Valero v. Spread Your Wings CA6

Filed 1/11/23 Valero v. Spread Your Wings CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LYNDA VALERO, H049119
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct.
Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 18CV338394)
v.
SPREAD YOUR WINGS, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Lynda Valero appeals from a judgment of
dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer to her first amended
complaint in favor of defendants and respondents Sabrina Dellard, Spread Your
Wings, LLC, and Spread Your Wings, Inc.1 The pleading, in a single cause of
action for malicious prosecution, alleged that Dellard was a care custodian,
employed by Spread Your Wings, and that she provided in-home services to a
dependent adult, Michael Barton. Valero also provided such services to Barton,
and the two caregivers worked different shifts in his home. Valero alleged that
Dellard, a mandatory reporter under the elder-abuse laws, made a knowingly
For ease, and except where context dictates otherwise, we refer to these
1
two entities collectively as Spread Your Wings.
false report to law enforcement that she had seen Valero try to kill Barton by
smothering him with a pillow. Dellard is further alleged to have later coerced
Barton to confirm the false report about Valero having tried to smother him.
Valero was arrested and charged with attempted murder, and spent some
28 days in custody, unable to post bail. Ultimately, as alleged, evidence surfaced
that revealed the reports about Valero having tried to kill Barton to be untrue,
and the criminal charges against her were dismissed.
Valero sued Dellard and Spread Your Wings, as Dellard’s alleged
employer, for malicious prosecution. The cause of action was factually based on
both Dellard’s allegedly false report of Valero’s abuse of Barton as a dependent
adult, and Dellard’s later alleged coercion of Barton to corroborate the false
report. These defendants ultimately demurred to the first amended complaint,
asserting statutory immunity under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15634, subdivision (a) (section 15634(a)), which provides absolute
immunity from civil and criminal liability to mandatory reporters under the
Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15600 et seq.).2
Rejecting Valero’s attempts to exclude intentionally false reports from the
absolute immunity afforded to mandatory reporters under section 15643(a), the
trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend. Judgment
of dismissal for respondents followed.
On appeal, Valero reprises her claim that a mandatory reporter of elder
or dependent-adult abuse does not enjoy immunity from civil liability for a
fabricated and knowingly false report of abuse. She contends that absolute
immunity under section 15634(a) protects only reports by mandatory reporters
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
that the reporter has observed, or of which the reporter has knowledge, or
which have been communicated to the reporter by the elder or dependent adult
(§ 15630, subd. (b)(1) [duties of mandatory reporters]), and that these
descriptors limit the absolute immunity of mandated reporters to “known or
suspected” incidents of abuse (§ 15634(a)) and exclude knowingly false reports
from protection.
We conclude that the clear legislative aim of absolute immunity in
section 15634(a) for mandated reporters was to serve and facilitate the policy
goals of the Act—by increasing the reporting of elder abuse and minimizing the
chilling disincentives to that reporting, including the fear of getting sued. We
further conclude that the carve-out to immunity for a knowingly false report by
a mandated reporter as urged by Valero is not dictated by the statutory
language of the Act as a whole and is counter to these legislative policy goals,
which are not ours to undo or undermine. Finally, we reject Valero’s effort to
couch Dellard’s alleged post-reporting coercion of Barton as later conduct
outside the broad contours of immunity for acts of reporting. We accordingly
affirm the judgment of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Valero’s First Amended Complaint3
The first amended complaint alleged a single cause of action for malicious
prosecution. As relevant to our inquiry, it alleges that Valero “worked for the
Stanislaus County Department of In-Home Supportive Services . . . and was
selected by Defendant Michael Barton to provide in-home care for him.
3 Dellard and Spread Your Wings moved for judgment on the pleadings
with respect to the original complaint on the same basis of statutory immunity.
Their motion was granted with leave to amend, resulting in the first amended
complaint, which added more factual detail and legal conclusions but consisted
of the same essential cause of action.
3
Mr. Barton needed care due to physical disabilities and limited mental
capacity.” Defendants Spread Your Wings, LLC and Spread Your Wings, Inc.
are alleged to be California entities owned and operated by defendant Andrew
Serry Dumbuya, and there is alleged a unity of interest between him and these
companies for purposes of alter ego liability.4 In October 2017, Spread Your
Wings was “hired to provide additional in-home care for . . . Barton. Spread
Your Wings’ employee, Defendant Sabrina Dellard, provided this care, staying
with Mr. Barton in his home overnight, while [Valero] would provide care for
Mr. Barton mornings, afternoons[,] and evenings, except for Thursdays, when
[Valero] would finish her shift at 2:00 p.m.”
According to the pleading, “During the time period [in which Valero] and
Dellard both provided care for Mr. Barton, their personal and professional
relationship deteriorated and became contentious. [Valero] is informed and
believes … that Dellard developed a strong dislike for [Valero].”
On “January 11, 2018, shortly after 2:00 p.m., [Valero] finished her shift
at Mr. Barton’s residence. After [Valero] had left the premises, . . . Dellard
arrived late for her shift, which was supposed to start at 2:00 p.m. Ms. Dellard,
4
Defendant Andrew Serry Dumbuya did not join the demurrer to the first
amended complaint filed by Spread Your Wings and Dellard. And the trial
court’s order sustaining the demurrer did not make a ruling in his favor. Yet,
the judgment of dismissal (signed by a different judicial officer than the order
sustaining the demurrer of Spread Your Wings and Dellard) refers to him as
having successfully demurred and therefore being entitled, like Spread Your
Wings and Dellard, to a judgment of dismissal. The judgment was approved as
to form by Valero’s counsel. No party addresses this issue in their appellate
briefing. Thus, as it stands, judgment appears to have been entered in favor of
defendant Dumbuya based on a successful demurrer that he never filed. Of
course, because Dumbuya’s liability is derived only from agency or alter ego
allegations as against Spread Your Wings, his entitlement to a judgment is
necessarily established by our affirmance of the judgment in favor of Spread
Your Wings.
