People v. Adelmann

Filed 8/31/16
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E064099
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1208202)
STEVEN ANDREW ADELMANN, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Edward D. Webster,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Emily R. Hanks and Donald Ostertag,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gene D. Vorobyov, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
The People appeal from an order granting the petition of defendant Steven Andrew
1
Adelmann to reduce his Health and Safety Code felony conviction to a misdemeanor
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18.1 After defendant was sentenced to probation by
the Superior Court of the County of San Diego, the “entire jurisdiction” of his case was
transferred under section 1203.9 to the Superior Court of the County of Riverside. The
People contend defendant’s petition must be decided by the trial court in San Diego that
originally sentenced defendant. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a) and (f).)
Based on established principles of statutory construction and considerations of
judicial resources, we hold that the Riverside Superior Court has entire jurisdiction over
defendant’s case and can decide defendant’s petition. Additionally, we hold that
defendant waived his right to have his petition decided by the San Diego court.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGORUND
In 2012, defendant was charged in the County of San Diego with driving under the
influence and for possession of cocaine and oxycodone. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a);
Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts.
Defendant also had a previous conviction in 2011 for intoxicated driving. On September
25, 2012, defendant was sentenced by the San Diego Superior Court to three years of
formal probation, ending in September 2015. In December 2012, the San Diego Superior
Court granted defendant’s motion for the jurisdictional transfer of his probation case to
Riverside County because he had changed his residence. (§ 1203.9.)
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
2
In January 2015, defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of Riverside
County to have his Health and Safety Code conviction reduced from a felony to a
misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).) At the hearing on the petition, defense counsel
explained to the Riverside court he had initially tried to file the petition in San Diego but
“the San Diego County Court Clerk rejected the filing and said they had no file. The
whole matter was transferred to Riverside County.” Defense counsel also stated he
contacted the San Diego County Public Defender “who was assigned to the department in
San Diego County handling Prop 47s. The public defender told me their department will
not hear it. So that is the reason we eventually filed here in Riverside County because of
the transfer.”
The People did not object to the hearsay evidence offered by defense counsel
about the procedures of the San Diego Superior Court or the Public Defender. The
People did not argue that defendant was not eligible for resentencing as a misdemeanant.
However, the People opposed defendant’s petition based on the argument that the
Riverside Superior Court lacked authority under section 1170.18 to decide the petition.
After the petition was granted by the Riverside judge, the District Attorney
appealed. The District Attorney continues to challenge the authority of any judge of the
Riverside Superior Court to rule on defendant’s petition. We reject the People’s appeal
and affirm the trial court’s grant of the petition.
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III
DISCUSSION
This appeal involves the interplay between sections 1203.9 and 1170.18. Where
defendant receives a grant of probation, section 1203.9 delineates a “detailed process for
the transfer of jurisdiction” and “jurisdiction rests exclusively in the county in which
probation is granted until it is transferred.” (People v. Klockman (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th
621, 627.) Section 1203.9, subdivision (b), provides that, when a probationer’s case is
transferred to another county, “[t]he court of the receiving county shall accept the entire
jurisdiction over the case effective the date that the transferring court orders the transfer.”
Conversely, once a case is transferred the original court no longer has jurisdiction. As
applied here, the San Diego court was the transferring court that transferred “entire
jurisdiction” of defendant’s case to the Riverside court.
Section 1170.18, subdivision (a), provides a person currently serving a sentence
for a felony conviction “may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that
entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing [emphasis
added]” for a misdemeanor. Subdivision (f) provides a person who has completed his
sentence or probation “may file an application before the trial court that entered the
judgment of conviction [emphasis added]” in his case to have the felony conviction
designated as a misdemeanor. Subdivision (l) further provides: “If the court that
originally sentenced the petitioner is not available, the presiding judge shall designate
another judge to rule on the petition or application.” Section 1170.18 makes no mention
of jurisdiction.
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Defendant was sentenced in San Diego to three years of probation, which he
completed successfully in September 2015. At the time his sentence was imposed in San
Diego in September 2012, he was living with his parents in Riverside County and
working as a tile-setter. For that reason, the San Diego probation department made a
motion for jurisdictional transfer of his case to Riverside County. (§ 1203.9; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.530(a)(5).) The motion was granted, causing the transferring court to
“transmit any records of payments and the entire court file, except exhibits, to the
receiving court within two weeks of the transfer order.” Therefore, when defendant’s
counsel first tried to file a petition in San Diego, he was informed the San Diego court
could not accept the petition because it had no file for his case. Defendant’s only
alternative was to file his petition in the Riverside court which had accepted “entire
jurisdiction” in December 2012.
In spite of defendant’s inability to file his petition in San Diego County, the
Riverside County District Attorney argues that section 1170.18 prohibits defendant from
filing his petition in Riverside county. Defendant argues that, because “entire
jurisdiction” over his case was transferred from San Diego to Riverside, defendant’s
county of residence, the Riverside court should decide his petition. The People counter
that, in spite of the “entire jurisdiction” language of section 1203.9, section 1170.18
requires the San Diego court, not Riverside, to decide the petition.
The legal commentators who are the authors of Sentencing California Crimes
maintain that a defendant, like here, whose probation case has been transferred under
section 1203.9, and who seeks relief under section 1170.18, should file the petition in the
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receiving county. Because the receiving county has exclusive jurisdiction over the case,
the original sentencing judge is no longer available as a matter of law. Therefore, the
request for relief may be handled by any judge appointed by the presiding judge.
