Castillo v. Matta CA2/5

Filed 1/11/23 Castillo v. Matta CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
KIMBERLY CASTILLO, B317919
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 19STCV33803)
SARAH MATTA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Alaba Ajetunmobi and Alaba S. Ajetunmobi
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seals Philips, Collin Seals, Mark R. Phillips; Beverly Hills
Lawyers & Assoc. and Angelica M. Leon for Defendant and
Respondent.
——————————
Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded damages to
tenant Kimberly Castillo on causes of action for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, negligence, nuisance, and
breach of contract, but the court found no additional damages
were shown for wrongful and retaliatory eviction, and ruled in
favor of landlord Sarah Matta on the remaining cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). On appeal,
Castillo contends the trial court erred by denying her pretrial
motion to amend the complaint to add her children as plaintiffs,
failing to award damages for the wrongful/retaliatory eviction
cause of action, finding for Matta on the IIED claim, and limiting
the award of attorney fees to those incurred in prosecuting the
wrongful/retaliatory eviction cause of action pursuant to Civil
Code1 section 1942.5, subdivision (i).
We conclude that in the absence of a reporter’s transcript or
suitable substitute for the hearing on the motion to amend the
complaint, the record is inadequate to review Castillo’s
contention that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial
court’s findings that no damages were shown for
wrongful/retaliatory eviction and that Matta is not liable for IIED
are supported by substantial evidence, and no legal error has
been shown. Although the judgment finds Castillo is entitled to
an award of attorney fees, our record does not include any
postjudgment litigation resulting in an award of fees, so we
cannot review Castillo’s contentions as to the appropriate amount
of attorney fees. We affirm the court’s judgment.
1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Complaint
On September 20, 2019, Castillo filed a complaint for
damages against Matta that included seven causes of action
arising out her tenancy in a property on Canto Drive in Los
Angeles (the premises) owned and managed by Matta.2 The
complaint alleged the following: Castillo took possession of the
premises in 2012 pursuant to a written agreement to pay
monthly rent of $850. In 2018, Castillo lived on the premises
with her five minor children.
In April 2018, Matta demolished the bathroom rendering
the premises unfit for human habitation. In May 2018, Castillo
was served with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit. Following
an inspection of the premises by the City of Los Angeles Housing
and Community Investment Department (City), the City ordered
Matta to remedy various health and safety violations. Over the
course of several months, including into at least December 2018,
Matta failed to correct the defective conditions, despite additional
2 In addition to being named in her individual capacity,
Matta was named in various capacities in connection with her
father’s trust. Although the litigation in the superior court at
times included disputes over the significance of distinctions
between Matta as an individual, Matta as trustee, the trust, and
other individuals associated with the trust, none of those
distinctions are relevant to this appeal. The parties do not
dispute that Matta, as an individual, is the proper defendant and
respondent here, and neither party raises any arguments that
require us to distinguish between Matta as an individual and any
other role or entity.
3
notices from the City. The City also ordered Matta to cancel the
three-day notice to quit served in May, as the premises were
included in the Rent Escrow Account Program (REAP), and
Castillo was entitled to a 10 percent rent reduction.
From April through December 2018, Castillo repeatedly
notified Matta of the defective and dangerous conditions of the
premises and requested repairs. In November 2018, Matta
served a retaliatory three-day notice to quit or pay rent and filed
a retaliatory unlawful detainer action, which action was
subsequently dismissed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County.
Castillo alleged that she suffered extreme emotional and
psychological distress, on a daily basis from looking for
bathrooms for her children outside the premises, and from the
harassment of the notice to quit and unlawful detainer case.
Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Plaintiffs
In February 2021, Castillo obtained orders appointing her
as guardian ad litem for her minor children. On February 17,
2021, Castillo filed an ex parte motion to file an amended
complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (a)(1), adding her five children (four minors and one
adult) as plaintiffs to the action. Castillo also gave notice of the
ex parte hearing, to be held the next day. In the memorandum of
points and authorities in support of the motion, Castillo’s counsel
explained that the children were not previously added due to his
mistake and inadvertence. Castillo acknowledged that she was
bringing the application “on the eve of trial,” which at that time
was scheduled for March 2, 2021; however, she contended that
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the addition of new plaintiffs would not add any additional facts
or causes of action to the case, and no new discovery of additional
facts would be necessary. No written opposition to the ex parte
motion appears in our record.
The court heard oral argument on the ex parte motion on
February 18, 2021. The court denied the motion, without
explanation or elaboration, in a minute order. The minute order
also noted that the current trial date would stand.3 Our record
does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the hearing, or any
other record of the parties’ oral arguments, or of the court’s
reasoning for the denial.