4
without any information, evidence or suspicion that Mr. Barton had been the
victim of abuse, called law enforcement and falsely reported that she [had]
witnessed [Valero] attempting to smother Mr. Barton to death with a pillow
when she arrived at Mr. Barton’s residence to start her shift. Ms. Dellard’s
statements to the police were untrue. Indeed, Ms. Dellard never observed any
interaction between [Valero] and Barton that day because when she arrived at
Barton’s residence, [Valero] was no longer there. Ms. Dellard’s report to law
enforcement was not a report of any instance of actual, known, communicated, or
suspected abuse, but a fabrication from whole cloth of a scenario created in
Ms. Dellard’s imagination, maliciously, and with the sole purpose of having
[Valero] arrested and prosecuted for a serious felony. Therefore, Ms. Dellard’s
report is not subject to any immunity conferred on mandated reporters. (. . .
§ 15630, subd. (b).)” (Italics added.)
“After making the fabricated report to law enforcement, Ms. Dellard took
advantage of Barton’s limited mental capacity and physical disabilities by
influencing, intimidating, and coercing him into falsely confirming to law
enforcement the fabricated report that Dellard had made, namely that [Valero]
[had] attempted to smother Mr. Barton with a pillow. Mr. Barton would not
have made this false report in the absence of the coercion and influence of
Ms. Dellard. Ms. Dellard’s actions in influencing and coercing Mr. Barton to
falsely identify [Valero] as the perpetrator of an attempted murder were not done
as part of any reporting obligations, but instead as a ‘private citizen[] [who
became] deeply enmeshed in investigatory or prosecutorial activities and [took]
on functions of the police.’ (James W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
246, 257 [(James W.)].) As such, Ms. Dellard’s coercion of Mr. Barton following
Dellard’s report to law enforcement [is] not subject to any immunities conferred
on mandated reporters.” (Italics added.)
5
“Based on the false report by Dellard and the coerced false report of
Barton, the police arrested [Valero], and the Stanislaus County District
Attorney’s Office charged and prosecuted [her for] attempted murder. The
report of either Dellard or Barton, standing alone, would have been sufficient to
move the authorities to arrest and prosecute [Valero]. [Valero] was incarcerated
for approximately 28 days, during which time [she] did not have the means to
post bail. Evidence proving [Valero]’s innocence came to light, resulting in her
release from jail and the dismissal of all charges against her. This evidence also
conclusively establishes that the statements made by Dellard and Barton in
order to have [Valero] arrested and criminally charged were unequivocally
false.”
“[Valero] suffered, and will likely continue to suffer for the rest of her life,
tremendous physical, mental, emotional, and economic injuries and damages
due to the prolonged incarceration for a very serious crime that Dellard and
Barton falsely accused her of committing. [¶] . . . [¶] In doing the things here
alleged, Dellard and Barton were actively involved in causing [Valero] to be
arrested, charged, and prosecuted with the crime of attempted murder. [¶] The
charges were all dropped as soon as evidence surfaced showing that [Valero]
was innocent of all charges and that Dellard and Barton [had] made
deliberately false allegations to the police and/or prosecuting authorities.
[¶] Dellard and Barton made the false report with malice and for the sole
purpose of having [Valero] arrested and prosecuted for a crime she did not
commit. [¶] The actions of Dellard and Barton were malicious in that they
intended to cause harm to [Valero], or were done in a despicable manner and
with willful and reckless disregard for [Valero]’s rights and safety. [Valero] is
6
therefore entitled to an award of exemplary damages against Dellard and
Barton, in an amount to punish and deter this behavior.”5
The pleading goes on to allege that Spread Your Wings “and/or Dumbuya
knew of the unfitness of . . . Dellard and the risk she posed to [Valero] prior to
Ms. Dellard’s false allegations against [Valero]. Nonetheless, despite knowledge
of the potential harm Dellard posed to [Valero], these defendants failed to take
any action to avoid harm to [Valero], by, among other things, training,
supervising, reprimanding, and/or terminating Dellard. As such, these
defendants are liable for compensatory damages, as well as exemplary damages
pursuant to Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), in an amount sufficient to
punish and deter these defendants.” It further alleged that Dellard was an
employee of Spread Your Wings and was acting in the course and scope of her
employment, and that Spread Your Wings ratified her acts by failing to
“reprimand, demote, or terminate her, nor did they do anything else to evidence
disapproval of Dellard’s conduct.”
II. Respondents’ Demurrer
Dellard and Spread Your Wings generally demurred to Valero’s first
amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
In support of this ground, they argued that they enjoyed absolute immunity to
civil liability under section 15634(a) as Dellard was a “care custodian” providing
services to a “ ‘[d]ependent adult’ ” under sections 15610.17 and 15610.23,
respectively, and she was therefore a “mandated reporter” under section 15630.
5Barton did not demur with respondents to the first amended complaint
and Valero’s claim against him was not disposed of by the judgment on appeal.
Barton is therefore not a party to this appeal, and we do not here address
Valero’s claim against him.
7
As Dellard enjoyed this absolute immunity, even if her report about Valero had
been knowingly false, so did her alleged employer, Spread Your Wings.
Valero’s opposition to the demurrer attempted to avoid respondents’ claim
to statutory immunity by contending that because Dellard’s reporting of
dependent-adult abuse by Valero had been knowingly false, it was not based on
“ ‘an incident that reasonably appears to be physical abuse’ ” or one that could
give rise to Dellard having “ ‘reasonably suspect[ed] that abuse’ ” (citing
§ 15630, subd. (b)), thus triggering the mandatory reporting obligation. As the
subject of Dellard’s reporting was not “a known or suspected instance of abuse”
that compelled mandatory reporting within the meaning of section 15634(a),
according to Valero, the absolute immunity afforded by this subdivision to
mandatory reporters did not extend to Dellard or Spread Your Wings,
notwithstanding their status as mandatory reporters.
In other words, according to Valero, there is no immunity extended to a
mandatory reporter who “fabricates an instance of abuse” because the
protection of section 15634(a) afforded to mandatory reporters reaches only
reports of “known or suspected” instances of abuse and a complete fabrication is
not such an incident. Valero further sought to separate Dellard’s act of
reporting Valero’s alleged abuse of Barton from her post-reporting coercion of
Barton to falsely corroborate Dellard’s accusation. Valero contended that this
later conduct by Dellard exceeded any statutory immunity Dellard enjoyed as a
mandated reporter for reports of abuse in any event.
