People v. Rodriguez CA2/8

Filed 1/9/23 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B317972
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. PA014564-01)
RAUL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Reversed and remanded
for further proceedings.
Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Raul Rodriguez was convicted of murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187)
in 1994. In 2020, he moved for a proceeding to present evidence
related to a future youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and section
1203.01. The court summarily denied his motion. We agree with
the parties that Rodriguez is entitled to a Franklin hearing and
remand the matter for that purpose.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1993, when Rodriguez was 17 years old, he shot and
killed Jose Salavia. He received a sentence of 15 years to life
after pleading guilty in 1994 to second degree murder.
Acting in propria persona, Rodriguez filed a motion
requesting a Franklin proceeding in November 2019. The trial
court denied the motion without prejudice because it did not
contain an offer of proof or a description of the types of evidence
Rodriguez believed would be relevant to the motion.
In December 2019, Rodriguez filed a second motion for a
Franklin proceeding. The trial court denied this motion without
prejudice, stating, “In this case, [Rodriguez’s] motion is nothing
but a blanket assertion that he is entitled to a Franklin hearing
25 years after his conviction, without providing the court with an
offer of proof, or a representation of the types of evidence that
[Rodriguez] believes to be relevant for his motion.” The court
further asserted that Rodriguez failed to indicate whether he had
been afforded a parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, and, if
he had in fact had a parole hearing, what the results were.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Still representing himself, Rodriguez filed a third motion
requesting a Franklin proceeding on January 16, 2020. The court
also denied this motion without prejudice, stating that Rodriguez
had not provided any of the information required by the court,
such as whether he had already had a parole hearing; and he
failed to make an offer of proof regarding the evidence he sought
to present that would allow the court to “determine whether such
evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully
adds to the already available record.”
This court granted Rodriguez’s request for relief from
default for failure to file a timely notice of appeal, and on
February 17, 2022, Rodriguez appealed from the denial of the
January 2020 petition.
DISCUSSION
Section 3051 provides a parole eligibility mechanism for
offenders convicted of offenses committed when they were
25 years old or younger. (§ 3051; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 277–278.) Subject to exceptions not applicable here,
“ ‘[S]ection 3051 . . . requires the Board to conduct a “youth
offender parole hearing” during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a
juvenile offender’s incarceration. [Citation.] The date of the
hearing depends on the offender’s “ ‘[c]ontrolling offense,’ ” which
is defined as “the offense or enhancement for which any
sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” ’ ”
(People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 890 (Lipptrapp).)
Rodriguez, convicted of a murder committed when he was 17
years old and sentenced to a term of less than 25 years to life,
became eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole
hearing during the 20th year of his incarceration. (§ 3051,
subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(2) & (h).)
3
When assessing a prisoner’s suitability for parole, the
parole board is required to take into consideration “the
diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity” of the prisoner. (§ 4801, subd. (c); § 3051,
subd. (f)(1).) The criteria for parole suitability provided in
sections 3051 and 4801 “contemplate that the Board’s
decisionmaking at [the prisoner’s] eventual parole hearing will be
informed by youth-related factors, such as his cognitive ability,
character, and social and family background at the time of the
offense.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
In Franklin, the juvenile defendant was sentenced to two
consecutive sentences of 25 years to life prior to the enactment of
sections 3051 and 4801. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268,
276.) Because the defendant, who was 16 years old when he
committed murder, may not have had an “adequate opportunity
at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his
youth,” the California Supreme Court remanded the matter to
allow the trial court to determine “whether [the defendant] was
afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information
relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Id. at
pp. 268–269, 284.) The court ruled that if the defendant had not
been afforded that opportunity, he could “place on the record any
documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-
examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender
parole hearing.” (Id. at p. 284.) Additionally, the prosecution
could present “any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile
offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on
the influence of youth-related factors.” (Ibid.) The purpose of
these proceedings “is to provide an opportunity for the parties to
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make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics
and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board,
years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great
weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether
the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a
serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Section 1203.012 “gives the trial court authority to conduct
an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin”
for juvenile offenders whose convictions, like Rodriguez’s, are
final. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 (Cook).) Juvenile
offenders seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment
in the trial court may request a Franklin proceeding by filing a
“motion in [the] superior court under the original caption and
case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and [the
Cook] decision.” (Id. at p. 458.) The Cook court stated that “[t]he
motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth
offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is
anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already
2 Section 1203.01, subdivision (a), provides that after the
judgment, “the judge and the district attorney [may file] a brief
statement of their views respecting the person convicted or
sentenced and the crime committed, together with any reports
the probation officer may have filed relative to the prisoner. . . .
The attorney for the defendant and the law enforcement agency
that investigated the case may likewise file . . . statements of
their views respecting the defendant . . . . Immediately after the
filing of those statements and reports, the clerk of the court shall
mail a copy thereof . . . to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation at the prison or other institution to which the
person convicted is delivered.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).)
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occurred.” (Ibid.) However, “[t]he court’s commentary about
what a motion should include is not the same as creating
mandatory pleading requirements.” (Lipptrapp, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.)
We agree with the parties that because Rodriguez was
sentenced in 1995, long before the effective date of section 3051
and the decision in Franklin, it appears he did not have a
sufficient opportunity to present evidence relevant to his future
youth offender parole hearing at the time of his initial
sentencing. We also agree with the parties that Rodriguez’s
motion contained sufficient information for him to gain access to
a Franklin hearing. “[T]here are no mandatory pleading
requirements for a Franklin motion, and the required showing to
initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding is minimal.”
(People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150 (Howard).)
Rodriguez included in his motion substantially all of the elements
delineated in Cook. He filed the motion under his original case
number, if not under the original caption, and the motion’s title
identified the requested relief he requested, the opportunity to
develop a record pertaining to his suitability for parole under
sections 1203.01 and 3051. Rodriguez stated he was a juvenile
offender and that he sought to develop the court record with
evidence of his maturity and culpability, the circumstances of the
commitment offense, rehabilitation, and juvenile fitness. As the
basis for the motion, he discussed sections 1203.01, 3051, and
4801, and the decisions in Franklin and Cook. “Consequently,
the court was clearly notified about the basis for the motion as
well as the cases giving the trial court authority to conduct
evidence preservation proceedings.” (Lipptrapp, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893–894.)
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Rodriguez did not describe the evidence he planned to
present or state whether he had already had a parole hearing,
but his motion was nonetheless legally sufficient to initiate the
process for a Franklin proceeding. (Lipptrapp, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893–894 [prisoner’s failure to include the
date of his next parole hearing in his Franklin motion was not a
valid reason to summarily deny the motion]; Howard, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 150–151 [prisoner is not required to
describe the specific evidence he sought to introduce].) The court
erred when it summarily denied the petition without giving
Rodriguez an opportunity for evidence preservation.3
Because Rodriguez “was not given a sufficient opportunity
to preserve evidence under Franklin,” we reverse the court’s
order and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
conduct a Franklin proceeding. (Howard, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th
at p. 153; Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 897.)
3 The trial court did not have the benefit of Lipptrapp and
Howard when it made its ruling because they had not yet been
decided.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Rodriguez’s motion for a proceeding to
present evidence related to a future youth offender parole
hearing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to
conduct a Franklin proceeding.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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