Trial, Statement of Decision, and Judgment
The court held a bench trial on August 10, 2021. At trial,
Castillo and one of her sons testified both by written declaration
and oral testimony. Matta also testified, as did Alex Matta, who
undertook some of the repairs to the premises. The parties
stipulated to the admission of all trial exhibits. No court reporter
was present to transcribe the court proceedings.
On August 17, 2021, the parties filed a joint settled
statement of the trial. The settled statement summarizes the
testimony of Matta, notes that the direct testimony of Castillo
was admitted in written form, summarizes Castillo’s testimony
on cross-examination, notes that the testimony of Castillo’s son
was adopted in written form, summarizes Castillo’s son’s
3 The court subsequently continued the trial date to later
dates, and ultimately to August 10, 2021.
5
testimony on cross-examination, and summarizes the testimony
of Alex Matta.
Although not requested by the parties, the court issued a
tentative statement of decision on September 22, 2021, setting
forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on each of Castillo’s
seven causes of action. The tentative statement advised the
parties that it was subject to the parties’ objections and would
become the court’s final statement of decision unless a party
timely specified principal controverted issues on which it was
requesting decision, or made proposals not included in the
tentative statement. In the proposed statement of decision, the
court found in favor of Castillo on the breach of implied warranty
of habitability because the bathroom on the premises was not
operational from February through December 2018. The court
found damages of $7,040 to be owed from Matta to Castillo, based
on a calculation that included overpayments of the maximum
allowable rent, and overpayments due to the value of the
premises being zero dollars during the period that the premises
was not habitable.
The court found in favor of Castillo on the cause of action
for wrongful/retaliatory eviction, based upon Matta’s pursuit of
the unlawful detainer action in November 2018. However, the
court found Castillo had not presented evidence of any specific
damages relating to this claim. Further, the court found that
Matta did not act with oppression, fraud, or malice. The court
awarded reasonable attorney fees to Castillo, limited to this
6
cause of action, pursuant to section 1942.5, subdivision (i), but no
other amounts for the wrongful/retaliatory eviction.4
The court found in favor of Castillo on her causes of action
for negligence, nuisance, breach of contract, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, on
each of these causes of action, the court determined that the
damages suffered by Castillo were duplicative of the $7,040
awarded based on the breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, with the following exception: on the negligence
cause of action, the court awarded an additional $5,000 to
Castillo “for emotional distress for enduring uninhabitable
conditions for the period from February through November 2018.”
Finally, on the cause of action for IIED, the court found in
favor of Matta. Specifically, the court stated, “[Matta] did not act
in a manner that supports a finding of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Court finds that although her efforts to
repair the premises was not always effective or expeditious, she
was making attempts to repair the premises in good faith during
the relevant period of time, such that the infliction of emotional
distress was not intentional.”
4 Section 1942.5 sets forth the remedies and penalties
available for retaliation by lessors against lessees, including
retaliation based on a lessee’s complaints about tenantability of a
dwelling. Subdivision (i) of section 1942.5 provides, in relevant
part: “In any action brought for damages for retaliatory eviction,
the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party.” We note the statement of decision includes an apparent
typographical error in its citation to the relevant subdivision,
referring to it as “1942.5(h)(i),” rather than 1942.5, subdivision
(i).
7
On October 29, 2021, the court issued a minute order
noting that no objections had been filed to its tentative statement
of decision or judgment. The court filed the judgment that day.
Castillo timely appealed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Denial of Request to Add Plaintiffs
Castillo contends the court erred by denying her ex parte
motion to add her children as plaintiffs. We conclude that the
record is inadequate to review this contention.
“We review a motion to amend a complaint under Code of
Civil Procedure section 473 for an abuse of discretion.” (Tung v.
Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 747.) The “trial
court has wide discretion in allowing he amendment of any
pleading [citations], as a matter of policy the ruling of the trial
court in such matters will be upheld unless a manifest or gross
abuse of discretion is shown.” (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975)
52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135.)
A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct,
and an appellant bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption by affirmatively showing error on an adequate
record. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141.)
Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b), “[i]f an appellant
intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral
proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must
include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the
following: [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶]
(2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled
8
statement under rule 8.137.” Where the cornerstone of an
appellant’s argument involves what occurred a hearing, in the
absence of a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings, “[w]e
must . . . presume that what occurred at that hearing supports
the judgment.” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193,
1201; see Stasz v. Eisenberg (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039
[we presume judgment is correct in absence of reporter’s
transcript and other relevant documents].) We presume any
matters that could have been presented to support the trial
court’s order were in fact presented, and may affirm the trial
court’s determination on that basis. (Vo v. Las Virgenes
Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447; Bennett v.