Relying principally on Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 485 (Easton) and Santos v. Kisco Senior Living, LLC (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 862 (Santos), the trial court in a written order sustained
respondents’ demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend,
concluding that Dellard and Spread Your Wings as mandated reporters enjoyed
8
absolute and broad immunity under section 15634(a), even if Dellard’s reporting
about Valero had been knowingly false; that Dellard’s alleged later conduct of
coercing Barton to corroborate her false report was readily distinguishable from
the facts of James W. and was thus also immune from suit; and that the
deficiencies in the first amended complaint could not be cured by further
amendment.6
Entry of judgment of dismissal as to Spread Your Wings, Dellard, and
defendant Andrew Serry Dumbuya followed, from which Valero timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We begin with the standard of review on appeal from an order sustaining
a demurrer, appealable here from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. “On
appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, the standard of review is well[-]settled. We give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. [Citation.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859,
865; see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In reviewing the
sustaining of a demurrer, we address whether the results, and not the trial
6Valero does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion
by not allowing her leave to amend. And she offers no ways in which the
pleading could be further amended to become viable. We therefore do not
address the trial court’s having sustained respondents’ demurrer without, as
opposed to with, leave to amend.
9
court’s reasons, are correct. (Perkin v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 492, 501.)
II. The Act and Relevant Law Construing and Applying It
As noted, the trial court here relied on Easton and Santos as dictating its
result. The Santos court, quoting liberally from Easton, discussed the Act,
highlighting its emphasis on the reporting of abuse of elders and dependent
adults and overcoming perceived obstacles to this reporting as underlying
legislative purposes. (See, e.g., §§ 15600, subd. (i) [express intent to establish
framework for reporting and investigation of elder and dependent-care abuse];
15601 [express purposes of the Act include reporting of abuse and providing
protection for reporters]; 15630 [duties of mandated reporters and criminal
consequences for the failure to report]; 15630.1 [civil penalties for failure to
report financial abuse]; 15634 [immunity from liability of persons authorized to
report and availability of claims procedure for attorney fees incurred in defense
of dismissed actions or to a mandatory reporter as prevailing party].) Santos
further addressed how the Act’s provisions affecting reporting have been
construed and applied, including by cases analogizing to parallel provisions in
the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, at Penal Code section 11164, et seq.
Finding Santos’s discussion apt for present purposes, we quote liberally from it.
“The Act ‘represents the Legislature’s response to the problem of
unreported elder abuse which came to its attention in the early 1980’s.’ (Easton,
supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 490.) ‘The focus of the Act has always been to
encourage the reporting of abuse or neglect.’ (Id. at p. 491.)” (Santos, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at p. 870.)
Under the Act, “[a] person who has assumed full or intermittent
responsibility for the care or custody of an elder or dependent adult . . . is a
10
mandated reporter.”7 (§ 15630, subd. (a).) Mandated reporters are statutorily
required to report suspected instances of abuse of an elder or dependent adult:
“A mandated reporter who, in his or her professional capacity, or within the
scope of his or her employment, has observed or has knowledge of an incident
that reasonably appears to be physical abuse, as defined in Section
15610.63, . . . is told by an elder or dependent adult that they have experienced
behavior . . . constituting physical abuse, as defined in Section 15610.63, . . . or
reasonably suspects that abuse, shall report the known or suspected instance of
abuse . . . immediately or as soon as practically possible.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The
failure by a mandated reporter to report abuse of an elder or dependent adult,
or who impedes or inhibits a report of such abuse by another, in violation of
section 15630 is a misdemeanor, with heightened punishment if the abuse
results in death or bodily injury. (Id., subd. (h).) And the intentional
concealment by a mandated reporter of their failure to report an incident
known by the reporter to be abuse or severe neglect of an elder or dependent
adult is a continuing criminal offense. (Ibid.)
“The Act contemplates that the appropriate authorities will undertake an
investigation into such reports in order to protect the elderly person [or
dependent adult]. For example, the Act provides that, ‘it is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this chapter to provide that . . . local law enforcement
agencies shall receive referrals . . . from any mandated reporter submitting
reports . . . and shall take any actions considered necessary to protect the elder or
dependent adult and correct the situation and ensure the individual’s safety.
(§ 15600, subd. (i), italics added; see People v. Davis (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
7 There is no dispute in this case that Dellard and Spread Your Wings
qualify as mandated reporters under section 15630, subdivision (a) as they each
meet the broad definition of a “care custodian” under section 15610.17.
11
1416, 1435 (Davis) [‘The enactment of such a comprehensive statutory scheme,
which not only requires designated professionals to report known or suspected
abuse but also sets up a system of outside agencies mandated to investigate
reports of such abuse, amply demonstrates the scope and severity of the
problem of elder and dependent adult abuse as perceived by the Legislature’];
Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 493 [‘The focus of the statutory scheme is to
encourage prompt reports so as to protect the victim of the suspected abuse’
(italics added)].)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 871.) The criminal
provisions of section 15630 for the failure to report “further the statute’s
purpose of fostering ‘the broadest possible reporting of incidents of known and
suspected abuse of elder and dependent adults’ and have been construed to
impose ‘criminal liability for failure to report, without regard to intent or
negligence.’ (Davis, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437.)” (Santos, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at p. 871.)
“In order to further ensure that mandated reporters comply with their
reporting obligations, section 15634[(a)] ‘create[s] an absolute privilege in those
individuals required to make such reports.’ (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 489, 494 [‘Immunity from reporting suspected abuse is crucial to ensure
compliance with the reporting obligation’].) Section 15634’s immunity provision
provides in relevant part: ‘No care custodian . . . who reports a known or
suspected instance of abuse of an elder or dependent adult shall be civilly or
criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article.’ (Id.,
subd. (a).)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 871–872.)
“In Easton, the court was ‘called upon to construe the breadth of
immunity from civil liability conferred by . . . section 15634.’ (Easton, supra, 80
Cal.App.4th at p. 488.) In that case, a physician made a report to sheriff’s
deputies based on information that the physician had received from a nurse
12
who had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the plaintiff to take his mother
to the hospital. (Id. at p. 489.) Authorities acted on the report by removing the
plaintiff’s mother from his home and taking her to the hospital. (Ibid.) The
Easton court considered whether the physician and the nurse were immune
from liability for [various torts] premised upon the report and the seizure of the
elderly woman. (Id. at pp. 489–490.) At the time of the incident, former
section 15630, subdivision (b) provided that a mandated reporter who ‘ “has
observed an incident that reasonably appears to be physical abuse” ’ was
required to report such abuse. (Easton, supra, at p. 491, italics added, quoting
former § 15630, subd. (b).)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 872.)