(§ 1170.18, subd. (l).) (J. Richard Couzens, Tricia A. Bigelow, and Gregg L. Prickett,
Sentencing California Crimes, § 25:11.)
Since the adoption of Proposition 47, only one published California case has
addressed the interaction of sections 1203.9 and 1170. In People v. Curry, the First
District Court of Appeal recently held that a defendant who was subject to PRCS
(postrelease community supervision) under section 3460, not section 1203.9, was
required to file a petition for reduction in the original sentencing county of Napa, not in
Alameda County where her case had been transferred for PRCS. The Curry court
adopted the distinction made by Couzens and Bigelow between persons on PCRS and
persons whose case has been transferred under section 1203.09: “‘There is a qualitative
difference between the transfer of the case for purposes of supervision, as in section
3460, and transfer of the “entire jurisdiction over the case” between courts, as in section
1203.9.’” (People v. Curry (2016) 1 Cal. App. 4th 1073, 1082.) Curry does not apply
here because it involved section 3460, not section 1203.9, which provides for the transfer
of the “entire jurisdiction” of a case.
We also conclude that defendant can waive his rights under section 1170.18 to
have his petition decided by a San Diego court. In addressing similar language in a
statute for resentencing under Proposition 36, the court held that it is “clear that the initial
sentencing judge shall rule on the prisoner’s petition. However, as with other rights, a
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defendant may waive the right for the petition to be considered by a particular judge.”
(People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1301.) Applying the
reasoning of Kaulick means a defendant seeking Proposition 47 relief may waive his right
to be sentenced by a particular judge in a particular county, something he has done in this
instance by filing his petition in Riverside superior court.
We briefly address the People’s arguments based on statutory construction.
Statutory construction is subject to de novo review on appeal: “When interpreting a voter
initiative, ‘we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction.’ (People v.
Rizo (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 681, 685.) We first look ‘“to the language of the statute, giving
the words their ordinary meaning.”’ (Ibid.) We construe the statutory language ‘in the
context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme.’ (Ibid.) If the
language is ambiguous, we look to ‘“other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly the
analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.”’ (Ibid.)” (People v.
Marks (2015) 243 Cal. App. 4th 331, 334.) “‘“The fundamental purpose of statutory
construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of
the law.”’” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1099.)
Statutory interpretation begins with an analysis of the plain meaning of the statute.
If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts must follow its usual, ordinary
meaning. Where the language allows for more than one reasonable interpretation, “‘“‘the
court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction
that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.’”’” (People v.
Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1099, Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 657, 663.)
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The final step in statutory construction requires courts to apply “reason, practicality, and
common sense to the language at hand.” (Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
(1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1239.) Statutory language is not interpreted “. . . in isolation,
but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (Coalition of
Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 733, 737.)
Section 1170.18, unlike section 1203.9 does not make any express mention
of “entire jurisdiction.” There is no language, plain or otherwise, addressing
whether a section 1203.9 transfer does not allow the court in the receiving county to
decide a petition for resentencing. Nothing in the language of section 1170.18
mandates that a defendant must file in the court that entered the judgment when the
“entire jurisdiction” over a case has been transferred to another court.
Instead the language in section 1170.18 is subject to a reasonable
interpretation, using a construction that “best harmonizes . . . with related statutes.”
(People v. Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.) The court must give “a
reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose
and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon
application will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (In re
Reeves (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 765, 771, fn. 9.)
One of stated objectives of Proposition 47 is to create a process for persons
who have qualified felony convictions to obtain reclassification of the crime as a
misdemeanor. (Proposition 47: Text of Proposed Laws, California Ballot
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Pamphlet: General Election Nov. 4, 2014 p. 70.) The People’s proposal that
defendant must somehow compel the San Diego court to accept his petition—
although entire jurisdiction over his probationary case has been transferred to
Riverside—seems wholly unfeasible and not an economical or practical use of
judicial resources. Based on a practical, reasonable, commonsense analysis,
allowing the court that currently has entire jurisdiction over a case to decide a
section 1170.18 petition is the wisest and most appropriate policy. (In re Reeves,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 771, fn. 9.)
Our conclusions comport with the principle of the California Supreme Court
that a specific statute should prevail over a general statute only when the two
statutes are in actual conflict. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 324, 385.) In this
case, section 1203.9 is specific about jurisdiction; section 1170.18 is not. Our duty
is “‘“to harmonize statutes on the same subject . . . , giving effect to all parts of the
statutes if possible . . . .” “[Courts] will find an implied repeal ‘only when there is
no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes . . . , and
the statutes are ‘irreconcilable . . . and so inconsistent that the two cannot have
concurrent operation.”’”’” (People v. Chenze (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 521, 526.)
Affirming the lower court’s disposition does not create irreconcilable or
inconsistent consequences. By allowing the “concurrent operation” of both section
1203.9 and section 1170.18, a probationary defendant can waive his right to be
resentenced by the same trial court and obtain expeditious relief in the court that has
entire jurisdiction over his case.
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IV
DISPOSITION
Under section 1203.9, the Riverside superior court has entire jurisdiction over
defendant’s case, including the power to decide defendant’s section 1170.18 petition. We
affirm the judgment.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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