McCall (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 122, 127.) An appellate record is
inadequate when it appears to show any need for speculation or
inference to determine whether error occurred. (Lincoln
Fountain Villas Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003, fn. 1.)
The minute order included in our record on appeal
indicates that the court heard oral argument from the parties on
Castillo’s ex parte motion to add her children as plaintiffs.
However, we do not have a transcript of the court proceedings,
nor any suitable substitute. We have no way of knowing what
statements were made by counsel for Castillo, counsel for Matta,
or the court at the hearing. In the absence of a record of the
hearing, Castillo’s appellate briefing relies solely on the fact that
the court’s minute order of the hearing did not articulate the
reason for the denial of her motion. Not knowing the basis for
the denial from the minute order, Castillo invites us to evaluate
her arguments on appeal in light of “what might have been the
trial court’s ostensible reason for the denial,” which Castillo
9
speculates to be solely that the motion was made “too close to
trial.”
The absence of an adequate record prevents Castillo from
prevailing on appeal on this contention of error. There is no
dispute on appeal that a showing of prejudice by Matta in
opposition to the motion would have provided a sufficient basis
for the court’s denial of the motion. But our record includes only
Castillo’s affirmative ex parte motion. Although Castillo notes
that Matta did not oppose the ex parte in writing, the absence of
a written opposition is not surprising, as Castillo brought her
motion on only one day’s notice. The only opportunity that Matta
had to set forth reasons opposing the addition of five plaintiffs,
and to explain the prejudice that such an amendment would
entail, was at the hearing itself. Absent any record of that
hearing, we cannot meaningfully assess the arguments Matta
may have made, any responses to those arguments by Castillo
(including any concessions), and the reasons for the court’s denial
of the amendment. We cannot speculate as to why the court
denied her motion. In the absence of a record setting forth the
court’s actual reasons for exercising its discretion, and how those
reasons were an abuse of that discretion, Castillo has not shown
a basis for reversal.
Trial Court Findings
Castillo contends the trial court’s findings on damages and
IIED are not supported by substantial evidence, or the court
committed legal error. We disagree.
10
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “[A]ny omissions or
ambiguities in the statement of decision must be ‘brought to the
attention of the trial court either prior to entry of judgment or in
conjunction with’ a new trial motion [citation] or a motion to
vacate the judgment [citation], thus allowing the court to respond
to objections before the taking of an appeal.” (Id. at p. 982.)
Where a party “fails to object . . . (depriving the trial court of the
opportunity to clarify or supplement its statement of decision
before losing jurisdiction), objections to the adequacy of a
statement of decision may be deemed waived on appeal.” (Id. at
p. 983.)
B. Damages for Wrongful and Retaliatory Eviction
Castillo contends that the court abused its discretion when
it found the November 2018 unlawful detainer action amounted
to a wrongful and retaliatory eviction, but declined to award any
damages for this claim. The court expressly noted in its
statement of decision that Castillo failed to specify any damages
incurred as a result of the wrongful and retaliatory conduct. On
11
appeal, Castillo relies on the statutory language from section
1942.5, subdivision (h) that sets forth that a lessor who violates
that section is liable for: “(1) The actual damages sustained by
the lessee[ and] (2) Punitive damages . . . where the lessor . . . has
been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice [for a retaliatory] act.”
With respect to actual damages, Castillo still identifies no
record evidence to support an award. The one specific argument
that Castillo makes is that she should have been awarded actual
damages for her severe emotional distress, which she contends
the court failed to consider. However, to support this claim,
Castillo cites only to the language of the complaint, and not to
trial evidence. Even were we to identify the evidence that could
be used to substantiate emotional distress on our own, the
existence of some evidence favorable to Castillo would not result
in reversal of the judgment.5 We do not reweigh evidence on
appeal, but rather defer to the trial court’s assessment of the
totality of the evidence adduced at trial in determining an
appropriate damage amount.
With respect to punitive damages, Castillo characterizes as
“confusing” the court’s finding that she did not prove oppression,
fraud, and malice. Castillo states her own contrary conclusion,
and urges this court to view the evidence differently than did the
court below. However, under the standard of review, it is not this
5 We note that the court found Castillo suffered emotional
distress damages in the amount of $5,000 in connection with
Matta’s negligence. The court’s factual finding makes clear that
such emotional distress was the result of “enduring
uninhabitable conditions”; there was no court finding of
emotional distress resulting from acts of retaliation.
12
court’s role to reevaluate and reweigh evidence. We defer to the
trial court’s finding, which is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Castillo contends the court erred by ruling for Matta on the
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We
conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings,
and any claim of legal error is baseless.
“Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a
plaintiff to prove: ‘ “ ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of
the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct. . . .’ Conduct to be outrageous must be so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a
civilized community.” [Citation.] The defendant must have
engaged in “conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with
the realization that injury will result.” ’ ” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 902; accord, Hughes v. Pair (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.)