“The Easton court first concluded that the immunity provided in
section 15634 to mandated reporters was absolute, rather than qualified. The
Easton court reasoned: ‘Based on the purpose of the immunity provision and
upon the Legislature’s drafting of section 15634, we conclude that the privilege
created by the section is absolute rather than qualified. The language of section
15634 distinguishes between mandated reporters of abuse who make required
or authorized reports and nonmandated reporters. As to those who must report,
the rule is sweeping in its breadth—no health practitioner who reports shall be
civilly liable for any report. However, the section goes on to create only a
qualified privilege for “[a]ny other person reporting.” Such nonmandated
reporters “shall not incur civil or criminal liability as a result of any report
authorized by this article, unless it can be proven that a false report was made
and the person knew that the report was false.” (§ 15634[(a)].) The plain
meaning of the statutory language is that for mandated reporters the truth or
falsity of the report is of no moment—the privilege is absolute.’ (Easton, supra,
80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 491–492.)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 872.)
13
“The Easton court then considered whether the physician and the nurse
were entitled to immunity, notwithstanding that they had failed to ‘comply with
the reporting method in [former] section 15630’ (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th
at p. 492), in that the nurse had not personally called law enforcement, but
instead had relayed information concerning the abuse to the physician, who
called law enforcement. The Easton court ‘reject[ed] a strict reading of the
reporting condition—namely that reports be made by one who “has observed” a
reportable incident—as inconsistent with either the letter or spirit of the
statutory scheme.’ (Id. at p. 493.) The Easton court reasoned that while a
physician’s reliance on a nurse’s report of suspected abuse ‘was not expressly
envisioned by the statutory scheme in effect as of [the time of the incident] the
Legislature had in fact already taken action to amend the statute so that such
reliance would be expressly permitted.’ (Id. at p. 494 [referring to an
amendment to the statute requiring a mandated reporter who ‘ “has observed or
who has knowledge of an incident,” ’ quoting § 15639, subd. (b)(1), as amended
by Stats. 1998, ch. 980, § 1, p. 7525].) The Easton court continued, ‘Clearly, the
purpose of the statutory scheme of which section 15630 is a part and the precise
language of the 1998 version of the section, would not be advanced by denying
immunity to either [the nurse] or [the physician].’ (Easton, supra, at p. 494.)”
(Santos, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 872–873.)
Thus, as chronicled in Santos, one feature of Easton is its construction
and application of the Act’s broad and absolute immunity to mandated
reporters to recognize and implement the clear and primary legislative purpose
of removing obstacles that hinder reporting, even when considering the Act’s
statutory text against plain-meaning arguments that would undermine and
thwart this overarching purpose. Easton is not alone in this; Santos followed
suit, and also relied on cases in the parallel child-abuse-reporting context that
14
took the same approach to attempts by plaintiffs in that context to narrow the
absolute immunity afforded to mandated reporters.
As further discussed in Santos, and as recognized by the parties in this
case, the mandated-reporter immunity provided in the predecessor child-abuse
context is relevant here. “In interpreting and applying section 15634, we may
consider its ‘predecessor statutes, which created reporting requirements and
immunity for mandated reporters of child abuse.’ (Easton, supra, 80
Cal.App.4th at p. 492.) Such case law is highly relevant in light of the similarity
of the two immunity provisions. (Compare . . . § 15634 [‘No care custodian . . .
who reports a known or suspected instance of abuse of an elder or dependent
adult shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required by this article’]
with Pen. Code, § 11172 [‘No mandated reporter shall be civilly or criminally
liable for any report required or authorized by this article’].)” (Santos, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
“Courts have repeatedly recognized the breadth of the immunity provision
contained in Penal Code section 11172. (See, e.g. B.H. v. County of San
Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 193 [‘The Legislature . . . grant[ed] . . . broad
immunities for those mandated reporters who report suspected instances of
child abuse’]; Thomas v. Chadwick (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 813, 821 (Thomas)
[‘To encourage reporting, the Legislature granted reporters broad immunities to
obviate the chilling effect the spectre of civil lawsuits would have upon a
reporter’s willingness to become involved’].) ‘In order to promote the purpose of
the act to protect abused children, [Penal Code] section 11172 provides that
mandated reporters of child abuse are absolutely immune from liability.’
(Robbins [v. Hamburger Home for Girls (1995)] 32 Cal.App.4th [671,] 679; see
also Arce [v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th [1455,]
15
1485 [(Arce)] [‘The immunity extends even to negligent, knowingly false, or
malicious reports of abuse’].]” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 873.)
“Further, courts have broadly interpreted the immunity provided at Penal
Code section 11172 beyond its literal text in order to effectuate this purpose.
For example, in Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 (Storch),
despite the fact that the version of the statute applicable in the case was limited
to persons ‘ “who report[] a known or suspected instance of child abuse” ’ (id. at
p. 675, fn. 3, italics added, quoting former Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a)), the
court concluded that the statute covered ‘those mandated reporters who are
involved in the identification of an instance of child abuse but do not personally
report it to the authorities.’ (Storch, supra, at p. 681, italics added.) In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned: ‘Team immunity is consistent with the
purpose and intent of the Legislature in promoting the reporting of child abuse.
Limitation of immunity to the person making the telephone call to the agency or
signing the report would defeat that purpose.’ (Ibid.)” (Santos, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at pp. 873–874.)
