
home without knocking, announcing his presence or giving any reasonable explanation.
In re Leanna W. does not compel us to reverse his burglary conviction on grounds of
insufficiency of the evidence.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
McKINSTER
J.
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