Though not entirely clear, Castillo seems to suggest that
the court either abused its discretion by finding that Matta acted
“in good faith” or erred in its application of the law, because “good
faith,” according to Castillo, is not a relevant consideration to a
claim of IIED. We conclude the court did not err in finding for
Matta on this cause of action.
To the extent that Castillo’s challenge is to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the court’s finding of good faith, the
13
challenge runs directly contrary to the concession Castillo makes
in her appellate briefing that she “accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact in the statement of decision.” Further, it is of no
moment that Castillo “wishes to add facts that the trial court
omitted” presumably as a counterweight to the evidence of good
faith. It was Castillo’s obligation, between the time Castillo
received the tentative statement of decision and before the entry
of judgment, to make suggestions to the trial court regarding
additional factual matters to be addressed. (Thompson v. Asimos,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982–983.) Having failed to do so,
Castillo’s factual arguments have been waived. (Ibid.) In any
event, the record contains substantial evidence to support a
finding of good faith, including the testimony of Matta and of
Alex Matta contained in the settled statement, detailing the work
done on Castillo’s bathroom and the explanations given for the
time frame for completing it. The court also had the opportunity
to observe Matta testify in person, and we defer to any credibility
finding the factfinder made about Matta’s good faith.
To the extent Castillo appears to be raising an argument of
legal error, it also fails. The trial court explicitly found that
Castillo failed to prove the intent element of a claim for IIED.
Castillo appears to suggest that the absence of an express
statement by the court acknowledging that Castillo need not have
shown an intent to injure, but only a reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress, demonstrates legal
error. We disagree; the court’s finding of “good faith” is an
implicit rejection that Matta aced with reckless disregard.
Castillo made no objections to the court’s statement of decision,
and did not suggest prior to judgment that the court’s tentative
statement of decision failed to address a theory of “reckless
14
disregard.” On appeal, we construe the court’s factual findings
liberally and draw reasonable inferences in support of the
findings. Here, a finding of good faith impliedly includes a
finding that Matta did not act with reckless disregard.
Attorney Fees
Castillo contends the trial court erred by limiting the
award of attorney fees pursuant to section 1942.5, subdivision (i),
to fees incurred in prosecuting the cause of action for wrongful
and retaliatory eviction. In its judgment, however, the court
provided for an award of attorney fees and costs to plaintiff; the
judgment does not specify the amounts of fees and costs, but
instead states “attorney fees and costs to be determined as per
code.” (Capitalization omitted.) Our record does not include any
postjudgment filings by the parties, or rulings by the court, with
respect to whether fees and costs were subsequently litigated,
were awarded, and if so, on what basis or in what amounts.
“The party challenging an award of attorney fees bears the
burden of providing an adequate record to demonstrate error.”
(Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1223,
1228.) Here, Castillo has failed to provide an adequate record for
review and has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in
making any award of fees.
Castillo tries to avoid the lack of a record regarding any
award of fees by attacking a portion of the court’s statement of
decision: specifically, that in connection with Castillo prevailing
on the cause of action for retaliatory conviction, the court made
an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 1942.5, subdivision
(i), but limited to the fees incurred in prosecuting that cause of
15
action. Castillo first argues that apportionment of fees is not
required here, because the various causes of action upon which
Castillo prevailed are too intertwined with the wrongful and
retaliatory eviction cause of action that apportioning attorney
time between causes of action is impractical. We have no way of
knowing, without access to a record of fees incurred, whether in
fact apportionment is impractical.
Castillo also contends that there are additional legal bases
for an award of attorney fees, beyond the statutory award that
the court used in granting fees for prevailing on a claim of
wrongful and retaliatory eviction.6 However, there is nothing on
our record that suggests that these alternative bases for fees
were presented to, or ruled on, by the trial court.7 We decline to
address, as abstract questions of law, whether Castillo had, or
has alternative arguments for fees that could have been, or were,
presented to the court.
6 In her opening brief, Castillo merely alludes to other
bases for fees, without specifying what they are. In her reply
brief, Castillo cites to sections 1717 and 1942.4, subdivisions
(a)(1) and (b)(2), and attorney fees awarded in connection with
tort damages.
7 It is not clear that the judgment in this matter precluded
Castillo from seeking fees after judgment on the bases other than
section 1942.5, subdivisions (h) and (i); the judgment provides for
an award of fees to be determined per code. The statement of
decision awarded fees incurred in connection with the
wrongful/retaliatory conviction cause of action, but includes no
ruling that additional attorney fees incurred by Castillo may not
be recovered on other statutory bases.
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Sarah Matta is awarded her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
BAKER, J.
17