“In addition, . . . courts have broadly interpreted the child abuse
mandated[-]reporter[-]immunity provision to apply to certain conduct related to
a reporting event. For example, in Krikorian v. Barry (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d
1211 (Krikorian), the court considered whether ‘mandatory reporters [are]
completely immune from liability for professional services rendered in
connection with the identification or diagnosis of suspected cases of child abuse,
or just for the act of reporting.’ (Id. at p. 1222.) The Krikorian court rejected the
argument that mandated reporter immunity extended only to the ‘act of
reporting’ (ibid.), reasoning in part: ‘[L]imiting immunity to the protection of
professionals against lawsuits resulting from the act of reporting would defeat
the Legislature’s goal of promoting increased reporting of child abuse. The
16
Legislature has identified the fear of civil liability for allegedly false reports as
a major deterrent to the reporting of suspected cases of child abuse by
professionals. Recent revisions to the Child Abuse [and Neglect] Reporting Act
have been largely directed at reducing or eliminating, to the extent possible,
professional[s’] fear of litigation resulting from required reports. A law
conferring “absolute” immunity for the act of reporting suspected child abuse,
but not for professional activities contributing to its identification, would not
likely allay the fear of a prospective reporter that an angry parent might
initiate litigation for damages, following a report which is subsequently proven
to be mistaken’ (id. at pp. 1222–1223). Ultimately, the Krikorian court held,
‘Insofar as liability for damages to a person falsely accused of child abuse is
concerned, we conclude that absolute immunity to professionals for conduct
giving rise to the obligation to report, such as the collection of data, or the
observation, examination, or treatment of the suspected victim or perpetrator of
child abuse, performed in a professional capacity or within the scope of
employment, as well as for the act of reporting.’ (Id. at p. 1223.)” (Santos, supra,
1 Cal.App.5th at p. 874.)
“In Arce, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, the Court of Appeal applied
Krikorian, among other cases, in concluding that a hospital social worker . . .
and the hospital for which she worked were immune from [tort liability for acts
of the social worker beyond the mere reporting]. (Id. at pp. 1491–1492.) . . . The
plaintiffs claimed that the trial court had erred in concluding that the
defendants were immune from claims premised on such conduct, arguing, ‘[the
nurse’s] conduct did not involve the act of reporting child abuse within the
meaning of Penal Code section 11172 and therefore was not protected under the
statute.’ (Ibid.) The Arce court rejected this argument noting, ‘Cases analyzing
Penal Code section 11172 have concluded that the statute provides immunity to
17
claims predicated on false and malicious reports of abuse as well as conduct
committed in furtherance of diagnosing whether abuse occurred.’ (Ibid.) Thus,
even though the plaintiffs argued that [the nurse]’s conduct was ‘ “harassing,
antagonizing, and threatening” ’ (id. at p. 1496), the Arce court concluded that
the trial court had properly determined that ‘[t]he conduct alleged against [the
nurse] falls within [Penal Code] section 11172’ (ibid., italics omitted).” (Santos,
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 874–875.)
“Courts have also concluded that immunity under Penal Code
section 11172 may ‘cloak[] the mandated reporter with immunity for activity
[occurring] after the report of suspected child abuse . . . is made.’ (Ferraro v.
Chadwick (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 86, 92 (Ferraro).) In Ferraro, the court noted
that Penal Code section 11172 extends immunity ‘not only to “required” or
mandated reporting but to another distinct category of reporting[,] that which is
“authorized” by the [Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting] Act.’ (Ferraro, supra,
at p. 93, quoting Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a); see also § 15634 providing
immunity ‘for any report required or authorized by this article’ (italics added).)
The Ferraro court concluded that ‘communications by a mandated reporter
to . . . law enforcement agencies that are statutorily entitled to receive and
investigate reports of child abuse are “authorized” communications or reports
under the [Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act], and, therefore, [a]re
protected by the immunity of [Penal Code] section 11172, subdivision (a).’
(Ferraro, at p. 95, italics added; see Thomas, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 822 [‘It
would be anomalous to conclude that the reporter’s “required” report of
suspected child abuse is privileged, but that the legislatively contemplated
subsequent communications concerning the incident would expose the reporter
to potential civil liability’].) The Ferraro court reasoned in part: ‘Certainly, it is
reasonable to infer the Legislature (1) anticipated that in the course of an
18
investigation into suspected child abuse, the reporter . . . is going to be
contacted and interviewed by the agency conducting the investigation and
(2) sanctioned such communication between the reporter and the investigating
agency. It is also reasonable to infer the Legislature foresaw the possibility of
the reporter being contacted by the district attorney with respect to criminal
investigations.’ (Ferraro, at pp. 94–95.)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp.
875–876.)
The Santos court itself went on to apply the broad and absolute immunity
afforded to mandated reporters by section 15634(a) by determining that the
mandated reporters there were not only immune from civil liability for an
actual report but also immune from the plaintiff’s false-arrest claim that was
premised on conduct “integrally related to a report of suspected elder abuse and
thus constituted ‘authorized’ activity within the meaning of section 15634[(a)].”
(Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 876.)
This targeted conduct in Santos was by a mandated reporter in
connection with police investigation in response to the actual report of
suspected elder abuse. The mandated reporter had signed a form to effectuate a
citizen’s arrest but the court concluded there was no evidence that the reporter
had interrogated or prosecuted the plaintiff, as had been alleged.8 (Santos,
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 876–877.) The court, analogizing to the parallel
child-abuse context, rejected the claim that the immunity afforded to mandated
reporters in the elder-abuse context under section 15634(a) did not extend to
conduct in addition to the act of reporting. “[C]ourts have concluded that
mandated reporters in the child abuse context may not be held liable for
‘conduct committed in furtherance of diagnosing whether abuse occurred.’ (Arce,
8 The Santos case was on appeal after a jury trial, not, as here, after a
facial attack on the pleadings.
19
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492, italics added.) We see no reason why this
same principle should not apply when interpreting the nearly identical
immunity provision in the Act. For the same reason, we conclude that case law
in the child abuse context providing that mandated reporters are immune for
communications with law enforcement that occur after an initial report of abuse
[but] that are related to abuse (see Ferraro, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 92,
95), should apply with equal force in interpreting section 15634.” (Santos,
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 877, fn. omitted.) The mandated reporter’s “act in
signing a citizen’s arrest form constituted activity that was so integrally related
to a report of elder abuse that it constituted conduct that falls within the
‘sweeping . . . breadth’ of the immunity afforded in section 15634. (Easton,
supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.)” (Id. at pp. 877–878.)
After all, according to the Santos court, the act of signing a form to
effectuate a citizen’s arrest “was far more similar to an act of ‘reporting’ than
other conduct to which courts have determined immunity extends. (See Arce,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491–1492 [making harassing phone calls];
McMartin v. Children’s Institute International (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1393,
1401 (McMartin) [interviewing children]; Krikorian, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1213, 1222–1223 [providing psychotherapeutic services]; Storch, supra, 186
Cal.App.3d at p. 674 & fn. 2 [conducting medical examinations and a pathology
analysis].)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.)
Finally, the Santos court distinguished the facts there from those in
James W., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 246, relied on by Valero here. In James W.,
which emanated from the same court as Santos, the court “concluded that
mandated[-]reporter immunity did not apply to the conduct of a family
counselor and foster parent who, for two and one-half years after a report of
sexual abuse, allegedly coerced a child into falsely naming her father as the
20
perpetrator of the abuse. (Id. at pp. 258–259.) The James W. court concluded
that the defendants, who had ‘[not] identified or reported child abuse,’ were not
entitled to immunity because they ‘voluntarily assumed roles of those who,
having received the report and determined the identity of the perpetrator,
search[ed] for corroboration and/or attempt[ed] to pressure a witness to get a
conviction.’ (James W., at p. 256.)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 879, fns.
omitted.) Distinct from this, the Santos defendant, who had effectuated a
citizen’s arrest in close connection and time proximity to a mandated report,
unlike the defendants in James W., had not “ ‘usurped the function of the
authorities (Robbins, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, discussing James W.)
such that he would not be entitled to mandated reporter immunity under James
W. [Citation].)” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 879.)
Having provided this legal framework and background, we now address
Valero’s specific claims.
III. Absolute Immunity for Mandated Reporters Under Section 15634(a)
Extends to Knowingly False Reports
Valero contends that despite the established law we have discussed
above, the plain meaning of the precise statutory language affording absolute
and broad immunity to mandated reporters under section 15634(a) does not
extend to knowingly false reports.9 This argument is premised on several
isolated bits of statutory text from the Act that, according to Valero, qualify the
requirement of a mandatory reporter to report an incident of abuse (apart from
having been told by the victim that they have experienced physical abuse) and
9 Valero concedes that section 15634(a) provides absolute and broad
immunity to mandated reporters, including for reports that turn out to be
untrue. But she separates such reports from those that are knowingly
fabricated or “concocted” at the outset by the reporter, attempting to avoid
immunity only for the latter.
21
limit it to only those instances where the reporter has an objective and
reasonable basis for suspecting the abuse. Valero urges that this qualification
coextensively cabins the absolute immunity afforded to mandatory reporters
under section 15634(a) to reports factually rooted in that objective and
reasonable basis.
First, Valero points out that section 15630, subdivision (b)(1) requires
that a “mandated reporter who . . . has observed or has knowledge of an incident
that reasonably appears to be physical abuse . . . or is told by an elder or
dependent adult that they have experienced behavior . . . constituting physical
abuse, . . . or reasonably suspects that abuse” must report “the known or
suspected instance of abuse.” (Italics added.) Thus, she argues, apart from being
told by an elder or dependent adult that they have experienced abuse, a
mandated reporter is bound only to report abuse that they have observed or
know about, or reasonably suspect.
Second, Valero observes that the provision for immunity from liability for
mandated reporters in section 15634(a) says in relevant part: “No . . . mandated
reporter . . . who reports a known or suspected instance of abuse of an elder or
dependent adult shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required or
authorized by this article.” (Italics added.) This immunity, she contends, is
coextensive with the requirement to report, which, per her argument, is limited
to instances of known or suspected abuse, or abuse told to the mandatory
reporter by the elder or dependent adult. This conclusion, according to Valero,
is mandated by the pure statutory text quoted above and excludes from
immunity any reports of abuse that are fabricated and knowingly false, as such
reports cannot be grounded in actual observation, knowledge, or reasonable
suspicion and are therefore not required to be made under the Act.
22
Valero further cites the Act’s express purposes listed at section 15601,
which include the provision of “protection under the law for all those persons
who report suspected cases of abuse, provided that the report is not made with
malicious intent.” (§ 15601, subd. (c), italics added.) As Valero has alleged
Dellard’s intent in making a knowingly falsified report of abuse to be malicious,
she argues that these allegations and the plain meaning of sections 15630,
subdivision (b)(1) and 15634(a) quoted above, taken together, remove Dellard’s
report (and later conduct) from the Act’s immunity protection.
In essence, based on these pieces of text from the Act, Valero urges us to
read the qualified immunity in section 15634(a) that is extended to
nonmandated reporters, which is expressly and distinctly limited to “any report
authorized by this article, unless it can be proven that a false report was made
and the person knew that the report was false” (italics added), to be
indistinguishable from the absolute immunity there afforded to mandated
reporters, with the protection extended to them likewise containing this same
limitation excluding knowingly false reports. While we understand the
argument, this reading ignores the marked difference in text between the two
types of immunity. It also ignores the primary legislative purposes of the Act as
a whole to increase the reporting of elder and dependent adult abuse and to
remove the chilling disincentives, such as fear of suit, to that reporting,
especially for mandated reporters who are uniquely in positions in the course of
their work or employment to become privy to instances of abuse. And it ignores
that as a practical matter, true immunity from suit would be utterly illusory if
all a plaintiff had to allege in any case against a mandated reporter is that the
report of abuse was not just false, but knowingly false. This would thwart the
clear twin legislative goals of the Act to increase the reporting of incidents of
23
elder and dependent-care abuse and to reduce the forces that chill such
reporting, such as the fear of suit, meritorious or not.
“When interpreting a statute, ‘our core task . . . is to determine and give
effect to the Legislature’s underlying purpose in enacting the statutes at issue.’
(McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227 (McHugh);
accord, Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 81 (Jarman).)
‘We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally
the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We
consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms
used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.’
(McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [‘ “We do not examine that
language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole
in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts
of the enactment.” ’].) ‘It is a basic canon of statutory construction that statutes
in pari materia should be construed together so that all parts of the statutory
scheme are given effect.’ (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090–
1091; accord, Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 307, 317,
review granted Nov. 10, 2021 (S270798).)” (Hirschfield v. Cohen (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 648, 660 (Hirschfield).)
“ ‘We have long recognized the principle that even though a statute may
appear to be unambiguous on its face, when it is considered in light of closely
related statutes[,] a legislative purpose may emerge that is inconsistent with,
and controlling over, the language read without reference to the entire scheme
of the law.’ (Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 50.) ‘ “If
two seemingly inconsistent statutes conflict, the court’s role is to harmonize the
law. [Citations.] We presume that the Legislature, when enacting a statute, was
24
aware of existing related laws and intended to maintain a consistent body of
rules.” ’ [Citations.]” (Hirschfield, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 660–661.)
“ ‘ “If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the
Legislature did not intend.” ’ (Jarman, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 381.) However,
‘[i]f the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, we look to appropriate
extrinsic sources, including the legislative history, for further insights.’
(McHugh, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 227; accord, Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy
Grinding Co., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1118, 1125 [‘ “If the statutory language
permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other
aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” ’].)”
(Hirschfield, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 661.)
Applying these rules of statutory construction, we reject Valero’s
argument that the plain meaning of sections 15630, subdivision (b)(1) and
15634(a) together compel the conclusion that the immunity extended to
mandated reporters under the Act does not extend to knowingly false reports.
The text of section 15634(a) on its face cannot be read to apply or extend the
express limitation for knowingly false reports on immunity for nonmandated
reporters to mandated reporters, for whom this express qualification on
immunity is absent. This textual distinction alone defeats Valero’s plain-
meaning argument that we should treat the protections afforded to mandated
and nonmandated reporters alike. (People v. Hillhouse (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
1612, 1618 [court must presume that the Legislature’s failure to restrict the
definition of a term in certain statutory provisions when it did so in other
provisions of the same statutes was intentional].) Had the Legislature intended
to similarly limit the immunity afforded to mandated reporters under the Act to
exclude knowingly false reports, as it did with nonmandated reporters, it knew
25
how to do so. (Ibid.; see also Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 129, 198 [when construing the words of a statute, primary goal is
to determine and give effect to the underlying purpose of the law; in doing so, a
court looks to the words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning, and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and
sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose].) We thus cannot treat the
express limitation on immunity for false reports applicable to nonmandated
reporters that is omitted with respect to mandated reporters as if the omission
did not exist.
Even crediting for the sake of argument that the language Valero cites
from sections 15630, subdivision (b)(1) and 15634(a) suggests a requirement of
knowledge of abuse—or at least an objective and reasonable basis for
suspicion—as a basis for a mandated report and therefore as a threshold for
absolute immunity, we would land on the existence of a statutory ambiguity.
This ambiguity lies again in the obvious distinction in the Legislature’s
treatment of immunity for mandated versus nonmandated reporters in
section 15634(a), with knowingly false reports carved out only for the latter.
Valero’s argumentative focus is to qualify the immunity for mandated reporters
to instances of abuse that are either known or reasonably suspected, but the
effect of her argument is to obliterate the express distinction between the two
types of immunity for the different types of reporters, the dividing line for
which is reports that are knowingly false. Applying the traditional rules of
statutory construction as outlined above would get us to consideration of
legislative intent and purposes in resolving that ambiguity. Those purposes
here require no speculation. They are to increase the reporting of elder and
dependent-adult abuse and remove disincentives to that reporting. For all the
reasons extensively discussed in Easton and Santos, as well as in Arce and
26
Storch in applying the parallel provisions of Penal Code section 11172, these
purposes readily compel the conclusion that the absolute immunity afforded to
mandated reporters by the Legislature in section 15634(a)—“sweeping in its
breadth” (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 491)—extends to knowingly false
or fabricated reports.
Among these reasons are that the Legislature enacted section 15634(a) in
1985 some five years after the parallel Penal Code section 11172 had been so
interpreted by courts and amended to delete the requirement that a mandated
reporter’s immunity for a false report turned on knowledge of the falsity.
(Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 [Legislature’s 1980 deletion of
requirement in Pen. Code, § 11172 that a mandated reporter’s immunity from
liability for a false report of child abuse turn on knowledge of falsity changed
such immunity from qualified to absolute]; Storch, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 671, 679–681 [same]; Arce, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; see p. 1493
[absolute immunity afforded to mandated reporters of child abuse extends to
“ ‘false and malicious’ ” reports].) The Legislature is presumed to have been
aware of this interpretation and amendment in the parallel statutory scheme
and to have intended the same result when it enacted section 15634(a),
mirroring the same language. (People v. May (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1008–
1009 [Legislature presumed to know the law when enacting new legislation or
not acting in the face of judicial construction of statutes, and its intentions may
be inferred from this action or inaction].)
Consideration of the Act’s preamble, which includes among its express
purposes at section 15601, subdivision (c) the “protection under the law for all
those persons who report suspected cases of abuse, provided that the report is
not made with malicious intent” (italics added) does not alter our conclusion.
While “statements of [express] purpose or intent of legislation in a preamble”
27
may “ ‘properly be utilized as an aid in construing a statute,’ ” they are “not
conclusive” or controlling and “ ‘do not confer power, determine rights, or
enlarge the scope of a measure.’ ” (Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior
Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 125, 153 (Jackpot); see also Carter v. Dept. of
Veteran’s Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925 [same].) Such statements can be
“ ‘illuminating if a statute is ambiguous’ ” and “ ‘may aid in the construction of
doubtful clauses,’ ” but they “ ‘may not overturn a statute’s language’ ” or
“ ‘control [its] substantive provisions.’ ” (Jackpot, at p. 153.)
Further, the Act’s general preamble at section 15601 with the clause
limiting its purpose of protection for reporters of abuse to those not acting
maliciously was enacted in 1982 (Stats. 1982, ch. 1184, § 3). Section 15634(a)
was enacted later, in 1985 (Stats. 1985, ch. 1164, § 11), and is specific to
immunity from liability under the Act. As discussed, it provides absolute
immunity for mandated reporters as distinct from qualified immunity for
nonmandated reporters. “ ‘ “If conflicting sections cannot be reconciled, later
enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions take
precedence over more general ones.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Superior
Court (Ortiz) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851, 854.) As section 15634(a) was later
enacted and is more specific to the topic of immunity, to the extent the Act’s
earlier and more general preamble excludes protection for reporters of abuse
who act “with malicious intent” (§ 15601, subd. (c)), this preamble cannot
override or negate the more generous immunity afforded to mandated reporters
at section 15634(a).
In sum, we see no reason to part with Easton and Santos, including their
reliance on Storch and Arce’s construction of Penal Code section 11172’s parallel
immunity provisions for mandated reporters of child abuse, in applying the
absolute the immunity provision of section 15634(a) to mandated reporters of
28
elder and dependent-adult abuse. We accordingly reject Valero’s arguments
urging that we apply the Act so as to exclude from the absolute immunity
afforded to mandated reporters those reports that are fabricated or knowingly
false.
IV. Dellard is Also Immune From Suit For Allegations of Her Post-
Reporting Coercion of Barton to Corroborate the Report
Valero contends that even if we conclude Dellard is immune from liability
for her alleged knowingly false report to law enforcement about Valero’s abuse
of Barton, Dellard’s later conduct of “influencing, intimidating, and coercing”
Barton to corroborate her false report is still actionable. While acknowledging
factual differences, Valero relies on James W., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 246, which
applied Penal Code section 11172, for support. She argues that like in James
W., Dellard’s later coercion of Barton was conduct apart from any of her duties
as a mandated reporter and was instead as a “—‘private citizen[] [who became]
deeply enmeshed in investigatory or prosecutorial activities and [took] on
functions of the police.’ ” Her conduct, Valero argues, therefore exceeds the
scope of reporting immunity under section 15634(a). We reject this contention.
As noted above, the Santos court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiff in that
case to bring the facts within the holding of James W., finding the case before it
“in sharp contrast.” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.) In James W., the
court concluded that the immunity afforded under Penal Code section 11172 did
not extend to conduct by foster parents and a family counselor, who, for over
two and one-half years after the child victim had initially reported to hospital
staff that a man had come through her bedroom window and hurt her, engaged
in a “campaign to convict the father and have [the child] adopted.” (James, W.,
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) The defendants were alleged to have, “after
[the] child abuse had been positively identified and reported” (id. at p. 256), and
29
for years, pressured the child and other family members to falsely accuse the
father while simultaneously concealing evidence suggesting that a third party
had committed the abuse and “inducing confessions and accusations by fraud,
coercion, and perjury” (id. at p. 249).
The James W. court held that Penal Code section 11172 did not apply to
provide immunity under these facts because the conduct at issue was not done
to identify whether child abuse had occurred, but rather to identify the
perpetrator of the abuse—an investigatory function. The court noted a
“dichotomy” under the law between persons required to report instances of child
abuse and officials who are responsible for investigating and prosecuting
allegations of abuse. (James, W., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) Under this
framework, Penal Code section 11172 was intended to protect individuals
required to report child abuse while other statutes exist to protect government
officials, who, having received a report of abuse, are responsible for
investigating and prosecuting the perpetrator. The James W. defendants were
outside the protections of Penal Code section 11172 because they had “[come]
onto the scene after the . . . child abuse had been positively identified and
reported [and then] voluntarily assumed roles of those who, having the report
and determined the identity of the perpetrator, search for corroboration and/or
attempt to pressure a witness to get a conviction.” (James W., supra, at p. 256.)
The James W. court further distinguished Krikorian and McMartin, where
expert witnesses against whom claims were made had been retained to evaluate
whether any child abuse had occurred and were granted immunity, as opposed
to the defendants in James W., who were not dealing with “a suspected victim
preliminary to a determination of child abuse.” (Id. at p. 257.) “Whatever
justifications exist for extending the immunity of the reporting act to forensic
30
teams investigating whether a child has actually been abused, they [were]
clearly not present” in James W. (Id. at p. 258.)
In Santos, the court likewise distinguished the defendant’s conduct—
signing a form to effectuate a citizen’s arrest—from that in James W., as action
undertaken by a mandated reporter in close connection with an official
investigation of elder abuse. (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.) The
conduct occurred “while law enforcement officers were physically at the scene
conducting an investigation, and in close temporal proximity to the initial
report of abuse.” (Id. at p. 879, fn. omitted.) The Santos court also pointed to
Ferraro, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at page 92, and Thomas, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d
at pages 816–817, as instances in which post-reporting conduct that was held
immune was much more distant in time from the actual reporting as existed in
Santos. (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 879, fn. 19 [more than two years and
more than one month, respectively].) Further, there was no evidence the
defendant in Santos had “ ‘usurped the function’ of the authorities [citation]
such that he would not be entitled to mandated[-]reporter immunity under
James W. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 879.) Santos also looked to Krikorian, supra, 196
Cal.App.3d at pages 1222–1223, as authority for the notion that the
Legislature’s goal of promoting the increased reporting of abuse precluded
limiting immunity to acts of reporting only, and that the legislative goal
required extending that protection also to other conduct related to reporting.
Arce, too, distinguished James W., rejecting the plaintiff’s argument there
that the defendant had effectively engaged in investigative rather than
reporting activities, precluding immunity. (Arce, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1497.) The Arce court found the timing of the pre-reporting conduct there, the
lack of usurpation by the defendants of official investigatory functions, and the
short duration of the defendants’ conduct all in contrast to the facts of James
31
W., which had merely held that Penal Code section 11172 “does not apply to
activities that continue more than two years after the initial report of abuse by
parties who are not acting as reporters.” (James W., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at
p. 253.) Arce therefore extended statutory immunity beyond actual reports of
child abuse to even allegedly tortious conduct committed in furtherance of
diagnosing whether the abuse had occurred. (Arce, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1491–1492, 1496.)
We conclude that Dellard’s alleged post-reporting conduct in coercing
Barton to corroborate her false report of abuse is, like in Santos and Arce,
distinct from the circumstances of James W. For one thing, as respondents point
out, Dellard was herself a mandated reporter of abuse, not a receiver of a report
who, after the fact and upon the report’s receipt, attempted to investigate,
prosecute, or respond to it in an unauthorized manner, and in doing so, usurped
or attempted to usurp these official functions. And unlike in James W., Dellard,
a mandated reporter, is not alleged to have done anything by which she could
be said to have become so “deeply enmeshed in investigatory or prosecutorial
activities.” (James W., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.)
Second, like in Santos, Dellard’s alleged coercion of Barton occurred close
in time, was a follow-up to her own report of Valero’s abuse, and concerned the
same alleged incident of Valero having tried to smother Barton. (See also Arce,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491–1492; Krikorian, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1213, 1222–1223.) In other words, Dellard’s alleged post-reporting conduct
involved getting Barton’s—the victim’s—confirmation of the same report. This
conduct, by a mandated reporter, is closely connected both in time and in
content to Dellard’s own report, for which we have already concluded she has
absolute immunity, and it therefore falls within the same immunity protection
of section 15634(a).
32
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
33
____________________________
WILLIAMS, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.
_____________________________
LIE, J.
Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC et al.
H049119

Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.